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ABSTRACT
When Pierre Le Moyne, Sieur d'Iberville, led the 
initial expedition to establish the colony of Louisiana in 
1698, as a veteran of the Canadian wilderness, he realized 
that native allies and native peace would be crucial for the 
colony's success. Good relations with the Indians would 
mean allies who would help the French hold on to this colony 
in the face of English or Spanish threat of conquest. 
Iberville was aided greatly by his brother Jean-Baptiste Le 
Moyne, Sieur de Bienville, in the first encounters with 
three of the important tribes of the colony, the Choctaw, 
the Chickasaw and the Natchez. From the beginning, French 
relations differed with each tribe.
Very much aware of the natives' potential desire for 
European merchandise, especially gunu and other metal 
products, the Le Moynes secured the allegiance of the Choc­
taw Indians through a skin and fur trade for such items. In 
the process, the French broke the cultural fiber of these 
Indians who eventually needed the white m an's merchandise to 
survive in a wilderness that was their home.
Through their association and alliance with the 
English of Carolina, Chickasaw were enemies of the French 
from the first years. As a result of their harboring the
viii
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Natchez following the Fort Rosalie Massacre in 1729, the 
Chickasaw were warred on by the French for nearly ten years. 
While they were not completely wiped out, the Chickasaw 
tribe was greatly reduced in numbers, leaving many of its 
people homeless and starving.
The Natchez Indians, a curious tribe who, although 
initially receptive of the French, turned on them in 1729 
and massacred more than 200 people who had settled on land 
belonging to them. The French responded by exterminating 
the tribe.
Although traditional opinion concerning the French 
and Indian relations in colonial North America holds that 
the natives received far better treatment from the French 
than from other Europeans who explored and settled the 
continent, the French experience with the natives of eight­
eenth century Louisiana was certainly not entirely success­
ful. Indeed, the interpretation of the French "success 
story" with the Indians has been largely arrived at through 
the study of the Canadian fur trade, a form of resource 
exploitation into which the Indians were easily integrated. 
French fur trading and trapping disturbed the social ecology 
of the wilderness far less than Spanish mining or English 
farming. Thus, French relations with the Choctaw, based, 
as they were, on the fur trade and involving no settlement 
on the Indians' lands, were generally good. Relations with
ix
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the Chickasaw because they were allies of the English were 
hostile. The one case in which the French settled on the 
Indians' lands, was marked by strain, and eventually 
violence, a situation which was similar to ones which the 
English knew.
The chief primary sources consulted in the research 
of this dissertation are contained in the Archives Nationales, 
Paris, France where the Archives des Colonies and the 
Archives de la Marine were consulted. Valuable manuscripts 
in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France, were also 
used. The Colonial Office Papers in the Public Record 
Office, London, England are valuable for English activity in 
the Southeast in this period.
x
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CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH FIND ALLIES: THE CHOCTAW, 1700-1712
The nature of the Indian tribes in the area of 
settlement often determined whether or not the establishment 
of a New World colony in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries succeeded. Such adversities as disease and famine, 
while difficult to endure, could often be dealt with if the 
natives were friendly rather than hostile. This was 
certainly true of the French colony of Louisiana in the 
eighteenth century. Of particular importance were the 
relations of the French with the important tribes of the 
colony, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw and the Natchez Indians. 
Initial contact by the French with the Choctaw and Natchez 
tribes was amicable. However, the Chickasaw, already strong 
English allies by 1700, would prove enemies of the Louisi­
anians even in the colony's first years.
At the end of April, 1700, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville 
learned of the Choctaw Indians, a large tribe with villages 
located only a few days' journey from Fort Biloxi, the 
French post on the Gulf of Mexico.1 As Louisiana's first
1Pierre Margry (ed.), Memoires et documents: 
Decouvertes et establissements des Francais dans 1 'Quest et
1
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governor, Iberville appreciated the perils of frontier life 
for settlers, having lived in and explored the French 
Canadian wilderness. He probably realized that the new 
colony of Louisiana would survive only if he secured Indian 
allies. Faced with the initial problems of colonial settle­
ment, such as the starving time and economic struggles, 
Iberville also confronted tremendous political pressures.
At home in France, the Minister of Marine, Jerome Phelypeaux, 
Comte de Pontchartrain, believed the territory of Louisiana 
to be especially important to French international prestige. 
Indeed, the leaders of the rival imperial powers, France and 
Great Britain, perceived the Mississippi River Valley as the 
key to the conquest of North America.2 Hoping to carry his 
share of these responsibilities successfully, Iberville 
needed native friends in Louisiana.
The Governor and his fellow colonists had been 
encountering friendly but small groups of Indians from the 
first days they anchored in the Gulf in January, 1699. 
Deserted Indian sites and burial grounds indicated that many 
more Indians had once lived along the coast. Indians of the
dans le Sud de I'Amerique septentrionale (6 vols., Paris, 
1879-88), IV, 425. Hereinafter cited as Margry.
2Guy Fregault, Pierre Le Moyne d*Iberville (Montreal, 
1968), Chapters 1 and 2; John C. Rule, "Jerome Phelypeaux, 
Comte de Pontchartrain and the Establishment of Louisiana, 
1696-1715," in Frenchmen and French Ways in the Mississippi 
Valley, edited by John Francis McDermott (Urbana, 1969), 
179-98.
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Pascagoula River area told the French of a catastrophic 
epidemic which in recent years had greatly reduced the 
Biloxi Indians and other tribes along the coast.3 In April, 
1700, while Iberville was exploring the Mobile Bay area in 
order to contact more Indians, some local natives informed 
him of the Thome, Mobile and Choctaw tribes. The Choctaw 
especially interested the French. This nation reportedly 
consisted of some 50 towns with 6,000 men. The major Choctaw 
villages lay about five days' journey north of Iberville's 
camp on the Pascagoula River.4
For several centuries, Europeans had known of the 
prominent position held by the Choctaw people in the South­
east. Even before the French arrival in Louisiana in 1699, 
the Indians of the Southeast, including the Choctaw, had 
encountered other white men. Hernando de Soto met various 
groups of natives when traversing the region in the 1540's, 
and at one point on the journey, he secured as guides some 
Indians whom the Spanish referred to as the Apafalaya, 
Pafallaya or in Choctaw, Pn sfalaya, which means long hair.5 
While sharing many physical features common to the red men
3Margry, IV, 427.
4Ibid.
5Edward Gaylord Bourne (ed.), Narratives of the 
Career of Hernando de Soto (2 vols.. New York, 1904), II, 
129-30? John R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern 
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, 
Washington, 1946), 121.
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of the Southeast— long black hair, aquiline noses, copper- 
colored skin— the Choctaws' flat heads and shorter stature 
distinguished them from other tribes.®
Between the first white contact in the sixteenth 
century and French settlement in the eighteenth century, the 
Indian population of the Southeast declined greatly. Archae­
ologists estimate that the tribes of the central area 
decreased by as much as 80 percent. And yet, in 1700 the 
Choctaw were still a numerous people. Although many 
fortified, native towns which De Soto described had dis- 
appeared, their population remained stable at 15,000 to 
20,000 from 1650 .into the twentieth century.7
In the eighteenth century the tribe lived between 
32° and 33° north latitude in an area that today comprises 
several counties of the state of Mississippi. John R. 
Swanton, the well-known anthropologist of the Indians of the 
Southeastern United States, divides the tribe's territory 
into four geographical areas (see Map No. 1):® (1) the
6james Adair, The History of the American Indians 
(London, 1775), 284; Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians 
(Knoxville, 1976), 29-31; John R. Swanton, Source Material 
for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians 
(Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 103, Washington, 
1931), 119.
7Jeffrey P. Brain, "The Lower Mississippi Valley in 
North American Pre-History" (unpublished manuscript of the 
National Park Service, Southeastern Region and Arkansas 
Archaeological Survey, 1971), 82; Swanton, The Indians of 
the Southeastern United States, 11, 123.
8Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, Plate No. 31, 54. See
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Map No. 1
A xerox copy of a map from John R. Swanton's Source
£ £ £ ■  BlfLgfn^grigfrll.
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southern unit, which included Sixtown, Chicasawhy and 
Yowani; (2), the central area, containing the Cane Towns, 
with Kunshak serving as a kind of capital; (3), the western 
area, where the Long People, the Okla Falaya, lived; (4), 
the eastern section, including the People of the Opposite 
Side, the Okla tannip. The language of the tribe varied 
from village to village; yet, a form of Muskeogean was 
probably spoken by all.9
Some anthropologists believe the tribe migrated to 
Mississippi from the West. However, the chief Choctaw myth 
concerning their beginnings, a tale common among other 
aborigines, says that they emerged from the earth. The 
Nanih Waiya mound in present-day Winston County, Mississippi 
provided a focal point for their mythological beginnings for 
many years. The mound was 200 feet long to the east and 
west, and 100 feet to the north and south, and was located 
near several smaller mounds.^ These mounds link the 
Choctaws' cultural past to that of the Mississippian era, a 
period peaking in 1200 A.D., a time known for its mound- 
builders. Swanton feels that Nanih Waiya remained the focal 
point in legend because of its location in a fertile agricul­
tural area in the Choctaw country. A nearby cave might have
also this Swanton work for a chart and a description of the 
Choctaw villages, 59-75.
9Ibid., 55-57; Hudson, The Southeastern Indians, 23.
^■°Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, 8.
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encouraged the notion of emergence from the earth. Finally, 
"waiya" in Choctaw means "to bear," or "to bring forth."1-!
While archaeologists hold that most mounds provided 
sites for public buildings, and even burial grounds, Swanton 
believes that Nanih Waiya served specifically as a defensive 
outpost against the Chickasaw, the traditional enemies of 
the Choctaw.12 Indeed, Nanih Waiya, located in the north- 
northwestern part of the Choctaw territory, and surrounded 
by several other mounds, would have offered a frontier 
defense against the Chickasaw for the tribe's lands, 
especially those of the Cane Towns where the tribe's leaders 
lived in the early historical period.
That the Choctaw had thrived throughout the sixteenth 
and the seventeenth centuries, even though that was a period 
of war, epidemics and adversity, is not surprising since the 
Indians were blessed with a country of fertile soil, count­
less clear streams and "a happy climate."^2 The "corn 
complex" rather than the hunting season imposed an economic 
and social order on their lives. Even members of the De 
Soto expedition had remarked on the abundance of corn and
11Ibid., 5-30; Hudson, The Southeastern Indians, 
77-79, 84.
12Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians  ̂ 27.
13Adair, The History of the American Indians, 282; 
Bourne (ed.), Narratives. I, 98.
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beans in the Pafallaya province.14 By the eighteenth century, 
the Indians of the Lower Mississippi Valley had been growing 
corn for over 500 years, the seed having been introduced 
into the Valley around 1200 A.D. This era had seen the 
beginnings of the cultivation not only of corn, but also of 
beans. The production of these two crops encouraged the 
development of a more intensive form of agriculture and 
settlement.15 As many as three varieties of corn were raised 
by the Choctaw, providing meal for sagamite so popular among 
these Indians. Since the soil annually retained its 
fertility, the general settlement area stayed constant over 
the years.16
Power in this nation of farmers rested with the 
chiefs of the individual towns. Swanton describes the tribe 
as a whole as having ". . . a n  ill-disciplined govern­
ment. . . . "  While as many as 115 towns have been mentioned 
by various travelers and anthropologists, the Choctaw nation 
probably consisted of only 40 or 50 communities at any one 
time. Swanton has suggested that the name of a village 
changed when the people moved. Each village had one chief, 
one war chief, two lieutenants or Taskamankachi, and one
14Adair, The History of the American Indians, 99; 
Bourne (ed.), Narratives, I, 129.
15Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, 49, 103; Brain, "The 
Lower Mississippi Valley," 67-71.
15Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern United 
States. 296.
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speaker for the chief, a Tasku minko. Next came the beloved 
men, Tashko or common warriors and, at the bottom, the 
weaklings. Such local orientation and allegiance encouraged 
divisions in the tribe which were unknown to the French 
leaders in Louisiana during the early years of the eighteenth 
century. It would take several decades for the French to 
become aware of the divisions and to understand the power 
struggles within the tribe.^
Within the Choctaw people there were two exagamous 
moieties, the in hilakta and the imaklacha. Such tribal 
relations suggest a strong intra-tribal basis of relation­
ship. Similar to other tribes of the Southeast, the suitor 
asked the family for the girl in marriage. However, the 
matrilineal structure of this people meant that the 
children's blood relatives came from the mother's family. 
While political power resided in the men of the tribe, the 
women quite frequently owned and controlled significant 
property, such as houses and land.^8 Much of the basic 
anthropological structure of the tribe was determined from 
the landed strength of women, not men.
Of interest to the French, also, must have been the 
Choctaw religious and world view. Even though the reports 
of eighteenth century white men are far from specific, we 
know from anthropologists that these Indians believed in an
17Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians'] 84] 9T] 95.
18Ibid., 76-81, 127-30; Hudson, The Southeastern 
Indians, 185-87.
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Upper World and an Under World, in a great good spirit who 
ruled the Upper World and a great evil spirit who ruled the 
Under World. As members of a solar cult, the Choctaw felt 
that the Middle World, or earth, was overseen by the Sun 
which they represented with fire.^
These were the natives whom Iberville dispatched 
M. de Souvolle, a member of the French party camped on the 
Pascagoula River that spring of 1700, to seek out. As 
Sauvolle and his companion traveled northward, the Governor 
set out for the coast and Fort Biloxi, arriving there on 
April 30. A few weeks later, the envoys returned with two 
Choctaw Indians whom they had found at a Thome village just 
west of the Pascagoula River. They reported that high waters 
from spring rains had prevented them from reaching the 
Choctaw country. According to the two representatives they 
brought back with them, the Choctaw were currently at war 
with some native enemies who lived to the north and east of 
them, people whom the English had supplied with muskets.
The two Choctaw did not name their foes, but during their 
visit the Governor learned from the colony's veteran scout, 
Henri de Tonty, that the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes were 
at war.^° After talking with the two Choctaw visitors for a
1^Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, 171-75, 195-203; Hudson, 
The Southeastern Indians, Chapter 3, 120-83.
20Margry, IV, 429-30; Journal of Paul du Ru; 
Missionary Priest to Louisiana. February 1 to May 8, 1700 
(Chicago, 1934), 22.
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few days, Iberville sent them home with a present for their 
chief.
A veteran of the New World frontier, Iberville had 
seen the impact of white man1s goods on the red men of North 
America. Although he had previously known only Canadian 
Indians, he anticipated that the natives of the Southeast 
would be as interested in the Frenchmen's trade items as 
were the red men of the North. He had requested from the 
Ministry of Marine numerous goods for presents and for trade 
with the Indians, including blankets, socks, hats, shirts 
and leggings, as well as iron pots, hatchets, needles, 
scissors, vermilion, beads, mirrors and bells. He also 
ordered several barrels of wine and 100 swords for the 
Indian trade. The official inventory of trade goods and 
presents did not include powder, balls or muskets, but a few 
Louisiana Indians did receive muskets in the first years, 
and by 1701, firearms appeared regularly on the Government's 
list of supplies for the Indians.21 Just how much of the 
goods requested by Iberville actually arrived in Louisiana
Expenses for Louisiana, August 1699, Archives des 
Colonies, C13A 1, ff. 203-204 (Archives Nationales, Paris, 
France), hereinafter cited as AC; Inventory of Supplies for 
Louisiana, February 22, 1701, AC, FlA 10, ff. 202 (v) 303; 
Relation ou Annale veritable de ce qui s'est passe dans le 
pais de la Louisiane, pendant vingt-deux annees consecutives, 
depuis le commencement de 1 'etablissement des Franqais . . . 
jusqu'en 1721 par Andrd Penigaut, Manuscript franijais,
14613, f. 9 (Salle des Manuscripts Bibliotheque Nationale, 
Paris, France), hereinafter cited as Penigaut, Ms. fr.,
14613. Scholars have questioned the dates and figures of 
the Penigaut memoir. However, his description of events 
gives a valuable picture of life in early Louisiana.
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and how much actually reached the Choctaw and other tribes 
is difficult to estimate. It is apparent, however, that the 
new governor planned to use these trade items to lure the 
Indians into alliances.
Iberville believed that a few small trinkets would 
suffice at first to pique native curiosity and to promote 
friendly exchanges. However, to counteract the presence of 
the English of Carolina who were supplying the red men of 
the Southeast with muskets and other merchandise, greater 
government support would be needed.
During his trip to France in 1700, which lasted more 
than a year, Iberville reviewed with Pontchartrain, the 
Minister of Marine, the strategic importance of maintaining 
a permanent settlement on the Gulf of Mexico to serve as an 
outpost from which to convert the Indians to Christianity.22 
From his arrival in France in the fall until his departure 
for Louisiana a year later, Iberville lobbied at the 
Ministry. By emphasizing the English presence near the 
colony and by insisting that the Indians could defeat them 
if armed properly, he secured the money necessary to supply 
the natives with French muskets. Not only did Pontchartrain 
grant Iberville 24,774 livres for Indian goods, he also 
allocated him an additional 8,000 livres to improve the
22Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and State in 
French Colonial Louisiana; Policy and Politics to 1732 
(New Haven, 1966), 28-29, 38.
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forts of the colony.23
On returning to Louisiana in December, 1701, Iber­
ville brought plans for peace negotiations with the Indians. 
By the end of January, 1702, he had organized a peace 
mission to the Choctaw and the Chickasaw. Henri de Tonty 
led the party of ten men. A member of the La Salle 1682 
expedition into the Mississippi River Valley and thus having 
been acquainted with the natives of the region for some
years, Tonty was indeed an excellent choice for such a 
24mission. ^
These Indians evidently accepted Tonty at once, for 
by March 1, he was returning to the Gulf coast, accompanied 
by seven Choctaw chiefs and three Chickasaw chiefs. The 
party arrived at the Mobile post on March 25, and on the 
following day Iberville welcomed the chiefs. He presented 
them with numerous gifts, including some weapons. As a 
further gesture of friendship towards the Chickasaw, upon 
their departure the Governor sent a young boy home with them 
to learn their language.23 In their conversations with the
23Memoir on the Mississippi, July 12, 1701, Archives 
de le Marine, B4 21, ff. 527 (v)-28 (Archives Nationales, 
Paris, France), hereinafter cited as AM; Minister to Begon, 
August 3, 1701, AM, B2 155, f. 191; Memoir on the Missis­
sippi, August, 1701, AC, C 13A 1, f. 331.
24Journal of Iberville, January, 1702, AM, B4 23, f. 
318. For a sketch of Tonty's exploration activities see 
E. R. Murphy, Henri de Tonty, Fur Trader of the Mississippi 
(Baltimore, 1941) .
25Journal of Iberville, March 19, 1702, AM, B4 23, f. 
324-24 (v); Memoir on the Establishment of Louisiana, 1702,
AC, C13C 2, f. 52(v); Margry, IV, 521.
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chiefs, the white men stressed the importance of maintaining 
peace among all of the people of Louisiana, white and red 
alike. For the colony to survive, Louisiana's leaders 
believed that the Indians had to remain at peace with the 
French.
While Iberville was emphasizing the importance of 
keeping the peace in Louisiana, in 1702, France went to war 
in a conflict known as the War of Spanish Succession. This 
war would hinder the development and growth of the struggling 
colony on the Gulf of Mexico. All supplies for Louisiana, 
including goods needed for the conduct of Indian relations, 
would arrive far behind schedule. From the home government's 
point of view, however, for the time being, the colony 
seemed to be getting along rather well, for Iberville's 
reports had mentioned that the tribes of the Mobile River 
area were providing the settlers with corn.^ By March of 
1703, the Marine had sent some 17,000 livres in presents to 
the colony.^ Having returned to France in the late summer 
of 1702, the Louisiana governor met constantly with French 
officials concerning the colony. His presence there 
encouraged Pontchartrain's interest in Louisiana; however, 
the war and health problems that plagued Iberville delayed
26Joumal of Iberville, March 12, 1702, AM, B4 23, f. 
323 (v); Bienville to the Minister, June 20, 1702, AC, C13A 
2, f. 43.
27Expenses for the Presents for the Indians of 
Louisiana, March 17, 1703, AC, FlA 11, f. 66.
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the departure of the ships, the Pelican and the Renomme. 
which were loaded with precious supplies for Louisiana.^®
In Louisiana, war between the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw continued despite French efforts to maintain peace 
among the red men. Less than a year after the negotiations 
of March, 1702, 30 Chickasaw chiefs came to Mobile to ask 
Jean Baptiste La Moyne de Bienville, the Governor's brother, 
to arrange a peace between them and the Choctaw. Bienville 
sent Pierre de Boisbriant, a fellow Canadian, to work out 
the negotiations. As soon as Boisbriant's party arrived at 
Yowani, the Choctaw village nearest the coast, the chief 
there accused the Chickasaw Indians who accompanied Bois­
briant of murdering the boy interpreter, Petit St. Michel, 
whom Iberville had sent home with them the previous spring 
to learn their language. Insisting on their innocence, the 
Chickasaw sent two of their men to retrieve the boy. The 
other chiefs offered for his safe delivery to be hostages 
for one month at the Choctaw village. As the days passed 
and the runners failed to return, the Chickasaw began to 
fear the worst for their messengers. Boisbriant himself 
must have considered the possibility of ambush in enemy 
territory. However, when the month had expired, Bienville's 
representative agreed to the Choctaws' killing the
^^Minister to Iberville, June 17, 1703, AC, B 23, f. 
193; Minister to Iberville, November 7, 1703, AM, B^ 170, 
ff. 354(v)-55; Minister to Begon, November 14, 1703, ibid., 
f. 427 (v).
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hostages.29
While Boisbriant probably believed that he had acted 
in the best interest of the French, later that year Bien­
ville learned that the boy was indeed alive.30 Whether 
convinced by an ill-founded rumor or a lie on the part of 
the Choctaw, the French had chosen to believe the Choctaw 
rather than the Chickasaw. Thus, even from French Louisi­
ana's first years, by preference, by inclination and by 
necessity, the French chose to ally themselves with the 
numerous Choctaw.
In a more traditional way of trying to win the 
attachment of the Indians, especially the Choctaw, the 
Foreign Fathers Missionaries considered the introduction of 
a reduccione mission scheme for Louisiana. Having too few 
priests to work among such scattered tribes, two of Louisi­
ana's first religious leaders, Father Henri Roulleaux de La 
Vent and Antoine Davion, proposed to remove the natives from 
their own villages to sites of new missions. The Choctaw 
tribe's great numbers, as well as their clustered-village 
life style, could easily be adapted to the mission system 
and would provide countless new Christian souls. Bienville, 
as leader of Louisiana during Iberville's absence in 1704, 
initially opposed the plan, but by 1706 the priests convinced
29Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, ff. 105-10; Margry, V,
435-39.
30Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, ff. 112-13; Margry, V,
440.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t o w n er. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
1 7
him to consider it seriously. However, with the War of the 
Spanish Succession continuing, the precious trade items 
needed to attract the Indians to the Fathers never materi­
alized. 31
Bienville would, in the end, probably never have 
supported such an alien institution as a mission system in 
colonial Louisiana. Having grown up on the Canadian 
frontier, Bienville had known the Indians of North America 
in both war and peace, as friends and as enemies. A New 
World man, he, like his brother Iberville, appreciated fully 
the Indian's need to be met on his own terms. He realized 
that the wilderness, whether the pine forests of Canada or 
the cane-brake bayous of Louisiana, was the Indian's home 
ground where he would fight any enemy to survive. French 
Louisiana's 200 people, many of whom were lazy and debauched, 
needed the red man. To prevail in the eighteenth century 
southeastern wilderness, the Frenchman and the Indian alike 
needed to defeat his enemies, the English and the Chicka­
saw.32
Following Iberville's death in 1705, Bienville 
emerged as the leading force in French Louisiana.
3lBienville to the Minister, 1706, AC C13A 1, f.
532; O'Neill, Church and State, 49-53.
32pictionary of Canadian Biography (10 vols., 
Toronto, 1966), III, 379-80; Bienville to Pontchartrain, 
July 28, 1706, in Dunbar Rowland and Albert Sanders (eds.), 
Mississippi Provincial Archives (3 vols., Jackson, 1927-32), 
II, 24; Census of Louisiana, August 12, 1708, ibid., 32. 
Hereinafter cited as MPA.
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Bienville's linguistic skills, peace-keeping efforts and 
general knowledge of the wilderness encouraged a greater 
rapport between the French and the Indians. As early as 
1704, he had secured natives from several tribes, including 
the Choctaw, to march with him against the Alabama Indians 
in order to avenge the deaths of some Frenchmen. However, 
the Choctaw deserted the expedition early keeping the 
muskets which Bienville had provided them.33 Although 
disappointed by such behavior, Bienville had gained the 
Choctaws' friendship with this gift of arms. Within the 
year, he learned that these Indians had defended themselves 
against an attack by the English from Carolina with the 
weapons that the French had given them. In fact, several 
years later, they declared their complete loyalty to the 
French and forbade the English to enter their territory.34
Still, the Le Moynes' successes among the Indians 
did not put them above criticism within the colony. Both 
the missionaries and Nicolas de La Salle, the commissaire, 
as overseer of the king's warehouse, accused the brothers of 
theft and profiteering. A series of ridiculous squabbles 
between Bienville and the Mobile chaplin, Henri de La Vente,
33Bienville to the Minister, 1706, AC, C13A 1, ff. 
508-509; Memoir of Bienville, September 6, 1704, ibid., ff. 
450-53.
^^Memoir of Pere Gravier, 1706, ibid., ff. 574-75; 
Bienville to Pontchartrain, April 10, 1706, MPA, III, 34: 
Bienville to Pontchartrain, October 12, 1708, ibid., II,
39.
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hurt the colony's morale. By 1706 Jerome Pontchartrain had 
discovered illegal and fraudulent activities that involved 
Iberville and several merchants.-*5
Iberville's death in Havana in 1706, along with the 
numerous complaints about his conduct from Louisiana, 
prompted the government to move for a reform. On May 25, 
1707, the Ministry of Marine announced that Nicolas Daneau 
de Muy had been appointed the new governor and Martin 
D 'Artaguiette the new commissaire, of Louisiana.38 The 
government hoped that this change in leadership would bring 
an end to the fraudulent and illegal acts on the part of 
officials and solve many other of the colony's problems.3  ̂
But, unfortunately, the new governor died on the crossing to 
Louisiana in 1707,38 and the reform movement in the colony 
died with him. Despite his disgrace, Bienville remained in 
power in the colony due to the demands of the war in Europe 
and the declining interest in Louisiana by the Marine.
To be sure, some graft occurred among officials of
35Minister to Begon, May 25, 1707, AC, B29, f. 259; 
O'Neill, Church and State, 60-63; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de 
la Louisiane Francaise, Regne de Louis XIV: 1698-1715
(Paris, 1953), I, 104-16. Hereinafter cited as Giraud, 
Histoire, I .
38Minister to Brisacia, May 25, 1707, AC, B 29, 
f. 262 (v)-67.
37Memoir of the King to De Muy, June 30, 1707, AC,
B 29, ff. 266 (v)-67.
38Minister to Begon, May 25, 1707, ibid., f. 258; 
King to De Muy, June 30, 1707, ibid.. ff. 273(v)-74; Giraud, 
Histoire, I, 117-20.
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early Louisiana, but external factors contributed more to 
the colony's distress. Terrible famine in France and the 
War of the Spanish Succession reduced and delayed shipments 
of supplies and men.39 In 1709 no ships arrived from the 
mother country. Within the colony, the settlers' crops 
failed due to their ignorance of the climate and of soil 
conditions; Bienville was forced to trade with the Spanish 
at Vera Cruz and at Havana to secure food and other 
supplies.40
Louisiana's survival in these years can be attributed 
directly to Indian aid in food supplies and in defense. For­
tunately, Bienville had not considered the Choctaw withdrawal 
during his military foray against the Alabama Indians as a 
breach of friendship. Indeed, these Indians showed their 
loyalty towards the French in other ways throughout the 
terrible years of distress. They became the main source of 
the colony's food. Provisions from elsewhere decreased to 
such an extent that nearly the entire garrison was living 
with the Indians by 1710. Thirty soldiers went to live with
•^Minister to Bienville, May 10, 1710, AC, B 32, ff. 
317 (v)-18; Minister to M. de Beauhamois, June 1, 1710, 
ibid., ff. 395 (v)-96; Minister to Bienville, September 2, 
1710, ibid., ff. 477 (v)-78(v) ; Marcel Giraud, "France and 
Louisiana in the Early Eighteenth Century, " Mississippi 
Valiev Historical Review, XXXVI (1949-50), 665.
40Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, ff. 191-92; Bienville to 
Pontchartrain, July 28, 1706, MPA, II, 20-22; D 'Artaguiette 
to Pontchartrain, June 20, 1710, ibid., 55; Bienville and 
D'Artaguiette to Pontchartrain, February 23, 1711, ibid., 
Ill, 157.
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the Choctaw.41 Because they provided them food and refuge 
the French leaders were very grateful to the Choctaw and 
their other Indian allies.
Although the colony lacked any real focus of 
authority, nearly everyone accepted Bienville's dealings 
with the Indians as vital for Louisiana's survival. While 
his status as a mere king's lieutenant failed to gain him 
the proper respect from officials and priests in the colony, 
it could not be denied that he had established peace and 
friendship with the natives. As part of his policy in 
Indian relations, Bienville, like his brother before him, 
sent interpreters to various tribes to learn their languages 
and to act as agents. Even Nicolas de La Salle, the com- 
missaire, had been convinced of Bienville's expertise in 
Indian affairs, and requested more muskets from the govern­
ment for the Choctaw.42 In urging the government to support 
his efforts to strengthen ties with the natives, Bienville 
reminded Pontchartrain of the English presence in Carolina 
and of the great influence of their trade goods. In fact,
41Memoir of D'Artaguiette, 1708, AC, C13A 2, f. 65; 
Bienville to the Minister, February 20, 1710, AC, C13 B 1, 
ff. 42-43; La Salle to the Minister, June 20, 1710, AC,
C13A 2, f. 520; Memoir of La Vente, June 21, 1710, ibid., f. 
564; Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, f. 192.
42Bienville to the Minister, June 21, 1710, AC, C13A 
2, f. 552; Bienville to the Minister, August 20, 1709, ibid., 
f. 520; Memoir of La Vente, June 21, 1710, ibid., f. 410;
La Salle to the Minister, May 12, 1709, ibid., f. 397; 
Bienville to Pontchartrain, October 12, 1708, MPA, II, 41; 
Giraud, Histoire, I, 208-209.
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the Minister of Marine was pleased with Bienville's work 
among the Indians and hoped that internal colonial peace 
would continue so that some kind of trade between France and 
the colony would be established.43
From Louisiana's first years, the government believed 
that Mobile Bay would serve as an excellent entrepot. Less 
susceptible to floods than Biloxi and accessible to the sea, 
a Mobile settlement could serve as a base from which to open 
up the Indian trade of the interior. The rivers which 
drained into Mobile Bay would provide water passage into the 
lands upstream, and especially the Choctaw country. The 
presence of a tribe of more than 15,000 people with whom to 
conduct a trade in furs and pelts suggested a rich economic 
future for the colony.44 The Minister believed in that 
future to such a degree that he allocated 8,000 livres for 
the construction of a fort at Mobile. Completed in 1702, 
this square stockade had four bastions with a place d'armes, 
or central parade ground, enclosed within a space of about 
300 feet square. The future plans included a trading house 
in addition to quarters for the chaplain and the officers.45
43Bienville to the Minister, October 27, 1711, AC, 
C13A 2 f. 570; Minister to D'Artaguiette, May 10, 1710, AC,
C 32, f. 322.
44Iberville to the Minister, July 2, 1701, AM, B4 
21, f. 520(v); Memoir on the Mississippi, July 12, 1701, 
ibid., f. 528.
_ 45Instruction for Iberville, August 27, 1701, AM,
B 152, ff. 157-57 (v); Giraud, Histoire, I, 38-41.
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Several ancient and well-worn buffalo trails, now 
native roads, ran from Mobile Bay into the interior regions. 
These paths, together with the Mobile River and its streams, 
provided an excellent communication system in nearly every 
month of the year.46
Other plans for fur trade centers in the Mississippi 
Valley were also being proposed by the government at this 
time. In conjunction with Iberville's colonizing effort, 
the French government granted St. Denis de Juchereau a 
permit to open a tannery on the lower Wabash River. As 
early as the 1680's, Henri de Tonty and French coureurs des 
bois had traded for the skins and furs of the Indians of the 
Illinois country. St. Denis himself recognized that trade 
with the Indians was crucial not only to the tannery's 
success but also to securing the red men's aid in the event 
of any English encroachment into the Mississippi Valley.4  ̂
Iberville concurred with St. Denis' view. However, since 
the region was under Canadian jurisdiction, the Louisiana 
governor was uncertain if the tannery would establish close 
ties with his colony.46
Before coming to Louisiana, Iberville's and
46Nancy Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana 
during the French Regime (New York, 1916), 84-86, 89-90.
^Memoir on the Establishment of a Colony on the 
Mississippi, 1700, AC, C13A 1, f. 2 (v); Minister to Iberville, 
July 20, 1701, AM, B2 155, ff. 108(v)-109; Surrey, The Com­
merce of Louisiana, 308, 314.
48Iberville to the Minister, July 2, 1701, AM, B4 
21, ff. 523-23(v); Giraud, Histoire, I, 47.
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Bienville's experience with and knowledge of native hunting 
customs had been confined to the North and the East. In the 
Southeast, where climate and geography differed sharply from 
that in the Canadian wilderness, these leaders found that 
the natives hunted mainly the white-tailed deer rather than 
the beaver.
Although hunting was secondary to farming in the 
Choctaw's economy, the tribe's hunters did pursue the deer, 
stalking the animals during their rutting season from late 
September to early December.49 During this cycle in their 
life, the deer were in a more relaxed and less guarded 
state. The acorns from the oak forests, a favorite food, 
lured the animals to forest sites well-known to the native 
hunters.59 Not only did the Choctaw hunt and eat deer, but 
they also cured and tanned their hides and made them into 
clothing. They might, thus, be expected to deliver leather 
and not just deerskins to Mobile.51
From Louisiana's first days, the Ministry of Marine 
believed that trade with the Indians would allow the 
colonists to reimburse the home government for merchandise
49Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, 49.
SOswanton, The Indians of the Southeastern United 
States, 316-17? Hudson, The Southeastern Indians. 274.
51Hudson, The Southeastern Indians. 275; David 
Bushnell, "The Choctaw of Bayou Lacomb, St. Tammany Parish 
Louisiana, " Bureau of American Ethnology (Bulletin 48, 
Washington, 1909), 11 ff.
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distributed among the natives.52 The Minister had acquiesced 
in the idea that the Indians should be provided with arms in 
order that they could hunt deer and other animals. Yet, by 
1709, of the hundreds of muskets sent to Louisiana, only 100 
had been designated for the Indians.53
By 1712 the government was granting only 4,000 
livres in gifts and trade goods as an annual subsidy for the 
Indians of Louisiana, a sum much lower than the 24,773 
livres allocated Iberville in 1701.54 A war economy and port 
graft partially explain this decline in availability of 
goods. Also food and clothing for the soldiers and settlers 
probably had a higher priority in the government's plans.
Part of the difficulty stemmed from a division of 
authority in Louisiana. After Iberville's death in 1706, 
the rivals of Bienville continued for several years to 
accuse the younger Le Moyne brother of the same fraudulent 
activities with which he and Iberville had been charged 
earlier.55 Arguments arose between Bienville and Nicolas de
52Minister to Iberville, August 3, 1701, AM, B2 155,
f. 195.
52Memoir on the Establishment of the Colony of 
Louisiana, 1702, AC, C13A 2, ff. 51(v)-52; Minister to
Begon, March 20, 1709, AC, B 30, f. 108.
54Expenses for Louisiana, August 20, 1709, AC, F1A 
15, f. 66; ibid., August 26, 1710, AC, F1A 16, ff. 110-10 (v); 
ibid., December 12, 1712, AC, FlA 17, f. 200 (v).
55Minister to Bienville, June 30, 1707, AC, C29, ff.
279 (v)-80; Minister to La Salle, June 30, 1707, ibid., ff.
281-82(v).
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La Salle, the commissaire and Bienville's leading opponent, 
because he believed that Bienville was stealing some of the 
supplies allotted for the Indians.5® Perhaps, some of his 
charges of Bienville's alleged profiteering were exaggerated. 
In at least one instance, Bienville traded some cloth, prob­
ably designated for the Indians, to the Spanish of Vera Cruz 
for food for the starving colony.57 Such activities may 
have been misinterpreted by the commissaire. Unfortunately, 
these disputes often took priority over the colony's major 
problems.
In an effort to end the quarrels among the officials 
and stop the theft of supplies in Louisiana, in 1710 Pontchar­
train leased the colony to a private individual, Antoine 
Crozat, for 30 years, and the Minister selected Antoine La 
Mothe Cadillac, founder of Detroit, as the new governor.
The government hoped that Cadillac's experience in frontier 
life and Indian ways would help him serve the colony wisely 
and efficiently, and that his knowledge of the fur trade 
would be useful in his efforts to encourage its development 
in Louisiana.58
On the eve of Cadillac's arrival in Louisiana, the
5®La Salle to the Minister, September 12, 1708, AC, 
C13A 2, f. 195 and ff. 202-203.
57Bienville and D'Artaguiette to the Minister, 
February 23, 1711, MPA, III, 157.
5®King to Cadillac, May 13, 1710, AC, B 32, ff.
345 (v)-46.
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colony's stability was in question. Louisiana had survived 
the first decade through the efforts and experience of the 
Le Moyne brothers. The establishment of peace and friend­
ship with the Indians by these two men, had, perhaps, pre­
vented the colony's complete collapse. Both the French and 
the Choctaw had benefited from their newly-establish rela­
tionship. The whites received food, refuge and military 
assistance, while the red men were repaid with the white 
man's goods, including muskets, which improved their ability 
to hunt and to defend themselves against their enemies, the 
Chickasaw. There was also the potential for a flourishing 
trade in hides with the Choctaw. The Crozat era could 
provide the impetus and the goods needed to exploit that 
trade.
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THE FRENCH ACQUIRE ENEMIES: THE CHICKASAW,
1699-1712
In the Choctaw, Governor Iberville had found an ally, 
but the Chickasaw were another matter. At the time of 
Iberville's arrival in Louisiana in 1699, the Chickasaw 
Indians had served as loyal allies of the English of Carolina 
for over a decade. This bellicose tribe, feared by all the 
natives of the Southeast, aided by the British, opposed the 
presence of the French in the Lower Mississippi Valley even 
at the outset of colonizing efforts in Louisiana.
From the first encounter with the Chickasaw, the 
white man knew the fierce and warring nature of these 
Indians. Members of the Chickasaw tribe welcomed the De 
Soto expedition on its entry into the Province of Chicaza in 
early December, 1540. The Europeans spent Christmas near 
the Yazoo and Tombigbee headwaters, having decided to camp 
for the winter among this friendly, but obviously warlike 
people. The De Soto chronicles give no description of the 
physical appearance of the Chickasaw. However, a later 
observer described them as darker than the Shawnee, " . . .  
taller and stronger bodied than the Choctaw . . .  a comely
28
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pleasant looking people . . . with round faces."1 Relations 
between the visitors and the natives must have deteriorated 
over the winter, for the Spanish departure in March was any­
thing but peaceful. A Chickasaw attack on the Europeans 
surprised the visitors completely. That the Indians chose 
not to pursue the Spanish saved the expedition, for its 
defeat seemed imminent.
By the eighteenth century, the French had determined 
the location of the tribe at 35° 20' north latitude. In the 
twentieth century, this area became the counties of Union 
and Pontotoc in the northwest part of the state of Missis­
sippi.^ (See Map No. 2.) Apparently, the Chickasaw first 
lived along the Tennessee-Cumberland divide north to the 
Ohio River and west to the Mississippi. When the tribe 
moved west, some time before the middle of the sixteenth 
century, it changed its central towns from present-day 
Madison County, Alabama to northeastern Mississippi near the
Barnes Adair, The History of the American Indians 
(London, 1775), 2, 5.
^Edward Gaylord Bourne (ed.), Narratives of the 
Career of Hernando de Soto (2 vols.; New York, 1904), II, 
132-34.
•^Adair, The History of the American Indians, 351; 
Memoir on the Mississippi Country, Papers of Claude de 
L'Isle, c. 1702, Archives de la Marine, 2-JJ 56 (X, 17,0), 
f. 45 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), hereinafter 
cited as AM.
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A X  CIE X T  C H I C K A S A W  DO.MAIX
Hap No. 2
A xerox copy of a map from Arrell Gibson's The 
Chickasaws, 3.
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headwaters of the Tombigbee.^
Although having long lived east of the Mississippi 
River, unlike the Choctaw, the Chickasaw believed that they 
had western origins. Their myths held that the tribe's 
forebears had followed a pole which the leaders carried as 
they traveled from the west eastward across the Mississippi 
River. A part of the migration legend also holds that the 
Chickasaw and the Choctaw tribes had originated from a single 
people whom the brothers, Chacta and Chisa, had led when the 
migration began. The two bands separated during the journey 
with Chacta's group settling farther south after crossing 
the Mississippi River. Chisa's people had known more war
and, as a result, his followers were fewer in number. The
Chickasaw nation in the early 1700's had 3,500-4,000 members, 
about one-fifth the population of the Choctaw at that time.^ 
The warlike Chickasaw were a nation of hunters 
rather than farmers. The time for stalking the deer and 
pursuing the bear regulated their social and economic lives. 
Their hunting grounds extended northward to the junction of 
the Tennessee and Ohio rivers and southward to the Oktibba 
River, the boundary between their territory and that of the
^John R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern 
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, 
Washington, 1945), 115; David Bushnell, "The Native Villages 
and Village Sites East of the Mississippi," Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Bulletin No. 59 (1919), 58; Arrell M. 
Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman, 1971), 5.
^Gibson, The Chickasaw, 4, 10-11; Swanton, The
Indians of the Southeastern United States, 22.
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Choctaw.6 Needing weapons to hunt and to wage war, this 
nation welcomed more readily the white man's goods and 
became dependent upon them more quickly than did the pre­
dominantly farming tribes.
The stockaded villages in which these Indians lived 
appeared to offer adequate defense from any encroachments 
by the white man. At the end of the seventeenth century, 
the Chickasaw nation occupied seven palisaded towns, located 
in the forests and prairies of the Tombigbee watershed. The 
town Chooha Phariabo, or Chukafalaya, served as the tribe's 
capital. The site of the main military town, Yaneka, or 
Akia, was on a ridge near present-day Plymouth, Missis­
sippi.7 This defense settlement guarded the approaches to 
the other Chickasaw towns. The villages consisted of sub­
stantially built wooden houses for wintertime, more open 
dwellings for the summer, a corn storage building and 
menstrual huts. As many as five families shared each house. 
The "public" huts consisted of a long fort, a council-cere- 
monial-ball field, and a building for religious and 
governmental affairs. The community-owned agricultural
6Gibson, The Chickasaws, 7; Swanton, The Indians of 
the Southeastern United States, 312-32, passim; Charles 
Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, 1976), 272-73; 
John R. Swanton, The Chickasaw (Forty-Fourth Annual Report 
of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, 1928), 240.
7Alvin M. Josephy, The Indian Heritage of America
(New York, 1968), 107; Clark Wissler, Indians xn the United 
States (Garden City, 1949), 240; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 6.
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fields could be found nearby, outside the walls, in meadows 
and prairie plots, where beans, corn and squash were culti­
vated.8
On the whole, the Chickasaw had no central govern­
ment. Each town had a great deal of autonomy. A semblance 
of a Chickasaw national council met periodically to form 
policy for the tribe. This loose federation united into a 
single nation in wartime and for general protection.9
Anthropologists have determined that the Chickasaw 
people divided themselves into two large moieties, the 
Imosaktca and the Intcukwalipa, the former having the higher 
status. Within each of these groups existed totemic sub­
divisions called ikasas, or clans, all 15 of them being both 
matrilineal and exagomic. The Indians ranked the clans, 
with that of the local chief, or Minka, as first with other 
lesser clans behind.
The Chickasaw Indians viewed war as a religious 
undertaking and experience. Rather than secular war leaders, 
a high priest quite frequently led them against their 
enemies. In the late spring, summer and early fall, they 
used the winter hut in which to gather for fasting and 
prayer before setting out to fight. The elders forbade sex 
and spirits during the several days of preparation. Older 
warriors oversaw the conduct of the younger men. One
8Ibid.. 25-27, 40. 9Ibid., 21-22.
10Ibid., 18-19; Swanton, The Chickasaw. 191-97.
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scholar has described the Indians' dedication to pre-war 
ritual as follows: "The persistence with which their tabus
are reported serves to underline the relationship felt to 
exist between warfare and a peculiar attunement to super­
natural forces."11 Indeed, the warriors maintained a very- 
strict discipline even while they were traveling, for viola­
tions of their tabus could very well bring evil spirits 
against the party. Armed with their bows and war clubs, 
before the musket was introduced, the braves received an 
enthusiastic send-off from the tribe. Even if they returned 
prematurely after having encountered evil omens, the other
Chickasaw received them without accusing them of 
12cowardice.
A native tribe with a strong tradition of bellicose 
ways, the Chickasaw were included in the initial reports 
which Iberville received concerning Indian unrest in the 
c o l o n y .1  ̂ Louis Jolliet and Pere Jacques Marquette probably 
saw several Chickasaw villages located on the Mississippi 
River in 1673, but none of the natives attacked them.
11Morrison W. Smith, "American Indian Warfare," New 
York Academy of Sciences, Transactions, 2nd Ser., XII 
(June 1951), 358.
12Ibid., 365-67; Adair, The History of the American 
Indians, 380-81; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 29-30; Hudson, The 
Southeastern Indians. 240-47.
12Pierre Margry (ed.), Memoires et documents; 
Decouvertes et etablissements des francais dans l'ouest et 
dans le sud de l'Amerigue septentrionale (6 vols., Paris, 
1879-88), IV, 164. Hereinafter cited as Margry.
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Several years later, in 1682, the La Salle expedition
encountered some friendly Chickasaw Indians while searching
for a lost member of the party, Pierre Prudhomme.1^ Despite
rumors of growing Chickasaw hostility in 1700, Fathers
Frangois de Montigny and Antoine Davion brought good news
from Henri de Tonty to Iberville's meeting with the Choctaw
in May of that year. Tonty reported that some of the elders
of the Chickasaw desired a peace with the French now that
their war against the Choctaw had ended.15
This report must have encouraged the Governor of
Louisiana, for he had become aware of the English presenceftin the Chickasaw villages. The English not only had 
encouraged Chickasaw attacks on the French, but they had 
also urged warfare among the natives of the Southeast for 
several decades in order to supply the thriving Indian slave 
trade between Carolina and the West Indies.16 The Chickasaw, 
armed with English weapons, fought rival tribes and sold 
their captives into the English slave trade.17
14Gibson, The Chickasaws, 33; Francis Parkman, The 
Discovery of the Great West: La Salle (New York, 1956),
218-19.
l5Margry, IV, 427, 430.
16Ibid., 398; Memoir of Iberville to the Minister,
October, 1699, AM, B4 20, ff. 418-18 (v).
l7Margry, IV, 406; Memoir on English Activities, c.
1701, Archives des Colonies, C13A 1, f. 336 (Archives 
Nationales, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as AC; Nicolas 
La Salle to the Minister, April 1, 1702, AC, C13A 2, f.
36(v); Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Frangaise, 
Regne de Louis XIV: 1698-1715 (Paris. 1953), I, 69-Vu;
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Iberville even knew the routes which the traders 
followed from Carolina to Louisiana. He described precisely 
the roads the English used traveling from Charleston into 
the Chickasaw lands.■*’8 The most direct path ran by the 
Ochee Creek to the Coosa and Tallapoosa Indian lands in the 
Alabama River area and then cut straight west into the 
territory of the Chickasaw.^ (See Map No. 3.)
Iberville's knowledge of the Chickasaw alliance with 
the English did not deter him from sending Tonty on a peace 
mission to the Chickasaw in February 1702.20 Through a 
private individual, the Governor had secured more than 500 
livres in goods for the tribe.2  ̂ On this mission, Tonty 
negotiated a preliminary peace between the Chickasaw and 
their foes, the Choctaw, Thome and Mobile, and all of the 
natives promised to support the French against the English, 
to remain at peace and to end all trade with the Caro­
linians. 22
V e m e r  Crane, "The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne's War," 
American Historical Review, XXIV (1919), 382.
18Margry, IV, 362.
•*-8V e m e r  Crane, The Southern Frontier (Durham, 1928) ,
39.
^Iberville's Journal, January 3, 1702, AC, C13A 1, 
ff. 357-60.
^Expenses for Louisiana from January 1, 1702 to 
March 31, 1702, ibid., f. 372.
22La Salle to the Minister, April 1, 1702, AC,
C13A 2, ff. 36(v)-37.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t o w n er. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
JO J1”0 >’U
<C «










Tonty returned to Mobile with leaders of both the 
Choctaw and the Chickasaw tribes on March 25, 1702, and the 
Governor opened further peace negotiations the following 
day. He dealt directly with the Chickasaw concerning their 
relations with the English of Carolina. He charged that 
the English, in trying to sustain their slave trade, had 
kept the Choctaw and the Chickasaw at war for a decade. 
Iberville also warned the Chickasaw that they themselves 
could very easily be made slaves by the English. The more 
than 500 Choctaw prisoners whom the British had purchased 
as slaves from the Chickasaw, he pointed out, showed an 
English rapaciousness of which the Chickasaw might one day 
be made the victims. Iberville even accused the English of 
planning to make all red men slaves.23
Using another diplomatic ploy, Iberville suggested 
to the Chickasaw that those Indians who allied themselves 
with the French might be given arms. Having already dis­
tributed a few muskets to their allies, he threatened to 
give guns to all the Choctaw, Mobile and Houma. And, he 
observed, the French had native friends as far away as the 
Illinois country who could also be supplied with weapons 
with which to war on the Chickasaw. Unable to withstand 
such opposition, the Chickasaw and their families might be 
struck down in their villages. Iberville then gave the 
chiefs a large number of presents, mainly weapons and
23Journal of Iberville, 1702, AM, B4 23, ff. 325-
25(v).
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munitions. Each chief received 200 livres worth of powder, 
a similar amount of lead and balls, 12 muskets, 100 hatchets 
and 150 knives.24 Two years before Iberville had given 
muskets to the Choctaw and probably felt that he was arming 
friends. The Chickasaw, however, had been carrying English- 
supplied weapons for several years, and he likely hoped to 
impress them with the excellence of French armaments, to 
convince these friends of the English that the Choctaw and 
other Indian allies of the French could be armed well enough 
to destroy them.25
As part of the agreement with the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw, Iberville promised to end the hostilities which 
existed between the red allies of the French and the Chicka­
saw people. Iberville kept this promise. Following the 
March meeting with the Indians, he assigned several Canadians 
to escort the Choctaw and the Chickasaw chiefs back to their 
tribes. The Chickasaw chiefs traveled safely through 
Choctaw country into their own lands. Continuing the 
journey north to the Illinois country, these new French 
allies made a peace even with the Indians of that area, 
reporting the news of the new understanding to Mobile in 
mid-May of 1702.25
24Ibid.. ff. 325 (v)-26.
25Ibid., f. 326.
26Ibid., ff. 326-26 (v); Iberville to the Minister, 
February 15, 1703, AM, B4 25, f. 374.
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Unfortunately, the French failed to meet all of the 
terms of the treaty which they made with the Chickasaw. 
Iberville had said that the Louisianians would establish 
trade with the Chickasaw since they agreed to cease dealing 
with the English. But when the Governor had promised to 
open a trading post in the area between the Chickasaw and 
the Choctaw lands and to stock it with merchandise, he had 
not known of the coming in Europe of the War of the Spanish 
Succession which would caus:- a desperate shortage of trade 
supplies for Louisiana in the following year.27
Believing that the French would provide them with 
additional gifts, the Chickas-iw continued traveling to Mobile 
in the year after the treaty. Their expectations .-/ere not 
realized. The empty storehouse at Mobile discouraged their 
further friendship with the French and only encouraged the 
English efforts to regain their lost allies.2® The French 
government did not sufficiently appreciate the importance of 
trade goods to the colony's success. The Minister of 
Marine, Comte de Pontchartrain, felt that the supplies sent 
thus far to Louisiana had been of a quantity and nature 
suitable for the needs and interest of both the colonists
27Joumal of Iberville, 1702, m, B4 23, ff. 326-
26(v) .
28La Salle to the Minister, May 20, 1703, AC, C13A 1, 
ff. 393-94; Minister to Iberville, June 17, 1703, AC, B 23, 
f. 193; Minister to Iberville, November 7, 1703, AM, B2 170, 
ff. 354 (v)-55; Minister to Begon, November 14, 1703, ibid., 
f. 427(v).
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and the Indians.^9 As was noted above, Iberville had already 
had to resort to a civilian to supply presents for the 
Chickasaw.30
An empty storehouse was not the only factor which 
contributed to the breakdown in relations between the French 
and the Chickasaw at this time. In the years following 
Iberville's general peace between the Choctaw and the Chicka­
saw, a new native war broke out in 1703. Jean Baptiste Le 
Moyne de Bienville, the colony's leader while Iberville was 
in France, delegated Pierre Dugue de Boisbriant to arrange 
a peace between the two tribes at Yowani village. During 
the talks, as was related in Chapter I, the Choctaw leaders 
accused their native enemies of killing a French boy, Petit 
St. Michel, whom Iberville had sent to the Chickasaw to learn 
their language. The Chickasaw chiefs denied their allega­
tions and sent runners to produce the child. When the 
runners failed to return Boisbriant had the Chickasaw chiefs 
handed over to the Choctaw and they killed them.33-
^Expenses for Presents for the Indians of Louisiana, 
March 17, 1703, AC, F1A 11. f, <16
39La Salle to the Minister, April 1, 1702, AC, C13C 
2, ff. 3 6 (v)-37 .
31Margry, ^IV, 521; Relation ou Annale veritable de 
ce qui s'est passe dans le pais de la Louisiane, pendant 
vingt-deux annees consecutives, dupuis le commencement de^
1 'etablissement des Franqais . . . jusqu'en 1721 par Andre 
Penigaut, Manuscript franqais, 14613, ff. 105-106 (Biblio- 
tequ.e Nationale, Salle des Manuscripts, Paris, France), 
hereinafter cited as Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613.
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Boisbriant's isolation in the midst of hundreds of 
red men undoubtedly had some bearing on his decision to turn 
the Chickasaw chiefs over to the Choctaw but the long-term 
results of what he did were disastrous for France. The 
Chickasaw tribe did not easily forget the deaths of these 
chiefs, for Petit St. Michel was, in fact, safe. Before the 
year ended, he was returned unharmed to Mobile.32 French 
intervention in this instance increased Chickasaw bellig­
erence towards them and also terminated the amicable 
relations which they had with this tribe.
Although the new French colony appeared to have lost 
the friendship of the Chickasaw, Bienville continued to hope 
for better rapport with the tribe. As leader of Louisiana 
following Iberville's death in 1706, he saw the advantages 
of having these courageous Indians for friends. To encourage 
the winning of their friendship, he believed that the French 
needed to increase contact with the Chickasaw tribe. One 
plan for doing so was the reduceione proposal of the Foreign 
Fathers for Indian conversion, accepted for a time by Bien­
ville, which had included the Chickasaw as well as the 
Choctaw. This plan called for assembling Indians in large 
mission villages, thereby reducing their independence in the 
wilderness. However, as was noted earlier, the reduceione 
system never worked out primarily because of the shortage of 
goods in the lean years of the War of the Spanish
32ibid.. ff. 106-12.
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Succession. However, Bienville did manage to send a few 
young French boys to the tribe to serve as interpreters.33
A shortage of soldiers, in addition to the lack of 
supplies hurt Bienville's hope and plan for the trading post 
to supply the Chickasaw nation, as had been promised by his 
brother. Bienville had known of the presence of the English 
in the Chickasaw territory since 1704, yet, he had always 
believed that the red men preferred the French to the 
English.3^ If the Chickasaw could be separated from the 
Anglo traders, the Indians would undoubtedly turn exclusively 
to the French for goods. Scouts already reported that the 
Mobile River was navigable into the Chickasaw territory, 
though the river was so shallow that getting loaded boats up 
it would be difficult. The channel was so narrow that 
French convoys would be easy targets for attack by tribes 
allied with the English, such as the Alabama.33
Bienville's efforts to maintain contact with the 
Chickasaw appeared hopeless when a new war broke out between 
the Choctaw and the Chickasaw in 1707. Earlier that year, 
Bienville had felt confident that the Choctaw and the Chicka­
saw chiefs still preferred the way of peace which the French
33Bienville to the Minister, 1706, AC, C13A 1, ff. 
525-26; Giraud, Histoire, I, 76-77.
3^Bienville to the Minister, 1704, AC, C13A 1, f.
460, ff. 529-30.
■ ^ B i enville to the Minister, October 10, 1706, AC, 
C13B 1, f. 10; Bienville to the Minister, February 20, 1707, 
AC, C13A 2, ff. 7-8; D 'Artaguiette to the Minister, February 
26, 1708, ibid.. ff. 144-45.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t o w n er. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
4 4
urged to that of war proposed by the English. Yet the 
Chickasaw continued to receive both the French and the 
English traders which indicated that the Chickasaw wanted 
to maintain their association with the English.
The French may have assessed the Chickasaws' desire 
for peace accurately, knowing that the current war with the 
Choctaw had decimated their families and destroyed their 
homes. And yet the failure of the French to provide goods 
in these years only enhanced the trading advantage of the 
warmongering English who were providing a seemingly endless 
supply of trinkets and ornaments while the French were 
waiting for their ships from the mother country. The 
Chickasaws1 disaffection toward the Louisianians undoubtedly 
grew when their chiefs 1 long trips to Mobile produced no 
supplies.37
Despite the growing tension between the French and 
the Chickasaw, Bienville tried to maintain contact with 
them. Not all of the Chickasaw were hostile towards the 
French, and some chiefs even informed envoys from Mobile of
36Ibid., ff. 313-14? Bienville to the Minister, 
February 20, 1707, ibid., ff. 8-9.
37Ibid.? Memoir on Louisiana by M. de la Vente,
June 21, 1710, ibid., f. 563? Minister to Begon, May 25, 
1717, AC, C29, f. 258? Minister to Bienville, May 10, 1710, 
AC B32, ff. 317(v)-18? Minister to Beauharnois, June 1,
1712, ibid., ff. 395(v)-96. See also Marcel Giraud, "France 
and Louisiana in the Early Eighteenth Century,1 Mississippi 
Valiev Historical Review, XXXVI (1949-50), 665.
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the whereabouts and activities of the English.38
In France the Ministry of Marine knew of the Caro­
linians ’ plans to use the tribes of the Lower Mississippi 
River Valley to drive the French out of Louisiana. So weak 
was the French position in Louisiana at this time that the 
government encouraged friendship with all of the Indian 
tribes, even those who traded with the English.38
The traders of Carolina were so effective because 
they received support and encouragement from several sources. 
As early as the 1690's Joseph Blake, the deputy governor of 
the colony for half of that decade, and James Moore, the 
governor from 1700 to 1702, were ardent intercessors with 
the Assembly for these frontier merchants. Indeed, Verner 
Crane, a historian of the fur trade of early South Carolina, 
argues that " . . .  the leaders in the government and in the 
skin trade were indentical. . . . A coureur de bois, one 
Jean Couture, the renegade servant of Henri de Tonty, had 
defected to the English late in the seventeenth century. 
Couture's knowledge of the interior geography and trails of 
the trans-Appalachian Southeast aided men such as Thomas
38La Salle to the Minister, September 12, 1708, AC, 
C13A 2, ff. 210-11.
39Minister to Bienville, July 11, 1709, AC B30, f.
182.
^8Crane, The Southern Frontier, 23-24, 45-46; Crane, 
"The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne's War," 382.
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Welch and Anthony Dodsworth who first traded with the Chicka­
saw tribe in the 1690's. Although the Government tried to 
control the activities of Indian traders by licensing them 
and requiring them to renew their licenses every year, the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw traders were excepted from such regula­
tion because those tribes were so far away.4"*"
While the Government made some effort to maintain 
control over the Indian trade, the colony's economic needs 
and the traders 1 desire for profits made effective regula­
tion impossible. Of the traders' importance Crane writes, 
"Even as late as the mid-century shipments of deerskins 
exceeded in value the combined returns from indigo, cattle, 
beef and pork, lumber and naval stores."42 In the first 
decade of the eighteenth century, South Carolina exported 
nearly three quarters of a million dressed, and half a 
million semi-dressed and undressed, buckskins to England.42 
It is no wonder that the monied interests among Carolina's 
leaders encouraged the traders 1 activities among the South­
eastern Indians.
Actually, in 1707 the Carolinians feared the French 
about as much as the French feared them. Some of the 
colony's leaders held that Carolina would be highly
41See Crane, The Southern Frontier, Chapter V, for a 
description of the Charleston Indian trade, 108-36.
42Ibid., 110-11.
43See Appendix A for a chart of all the skins traded 
at this time by the colony of Carolina.
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vulnerable to attack if France managed to arm and organize 
all the red men in its territory. In an effort to prevent 
this from happening, throughout 1707 and 1708 Thomas Nairne 
and Thomas Welch of Carolina had been working for a peace 
between the Charleston government and the Indians of the 
Louisiana area. Considering the Chickasaw friends, these 
men spent their time among those tribes who were allies of 
the French. Nairne negotiated with the Choctaw, while Welch 
spoke with the Arkansas, Taensa, Natchez and Koroa 
natives.44 As a result of these contacts, Nairne suggested 
several schemes to the Carolina government to break the 
French hold and influence on the Indians in the area. One 
proposal involved enslaving all the Indians of the Mobile 
region or removing them to the Chickasaw territory. The 
Carolina assembly also considered invading Louisiana and 
attacking Mobile with a force of 80 canoes and 1,000 
Indians.45
The French realized only too well how weak was their 
position on the Gulf of Mexico when the news of English 
activities and plans reached Mobile in the late summer of 
1708. Voyageurs from the Yazoo area reported that English
44Thomas Nairne to the Minister, July 10, 1708, 
Colonial Office Papers 5, 382, ff. 24-24(v) (Public Record 
Office, London, England), hereinafter cited as PRO, C.O. 5; 
Crane, "The Southern Frontier," 390-91.
^Thomas Nairne to the Minister, July 10, 1608, PRO, 
C.O. 5, 382, f. 24 (v).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
traders were offering the Indians along the Mississippi 
River thousands of crowns worth of merchandise to terminate 
any French alliance which they had formed. These merchants 
had told the Indians that forces from Carolina would march 
southward in January or February of the following year to 
conquer the French in Louisiana. Having only 130 men to 
defend the colony, Louisiana's leaders asked for additional 
troops from Canada as they worked to strengthen their forti­
fications at Mobile. In the face of this near certain 
disaster, Bienville retained his confidence in his Indian 
allies.46
In late 1707 Bienville helped the French position by 
arranging a peace between the Choctaw and the Chickasaw 
through his brother Antoine Le Moyne de Chateaugue. But the 
English were still relying on Chickasaw support. When the 
Carolinians and some 600 to 700 Indians descended the 
Alabama River in May, 1709 to attack two small tribes, the 
Mobile and the Thome, the French retaliated successfully.
The Louisianians, along with their Indian allies, pursued 
the invaders, killing about 34 men altogether. The victory, 
it seemed, might be shortlived, for by August of that year 
Bienville learned from an Irish deserter of English plans to
4^D1Artaguiette to the Minister, October 1, 1708, 
AC C13A 2, ff. 341-42; Bienville to the Minister, October 
12, 1708, ibid., f. 169.
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return in October with three pieces of cannon and 2,500
4 7Indians.
Despite the French government's preoccupation with 
the War of the Spanish Succession, in Louisiana's first 
decade of settlement, as the Marine appreciated, the Le 
Moynes succeeded in preventing a successful English offen­
sive in Louisiana. Of course, their position would have 
been stronger if the colony had received adequate trade 
goods and supplies. The allotment of BOO litres for the 
natives' presents in 1708 and 1709 had never even been sent 
to the colony. But it was hoped that Louisiana's adminis­
trative reorganization under Antoine Crozat would help over­
come the supply shortage.49
While some scholars hold that the French frontier 
influence among the Indians grew and that of the English 
declined in the years following 1708, the leaders of Louisi­
ana believed that the English threatened the colony in a 
very real way.49 Even though the Carolina assembly had dis­
missed. Thomas Nairne's plans for Indian removal and for a 
major attack on Louisiana, the Carolinians' seemingly
47Ibid., 170? Bienville to the Minister, August 20,
1709, ibid., ff. 407-409.
49King to the Cadillac, May 13, 1710, AC, B52, f. 
342(v)? Pontchartrain to Bienville, May 10, 1710, in Dunbar 
Rowland and Albert Sanders (eds.J, Mississippi Provincial 
Archives (3. vols., Jackson, 1927-32), III, 139. Herein- 
after cited as MPA.
49Crane, "The Southern Frontier," 391; Giraud, 
Histoire, I, 189-90.
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Inexhaustible supply of Indian trade goods had to be dealt 
with. Not only were the English continuing to supply the 
Chickasaw who lived deep within French territory, but they 
were also dealing with loyal French allies close by in an 
effort to disrupt the colony's peace.50 Unable to provide 
even for his Indian friends, Bienville could not hope to 
sustain a peaceful relationship with the Chickasaw, whose 
growing dependence on the white man1s goods drew them 
increasingly into the English camp.
Despite the Le Moynes' successes in securing Indian 
allies for the colony, in 1712 the Chickasaw remained 
associated with the English. It was indeed unfortunate for 
the French that they could not control one of the major 
tribes of colonial Louisiana. These fierce, warlike people 
would have provided an excellent source of manpower and 
security for the struggling colony against its European 
rivals. Perhaps, with the new Crozat regime and a greater 
government interest in the colony, French supplies would 
increase enough to win over even the Chickasaw and help 
diminish the English threat to the French in Louisiana.
50Bienville to the Minister, June 20, 1711, AC, 
C13A 1, ff. 47(v)-48? Memoir of D'Artaguiette to Pontchar- 
train, May 12, 1712, MPA. II, 64.
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CHAPTER III
THE FRENCH ENCOUNTER AN ENIGMA: THE NATCHEZ,
1700-1712
During a short trip to the Mississippi River tribes 
in 1700, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville visited the Natchez 
Indians.̂  While initial encounters with the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw tribes defined immediately the French relationship 
with these natives, through the first decade of the colony's 
history Louisiana's leaders remained uncertain about their 
status with the Natchez people. The culture and society of 
this tribe appeared quite advanced, almost sophisticated, at 
the first encounter. Yet, even from the initial meeting, 
the French sensed that this tribe was different from the 
other natives of Louisiana.
Quite probably, Iberville had learned of this tribe 
from Nicholas de la Salle and Henri de Tonty, the former 
Louisiana's commissaire and the latter the colony's chief 
scout. As members of Robert Cavalier de la Salle's exploring 
party of 1682, they both had seen the Natchez Indians in
^•Pierre Margry (ed.), Memoires et documents; 
Decouvertes et etablissements des francais dans l'r0uest et 
dans le Sud de l'Amerique septentrionale (6 vols., Paris, 
1879-88), I, 558. Hereinafter cited as Margry.
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March of that year. Shortly after their departure from a 
Taensa village a few miles north of present-day Natchez, 
Mississippi, the explorers had spied about 200 natives down 
river on the eastern shore, armed with tomahawks and bows 
and arrows. Fearing attack, the French retreated to the 
western bank of the river. Later that day, in an overture 
of peace, Tonty offered a calumet which was readily 
accepted by the Indians. The natives immediately extended 
an invitation to the white men to visit their village.
Located some three leagues away from the river amidst several 
hills, the settlement must have seemed picturesque. The 
chief greeted La Salle and offered him food while the 
parties waited for the chiefs to come in from the tribe's 
surrounding villages. Anxious to continue their journey, 
however, the Europeans left before the arrival of the other 
native leaders, believing that they had made peace with all 
the Natchez.^
When Iberville came to Louisiana in January, 1599, 
he received more specific details concerning the Natchez 
Indians from missionaries and explorers. The Natchez 
people, he was informed, lived on the eastern bank of the 
Mississippi River, 23 leagues south of the Taensa territory,
in the vicinity of modern-day Natchez, Mississippi. The
2Ibid., 557, 602-503; Relation of La Salle's Journey
to the Mouth of the Mississippi River, April, 1682, Archives
des Colonies, C13C 3, f. 28 (v) (Archives Nationales, Paris, 
France), hereinafter cited as AC.
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tribe consisted of 2,000 individuals who spoke the Taensa
language. The five villages which comprised the Natchez
were allied with 40 other Indian settlements located along 
2the Mississippi River.
From a Taensa Indian, Iberville learned still more 
about the Natchez. He related that these Indians were 
merely a part of a larger people, the Theoel who included, 
besides the Natchez, the Pochougoula, Ousagoucoula, 
Cogoucoula, Yatannaca, Ymacha, Thoucoue, Thougoula, and the 
Achougoula.̂  The Natchez, however, must have been the most 
powerful of all these tribes, for their village seemed to 
dominate all the others.
Despite the language barrier between the white men 
and the Natchez, eighteenth-century French observers 
recorded a great deal concerning the rich culture and 
customs of this tribe. More recently, archaeologists, 
through extensive excavations near present-day Natchez, 
Mississippi, have determined that the Natchez Indians lived, 
at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in 
villages along St. Catherine Creek, a tributary of the river.
^Ibid.; M. de Montigny to the Minister, May 6, 1699, 
Papers of Claude de L'Isle, Archives de la Marine, 2JJ-56, 
#13, f. 3 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), hereinafter 
cited at AM; Tonty to his brother, February 28, 1700, ibid., 
#14, f. 6; Andrew C. Albrecht, "Indian-French Relations at 
Natchez," American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 48 
(1946), 330.
^argry, IV, 178-79.
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The Grand Village was on the modern-day Fatherland Planta­
tion.5
The higher elevation of the region in which the 
Natchez lived could well have symbolized the noble spirit in 
these people when the white men first encountered them.
Indeed, the Natchez seem to have epitomized the notion of 
the "noble savage" perceived as, . . a member of that 
ideal society . . . free from the burden of civilization, 
knowing neither human weakness, suffering nor want. . . ."5 
Travelers to eighteenth century Louisiana thought that the 
Indians there had originated from the migrations of the Jews, 
Carthaginians and the Vikings.7 Some observers concluded 
that the Natchez had many vestiges of ancient western peoples.
5Robert S. Neitzel, Archaeology of the Fatherland 
Site: the Grand Village of the Natchez (New York, 1955), 9.
Archaeologists in this century have discovered three dis­
tinct mounds at the plantation, each of which has been 
identified. The work of Robert S. Neitzal in recent years 
aided the marking of Mound A as a possible former temple 
site, Mound B as the site of the Great Suns' house and Mound 
C as the location of the temple, ibid., 12-14; Robert S. 
Neitzal, "The Natchez Grand Village," The Florida Anthro­
pologist. XVII, No. 2 (June, 1964), 63-64.
6Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on
European Images of Non-European Man (New Haven, 1965) 27-.'”
7Louis Hennepin, Description de la Louisiane (Paris, 
1683), 16 ff; M^moire sur la Louisiane-par Le Maire, Fonds 
frangais, 12105, ff. 10-11 (Bibliotheque Nationals, Salle 
des Manuscripts, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as Le 
Maire, 12105; Memoir of Le Maire, January 15, 1714, AC, C13C 
2, ff. 124-24(v); Father Le Maire, Memoire inedit sur la 
Louisiane. 1717 (New Orleans, 1899), 11-13; Benard de La 
Harpe, Journal Historique de 1 'etablissement des Francais a 
la Louisiane (New Orleans, 1831), 399-403; Lee Eldridge 
Huddleston, Origins of the American Indians: European Con­
cepts. 1492-1729 (Austin, 1967), 32-33, 37.
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According to their own sacred history, years before, 
the Natchez tribe had lived in a beautiful region of the 
Southwest, presumably Mexico. Internal tribal disputes had 
forced them to migrate eastward, wandering first towards the 
mountains, perhaps the Rockies, then again south to the 
mouth of the Mississippi River. They then ascended the 
river until they sighted the bluffs in present-day Missis­
sippi. Here they stopped and remained for generations. At 
one time, their territory extended 12 days' journey east 
and west, and 15 days' journey north and south. A terrible 
plague struck their people several centuries before, greatly 
reducing their numbers. These people could well have con­
tracted some disease from the Spanish of the De Soto 
expedition in the sixteenth century.®
Scholars have estimated that some 4,000 people com­
prised the Natchez tribe in 1700.9 The Natchez were tall 
Indians who looked like other natives of the region. They 
used tattoos more than other Indians of the Southeast.
Andre Penicaut, a member of the original settlement group, 
observed that they had nicer faces and that they spoke in a 
less guttural fashion than most of the other Indians. The
^ e  Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane (3 vols., 
Paris, 1758), III, 62, 338; Albrecht, "Indian-French Rela­
tions at Natchez," 326.
9John R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern 
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, 
Washington, 1946), 161; Alvin M. Josephy, The Indian Heri­
tage of America (New York, 1968), 106.
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men wore tunics made from buckskin while the women dressed 
in longer cloaks. The tribe appeared to outside observers 
to be a unified, but subservient people.-1-0 As to their 
character, assessments varied greatly, depending on the 
personal biases of the reporter. One priest, Father Gravier, 
wrote that "'The Natches . . . practice polygamy, steal, and 
are very vicious . . . 1" while another early missionary in 
the colony, Father Henri de la Vente, believed, "'Envy, 
anger, oaths and pride are unknown among the greater part of 
them, and to put everything in a word, they have nothing 
savage but the name. . . . Le Page du Pratz described the 
tribe as "1. . . one of the most estimable in the colony in 
the first times. . . . '
The solar cult of the Natchez with its monotheistic 
overtones distinguished these people from the region's 
polytheistic tribes.^-2 Their temple was a building of
lc,Relation ou Annale veritable de ce qui s'est passe 
dans le pais de la Louisiane, pendant vingt-deux annees 
consecutives, depais le commencement de 1'etablissement des 
Frangais . . . jusqu'en 1721 par Andre Penicaut, Manuscript 
frangais, 14613, ff. 123-24 (Salle des Manuscripts, Biblio- 
theque Nationale, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as 
Penigaut, Ms. fr. 14613? John R. Swanton, Indian Tribes of 
the Lower Mississippi Valley and Adjacent Coast of the Gulf 
of Mexico (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 43, 
Washington, 1911), 48-57, passim.
11Ibid.. 49-51.
12John R. Swanton, "The Ethnological Position of the 
Natchez Indians," American Anthropologist, New Series, IX 
(1907), 527; Swanton, Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi 
Valley. 717.
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approximately 40 feet by 20 feet, constructed of hickory 
wood and cane, and mortared with mud and straw. It pro­
tected not only the sacred fire, but also several baskets 
containing bones of past Great Suns, the tribe's deceased 
monarchs. The structure had no windows and only one door 
which faced the house of the reigning Great Sun. Although 
only members of the nobility and the priests were permitted 
to enter the temple, everyone brought the first fruits of 
his harvest there as o f f e r i n g s . 1 -̂
During their first years in the colony, the French 
surely recognized the centralized political organization of 
the tribe, unified as it was through a noble chief and his 
family. Even though the Europeans did not know specific 
details, they did understand that the principal chief had 
absolute power over all the people.14 Other villages of the 
tribe had chiefs, but the Great Sun was superior to them. A
■^Le Page du Pratz, Histoire, III, 335-37; Pierre de 
Charlevoix, S.J., Journal historique d'un Voyage par ordre 
du roi dans l'amerique septentrionale (Paris, 1744), II,
417; Margry, V, 451-52; Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), The 
Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents; Travels and Explora- 
tions of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791 
(73 vols., Cleveland, 1893-1901), LXV, 139, hereinafter 
cited as the Jesuit Relations; Journal of Paul du Ru; 
Missionary Priest to Louisiana, February 1 to May 8, 1700 
(Chicago, 1934), 36. At the Fatherland Plantation site near 
Natchez, Mississippi, archaeologists have determined the 
temple's location on Mound C, some 450 feet south and west 
of Mound B, the Great Sun's house. See Neitzal, Archaeology 
of the Fatherland Site, 37.
14Margry, IV, 411-12; Journal of Paul du Ru, 34, La 
Harpe, Journal Historique, 28.
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descendant from Tai, whom these natives believed to be the 
Supreme Light, Great Sun and his relatives reflected small 
rays of this pervasive source of light.15 The ruler was a 
male, but early French observers, such as Father Paul du Ru 
and Le Page du Pratz, also detected power in the hands of a 
woman. They mention a chieftainess whose influence was 
great and whose control over the activities of noble male 
children seemed unquestioned.
Natchez tradition held that years ago a man and his 
wife had come into their midst glowing as bright as the sun. 
The man said that he had come to teach them a better way of 
life. Presenting a moral code condemning murder, adultery, 
theft and lying, the visitor won over his hosts, and the 
elders ashed him to be their sovereign. Accepting their 
offer, the holy man commanded that his children, the Suns, 
rule the Natchez, and that the oldest princess' first male 
child should become the Great Sun. The other princes and 
princesses should marry within their rank, except in the 
case of the lowest nobility who could marry the common 
people, the Stinkards. Such a rigid caste system only 
enhanced the sacredness of the chief.15 Even the homes of 
this noble class were different from those of the other
15Extract of a letter of S . Le Sueur to his brother, 
April 4, 1700, Papers of Claude de L'Isle, AM, 2JJ-56; Le 
Page du Pratz, Histoire, II, 336.
l6Le Page du Pratz, Histoire. Ill, 323, 330-32; 
ibid., II, 334; Journal of Paul du Ru, 30; Margry, V, 453.
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groups, as they were elevated several feet off the ground.17
Anthropologists and archaeologists have studied and 
from time to time commented on this relatively advanced 
native social structure.1® The lower nobility's intermar­
riage with the common people seems to suggest that eventually 
the Stinkards would overcome the aristocratic classes. Such 
a phenomenon cannot be explained in neat anthropological 
patrilineal or matrilineal terms. An interesting interpreta­
tion holds that the Natchez of the historical era were 
integrating wandering or displaced peoples into their 
society and, that, indeed, this complex social arrangement 
was fairly new. Iberville mentioned nine villages in the 
Natchez area. Perhaps, these villages supplied the older 
Natchez tribe with new "blood."1®
Although these natives appeared to have elements of 
a highly organized society, several terribly barbaric 
elements of the Natchez culture were noticed by even the 
first settlers. At the death of the Great Sun or an impor­
tant chieftainess, mass strangulation occurred. Not only
17Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14513, f. 131.
1®See Kingsley Davis, "Intermarraige in Caste 
Societies," American Anthropologist, XLVIII (1941), 382; 
William Christie Macleod, "Natchez Political Evolution," 
American Anthropologist. XXVI (1924), 201-209; William 
Christie Macleod, "On Natchez Cultural Origins, " American 
Anthropologist. XXVIII (1926), 409-13; Andrew C. Albrecht, 
"Ethical Precepts among the Natchez," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly, XXXI (1948), 559-97.
1®Jeffrey P. Brain, "The Natchez Paradox," Ethnology. 
X, No. 2 (April, 1971), 215-22.
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were the deceased's bodyguards killed, but so also were 
infants and other members of his own family in order that 
the chief might not journey alone into the next world.
Tribal members accepted this honor, a dubious one to the 
eighteenth century European, without question. A Stinkard 
family that offered some of its members in the sacrifice 
could be promoted into the lower ranks of the nobility.20 
According to Le Page du Pratz and Pierre de Charlevoix, two 
French visitors to the Natchez, this murderous custom was 
still being practiced in the 1720's.21
Such extremely unusual behavior did not characterize 
the Natchez tribe's economic activities. They were similar 
to those of most other Indians. Although they depended more 
on farming than hunting for their food, they did hunt. The 
chasse g6n£rale among the Natchez struck white men as a 
spectacular sight (Illust. No. 1). In this type of hunt, 
the young men of the tribe would surround the animal while 
dancing, forming a U, and closing in for the kill. The 
creature, after it was slain, was taken by hunters to the 
chief who distributed the meat to the hunters.22
20Extract of a letter of Sr. Le Sueur to his brother, 
April 4, 1700, Papers of Claude de L'Isle, AM, 2JJ-56; 
Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, ff. 135-37; Brain, "The Natchez 
Paradox," 216.
21Swanton, Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi 
Valley, 138ff. Extensive quotations can be found here which 
have been taken from the histories and the travelers' 
accounts of the Natchez people.
22Ibid., 70-71; Charles Hudson, The Southeastern 
Indians (Knoxville, 1976), 277-79.
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C /iassc yesi& 'a/e d u  
C/zcvrcud .
Figure  70. N atchez U -shaped form ation for hun tin g  d eer. W oodcut from 
L eP age  Du P ra tz ,/ /  istoire de la L ou isiane , Paris, 175S, vol. 2 ,0 p p . p. 7l -
Illustration No. 1
A xerox copy of an illustration from Charles Hudson's 
The Southeastern Indians, 278.
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Farming was also carried on as a communal effort.
The principal crops were cultivated as follows, " . . .  
Planting of the grain is always done in common; all of one 
village will work for another so successfully until all of 
their work is finished." Harvesting was also a communal 
activity.23 When Louisiana's first leaders learned that 
maize was harvested two times a year, in May and in November, 
they must have realized that the land was fertile and the 
growing season was long.2^
Iberville met the Natchez Indians for the first time 
in March, 1700. He and his party traveled north from the 
Houma villages to the Natchez territory, 18 leagues up river. 
Arriving early in the morning on March 11, the travelers 
came upon several Indians fishing along the banks of the 
river. Their meeting was friendly, for these natives gave 
the white men some of their catch. After sending word up to 
the village of their coming, th-̂  French waited on a bluff by 
the river to be received. Shortly thereafter, the chief's 
brother, accompanied by 20 warriors, approached the white 
men in a peaceful procession. He offered Iberville a 
calumet as a sign of friendship.23 The emissary reported 
that while the Great Sun, the chief of the Natchez, was ill
23Quoted in Swanton, Indian Tribes of the Lower 
Mississippi Valley, 75.
24-The Jesuit Relations, LXV, 145.
25Journal of Paul du Ru, 34.
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and reluctant to travel, he awaited eagerly their arrival at 
his village.
Iberville and his companions, led by the Natchez
entourage, set out for the Great Village at about 2 o'clock
that afternoon. Along the way, they encountered another
Indian escort which was bearing the ailing monarch on his
bed of state (Illust. No. 2). Iberville noticed the power
and authority which this small, thin man of barely five feet
seemed to exude. The Frenchman reported, "He appeared to me
the most absolute Indian I have ever seen. . . . Despite
his suffering from the flux, the Great Sun's graciousness
and dignity struck the newcomers. Another member of the
French party wrote:
The chief's manner impresses me; he has the air of an 
ancient emperor, a long face, sharp eyes . . . the 
respect with which the other Savages approach and 
serve him is astonishing. If he speaks to one of them, 
that person thanks him before answering. They never 
pass in front of him if it can be avoided, if they 
must, it is with elaborate precautions. . . .27
On meeting the French, the chief presented Iberville, Father
Paul du Ru, Bienville and Sieur de Guay with several white
crosses and a few pearls. The entire group then proceeded
up to the village, stopping before the chief's house. The
house, a cane structure, was 45 feet long and 25 feet wide
and rested on stilts about ten feet off the ground. It was
surrounded by eight smaller huts.28
28Margry, IV, 412. 27Journal of Paul du Ru, 34.
28Margry, IV, 411.
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Figure 4 9 . The N atchez G reat Su p carried on a litter. From  LePage Du 
Prutz, llv ito ire  die la L ouhiane, Paris, i"5S , vol. 2, opp. p. 367. Courtesy, 
U niversity of Georgia L ibraries. _______
Illustration No. 2
A xerox copy of an illustration from Charles Hudson's 
The Southeastern Indians, 205.
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Opposite the Great Sun's house, the visitors 
observed a temple. An oval structure, Iberville estimated 
that it encompassed an area 200 feet wide and 300 feet long. 
The temple seemed to represent the life force of the village 
as it was set very near the chief's home and also to a large 
creek which provided the community with water.^
Probably because of the Natchez' strong commitment 
to their own religious beliefs, the Mission Fathers had 
reported difficulties in converting these Indians. Although 
Father de Montigny did leave word that he had baptized 185 
children in 1700, he nevertheless considered his mission 
effort there a failure when he left for the Taensa.30
While earlier conversion attempts may have had 
limited success, the Natchez people exhibited to Iberville 
and his party a hospitality and friendliness which over­
whelmed the French. "We are living with them as with 
brothers," wrote Father Du Ru. "I should, " he added,
"prefer to be alone at night in their midst than on Rue St. 
Jacques in Paris at nine o'clock in the evening. "3  ̂ The 
French experienced the "gentleness and kindness of all the 
savages." Even the chieftainess and her son provided them
with food and drink during their stay and for the rest of 
09their journey.
29Ibid.
"Th e  Jesuit Relations. LXV, 135? Margry, IV, 411.
31Ibid., 34. 32Ibid., 38.
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Perhaps the pleasant nature of the Natchez was pro­
duced by their natural surroundings, for they lived in an 
area of rolling terrain with verdant fields and lush vegeta­
tion. Shortly after their arrival, Father Du Ru wrote:
The plains of the Natchez which I observed a little 
more attentively today are even more beautiful than
I had realized. There are peach, plum, walnut and
fig trees everywhere. It is unfortunate that this 
place is so remote from the mouth of the Missis­sippi. 33
Iberville observed the soil of the area to be yellow and 
gray like that of France. Scattered throughout the rolling 
countryside were foot paths which led to dispersed hamlets 
nestled among clusters of trees. He believed the territory 
of the tribe to have been only eight square leagues in area,
and he estimated the number of huts at about 400 . ^
Interestingly enough, the French did not mention 
specifically the villages of the eight other bands of the 
Theoel people already described for them by the Taensa 
Indian. Iberville does allude to the existence of additional 
hamlets. The fact that their leaders, or chiefs, were not 
contacted by the French at this time indicates that the 
Theoel people's power and authority over the region was 
centered in the hands of the Great Sun who lived at the 
Great Village visited by the French.
Desiring to establish a friendship with these
33ibid.
^^Margry, IV, 411-12; Penigaut, Ms. fr., 14613, ff.
118-19.
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Indians, prior to his departure Iberville gave the chief a 
musket, some powder and lead, a blanket and a cap, as well 
as some hatchets, knives and beads. The chief had these 
gifts immediately placed in the temple. Although ignorant 
of the Natchez language, Bienville tried to exchange a few 
words of friendship with the Indians while a second calumet 
was smoked.-^5 Iberville promised to send a young boy to 
learn the Natchez language.-^
In the years immediately following Iberville's and 
Bienville's initial contact with the Natchez in 1700, 
references to further French relations with the tribe are 
rather fragmentary. Bienville, as the main leader of the 
Louisiana colonizing effort in the years after Iberville's 
death, was, of course, very much aware of the location and 
the presence of the tribe. Whether or not they could be 
considered allies, the young Le Moyne was not sure, for 
while they had immediately responded to his request for aid 
against the Attakapa Indians in 1704, their flirtations 
with the English could not be overlooked. As early as 1706, 
Bienville knew of English designs to drive the French out of
35Margry, IV, 412? Journal of Paul du Ru, 35.
■^Richebourg Gaillard McWilliams (ed.), Fleur de Lys 
and Calumet; Being the Penicaut Narrative of French Adven­
ture in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1953) , 28~.
37Bienville to Pontchartrain, September 6, 1704, in 
Dunbar Rowland and Albert Sanders (eds.), Mississippi Pro­
vincial Archives (3 vols., Jackson, 1927-33), II, 23. 
Hereinafter cited as MPA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
Louisiana. In fact, the English were giving these Indians 
both better prices for their skins than the French and more 
p r e s e n t s . F r e n c h  fears of the English were exacerbated 
when the Carolinians Thomas Welch and Thomas Nairne, as was 
mentioned in Chapter II, worked openly in 1707 to win over 
the Mississippi River tribes. Nairne tried to persuade the 
Choctaw to become allies of the English at the same time 
that Welch was working among the Koroa, Natchez, Taensa and 
Arkansas Indians.39 While the French later generally assumed 
that the Anglo effort had been arrested, that the Natchez, 
in fact, preferred them to the English, the position of 
these Indians as an ally remained questionable.
Still, doubts concerning Natchez loyalty to the 
French must have not been too widespread among the first 
Louisianians. In 1700 several settlers petitioned the 
colony's leaders for land in the Natchez area.^ The marshy 
soil of the coastal region near Mobile Bay was anything but 
conducive to successful farming. Even in Louisiana's first 
years, rumors and reports of the excellent soil and plentiful
®8Bienville to Pontchartrain, July 28, 1706, ibid., 
24; Bienville to Pontchartrain, October 12, 1708, ibid.,
39.
39Thomas Nairne to the Minister, July 10, 1708, 
Colonial Office Papers 5, 382, ff. 24-24 (v), in the Public 
Record Office, London, England; V e m e r  Crane, "The Southern 
Frontier in Queen Anne's War," American Historical Review, 
XXIV (April, 1919), 390.
^°D'Artaguiette to Pontchartrain, June 20, 1710,
MPA, II, 59.
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rainfall in the Natchez area had prompted investigations of 
the country. "That country of the Natchez is very different 
for it is perfectly good and agreeable . . . "  wrote Sauvole 
in 1701, after receiving favorable word from the scouts whom 
he had sent there.4^ Iberville himself, it has been noted, 
had observed that the country was a great deal like that of 
France.42 indeed, the Natchez country seemed to offer a 
solution to the colony's need for farm land. Located on the 
Mississippi River, the fruits of the harvest could be sent 
easily downstream.
Officials in France, as well as in Louisiana, knew 
about the uniqueness of the Natchez by the beginning of the 
Antoine Crozat regime in 1712. While the status of the 
Choctaw and the Chickasaw tribes, as ally and foe, respec­
tively, had been defined by the end of Louisiana's first 
decade, the position of the Natchez still remained uncertain. 
Members of both the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes had come to 
Mobile to meet the new white men in 1700. Through their 
contact with these tribes, the French had a fairly clear 
notion of their relationship with them. On the other hand, 
the French went to the Natchez in that spring of 1700.
Greatly impressed by the richness and the fertility of the 
Indians' lands, the Le Moynes and their followers seemed to
41Sauvole to Pontchartrain, August 4, 1701, ibid.,
16.
42Margry, IV, 412.
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understand the potential of the land of the Natchez rather 
than the natives themselves, who would remain an enigma for 
some time.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FRENCH AND THE CHOCTAW, 1713-1720
When Governor Antoine Le Mothe Cadillac arrived in 
Louisiana in May, 1713, a new era began for the colony. For 
the next seven years efforts to exploit the economic poten­
tial of this starving settlement on the Gulf of Mexico 
increased steadily, first under the auspices of Antoine 
Crozat and then under John Law. The quarreling, disorder 
and profiteering of the first colonists were well-known to 
all. However, the French government hoped to bring them 
.■nder control by appointing Cadillac governor of Louisiana 
for the opening years of Antoine Crozat1s directorship. As 
the founder of Detroit, he had had a good deal of experience 
with the new frontier establishments and with Indian affairs. 
The government, therefore, hoped that he would be able to 
improve the colony's trade relations with the Choctaw.
Governor Cadillac's regime in Louisiana began badly. 
On approaching Dauphine Island in May 1713, his ship hit a 
sandbar and sank, an event which foreshadowed the diffi­
culties Cadillac would have in the colony. His reputation 
for strict, nearly tyrannical rule at the Detroit post had
71
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preceded him.1 Although aware of Louisiana's need for a 
more disciplined administration to achieve an improvement of 
the colony's economy, Jerome Phelypeaux, Comte de Pontchar­
train, the Minister of Marine, cautioned the new governor to 
exercise prudence in dealing with the unruly settlers of 
Louisiana.3
The Government's high expectations of Cadillac's 
work with the Indians were not realized. From his first 
days as governor, his attitude towards the natives conflicted 
with that of Jean Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville. The 
successful peace worked out by the Le Moynes with the Indians, 
especially between the Choctaw and the Chickasaw, over the 
preceding decade, was threatened by this new ruler who 
advocated inter-tribal wars to eliminate the Indian popu­
lace.3
Apparently the Indians sensed his arrogance and 
hostility, for as late as the fall of 1713 the Choctaw, as 
well as other natives, still acknowledged Bienville as the 
head of Louisiana and the chief gift-giver. The new
^ 1Artaguiette to Pontchartrain, February 12, 1710, 
in Dunbar Rowland and Albert Sanders (eds.), Mississippi 
Provincial Archives (3 vols., Jackson, 1927-33), II, 52, 
hereinafter cited as MPA; Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church 
and State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics
to 1732 (New Haven, 1966), 91.
^King to Cadillac, May 13, 1710, Archives des 
Colonies, B 32, ff. 345(v)-46 (Archives Nationales, Paris, 
France), hereinafter cited as AC? O'Neill, Church and State, 
83.
3Memoir of Duclos to Pontchartrain, October 26,
1713, AC, C13A 3, f. 272.
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governor recognized Bienville's linguistic skills and com­
petence in dealing with the red men. He also felt, however, 
that both he and Bienville could not live at the same post.
As a result, Cadillac sent Bienville on numerous assignments 
away from Mobile.^
Cadillac's condemnation of the Canadians 1 activities 
with the Indians exemplified the differences of opinion 
between himself and Bienville in Indian affairs. A major 
source of conflict between Cadillac and Bienville was the 
fact that each of these men had had his own experience in 
dealing with the red man. Although he had known mainly the 
natives of the Detroit area, Cadillac acted as though he 
knew the customs of all Indians and he did not feel it 
necessary to educate himself on the local Indian situation. 
Bienville, however, knew the Indians of Louisiana well. He 
valued their friendship and attempted to keep peace with 
them by respecting their territories and customs. Under 
Cadillac, Bienville's views did not prevail in French 
councils. The new governor, for example, permitted migrant 
Indians from the Carolina border country and the Red River 
basin to settle in the vicinity of Mobile, failing to consult
any of the chiefs of the tribes near Fort Louis.^ Such an
^Ibid.; Cadillac to the Minister, October 26, 1713,
ibid., ff. 91-92; Duclos to the Minister, October, 1713,
ibid., ff. 183-84.
5Duclos to Pontchartrain, October 25, 1713, ibid., 
ff. 267-68.
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obvious disregard of their territorial claims did not pro­
mote native friendship.
Further tension regarding the governor's authority- 
evolved from within the new leadership itself. Jean-Baptiste 
Duclos had accompanied Cadillac to Louisiana as commissaire 
to succeed Nicholas de La Salle who had died in 1711. Duclos 
adapted easily to his role as overseer of the colony's 
supply depot, and he supported Bienville's position with the 
Indians almost from the start. When the Choctaw and other 
tribes of the Mobile River hinterland came to Fort Louis in 
October, 1713 to meet the new governor, Duclos welcomed them. 
As part of the welcoming ceremony, he provided food for the 
visitors and gave them presents. Duclos observed this 
widely followed Indian custom because he deemed it necessary 
to retain the Indians' friendship. Cadillac, however, did 
not agree and he accused Duclos of illegally tampering with 
the company 1s merchandise.®
The French government had learned from previous 
experience the damaging effect on Indian relations of 
colonial quarrels over matters of trade and the distribution 
of presents. In 1714, therefore, the King announced an 
official position to be followed by the colonial personnel.7 
France was allotting 4,000 livres a year to be used solely 
for Indian presents. The governor and the commissaire would
6Ibid., ff. 273-74; Cadillac to the Minister,
October 26, 1713, ibid., 25-26.
7Cadillac to the Minister, February 20, 1714, ibid.,
436-38.
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share 2,000 livres in goods to distribute to the Indians of 
the Mobile and Alabama rivers, and Bienville would have the 
other half of the presents to give to the natives who lived 
along the Mississippi River as far north as the Natchez 
region. Crozat's clerks would compare the bills and the 
lists of goods sent. The Ministry of Marine ordered the 
governor and Bienville to keep a careful account of the 
items given the Indians and warned them not to exceed their 
allotment of 2,000 livres each.® These orders, however, did 
not end the arguments, accusations and disputes between the 
governor and the commissaire.9
In December, 1714, Antoine Huche, the chief French 
interpreter to the Choctaw nation, arrived at Mobile with a 
delegation from the Choctaw tribe who sought gifts from the 
governor. Huche had urged these Indians to go to Mobile 
when English traders began to trade that year in Choctaw 
territory. Having more than the usual amount of merchandise, 
these men from Carolina were planning to set up a trading 
post in the main Choctaw village of Kunshak.^® The governor
®Memoir of the King to La Mother Cadillac and Duclos, 
Governor and Commissaire, respectively of Louisiana, 1714, 
ibid., ff. 698-99; List of Louisiana's Expenses for 1714 by 
Duclos, ibid., f. 292; Duclos to the Minister, October, 1713, 
ibid., f. 150; Funds for Louisiana, September 9, 1713, AC, 
FlB“l8, ff. 100(v)-102(v).
^Duclos to Cadillac, December 24, 1714, AC, C13A 3, 
ff. 764-66.
^ C a d i l l a c  to Duclos, December 23, 1714, ibid., ff.
762-63.
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managed to supply the Choctaw delegation with shirts, hats, 
beads and vermilion. Unfortunately, even though appropria­
tions increased for such expenditures under the Crozat 
regime, the French continued to have fewer goods than the 
English.^
Faced with the danger of losing the colony's most 
important Indian allies, the Choctaw, the governor planned 
to expel the English from the region. Cadillac's ignorance 
of local conditions was clearly reflected in his planning. 
Choosing not to deal directly with the Choctaw in the matter, 
he proceeded to involve the Chickasaw, the Choctaw nation's 
principal enemy. He sent Huche to the Chickasaw to ask them 
to ambush the English traders as they traveled among the 
Choctaw villages. As a result of the Chickasaws' assaults 
on those traders, minor clashes and disputes broke out 
between the two tribes. By the end of 1715, this native 
strife had ended and the governor remained convinced of the 
unquestioned loyalty of the Choctaw to the Louisianians in 
all matters. As a matter of routine, the Choctaw continued 
to be supplied with powder, balls and other presents.^2
Within the colony, petty rivalries among the offi­
cials continued to take priority over the serious matter of
•^Inventory of Supplies to be Sent to Louisiana,
1714, ibid.. ff. 293-300.
12Cadillac to the Minister, January 2, 1716, ibid.. 
f. 518; Council's Review of Cadillac's Report on the Indians 
and on the English of Carolina, August 29, 1716, AC, C13A 4, 
ff. 239-40.
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Indian affairs. Cadillac had always resented Bienville's 
right to distribute gifts to the Indians and, in turn, the 
king's lieutenant enjoyed irritating the arrogant governor. 
Violating the French government's orders to confine his 
gift-giving to the Mississippi River tribes, Bienville pro­
ceeded to distribute goods to the Indians near Mobile, even 
though Cadillac protested that he, and not Bienville, was 
the real donor of the goods.^
Whether they were received as gifts or trade items, 
French goods decisively affected the lives and altered the 
culture of the Choctaw people. When Iberville brought the 
first settlers to Louisiana, the natives of the area were 
still essentially living in the Stone Age. Of course, they 
had been exposed to a few iron implements in the preceding 
century. By the end of the French regime, however, the 
Choctaw, as well as other Southeastern tribes, would have 
entered a different cultural epoch.
As with nearly all of the Indians of the interior 
Southeast, the Choctaw clothed themselves in buckskin.
Prior to the French presence in the region, the men wore 
loin cloths in the summer and tunics in the winter all made 
from deerskins. The women likewise wore deerskin tunics
Cadillac to the Minister, January 23, 1716, AC, 
C13A 4, f. 548; Cadillac to the Minister, February 7, 1716, 
ibid., ff. 581-82.
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all year r o u n d . T h e  discomfort of such material in wet, 
hot, humid weather must have been severe. The first French 
immigrants to Louisiana must soon have realized the potential 
of European clothing as trade goods. Included in their 
first lists of trade merchandise requested from the Marine 
were such items as cotton shirts and several hundred yards 
of red cotton cloth.16 By the 1720's, the period when Le 
Page du Pratz was living in Louisiana, many of the Indians 
living close to the French wore loin cloths and tunics made 
of cotton.16
In addition to clothing, the eating and cookery of 
the Choctaw and other tribes changed because of their con­
tact with the French. Along with introducing these Indians 
to bread,17 the Louisianians also brought them the iron pot 
to replace the earthenware pottery which they used for 
cooking. From the first, the French nearly always had iron 
and brass pots to trade or give the Indians. Inventories of 
trade goods for Louisiana from the Crozat regime, for 
example, included several sizes of kettles and pots.16 The
14-Le Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane ■3 vols., 
Paris, 1758), II, 190-91.
• ^ I n v e n t o r y  of  Supplies to be S e n t  to Louisiana,
1714, AC, C13A 3, f. 299.
16Le Page du Pratz, Histoire, II, 190-91.
17Memoir of Duclos to Pontchartrain, October 25,
1713, AC, C13A 3, f. 273.
ISjnventory of Supplied to be Sent to Louisiana,
1714, ibid., ff. 295-96.
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Indians quickly discovered that metal cookware was nearly 
unbreakable and could endure the heat of an open fire for 
much longer than could that made of clay.
Besides kettles, the French furnished the Indians 
with other metal objects, such as knives, axes and hoes.'1'9 
The knives which the French traded to the Choctaw were 
probably butcher knives and clasp knives.20 Crozat provided 
the colonists with a forge with which to make hatchets, 
knives and pickaxes in Mobile rather than importing them 
from France.2^ The introduction of iron products by the 
French to the natives of Louisiana can be viewed as the key 
to the technological revolution which the colonists began 
among the Indians. Rather than using bones to clean hides 
or to till the land, the Choctaw now had knives, pickaxes 
and hoes, all of which lasted longer and were more efficient.
In addition to such things as clothing and cooking 
utensils and farming tools, the French gave or traded the 
Indians the usual trinkets and bagatelles. Among the most 
desirable of these were beads. When Columbus first saw the
^°George Irving Q u i i m . Indian Culture and European 
Trade Goods (Madison, 1966), 6/, 76. See also George Irving 
Quimby, "Indian Trade Objects in Michigan and Louisiana," 
Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters, 
Vol. 27 (1941), 543-51.
20Quimby, Indian Culture, 68-69.
21Ibid., 71-72; Council of the Marin Reviews the 
Superior Report on Crozat, September 22, 1716, AC, C13A 4, 
f. 359.
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red men, he observed that they were wearing beads. The
Indians of Louisiana also had glass beads before the arrival
of the French, but the Europeans brought them more. Antoine
22Crozat made sure that they were on his supply list.
French silversmiths also reproduced the single shell neck­
lace often worn by the Indians. The Choctaw chiefs cherished 
these silver ornaments because they resembled the Cross of 
St. Louis which the French wore even in the wilderness. The 
French also provided the Indians such trivial items as combs, 
pipes and buttons, and the Indians themselves tried to 
manufacture some of these products. They, for example, made 
bone combs and stone pipes.
When they felt confident of the friendship of Indians, 
as they did that of the Choctaw, the French gave or traded 
them muskets to replace the bows and arrows which had served 
as their chief weapons for war and hunting for centuries. 
Trade muskets appeared on order lists for supplying the 
Louisiana hide trade as early as 1 7 0 1 . Different from the
22Quimby, Indian Culture, 81? Quimby, "Indian Trade 
Objects," 545; Hiram A. Gregory and Clarence H. Webb, 
"European Trade Beads from Six Sites in Natchitoches Parish, 
Louisiana," The Florida Anthropologist. XVIII (September, 
1965), 40; Inventory of Supplies for the Colony of Louisiana, 
1714, AC, C13A 3, f. 299; Le Page du Pratz, Histoire, II,
196.
22Quimby, Indian Culture, 10.
2^See Chapter I, p. John R. Swanton questions the 
extent of the use of muskets by this tribe. However, James 
Adair, The History of the American Indians, is his source.
It should be noted that this English traveler did not know
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muskets used by the military, these flintlock weapons were 
lighter and had serpent-shaped side-plates with larger 
trigger guards. Their lightness, as well as the readier 
accessibility of the trigger, made these strange weapons 
easier for the natives to use.25 The Choctaw could obtain 
flints for their guns, as they had for their arrow heads, 
from the Tallapoosa River area, as well as from a creek near 
Nanih Waiya, the Choctaw sacred mound. For powder, however, 
the Choctaw had to depend upon the French.26
Despite the fact that the quantity of trade goods 
and muskets for the Indians increased under Crozat, the full 
potential of the skin trade was never realized. A major 
reason was that Crozat's greed discouraged participation in 
the trade by other individuals. The cost of the goods, 
which had to be purchased from the company store, was too 
high for the average trader to bear.27 A pound of vermilion 
which cost Crozat only 5 livres in France, for example, sold 
at his store at Mobile for more than three times as much.^6
^^Quimby, Indian Culture, 9.
^Minister to M. de Clairambault, October 19, 1712, 
AC, B 34, f. 422 (v); Minister to M. de Clairambault,
November 16, 1712, ibid., f. 426; Minister to M. de Clair­
ambault, November 30, 1712, ibid., f. 428 (v); Minister to 
Crozat, December 8, 1712, ibid., ff. 432-32 (v); Minister to 
Beauharnois, December 3, 1712, ibid., f. 456.
^7Nancy Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana 
During the French Regime (New York, 1916), 342; Marcel 
Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Francaise: Regne de Louis
XIV. 1698-1715 (Paris. 1953). I. 273. Hereinafter cited as 
Histoire. I .
2®Council of the Marine Reviews M. Duclos 1 September
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To be sure, there were interested entrepreneurs. 
Dubreuil Massy and Guenot de Trefontaine, for instance, 
wanted to trade with the Indians. However, the voluminous 
red tape involved in obtaining permission to trade from both 
the governor and the commandant of a post, kept these men 
from working to develop such an enterprise.29 On the one 
hand, by 1716 Crozat firmly believed in the future of the 
pelt business in the colony. And yet, his policies hindered 
any extensive trade with the Indians at this time.
Crozat's mismanagement of trade resulted in great 
unhappiness among the Choctaw and other Indian allies who 
felt they were not receiving an adequate amount of goods.
One observer wrote, ". . . if we wish to have the Indian for 
a friend, we must furnish him with his needs. . . . Would it 
not be better for the Company to lower its prices on goods 
. . . than to expose the country to . . .  a revolt of the 
Indians. "29
Because of the high prices which the French charged 
for their merchandise, for a time it seemed that the red
8, 1715 Report, September, 1716, AC, C13A 4, f. 271.
29Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Frengaise:
Anndes de Transition. 1715-1717 (Paris, 1957), II, 143.
Hereinafter cited as Histoire, II.
29Fran<jois Le Maire, Mdmoire sur la Louisiane, 1717,
Fonds Fran^ais, 12105, f. 20 (Salle des Manuscripts, Biblio- 
theque Nationale, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as 
Le Maire, FF. 12105.
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men, especially the Choctaw, might turn to the English for 
merchandise.3 -̂ Fear of extensive English penetration into 
Choctaw territory had lessened over the months. By late 
1715, it appeared as though the Choctaw preferred to trade 
with the French rather than with the English, for Bienville 
had persuaded some of the tribe to burn and pillage a 
trading post established by the English in one of their 
villages.33 Crozat's advisors were still recommending that 
the French establish a post in the Choctaw country. In fact, 
the French knew several routes into the heart of Choctaw 
territory which the traders might use. Estimates concerning 
the number of warriors in the tribe still averaged about 
5,000, a substantial number of men to hunt and with whom to 
trade.33
Although he committed substantial amounts of money 
and energy to the Louisiana venture, Crozat, in 1716, decided 
that he could not obtain the profit from the colony that he 
had hoped for. Therefore, the French government found a new
31ibid., 19; Huchd to the Minister, May 17, 1717, 
M^moires et Documents, Amerique, I, f. 314 (v) (Archives des 
Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as 
Mem. et Doc., Am.
32Giraud, Histoire, I, 302.
33Remonville's Description of the Mississippi and 
Mobile Rivers, 1715, Depot des Fortifications des Colonies: 
Louisiane, #27, f. 9 (Archives d'Outre-Mer, Paris, France), 
hereinafter cited as Depot des Fortifications; An Anonymous 
Description of the Mobile River, Dauphine Island and the 
Mississippi, c. 1715, AC, C13C 2, f. 169.
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sponsor for Louisiana in John Law and his Company of the
West. Even before this change occurred, the financier had
requested that the quarreling pair, Cadillac and Duclos, be
recalled which they were in 1716. The new governor, Jean
Michele L'Epinay, and the commissaire, Marc-Antoine Hubert,
who arrived in 1717, would have to deal with many problems
which they inherited from the previous regime. The Ministry
of Marine hoped that they would not repeat the mistakes of
earlier years and would quickly learn the local geography 
34and the native inhabitants.
Of prime importance to the Company of the West was 
information about trails, roads and river routes upon which 
colonists and traders relied. The network of native trails 
was quite extensive in the Southeastern region. Three major 
trails led from the Choctaw villages to Mobile (labeled on 
Map No. 4 and Nos. 99, 105 and 106).33 Quite probably, the 
Memphis, Pontotoc and Mobile Bay trail (No. 105), was the 
route most used by French traders. Even the Chickasaw, who 
lived along the Mississippi River, traveled to the Gulf of 
Mexico via this trail.36 The Choctaw were also very 
accessible to English traders by means of trails that began 
in South Carolina and ran west through central Georgia into
^Giraud, Histoire, II, 71; O'Neill, Church and 
State. 101.
35william E. Myer, Indian Trails of the Southeast
(Nashville, 1971), 82, 94-99.
36Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
O'aWfS ct- ittt i R AiL jYSTtM




A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
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central Alabama (Trail Nos. 60 and 79) .37
In reviewing the economic potential of Louisiana 
following Crozat's retrocession of the colony to the French 
government, the Company of the West under John Law examined 
the Indian trade. The company quickly recognized that posts 
needed to be built in the interior. By close contact with 
the natives and by overtures of friendship, the company 
hoped to make the Indians active partners in trade.38 Yet, 
several problems of the fur trade which the Crozat regime 
had experienced continued in the John Law era in Louisiana. 
No good method of preserving the tanned hides from rotting 
in Louisiana's humid climate was found. In addition to 
this, the shortage of trade supplies persisted in these 
years with the prices of French goods remaining somewhat 
higher than the items which the English had to offer. Even 
when the company agreed to Bienville's suggestion in 1719 to 
lower the costs of trade goods by one-half of what they were 
in the Crozat regime, the English still had cheaper and
^7Peter A. Brannan, The Southern Indian Trade; 
Being Particularly a Study of Material from the Talapoosa 
River Valley of Alabama (Montgomery, 1935), 11; Surrey, 
The Commerce of Louisiana, 87-88.
38The Company of the West and Its Objectives for 
Trade, 1717, Mem. et Doc., AM., 1, ff. 319-21; Initial 
Suggestions to the Company of the Indies Concerning the 
Indians of Louisiana, 1718, ibid.. ff. 443(v)-44.
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better goods.^ The John Law officials apparently had not 
learned from the mistakes of Crozat whose controls, it has 
been noted, had both stifled trade and hurt relations with 
the Choctaw.
These Indians were shrewd in dealing with the white 
traders. By 1718 they knew that they could obtain a musket 
from a Carolina merchant for 10 or 12 buckskins, and a 
blanket for 8 skins. On the other hand, in 1718 the French 
traders charged 30 skins for a musket and 20 skins for a 
blanket. At the same time that the shoddily-dressed, 
impoverished French trader was attempting to deal with the 
Indians at the rates quoted above, the English trader with 
his lower rates and better quality of goods only enhanced 
the Carolinians' trade status with the Indians. The colony 
could never expand its hide trade if the French prices were 
not lowered.40
By the beginning of the 1720's, understandably, the 
Company of the Indies, having absorbed the Company of the 
West in 1719, had not realized much profit from the fur 
trade in Louisiana. Not only was the volume of the trade
^°An Edict Concerning the Establishment of a Trading 
Company under the Name of the Company of the West, August, 
1717, AC, A 22, f. 26; Edict Forming a Trading Company under 
the Name of the Company of the West, August, 1717, Mem. et 
Doc., Am., I, f. 411; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisi­
ane Francaise; le Systeme de Law (Paris, 1963), III, 352. 
Hereinafter cited as Histoire, III.
40Bienville to the Minister, June 10, 1718, Mem. et 
Doc., Am., I, ff. 211-11(v); Giraud, Histoire. Ill, 388.
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disappointing, but most of the hides thus far received had 
been ruined by mites. Still, the directors knew that the 
Indians had to be kept as allies, and the Choctaw had to be 
supplied with such things as cloth, hats, hatchets, knives, 
powder and lead.4^ Yet, their allowances for these trade 
items and presents remained low, as did the supplies of 
muskets which were designated specifically for the Indians. 
Even the amount of brandy for the red men, which they 
preferred to wine, continued to be small.43 In 1720 Charles 
Legac, a company director residing in Louisiana, recommended 
that the company give up the monopoly of the trade which the 
French government had granted it and open up the enterprise 
to private individuals. Whether or not the company did this 
is not known at this time. Obviously, Bienville realized 
that the prices of trade goods had to be lowered. But 
satisfying the Choctaw desire for and increasing reliance 
upon the white man's goods, while understood in theory, 
seemed to be a low priority matter for Louisiana's officials 
of the John Law era.43
41Memoir of M. du Vergier, Director of the Colony of
Louisiana, September 15, 1702, AC, C13A 6, ff. 20(v)-21.
43Memoir on the Status of Louisiana, c. 1715, Mem.
et Doc., Am., I, f. 216(v); Expenses for Louisiana, 1716, AC,
F1a  19, f. 85; Directors of the Colony to the Company, 
January 22, 1721, A1 2595, f. 101 (v) (Archives de la Guerre, 
Chateau Vincennes, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as AG. 
Hubert to the Council, October 26, 1717, MPA. II, 240; Le 
Page du Pratz, Histoire. Ill, 13.
^Memoir on the Status of Louisiana, c. 1718, Mem. et
Doc., 1718, Am., I, ff. 441-41(v); Memoir of M. Le Gendre
D'Ainscure, c. 1718, ibid., f. 263(v); Giraud, Histoire, III, 
352.
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The company's efforts to describe the specific 
duties of the governor and the commissaire failed to prevent 
the arguing and rivalry over the management of Indian affairs 
between the new officials, L'Epinay and Hubert, that had 
existed under their predecessors. In theory, the governor 
oversaw military matters while the commissaire dealt with 
finances and trade.44 However, the familiar scenario of the 
Cadillac-Duclos administration of a governor desiring 
presents for the Indians and a commissaire jealously hoarding 
supplies was soon repeated. The respective spheres of 
authority of the two officials remained undefined. L'Epinay, 
as governor of Louisiana, failed to extend himself to meet 
the red men. According to Hubert, the Choctaw and other 
Indians called him a "poor old woman who never leaves his 
house. . . . "  Moreover, the governor gave few, if any, 
tokens of friendship to the Indians who did come to Mobile. 
The complaints against the governor reached official levels 
in France, and in the fall of 1717 he was transferred to the 
Isle of Granada.45
If L'Epinay had not understood the Indians, Bien­
ville certainly did. When L'Epinay left Louisiana,
^Qiraud, Histoire, II, 90; Donald J. Lemieux, "The 
Office of 'commissaire ordonnateur' in French Louisiana, 
1731-1763: a Study in French Colonial Administration"
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Louisiana State University, 
1972), 69.
45L'Epinay to the Minister, November 21, 1716, AC, 
C13A 4, ff. 883-84; Hubert to the Council, October 26, 1717, 
AC, C13A 5, ff. 55-55(v).
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Bienville was promoted to commandant general and was awarded 
the Cross of St. Louis.45 Bienville had a high degree of 
success in dealing with the aborigines. Rather disgusted 
by the endless arguments between the governor and Hubert, 
the new commandant general worried about the potential loss 
of the friendship of the Choctaw nation to the English of 
Carolina.47 The Company of the West and the French govern­
ment appreciated Bienville's unending success in keeping the 
Indians of the colony at peace. Yet, under the new regime, 
he could not work as effectively as he might have to main­
tain alliances with the red men, for nowhere was there a 
statement which defined specifically his authority and that 
of the governor. As commandant general, Bienville could 
give out presents, but he was forbidden to undertake wars 
and make alliances with the Indians without the permission 
of the company and a majority of the colony's governing 
body, the Superior Council.4^ Such unrealistic restraints 
could not be taken seriously by Bienville. The immediate
^Memorandum of Improvements for the Colony on the 
Mississippi, April 3, 1717, Mem. et Doc., Am., I, f. 281; 
Council to Bienville, September 27, 1717, AC, B39, f. 450; 
Council of the Marine's Review of Chateaugue's July 17, 
1716 report, November 18, 1716, AC, C13A 4, ff. 475-79.
47Giraud, Histoire, II, 80-92; Giraud, Histoire, 
III, 389.
4®0rders for Sieur de Bienville, the Commandant 
General of Louisiana, September 20, 1717, AC, A 22, ff.
3 5(v)-36; Orders for the Louisiana Commandant General, 
September 20, 1717, AC, B39, ff. 452(v)-53.
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war and peace-time needs of the Indians could not be handled 
by a formal vote of white men.
Despite the handicaps under which he worked, Bien­
ville maintained his influence with the Indians. By early 
summer 1718, some Choctaw chiefs, along with leaders of the 
Alabama Indians, were once again receiving a proper welcome 
and gifts at Mobile, and Bienville was doing everything he 
could to forestall the threat of English infiltration among 
these tribes.49
Bienville soon began having difficulties with Com­
missaire Hubert and other newcomers, especially a company 
agent, Charles Legac, but this was offset by the growing 
influence of his own faction of friends and relatives.50 
The company promoted Pierre de Boisbriant, a close associate 
of many years, to second in command in the colony, and both 
he and Bienville's younger brother, Antoine Le Moyne de 
Chateaugu^, received the Cross of St. Louis in 1719.5^ It 
was fortunate that the commandant general had such strong 
support and competent help, for the need of military leaders 
respected by the Indians, was imminent.
49Hubert to the Council, June 10, 1718, AC, C13A 5, 
ff. 184(v)-85.
50Giraud, Histoire. Ill, 292-93.
5^King to Sr. de Boisbriant, September 20, 1717, AC, 
B39, ff. 453(v)-55; the Council's Review of Bienville's 
September 18, 1718 report, February 14, 1719, AC, B41, f.
165(v).
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In April, 1719, the Louisiana leaders learned that 
war between France and Spain had begun in January of that 
year. Joseph Le Moyne de Serigny, Bienville's older brother, 
had brought the dispatch carrying this information from 
France. He also had orders for the French to take the 
Spanish post at Pensacola.5^ The Louisianians had never 
been greatly concerned about this post, which was located 
only 15 leagues east of Dauphine Island, because it was 
undermanned, dilapidated and rotting and appeared to offer 
no threat to the French.^
The Louisiana colonists planned to use both land and 
sea forces in their attack. For several years, the govern­
ment had realized the potential of the natives as military 
allies, and it planned to use them in this campaign.
Hubert, therefore, insisted that they be given more presents 
in an effort to secure their aid.54 The call for Indian 
warriors must have been sent up the Mobile River into 
Choctaw country, for by early May Chateaugue, the second
5^Glen r . conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration and 
War in Louisiana: 1718-1721, " based on the Memoir of Charles
Le Gac, a Company Director, in University of Southwestern 
Louisiana Historical Series (1970), 10-11.
53council of Commerce in Louisiana, April 20, 1719, 
AC, C13A 5, f. 331(v); Le Maire, FF. 12105, ff. 11-12.
54Hubert to the Council, April 25, 1719, AC, C13A 5, 
f. 284; Council of the Marine on Louisiana, October 8, 1716, 
Fonds Frangais, Nouvelles Acquisitions, 2610, ff. 52-52 (v) 
(Salles des Manuscripts, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, 
France).
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lieutanant, had assembled 400 Indians to march overland with 
him and his force of 100 white troops. These men were to 
rendezvous with Bienville and the naval force at the mouth 
of Perdido River.55 (Map No. 5.)
A flotilla of about 13 ships and sloops with more 
than 500 people left the Mobile Bay area on May 13. For 
some unknown reason, the land army failed to meet Bienville 
and Serigny at the mouth of Perdido River. Nevertheless, 
the naval units attacked on their own and completely 
surprised the Spanish who surrendered the post on May 17.5^
Having captured the excellent harbor of Pensacola 
Bay, perhaps the best one on the entire Gulf coast, the 
company decided to move the base of its operations there. 
Throughout the summer of 1719, ships bound for Louisiana, 
loaded with precious supplies, as well as colonists, 
soldiers and slaves, arrived at Pensacola. By the end of 
July, Chateaugue and Larcebault, a company director, were 
overseeing activities at Pensacola where there were already 
more than 360 people.57
The French victory was short-lived. On August 5
5^Benard de La Harpe, journal de la Louisiane, Fond 
Frangais, 8989, f. 26 (Salles des Manuscripts, Bibliotheque 
Nationale, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as La Harpe,
FF, 8989; Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration," 12.
56Bienville to the Council, October 20, 1719, AC, 
C13A 5, ff. 274-74(v); Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigra­
tion, " 14-15.
57Ibid.
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Map No. 5
A xerox copy of a map from Glen Conrad (ed. and 
trans.), "Immigration and War in Louisiana: 1718-1721,"
University of Southwestern Louisiana Historical Series 
(1970).
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lookouts sighted Spanish ships near Pensacola, and they soon 
entered the harbor and seized the French ships Comte de 
Toulouse and Marechal de Villars. As the enemy approached, 
the French garrison's morale collapsed and 60 soldiers 
deserted to the enemy. By the evening of August 6, a 
Spanish force of 2,000 had retaken not only their post and 
harbor, but had also captured huge quantities of supplies 
from the company’s nearby storehouse.5®
News of the fall of Pensacola spread rapidly. On 
hearing these reports, relief forces from Mobile, led by 
Bienville's younger brother, Chateaugue, turned back at the 
Perdido River. Another group, consisting of 400 Indians 
and 30 soldiers, also returned to Mobile. Fortunately, all 
of these men were on hand when the Spanish siege of Dauphine 
Island began on August 13. Although badly outnumbered and 
poorly armed, a group of 800-900 French, Indians and Negroes 
successfully held the island and Mobile Bay in the face of a 
Spanish attack which lasted nearly two weeks. Natives 
allies of the French were also active on land, foiling the 
several attempts made by the Spanish to land and pillage the 
Mobile area.5  ̂ A shortage of supplies caused the Spanish
58ibid., 16-17; An Anonymous Account of the Events 
between the French and the Spanish at Pensacola, August, 
1719, AC, C13A 5, ff. 303-303 (v); Bienville to the Council, 
October 20, 1719, ibid.. f. 275.
59Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration," 18-20; An 
Anonymous Account of Events between the French and the 
Spanish at Pensacola, August, 1719, ff. 303(v) ff.
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to return to Pensacola.
The Spanish, no doubt, felt certain that the French 
would never retaliate, but they were badly mistaken. On 
September 1, several ships arrived at Mobile from France.
The Ministry of Marine had ordered M. de Chapmeslin, the 
captain, to aid in the defense of Louisiana. Again, land 
and sea forces were organized to make another attack on 
Pensacola. Because of the difficulties in May, this time 
Bienville led the infantry, the majority of whom were 
probably Choctaw Indians. Departing on September 11, these 
troops met with the ten vessels at the mouth of Perdido 
River five days later.60 From this point onward, all 
elements of the attacking force kept each other in sight.
On September 17, four of the ships entered Pensacola harbor. 
The Hercule attacked the fort on Santa Rose Island which 
surrendered immediately. Recognizing that he was faced with 
a superior force, the Pensacola commander asked for peace.
A week later, the Louisianians captured a 150-ton warship 
and a smaller boat, each of which was loaded with valuable 
supplies. In the evacuation of the fallen post, the French 
secured the company's food, burned the forts at both Pensa­
cola and Santa Rosa Island and returned victorious to 
Mobile.51
60Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration," 21-24; 
Bienville to the Council, October 20, 1719, AC, C13A 5, ff. 
278 (v)-79(v); Council of Commerce, September 5, 1719, ibid., 
ff. 334-35.
61Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration," 23-24;
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The several accounts of the attack on Pensacola 
disagree regarding the extent of Indian participation in it. 
While Legac reported that Bienville and his Indians looked 
on during the clash, the commandant general recorded that 
the land forces actually took part.62 It should be recalled 
that Bienville, rather than his younger brother, led the 
natives in September, Chateaugud having missed the entire 
encounter in May. Obviously, Bienville was better qualified 
than Chateaugue to convince the Choctaw and the other 
Indians under his command to fight for the French. Thus, 
it is quite likely that these Indians did participate in the 
fight, helping the French to achieve victory. Legac, 
increasingly at odds with Bienville, probably would have 
attempted to minimize Le Moyne's role in the victory.
By the opening months of the 1720's, the colony of 
Louisiana stood on a relatively sound footing. Throughout 
the period from 1713 to 1720, the Choctaw remained loyal 
commercial and military allies. It was Bienville's presence 
that contributed much to assuring Choctaw friendship in 
these years of administrative quarreling and controversy.
At the same time, this friendship was also based upon the 
Indians' increased interest in and dependence upon the white
Bienville to the Council, October 20, 1719, AC, C13A 5, ff. 
275(v)-76 (v).
62Ibid., f. 275(v); Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immi­
gration," 24; Council of the Marine Reviews Bienville's 
April 28, 1720 report in June, 1720, AC, C13A 6, ff. 6-7.
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While the Choctaw were friends, they had to 
see the tangible evidence of a steady supply of 
to be kept solidly in the French camp.
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CHAPTER V
THE FRENCH AND THE CHICKASAW, 1712-1720
At the same time that the bond between the French of 
Louisiana and the Choctaw nation was solidifying (from 1712 
to 1720), the Chickasaw became firmer allies of the English. 
Carolina's influence over the tribe increased in this era of 
changing governments in Louisiana. Neither Antoine Crozat 
nor the Company of the West under John Law truly appreciated 
diplomatic matters. Only immediate profit motivated both of 
these ruling interests. Thus, the regimes failed to see 
clearly the threat of a foreign power to the colony by way 
of a native tribe. Problems of the previous decade, such as 
the shortage of French trade goods and a failure of Louisi­
ana leadership, continued. Even more important was the 
Chickasaw participation in the intensifying rivalry for the 
Southeast between France and England. The Chickasaw tribe 
would emerge as the British-sponsored threat to the French 
colonizing venture in Louisiana.
The French government at Versailles appeared to be 
very much aware of the English presence and influence among 
the natives of the Southeast even if the colony's new over­
seers would not deal with it. Both the governor and the
99
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commissaire for the Crozat regime were informed of the 
problem before arriving in Louisiana. On issuing Cadillac 
his orders as the new governor of Louisiana in 1710, the 
Ministry of Marine stressed the colony's problems with 
Indian unrest, much of which the Carolinians had encouraged.1 
Initially, Cadillac himself seemed to understand the serious­
ness of English inroads among the Indians. He believed it 
crucial to provide the natives of the colony with sufficient 
merchandise to prevent their defection to English interests. 
Actually the government had known of the mismanagement of 
French trade goods for the Indians of Louisiana for some 
time. In an effort to strengthen the French supply depot, 
the government asked Jean-Baptiste Duclos, the new commis­
saire, to look into the irregularities which had existed in 
the past.2
Even with new leadership, the Louisianians failed to 
counter English activity among the natives, especially the 
Chickasaw. By 1715 this tribe was believed to be once again 
a strong ally of the Carolinian traders.3 Despite Cadillac's
^Memoir of the King to Cadillac, Governor of Louisi­
ana, May 13, 1710, Archives des Colonies, C13A 3, ff. 71-,
713 (Archives Kationales, Paris, France), hereinafter cited 
as AC.
2Memoir of Cadillac on Louisiana to the Minister, 
August 6, 1712, AC, C13A 2, f. 653; Minister to Duclos, 
December 18, 1712, AC, B34, f. 444 (v).
3Memoir of Antoine Huche on Indian Tribes, April 17, 
1714, AC, C13A 3, ff. 621-22; A description of the Missis­
sippi and Mobile Rivers, 1715, Depot des Fortifications des
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seeming awareness of this increasing English influence over 
the tribes of Louisiana, he did little to promote French 
activity among the Indians. He blamed the unfavorable 
situation on Louisiana's wretched conditions rather than 
take any positive action. To be sure, the shortage of 
supplies made a very poor impression on the natives, as did 
the little fort at Mobile. Composed of only a few rude huts, 
four small bastions and several cannon resting on logs, Fort 
Louis did little to suggest French strength.4 Yet, this 
appearance of weakness did not excuse Cadillac's neglect of 
work among the Indians.
Although the governor refused to deal with the red 
men, Bienville, the king's lieutenant, realized that personal 
contact with the Chickasaw and other tribes would promote 
French favor among the Indians. His own linguistic skills 
and general understanding of the natives' ways helped in the 
first years of the new regime. By means of his interpreters 
who lived with the various tribes, he kept himself informed 
especially of English plans to trade with and to infiltrate 
the tribes of Louisiana. Although often having few, in any, 
presents to give them, Bienville enjoyed good relations with
Colonies: Louisiane, # 27, f. 9 ^Archives d'Outre-Mer, Paris,
France), hereinafter cited as Depot des Fortifications.
4Cadillac to the Minister, September 18, 1714, AC,
C13A 3, f. 519; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane 
Francaise. R^gne de Louis XIV: 1698-1715 (Paris, 1953),
I, 263. Hereinafter cited as Giraud, Histoire. I.
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the Indians through the atmosphere of general good will and 
friendship which he maintained towards all of the natives.^
Several English traders were indeed active among the 
Chickasaw.^ And some of the leaders of the Carolina colony 
continued their interest in the fur trade, for by 1715 more 
than £ 10,000 in goods were available to the traders for the 
Indian trade. These goods included such items as red and 
blue blankets, hoes, salt, tobacco, pipes, brass kettles, 
hatchets, knives, scissors, and needles and thread. In 
addition, firearms and rum went with nearly every pack train 
that left for the Chickasaw territory.7 The French had 
little to offer in the face of such competition. Indeed, 
they learned that in the fall of 1714, four horse-loads of 
English goods had even gone to the villages of their allies, 
the Choctaw.^
The general consensus of the French was that the 
English traders were concerned primarily with securing
5Duclos to Pontchartrain, October 25, 1713, AC,
C13A 3, ff. 266-67.
^Veraer Crane, "The Southern Frontier in Queen 
Anne's War," American Historical Review, XXIV (April, 1919), 
393-94.
7V e m e r  Crane, The Southern Frontier (Durham, North 
Carolina, 1928), 115-17.
8Cadillac to the Minister, September 18, 1714, AC, 
C13A 3, f. 519.
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slaves from the Chickasaw.9 But the English were not alone
in engaging in the Indian slave trade. Some Indian slavery
existed in Louisiana as well. The colonists often used
native slaves to clear land, cut down trees and build houses.
Their presence in the colony was so common that the Superior
Council passed a special ordinance to regulate criminal
actions committed by Indian s l a v e s . C a d i l l a c  complained
loudly about the debauchery and the licentious relations of
the coureurs des bois with their Indian slave women.^
Nevertheless, a working slave trade never existed in Louisi-
12ana, for the French government had forbidden it.
Unable to compete successfully with the English in 
trade goods, Governor Cadillac tried to rid the colony of 
these foreign traders by engaging Antoine Huchd, a young 
Frenchman who was a Choctaw interpreter, to urge the Choc­
taw to ambush the English traders who were trading among the 
Chickasaw. Cadillac's representative proceeded to convince 
the Choctaw to plunder the merchants. His intervention, 
however, resulted in conflict between these two tribes in 
1715. While not a major native war, the ambushes and minor
9ibid.
10Duclos to Pontchartrain, October 25, 1713, AC,
C13A 3, ff. 212-13: Regulations Established by the Superior
Council of Louisiana, November 12, 1714, AC, A 23, f. 5.
■^Council of the Marine's Review of Cadillac's 
Report of January 2, 1716, AC, C13A 4, f. 190.
12See Chapter II, p. 38.
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skirmishes which occurred did not help the tribes or French 
relations with them.13
In the end, these efforts of the governor failed, 
for English traders still came to the villages of the Chick­
asaw. Becoming both exasperated and disinterested by his 
lack of success, Cadillac gave Bienville the task of 
expelling these European rivals while he himself left for 
the Illinois country in the spring of 1715. Bienville 
handled the problem well by talking with the Chickasaw 
chiefs personally, urging them to expel the Anglo traders.
In the weeks that he was carrying on the negotiations, he 
learned more about English plans for the Lower Mississippi 
Valley from Price Highes, a captive. Bienville was 
apparently enjoying some success, for members of several 
tribes, probably some of the Alabama and the Chickasaw, 
defected from the English camp by the late summer of 1715. 
With the customary ceremony the Indians liked so well, 
Bienville presented these new friends with a calumet of 
peace, presents, and good wishes for a lasting alliance with 
the French.14
A large part of the French difficulty in dealing 
with the Chickasaw lay in the fact that the English had been
l3Council of the Marine's Review of Cadillac's 
Report of August 29, 1716, AC, C13A 4, ff. 238-39.
l4Bienville to the Minister, June 15, 1715, AC,
C13A 3, f. 830? Bienville to the Minister, September 1,
1715, ibid., ff. 782-86.
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supplying these and other natives of the Southeast with guns 
since the 1690's, giving them great military superiority 
over their neighbors. For example, when the Apalachee of 
Florida attempted an invasion of Carolina, armed merely with 
bows and arrows, they were driven back by the Creeks. These 
allies of the English were able to withstand the Apalachee 
attack because they were equipped with firearms which they 
had obtained from the English traders.15 The Apalachee 
tribes were defeated again two years later when James Moore 
led the Creeks to the Apalachee village of La Conception de 
Ayerbale, and the attacking Indians' superior musket power 
brought death or enslavement to 200 Apalachee Indians. This 
invasion broke up the Apalachee nation, many of whose members 
took refuge near Mobile.15
Louisiana tribes also knew the havoc British muskets 
could bring. For years the traders had supplied the Chicka­
saw tribe with guns to aid them in securing native captives 
for their slave trade. The attacks by the Chickasaw on 
neighboring tribes had plagued Louisiana's leaders from the 
colony's first days.17
15Crane, The Southern Frontier, 74.
16James W. Covington, "The Apalachee Indians Move 
West," The Florida Anthropologist. XIV (December, 1964), 
221-25.
17Pierre Margry (ed.), Mdmoires et documents: 
D^couvertes et ^tablissements des Francais dans l 1Quest et 
dans le Sud de l'Amerique septentrionales (6 vols., Paris, 
1879-88), IV, 406, hereinafter cited as Margry; Memoir on 
English Activities, c. 1701, AC C13A 1, f. 336; La Salle to
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While both the French and the English offered flint­
lock muskets to the Chickasaw, the English had a substantial 
trade advantage. In 1718 Bienville complained that a French 
musket cost the Indians 30 skins,18 while, he believed, the
Anglos sold one for their guns for only 10 to 12 skins.
Actually, the official trade rate set by the Indian Trade 
Commission of Carolina at that time fixed the price at 16 
hides,19 and the actual working rate between trader and 
Indian was probably 14 or 15 sk. ~.
The Indians adapted qu ckly to the use of flintlock
firearms. Although initially dependent upon the Europeans
for flints, the Indians eventually produced their own crude
20flints from chert found in tie region. In similar fashion, 
they compensated for the urn .lability of balls by using
the Minister, April 1, 1702, AC, C13C 2, f. 236(v); Crane, 
"The Southern Frontier," 382.
19Bienville to the Minister, June 10, 1718, Mdmoires 
et Documents, Amerigue, I, f. 211(v) (Archives du Ministere 
des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, France), hereinafter cited 
as Mem. et Doc., Am.
19Indian Trade Commissioners' Journal, April 23, 
1718, 269, in W. L. McDowell (ed.), Journals of the Commis­
sioners of the Indian Trade, September 20, 1710-August 29, 
1718 (Columbia, South Carolina, 1955). Hereinafter cited as 
Journals of the Commissioners.
^Major James E. Hicks, French Military Weapons: 
1717-1938 (New Milford, Connecticut, 1964), 10; Douglas 
Leach, Arms for Empire; a Military History of the British 
Colonies in North America. 1607-1763 (New York, 1973), 4.
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71pebbles or small nuts. Still, the Chickasaw had to go to 
the white man for powder. The Anglos were generous in pro­
viding ammunition for their native allies, especially those 
who warred on France's Indian f r i e n d s . 2 ^
British supplies of ammunition found their way from 
Charleston deep into Chickasaw territory by means of several 
well-traveled routes. These included the Middle Creek 
Trading Path, the Lower Creek Trading Path and the Augusta, 
Macon, Montgomery and Mobile Trail (Trail Nos. 114, 60, 61, 
Map No. 6).23 It was not until 1717, when the French built 
Fort Toulouse at the site of present-day Montgomery,
Alabama, that the Louisianians offered any kind of obstruc­
tion to the English traders' penetration of the territory. 
Even then, however, the Lower Creek Path remained relatively 
free from French interference for some time.
Within the land of the Chickasaw people, an excellent 
system of intra-territorial trails existed. Communication
2lBeauchamp to the Minister, October 24, 1748, AC, 
C13A 32, f. 215(v); Meeting of the Board of Commissioners, 
October 28, 1710, Journals of the commissioners, 5.
22F.P.N. Gillet-Laumont, "Extracts from a Report by 
a Citizen Salivet on the Making of Gunflints in the Depart­
ments of Indre and Loire-et-Cher," in T. M. Hamilton (ed.), 
Indian Trade Guns, Missouri Archaeologist, XXII (1960), 62- 
66; T. M. Hamilton, "Additional Comments on Gunflints," 
ibid.. 74-77; Arthur Woodward, "Some Notes on Gunflints," 
Ibid., 35.
23William E. Myer, Indian Trails of the Southeast 
(Nashville, 1971), 13-14.
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Map No. 6
A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
Trails of the Southeast.
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between the Mississippi River at the Chickasaw Bluffs, or
present-day Memphis, Tennessee, and the central Chickasaw
towns at Pontotoc, Mississippi, remained open along several
paths (Nos. 11, 12, 105 and 109). Other trails led to the
Gulf Coast.24 Most of these trails could be used all year
round. James Malone described one of them as follows:
. . .  by leaving the Chickasaw Bluffs and crossing 
Wolf River near Memphis at Raleigh, where the high 
land comes down in an abrupt precipice to the water, 
or even nearer Memphis, you can travel almost dry 
shod to Hardman County (Tenn.) near Bolivar? and 
then taking the crest of the well-known Pontotoc 
ridge southward you will pass over the highest ground 
in all Mississippi, almost 700 feet above the sea, 
lying in Tippoh County; and thence on to Pontotoc, 
and during all this journey you will scarcely cross 
a stream, a distance of about 160 m i l e s . 25
Such a system of communications greatly facilitated Chicka­
saw hunting, as well as trading activities.
By nature and inclination the Chickasaw men were 
hunters and warriors. The tribe viewed both of these 
activities with a religious reverence. The hunter fasted 
before setting out on the chase in a fashion similar to that 
of the warrior before starting after his enemy.2^ These 
Indians welcomed the musket as a tool to be used in hunting
24Ibid.
25James W. Malone, The Chickasaw Nation: a Short
Sketch of a Noble People (Louisville, 1922), 59.
2^John R. Swanton, "Socxal and Religious Beliefs and 
Usages of the Chickasaw Indians," in the Forty-Fourth Annual 
Report of the United States Bureau of American Ethnology. 
1926-27 (Washington, 1928), 240-4U
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as well as warfare, and unknowingly, by adopting it, the 
Chickasaw greatly increased their dependence upon the 
Europeans.
Despite the successful trading ventures of the
English among the Chickasaw, abuses that accompanied their
commercial contact with other native tribes sometimes led to
war. The Yamasee War of 1715-1716 is one example. In
examining the causes of this conflict, the Board of Trade
recognized a pattern of factors that included "the ill usage
27of Indians by the traders. . . . "A/ While this uprising 
lasted only two years, it inflicted serious damage on Caro­
lina. Hundreds of settlers were killed and property damage 
was extensive.28 By early 1716, the colony's assembly was 
appealing to the Crown for additional protection. The 
colonists could derive some consolation from the fact that 
the Cherokee remained loyal allies.
Even though rumors circulated in Carolina that the 
French had intervened in the war,29 the French apparently 
made no specific plans to take advantage of the Yamasee War 
to invade Carolina or to encourage Indian disorders in that
27Report of the Board of Trade to Mr. Secretary 
Stanhope, July 19, 1715, Colonial Office Papers 5, 383, f. 2 
(Public Record Office, London, England), hereinafter cited 
as PRO, C.O. 5.
28Crane, The Southern Frontier, Chapter III.
29The Assembly of South Carolina to their Agent in 
London, March 15, 1716, PRO, C.O. 5, 1265, Q. 72.
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colony. Still, the English believed that the French were 
involved. They also felt that the building and supplying of 
Fort Toulouse in the Alabama territory in these years was a 
direct threat to their security. The paranoia of the Caro­
linian officials grew to the extent that they reported that 
as many as 5,000 native allies of the French at Mobile and 
the Spanish at Pensacola were preparing to invade the 
English territory.30
The Indian uprising of 1715-1716 disrupted the skin 
and hide trade of the Lower Mississippi Valley which the 
Carolina merchants had dominated for years.31 On the eve of 
the war, the Carolinian government estimated that 9, 000 
Indians traded with nearly 200 English traders for merchan­
dise whose value totaled more than £ 10,000 annually.32 
Throughout the months of turmoil and conflict, the Indian 
Commission of Carolina continued to allocate powder to be 
sold to the Indians in order to maintain the trade as much 
as possible. Even though such supplies were low because of 
the war, over a six-month period extending from July, 1716
30Memoir of Mr. Richard Beresford on the Present 
State of South Carolina, June 23, 1716, ibid., A 77? the 
Assembly of South Carolina to their Agents' in London,
June 29, 1716, ibid.. Q 78? Letter from a Committee of the 
Assembly of Carolina to Mr. Boone and Mr. Beresford, London 
Agents, August 6, 1716, ibid., Q 95
31Crane, The Southern Frontier, 112.
32Colonel Johnson, Governor of Carolina to the Board 
of Trade, January 12, 1719, PRO, C.O. 5, 1265, Q 201.
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to February, 1717, nearly 3,000 pounds of powder were used 
to supply the natives.33 Much of it probably went to the 
Carolinians' Cherokee allies, but it is possible that the 
Chickasaw also received some.
By the fall of 1716, leaders of the Chickasaw tribe 
were making gestures to the English that suggested a desire 
to renew regular trade ties.3^ Within six months, the 
Yamasee War was over and some of the Chickasaw chiefs were 
personally soliciting English Traders in Charleston.55 
Despite Louisiana's advantageous position during the war, 
the French had failed to capture the friendship and the 
trade of the Chickasaw nation.
The Carolina government itself began to work 
earnestly in the years following the Yamasee War to regain 
native allies in order to re-establish the skin trade. 
Having learned from their mistakes, the English no longer 
extended credit to the Indians of the Lower Mississippi
33Board of Commissioners Meeting, July 17, 1716, 
Journals of the Commissioners, 81; Board of Commissioners 
Meeting, August 9, 1716. ibid., 100; Board of Commissioners 
Meeting December 5, 1716,~lbld.. 136; Board of Commissioners 
Meeting February 2, 1717, ibid., 158.
34Board of Commissioners Meeting, November 29, 1716, 
ibid., 134.
35Board of Commissioners Meeting, March 6, 1717, 
ibid.. 168; Board of Commissioners Meeting, December 5,
1717, ibid., 238; Lords Proprieters of Carolina to the Board 
of Trade, June 4, 1717, PRO, C.O. 5, Q 121.
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Valley, a practice which had brought on the Indian uprising 
when traders demanded payment for debts owed them. Neverthe­
less, their financial difficulties increased in the years 
from 1717 to 1720 because of . . the vast Presents we 
are obliged to make the Indians to keep a part amongst them 
depending entirely upon the French. . . ."36 Their renewed 
efforts proved successful, for by 1720 the Chickasaw were 
once again firm allies of the English.37
The English recaptured the Chickasaws' loyalty not 
so much because of their own efforts but chiefly because 
the new administration in Louisiana under the Company of the 
West failed to cultivate Chickasaw friendship. Unfortunately, 
the policies begun in the Antoine Crozat regime continued. 
Although officials in France hoped that a change in govern­
ment would improve the desperate economic plight of 
Louisiana, the colony remained in difficult straits.
Rivalry among the leadership continued to plague the colony.
36j4emoir of Several Merchants on Trade with Carolina, 
October 27, 1720, PRO, C.O. 5, 358, A 14 and 15? A State of 
the Affairs between the Inhabitants of South Carolina and 
the Lords Proprietors of that Province, June 16, 1720, PRO. 
C.O. 5, 1265, Q 203.
37Joseph Boone and John Bornwell on Carolina, 
received August 23, 1720, PRO, COO. 5, 358, A 8, f. 19(v); 
Memoir of Governor Nicolson on the Indian Trade, received 
September 16, 1720, ibid.. A 11, f. 33; Mr. Boone and Colonel 
Bornwell respond to questions on Carolina, received August 
23, 1720, ibid., A 7 and 8, ff. 15-16 (v); Council and 
Assembly of Carolina to the Board of Trade, December 24,
1719, PRO, C.O. 5, 1265, Q 199;^Marcel Giraud, Histoire de 
la Louisiane Francaise, le Systeme de Law: 1717-1720
(Paris, 1963), III, 389. Hereinafter cited as Giraud, 
Histoire. III.
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Jean Michele L'Epinay, the governor, and Marc-Antoine 
Hubert, the new commissaire, became embroiled in arguments 
with the Bienville faction almost immediately upon their 
arrival in Louisiana.
The problem of the distribution of presents to the 
Indians remained unsolved. More concerned about the means 
and control of gift-giving than the end of obtaining Chick­
asaw allies, L'Epinay did little to further good relations 
with those Indians. Under Crozat, Governor Cadillac and 
Bienville, the king's lieutenant, had divided the gifts
between them and each had distributed his share to the
tribes assigned him.38 L'Epinay had his own ideas on Indian 
affairs. Initially, he complained that the annual allotment 
of 4,000 livres for Indian presents was inadequate.39 The 
allowment was increased, but trade problems continued. 
Bienville reported that the governor refused officers at 
the Natchez, Natchitoches and Alabama posts any gifts for 
the Indians in their areas.40 As a result, some Indians 
were having to travel as far as 200 leagues to Mobile to 
receive only token presents. Often they were not even fed 
at the end of a long journey.41 Such actions by the
38See Chapter IV, pp. 74-75.
39L'Epinay to the Council, August 6, 1716, AC, C13A
4, ff. 855-56.
40Bienville to the Council, May 10, 1717, AC, C13A 5, 
ff. 62-62 (v); Hubert to the Council, October, 1717, ibid., 
ff. 42-42 (v).
4lHubert to the Council, October 26, 1717, ibid., ff. 
55 (v)-56.
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government seemed even more inexcusable when one considers 
that Hubert reported that there were unused supplies in the 
warehouse at Dauphine Island.
L'Epinay's tenure as governor was short-lived. Both 
Indians and colonists came to believe that he lacked the 
physical courage needed for his position. The Indians 
described him as cowardly and an old woman. Fortunately, 
he was soon transferred to the Isle of Grenada to serve as 
governor there.
While L'Epinay's poor leadership in the handling of 
Indian relations helped the English, his building of Fort 
Toulouse on the Alabama River appeared to the English as a 
threat to their hegemony over the natives of that area. The 
governor's predecessor, Cadillac, had opposed the erection 
of such a fortification, fearing that the French presence 
there would upset the Indians of the area.^ The Council of 
the Marine had felt otherwise, however, believing that the 
Alabama Indians would provide an excellent barrier between
42Inventory of Supplies at the Dauphine Island Ware­
house by Hubert, March 1, 1718, ibid., ff. 175-80 (v).
^Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and State in 
French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732
(New Haven, 1966), 113; Memoir on Louisiana, 1718-1719,
Mem. et Doc., Am., I, ff. 140-42(v).
44cadillac to the Minister, January 2, 1716, AC,
C13A 4, ff. 517-18; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane 
Francaise. Annees de Transition: 1~715-1717 (Paris, 1957),
II, 152.
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the English of Carolina and the colony of Louisiana,45 and 
that their attachment to the French would be strengthened by 
the construction of the fort.
A brave, warlike people, the Alabama numbered about
1,200 souls in the early eighteenth century. Their terri­
tory comprised a region along the Alabama River just south 
of the junction of the Coosa and the Tallapoosa rivers. The 
area had been a point of English-French rivalry from 
Louisiana's first days. When French traders began to work
among these Indians, the Carolinians responded by murdering
some of them in 1703.46 Despite English efforts to maintain 
the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of these 
Indians, by 1712 it appeared that they had indeed become 
allies of the French.47
The Alabama region was also thought by the French to 
have special economic assets besides the Indian trade. For 
several years it had been rumored that it contained a salt­
peter mine. Stories spread that the Alabama Indians had 
actually sold some of the mineral, so valuable for the
4^Council of the Marine's Memoir on Louisiana, June 
21, 1718, AC, C13A 5, ff. 127-31.
46Crane, "The Southern Frontier," 388.
47John R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern 
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, 
Washington, 1946), 87-88; Board of Commissioners Meeting, 
July 9, 1712, Journals of the Commissioners. 31-33.
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manufacture of gunpowder, to the English.4® French leaders 
were also anxious to investigate rumors of a silver mine 
said to be located 60 leagues from Fort Louis at Mobile on 
the Alabama River.49
Fort Toulouse was a modest post. It was established 
in the summer of 1716 by a Lieutenant La Tour along with an 
interpreter and 20 men. These men were ordered by Governor 
L'Epinay to build a fort at a site 100 leagues from Mobile 
and also to reprimand any French trader who was either 
cheating or mistreating the Indians in the vicinity.50
Maintaining Fort Toulouse was considered by the 
government to be a matter of some importance over the next 
few years. When reports of widespread illness among the 
troops due to lack of food were received from La Tour, the 
Superior Council, now headed by Bienville, saw to it that a 
doctor and additional supplies were sent to the post.5  ̂ The
post garrison grew steadily, for by 1720 it included 58
soldiers, three officers, a clerk and a surgeon. The
civilian populace of more than 30 men and women had also
48Duclos to the Minister, January 15, 1715, AC, C13A 
3, f. 536.
49Council of the Marine Reviews a Crozat Memoir, 
October 11, 1716, AC, C13A 4, ff. 429-31? Council of the
Marine to M. de L'Epinay, October 28, 1716, AC, B 38, f.
340(v).
50Giraud, Histoire. II, 152; Orders of L'Epinay for
the Alabama Area, May 23, 1717, AC, C13A 5, f. 120.
5^Council of Commerce, Dauphine Island, March 12, 
1719, ibid.. ff. 329-29 (v).
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settled near the fort.52
Although thus strengthened, this little outpost 
could have fallen easily to attack by either the Alabama 
Indians or the Carolinians. What was important, however, 
was that the English believed that the French position was
strong.53
The importance of Fort Toulouse from the British 
point of view rested on its strategic location. For the 
Augusta, Macon, Montgomery and Mobile Trail (No. 61) ran 
directly from English territory to the fort. From there, 
the Alabama-Chickasaw Trail ran to the Chickasaw Bluffs on 
the Mississippi River, and from there another trail led 
southward into the heart of the Choctaw country.54 Until 
the erection of Fort Toulouse, English traders thus had 
relatively easy access to all of those tribes. With the 
establishment of the fort, however, their pack trains could 
be easily ambushed by the now pro-French Alabama Indians.
However, the French failed to win control of the 
Chickasaw from the English despite the advantages which they 
gained from the Yamasee War, the establishment of Fort 
Toulouse and the Carolinians' exaggerated estimate of the
52status of Louisiana, June, 1720, Archives de la 
Guerre, A-^2592, f. 89 (v) (Chateau Vincennes, Paris, France). 
Hereinafter cited as AG.
52South Carolina Leaders to the Board of Trade,
January 29, 1719, PRO, C.O. 5, 1265, Q 204.
54Myer, Indian Trails of the Southeast. 13-14.
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strength of the French in the Lower Mississippi Valley. 
Undoubtedly, their lack of merchandise hurt the French in 
their efforts to secure at least the neutrality of the 
Chickasaw. Even more than this, neither L'Epinay nor Bien­
ville encouraged any missionary effort to this tribe, an 
endeavor which would surely have strengthened its ties with 
the Louisiana government.^ It should also be recalled that 
in 1719, the Louisiana leaders were more concerned with the 
Spanish threat at Pensacola than with their internal prob­
lems. 56
Nearly all colonial officials, both French and 
English, would probably have agreed at the beginning of the 
period 1712-1720 that the Chickasaw Indians were strong 
allies of the English. In the course of these years, and 
especially during the Yamasee War, the Louisianians had an 
opportunity to establish their influence in the Southeast by 
securing the allegiance of the Chickasaw tribe. Their 
efforts to do so, did not prove successful because they 
lacked sufficient trade merchandise to sway the Chickasaw 
nation now that it had become greatly dependent on the white 
man's goods. The French weakness became obvious to all when 
the British overcame their extensive losses of the war and 
regained their preeminent position with the Chickasaw nation, 
the most feared people of the Southeast by 1720.
^5Giraud, Histoire. II, 164-65.
56See Chapter IV, pp. 92-97 for an account of the 
Battle of Pensacola.
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CHAPTER VI
THE FRENCH AND THE NATCHEZ, 1712-1720
In the period from 1712 to 1720, when the French were 
failing to curtail English penetration into Louisiana by way 
of the Chickasaw tribe, the Louisianians began an ostensibly 
successful settlement and development of the Natchez country. 
Both Antoine Crozat and the Company of the West under John 
Law knew about the Natchez area's fertile lands and peaceful 
natives. The strategic location of the tribe's villages on 
bluffs overlooking the Mississippi River encouraged the idea 
of a trade entrepot for both the Louisiana French and the 
Canadians to the north. Crozat began trading among the 
Natchez and the Company of the West provided settlers and 
labor to exploit the Natchez lands for settlement and 
farming. The French envisioned a period of close economic 
and personal contact with the Natchez. Still, French 
ignorance of Natchez customs prevented smooth execution of 
these ambitious plans. Despite misunderstandings with the 
Natchez, by 1720 the French believed that they finally had 
started a lucrative endeavor for the colony of Louisiana.
Immediately following their arrival in Louisiana in 
1713, Antoine La Mothe Cadillac and Jean-Baptiste Duclos, the
120
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new governor and commissaire, respectively, sought more 
extensive commercial and colonizing possibilities for the 
colony. The movement of English traders among the Natchez 
finally precipitated their efforts to establish a trading 
post in the Natchez country.^ The brothers Marc-Antoine and 
Louis-Auguste de la Loire were asked to set up the Natchez 
post. Receipt of the orders, however, did not prompt 
immediate action. The brothers delayed their departure for 
some months, believing that no profit could be derived from 
the area. By February, 1714 they were still complaining to 
the governor about the uselessness, as well as the dangers, 
of such an undertaking.^ With some reluctance, the brothers 
finally departed later that year for the Natchez country, 
accompanied by 12 people in two supply canoes. Although 
very little is known about this store at the Natchez which 
they established, by 1715 both the Louisianians and the 
Canadians considered it an important center for bartering
Cadillac to Pontchartrain, October, 1713, in Dunbar 
Rowland and Albert Sanders (eds.), Mississippi Provincial 
Archives (3 vols., Jackson, 1927-33T", II] 166. Hereinafter 
cited as MPA; Relation ou Annale veritable de ce qui s'est 
passe dans le pais de la Louisiane, pendant vingt-deux 
annees consdcutives, depuis le commencement de 1'dtablisse- 
ment des Frangais . . . jusqu'en 1721 par Andre Penigaut, 
Manuscript Frangais, 14613, ff. 230-32 (Salle des Manuscripts, 
Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France), hereinafter cited as 
Penigaut, 14613.
^Petition from the Le Loire Brothers to La Mothe 
Cadillac, c. February 1714, Archives des Colonies, AC,
C13A 3, ff. 465-68 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), 
hereinafter cited as AC.
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with the Indians.3
Besides its value as a trading center, the military 
potential of the Natchez site also interested the Minister 
of Marine. Establishing a post in this high country seemed 
like a good plan. In 1714 Pontchartrain ordered Bienville, 
the king's lieutenant, to take 30 men with him and establish 
a fort, to be named Rosalie, in the Natchez country to pro­
tect the Crozat post and to discourage English attempts at 
infiltration among the Natchez.4
Unfortunately, Louisiana's manpower shortage delayed 
the establishment of the post for several years. Bienville 
was unable to obtain the needed force.^ Indeed, Cadillac 
had initially refused even ten soldiers whom the La Loire 
brothers had requested to accompany them. Some colonial 
officials had suggested that armed settlers in the Natchez 
area could serve as an alternative to sending soldiers.^
The possibility of discovering and exploiting silver
3Cadillac to the Minister, February 20, 1714, ibid., 
ff. 418-19; Pierre Margry (ed.), Decouvertes et etablisse- 
ments des frangais dans 1 'Quest et dans le Sud de l'Amdrique 
septentnonale (6 vols., Paris, 1879-88), V, 506; herein­
after cited as Margry; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisi- 
ane Franpaise: Regne de Louis XIV, 1698-1715 (Paris, 1953),
I, 325, hereinafter cited as Histoire, I.
4Ibid., 320-21; Council of the Marine, August 29, 
1716, AC, C13A 4, ff. 216-17.
5Ibid.. 321.
^Memoir of Le Maire, January 15, 1714, AC, C13C 2 f, 
100(v); Cadillac to the Minister, February 20, 1714, AC,
C13A 3, f. 436; Memoir of Louisiana, April 17, 1714, ibid., 
ff. 625-30.
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mines in the Illinois country interested Cadillac more than 
establishing military installations. Although the governor's 
information about the presence of silver there was based 
merely on several pieces of metal which some voyageurs had 
brought him,■Cadillac left hastily for the north in the 
winter of 1715, perhaps hopeful that his fortune could be 
made.^ Unfortunately, he failed to visit the native 
villages along the Mississippi River on his way up river, 
and when he returned south in October, Cadillac stopped at 
the Natchez villages only to pick up supplies. He made no 
effort to smoke the calumet or to pay proper respects to the 
Natchez chief, the Great Sun. The Indians found Cadillac's 
behavior inexplicable, and they feared a war with the French 
as a result of this behavior of the French leader, so 
insulting did it seem to them.8 The governor's brusqueness 
was especially insulting to the Natchez because his visit 
had come during a sacred period. In the autumn months, the 
Indians held religious celebrations in honor of the Great
QCorn Harvest.
7Bienville to the Minister, June 15, 1715, ibid.,
f. 827.
8Duclos to the Minister, June 7, 1715, Ac C13A 4, f. 
583; A Memoir on Bienville's First Expedition against the 
Natchez in 1715, ibid.. f. 786; "Richebourg's Memoir," 
Benjamin French (ed.), Historical Collections of Louisiana
and Florida (5 vols., New York, 1846-53), III, 241-42.
% o h n  R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern 
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, 
Washington, 1946), 256.
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Oblivious to the fact that he had offended the
Natchez people during his travels, Cadillac, upon his return
to Mobile, again ordered Bienville to leave for the Natchez
country to set up the military post.'1'0 Bienville expressed
some doubts about the feasibility of establishing a fort
with the resources available to him. In a letter to Pont-
chartrain of January 1716, he complained that only a few
recruits and minimal supplies had been allotted to him.
Bienville continued:
There is no one here who thinks I shall be able to 
succeed in building even the fort, but as I have 
great influence over the minds of the Indians and 
as I make them do what I wish I hope I shall succeed 
in it.11
In the months to come, Bienville would have ample oppor­
tunity to exhibit his self-proclaimed influence "over the 
minds of the Indians. . . ."
In his dispatch to Pontchartrain, Bienville also 
reported on Cadillac's trip to the Illinois country and his 
diplomatic blunders. Both the white and the Indian populace, 
according to Bienville, knew about the trip. "All of the 
nations are talking about it with very great scorn to the
12shame of the French," he concluded.
•^Cadillac to the Minister, January 2, 1716, AC, 
C13A 4, f. 533r Cadillac to the Minister, January 20, 1716, 
ibid., ff. 539-40.
H-Bienville to Pontchartrain, January 2, 1716, MPA, 
III, 194-95.
12Ibid.
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While some of the river tribes merely expressed 
contempt for the French, a band of the Natchez went further. 
They attacked and killed four Canadian voyageurs who passed 
their villages shortly after Cadillac's departure. Father 
Antoine Davion, the missionary priest with the Tunica tribe, 
notified Louisiana officials of the attack, reporting that 
10,000 livres in merchandise which belonged to Crozat and to 
the French traders had also been stolen. When Cadillac sent 
Bienville to the Natchez country, the king's lieutenant was 
instructed to avenge the atrocity as well as to begin work 
on Fort Rosalie.1"̂
Although Cadillac insisted that the French take 
action against the Natchez, he severely limited the forces 
at Bienville's disposal.14 He refused to allot Bienville 
more than 34 new cadets, two-thirds of whom were ill. None 
of these men could even handle a canoe. After hiring 
Canadians to steer the boats, this pitiful "armed French 
force" of eight pirogues, 34 young soldiers and 15 Canadians 
set out late in January with the prospect of facing 800
■^A Memoir of Bienville's First Expedition against 
the Natchez in 1716, AC, C13A 4, f. 787? Bienville to the 
Minister, January 20, 1716, ibid., f. 776; Marcel Giraud, 
Histoire de la Louisiane Frangaise: Annees de Transition,
1715-1717 (Paris. 1958), II. 178-79; Charles Edwards O'Neill, 
Church and State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and
Politics to 1732 (New Haven, 1966), Chapter III.
14Bienville to the Minister, January 20, 1716, AC,
Cl3A 4, f. 778.
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armed Natchez.15
The trip to the Natchez country proved long and 
difficult. Bienville led his tiny force out of Mobile Bay, 
then proceeded westward across Lake Pontchartrain to Lake 
Maurepas. In the early years of Louisiana settlement, 
Iberville discovered a small stream, originally named for 
him, but ultimately referred to as Bayou Manchac, which 
connected this second lake with the Mississippi River, and 
he and his party followed this route.15 (Map No. 7.) 
Ascending the Mississippi, they reached the Tunica territory 
on April 23, approximately three months after their departure 
from Mobile.1^
Upon their arrival among the Tunica, the Frenchmen 
heard Father Davion1s report of the death of another French 
trader at the hands of the Natchez Indians during March. 
Hopelessly outnumbered, Bienville decided to initiate nego­
tiations with the Natchez from the village of the Tunica who 
were allies of the French, before proceeding farther.15
I^a  Memoir of Bienville's First Expedition against 
the Natchez in 1716, ibid., f. 788; Council of the Marine 
Reviews M. Crozat's Memoir, October 11, 1716, ibid., f. 424; 
Bienville to Cadillac, June 23, 1716, ibid., f. 693.
16Giraud, Histoire. I, 30.
17A Memoir of Bienville's First Expedition against 
the Natchez in 1716, AC, C13A 4, f. 788; French (ed.), 
"Richebourg's Memoir," 242.
18Ibid.
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Map No. 7
A xerox copy of a map in Marcel Giraud1s Histoire 
de la Louisiane Frangaise, Volume I.
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Informed by Davion of Natchez efforts to bribe the 
Tunica to attack the French, Bienville decided to camp on 
an island in the river, about a mile from the main Tunica 
village. Then he ordered that huts be built there for a 
prison, a supply depot and a guardhouse. In the meantime, 
he sent word to the Natchez villages, located 18 leagues 
upriver, that the French had arrived in the area and that 
he was ready to speak to the Natchez leaders. On April 27 
three members of the lower nobility of the tribe came to the 
French camp to offer a calumet of peace, but Bienville 
refused it, insisting that the Suns and the higher chiefs 
talk with him.19
The precarious position of his small force was 
apparent to Bienville, as so, after dismissing the Natchez 
representatives, he dispatched a Canadian and an Illinois 
Indian to Fort de Chartres, the Illinois post, to seek help. 
He also ordered them to place signs at various points along 
the river to read "The Natchez have declared war on the 
French and M. de Bienville is camped at the Tunica." It was 
hoped that these warnings would prevent any more traders 
from stopping at the Natchez.20
Finally, on May 8, lookouts reported a large Natchez 
entourage approaching Bienville's camp. Bienville ordered 
half of his men to hide in the guardhouse while the remainder 
of the troops, armed with muskets, would form an escort
19Ibid., 245. 20Ibid., 243.
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around him. This party of the Natchez included some of the 
more important chiefs, the Suns. When they landed at the 
French camp, Bienville refused their peace offering and 
demanded to know the reason for the murder of the voyageurs. 
Believing that the French leader had summoned them to dis­
cuss the proposed fort for the Natchez area, these Indians 
were taken by surprise. When they offered no explanation 
for the crime, Bienville ordered them put into chains.
The following day the most important Natchez chiefs 
— the Great Sun, Tattooed-Serpent and Little Sun— arrived 
and Bienville opened talks with them. He assured them that 
he felt that they, as friends and allies of the French, were 
not directly responsible for the deaths of the French 
traders. However, he insisted on being given some kind of 
explanation of why they had been killed, and why those who 
had committed the crime had not been punished. Had not the 
French followed Indian law by having guilty whites killed 
when they attacked unsuspecting red men? Moreover, could 
not the French unite with their Indian allies and annihilate 
the Natchez nation? Very much embarrassed, these chiefs 
retorted that they alone could not impose justice on those 
who had murdered the Frenchmen.
Bienville sent Little Sun back to the Natchez village 
to seek the tribe's assistance in discovering the guilty 
parties. On his return, the chief presented the French with
21Ibid., 245.
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three heads, two of which belonged to the reported assail­
ants and the third to a substitute for the third criminal. 
Angered by their failure to bring in all of the guilty 
parties, Bienville put Little Sun into prison.
This l=>.st action prompted the other chiefs to admit 
that an intra-tribal power struggle had precipitated the 
attack on the voyageurs. Great Sun and Tattooed Serpent 
explained that for more than a year some of their people had 
been governed by the whims of three other chiefs who pre­
ferred the friendship and trade of the English to that of 
the French. By means of bribes, the English had encouraged 
these chiefs in acts of hostility against the French.
Indeed, the presence of the English in the Natchez country 
had been reported by French traders and settlers for several 
years.22 Qf these pro-English chiefs were among those
being held prisoner by Bienville. White Ground, the third 
chief involved, had fled to the English before Bienville and 
his troops had arrived in the Tunica territory.22 Bienville 
decided that the two guilty chiefs whom he was holding at 
his encampment would have to die. Accordingly, a few days 
later, the chiefs and several of their followers were 
tomahawked by some of Bienville’s men.24
22Margry, V, 506; Thomas N a i m e  to the Minister, 
Colonial Office Papers 5, 382, ff. 24-24 (v) (Public Record 
Office, London, England), hereinafter cited as PRO, C.O. 5.
23French (ed.), "Richebourg's Memoir, 248-49.
24Ibid., 249-50.
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Captain Richebourg, an officer with Bienville at 
that time, recorded that Tattooed Serpent had asked that the 
captive chiefs be taken to the governor for examination 
before their execution. Yet, the historian, Marcel Giraud, 
using an anonymous memoir, records that Bienville ordered the 
Indians executed on the trail to Mobile, far away from the 
Natchez territory, to keep word of the French action from 
spreading so quickly.25 The executions of the Natchez chiefs 
became a matter of contention between Bienville and Cadillac. 
According to Bienville, the French emerged from this "war" 
in an advantageous position. Cadillac, on the other hand, 
considered the execution of the chiefs an atrocity.25
Bienville's decision to execute the Indians was
apparently based upon his understanding of Indian culture.
In a similar situation in 1708, he explained to Pontchartrain:
It is custom in all the nations not only of this 
continent but also of those of Canada to kill as 
many of these men of their enemies as they have 
lost on their side, otherwise it is disgraceful 
among them to speak of recognition if they have not 
got vengence man for man.2/
From all indications the Natchez accepted the executions as
inevitable.
The confrontation between Bienville and the Natchez
25Ibid., 250; Giraud, Histoire, II, 151.
26Bienville to Cadillac, June 23, 1716, MPA, III,
213.
27Bienville to Pontchartrain, February 25, 1708, 
ibid.. 116.
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chiefs revealed divisions within the tribe previously unsus­
pected by the French. By executing some of the members of 
the White Ground faction, he apparently helped solidify the 
power of the Great Sun and improved the position of the 
pro-French group.
With the pro-French leaders apparently in control of 
the tribe, Bienville sent his soldiers on up to the Natchez 
country to select the site for Fort Rosalie and to begin its 
erection. On June 8, some of these soldiers returned to the 
camp reporting that the site for the fort had been chosen by 
the French officers who led the group. By July 1 the Indians 
had cut most of the wood for the fort. When Bienville 
arrived among the Natchez two weeks later, he found Fort 
Rosalie completed. Tattooed Serpent had recovered some of 
the merchandise stolen from the French traders which he had 
delivered to the fort. It was put with the supplies for the 
fort in several crude huts which had also been constructed.
Upon Bienville's return to Mobile in early October, 
he recounted his successful trip to the Minister. The 
French deaths had been avenged and Fort Rosalie had been 
constructed. He had also established peace with the Natchez 
and had reopened the company store there.2®
What the French saw as a relatively simple diplo­
matic victory was for the Natchez the terminal point in a
28Giraud, Histoire. II, 151-52; French (ed.), 
"Richebourg‘s Memoir," 250-52.
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long and traumatic series of events. Natchez society was 
characterized by a rigid caste system and by a definite 
economic cycle. Relations with the Europeans disrupted both 
of these crucially important organizing features of Natchez 
life.
Its caste-class system imposed an important sociolo­
gical order on this tribe. Descendants of Tai, or the Sun, 
the nobility, comprised a sac- elite who remained separate 
from the lower classes, or the Stinkards. With the excep­
tion of the lowest order of the nobility, members of the
29upper classes had to marry within their ranks. As a 
result of the intermarriage between the lesser nobility and 
the common people, however, the more numerous lower orders 
would undoubtedly eventually dominate the aristocratic 
classes. An interesting explanation holds that by the 
historic period, the Natchez population was declining to 
such an extent that the tribe was trying desperately to 
integrate wandering peoples into its society in order to 
increase the population, and these newcomers were the 
Stinkards.30
Thus, while it cannot be denied that Cadillac's
2% e  Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane (3 
vols., Paris, 1758), II, 323, 334; Journal of Paul du Ru: 
Missionary Priest to Louisiana, February 1 to May 8, 1700 
(Chicago, 1934), 30; Margry, V, 453.
30Jeffrey P. Brain, "The Natchez Paradox," Enthnology, 
X, No. 2 (April, 1971), 215-22.
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insults and haughty attitude when he went to the Illinois 
country in 1715 hurt relations with the Natchez, intra- 
tribal turmoil among the Natchez people, not appreciated 
fully by the Europeans, must also have affected their rela­
tions with the French. It has already been noted that the 
Natchez leaders. Great Sun, Tattooed Serpent and Little Sun, 
admitted that divisions existed within the tribe. In his 
refusal of the calumet offered him, Cadillac might have 
insulted not the Natchez core group, represented by Great 
Sun, but rather, the "newcomer" element led by White Ground. 
Coupled with this insult, English encouragement could have 
prompted the pro-Anglo element to attack the voyageurs. 
However, it is quite possible that Cadillac's rejection of 
the Great Sun's calumet had upset the entire tribe. If this 
were the case, the White Ground faction, cast as the "new­
comers" could have assassinated the white men to strengthen 
their stature before the tribe. This view does not dismiss 
the possibility that English traders who were on hand had 
urged such activity.^ Besides, the tribe would have 
profited from the spoils of a pillage.
The true nature of these tribal divisions can only 
be surmised at this time. The leaders, Great Sun and 
Tattooed Serpent, did state that some of the Natchez pre­
ferred the English to the French. But why would some of 
these natives have chosen one group of white men over
31ibid.
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another? As has been suggested, it is conceivable that the 
White Ground faction led the masses, the lower nobility, 
that they and their followers did not yet have the political 
power which the Great Sun element did. If this were so, it 
is possible that the Natchez core group, their numbers 
dwindling, their position declining, welcomed French retalia­
tion against the newer element in the tribe in the spring of 
1716. It just so happened that all of the culprits were 
members of their opponents' faction. Having, perhaps, 
intimidated any potential rebel forces, Great Sun and 
Tattooed Serpent allied themselves even more closely with 
the French by helping with the construction of Fort Rosalie 
that summer. In addition, the whites who began to settle 
in the Natchez area during the John Law era beginning the 
following year could be expected to support the. older order 
of the Natchez. Thus, alliance with the French could have 
meant the securing of political power, if only for a time, 
by a threatened and dying class.
In addition to the social structure, the economic 
cycle which the Natchez followed affected its relations with 
the French. The Natchez year was divided into 13 months, 
each of which was named for the subsistence activity which 
occurred at that time."^ In an effort to assess the impact 
of this first "Natchez war" on these natives on this level.
wanton, The Indians of the Southeastern United 
States. 260-61.
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the spring, the early summer and the fall seasons are par­
ticularly important. Cadillac left for the Illinois country 
in February, 1716, and he probably arrived at the Natchez 
villages in April. (Since Bienville's trip of the following 
year took three months,33 it can be assumed that Cadillac's 
also did.) If Cadillac had refused a calumet which the 
Natchez would have offered at this time, he would not have 
committed a great offense, for most of the tribe was prob­
ably out gathering wild fruit from the forests, the seasonal 
occupation of late April. Even if he had come for the first 
c o m  harvest, Little Com, a May feast, he would have been 
present for an occasion that was not nearly as sacred as the 
fall celebration. However, on his return trip, he stopped 
at the Natchez for supplies in October, the month of the 
Great Com, or Maize. At that time, all of the Indians 
would have been gathered to celebrate and to feast on the 
fruits of their labors. Therefore, Cadillac's insulting 
refusal to celebrate with them would have been known by a 
greater number of Indians. It wo id have also seemed more 
serious, for the Great Corn month was especially sacred.34
It was following Cadillac's departure that the French 
traders were killed. Several weeks after these assaults, 
the Natchez temple burned. Located only 350 feet from the
33French (ed.), "Richebourg1s Memoir," 241-42.
34Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern United 
States, 256-57.
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Great Sun's house, the chief had to live with the ruin of 
this sacred structure and the loss of the eternal flame and 
the ancients’ bones. With most of the tribe having dispersed 
for the winter hunt, rebuilding the temple would have been 
an extremely difficult task. This catastrophe would surely 
have upset the tribe and its leaders. Why the temple burned 
is not known. Yet the Great Sun could have viewed its 
destruction as a sign of Tai's displeasure with the Natchez 
for having killed the French voyageurs„ If that were the 
Natchez reaction, it should not'have been at all surprising 
that by the spring of 1716 the Great Sun faction was more 
than willing to sacrifice White Ground and his followers to 
Bienville who sought to avenge the deaths of the French­
men . ̂  ̂
With relations between the French and the Natchez on 
an apparently amicable basis following Bienville's departure, 
the colonists showed an increasing interest in the exploita­
tion of the Natchez country in the years after 1717.
Louisiana, advertised as the "El Dorado on the 
Mississippi" by John Law, had attracted wealthy backers 
interested in making a profit. In 1719, through a royal 
edict, the Company of the West was combined with the Company 
of the Indies and the Company of China to become the Per­
petual Company of the Indies. Following this consolidation,
•^council of the Marine, August 29, 1716, AC, C13A
4, ff. 221-22.
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there was greater interest than ever on the part of poten­
tial investors in Louisiana.36 The Natchez country, having 
a reported 2,000 arpents of cleared land, was advertised as 
the site for possible concessions in the colony. The loca­
tion of the region on higher ground well removed from the 
flood hazard New Orleans area, appealed to prospective 
backers.37 Furthermore, situated between the Illinois 
country and the coast, and with an established post, the 
commercial possibilities of the Natchez land seemed excel­
lent. More than 300 colonists requested permission from 
the Company of the Indies to settle there. The company's 
lack of boats, supplies and tools, however, prevented most 
new arrivals from going north. Only those independently 
financed, such as the groups led by Charles Scaurion de la 
Houssaye and Hector Scaurion de Vienne, managed to embark 
for the Natchez region in 1719.38
While the settlement of the Natchez area began 
slowly, a terrible flood which occurred in New Orleans 
during the winter of 1719 encouraged further migration to 
the higher elevation of the Natchez country. Included among
36Glen R. Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration and 
War in Louisiana: 1718-1721, based on the Memoir of Charles
Le Gac, a Company Director, in University of Southwestern 
Louisiana Historical Series (1970), 4; Pierre Heinrich, La 
Louisiane sous le Companie des Indes (Paris, 1910), 137-41; 
O'Neill, Church and State, 119.
37Council of the Marine, August 29, 1716, AC, C13A 
4, f. 217.
38Conrad (ed. and trans.), "Immigration," 4-9.
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the settlers who moved to that area was Le Page du Pratz, 
the noted historian of early Louisiana. His eyewitness 
description of the country and life in the colony is an 
excellent source for the history of Louisiana. Abandoning 
his flooded property on Bayou St. John, near New Orleans,
Du Pratz moved to the Natchez territory in 1719 or 1720 
where he stayed for nearly eight years. Shortly after his 
arrival there, he negotiated with some of the Indians for 
the purchase of a small hut and the cleared land surrounding 
it. During his years among the Natchez Indians, he gained 
the trust of the nation.33
By 1720 the white population of the Natchez country 
had grown to more than 100 settlers, and several conces­
sions were operating in the area. The company's own 
interests were overseen by a M. Baujon and another inspector. 
Eighteen men came to Louisiana from Clerac in Gascony at the 
beginning of 1719. Motivated by the possibility of growing 
tobacco profitably at the Natchez post, these people 
received supplies for a tobacco plantation ir. 1720. By the 
end of the year, they were working hard to produce the 
p i a n t . M a r c - A n t o i n e  Hubert, the former company employee,
3 Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary
of American Biography (21 vols., New York, 1928-44), V, 534;
Le Page du Pratz, Histoire, I, 126-27, 307, 321.
40Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Frangaise:
le Systeme de Law. 1717-1720 (Pans, 1963), III, 249-50,
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was also developing the land. Having received his conces­
sion in 1717#41 Hubert's agricultural endeavor was thriving 
by 1720. The tension between him and Bienville, in the 
meantime, had grown in the preceding few years. Bienville, 
as commandant general, complained to the Company that Hubert 
had become less interested in improving the colony's capital 
at New Orleans than he was in directing supplies and men to 
the Natchez area. Therefore, it was no surprise when 
Hubert1s request for retirement was granted in the fall of 
1720.42
The decade of the 1720's saw the beginnings of a 
potentially thriving French community at the Natchez post. 
Good climate, fertile soil, a river entrepot and a strategic 
military installation gave the Natchez area a promising 
future. At least this was the way the white men perceived 
it. Although appearing to the French as a calm, settled 
area, ripe for development, underlying native tensions would 
touch the lives of the settlers there and upset their hopes 
and plans.
41Ibid., Pierre de Charlevoix, S.J., Journal 
historique d'un Voyage par ordre du roi dans l'Amerique 
septentrionale (Paris, 1744), 11^ 415? "Letters of Conces- 
sion Grant," French (ed.), Historical Collections of Louisi­
ana, III, 78.
42Giraud, Historie. Ill, 290, 294; Conrad (ed. and 
trans.), "Immigration," 33.
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CHAPTER VII
NATIVE UNREST, 1720-1725
At the beginning of the 1720's officials of French 
Louisiana did not realize that the next five years would be 
a period of unrest for the colony's three major tribes.
With the exception of the first Natchez "war" in 1715-1716, 
for nearly 20 years, relations between the French and the 
Choctaw, Chickasaw and Natchez had been peaceful. Such a 
relatively happy situation could not last. While conflict 
between the Choctaw and the Chickasaw began through French 
encouragement of the former to attack the latter, harass­
ment of the white settlers at Fort Rosalie by the Natchez 
Indians had very different origins. Officials were success­
ful in asserting French influence over the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw. However, not even the expertise of Jean Baptiste 
le Moyne de Bienville could settle satisfactorily the complex 
problems between the white people and the red men at the 
Natchez settlement. Indian policy in the years from 1720 to 
1725 ceased to be an open-ended and flexible as it had been 
under the Le Moynes. The dictates of the Company of the 
Indies' bureaucrats superseded the policy of former times. 
And the five years of violence that followed led finally to 
a massacre of the French at the end of the decade.
At the height of the summer of 1720, news of Chicka-
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
saw attacks on their French traders spread throughout the 
colony. Exactly what prompted the killings remained uncer­
tain. Highly suspect were English traders whose influence 
over the Chickasaw had plagued the colony for years.^ As 
the commandant general of Louisiana in charge of military 
matters, Bienville realized that the Choctaw nation of
6,000 warriors would be crucial to the French if a major 
Indian war should develop. And yet, even though the French 
and the Choctaw had been allies as recently as the previous 
year when Pensacola had fallen, this nation responded slowly 
to French calls for aid. Bienville was not at all surprised 
by the Indians' hesitancy. As long as the supply of French 
trade goods remained low and their rates of exchange for 
hides and skins remained unfavorable, the Choctaw would 
never be completely happy with the French.2
Knowing that the French traders' prices for their 
goods were high, the Chickasaw tried to convince the Choctaw 
to war with them against the Louisianians. In the aftermath 
of a Chickasaw attack on the French fort of St. Pierre, 
located on the Yazoo River, the Choctaw were approached by
-'-Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Francaise, 
La Louisiane apres le systeme de Law: 1721-1723 (Paris,
1974), IV, 420. Hereinafter cited as Giraud, Histoire, IV.
2Benard de la Harpe, Journal du Voyage de la Louisi­
ane, Fonds Fran<gais, 8989, f. 32 (Salle des Manuscripts, 
Biblioteque Nationale, Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as 
La Harpe, Ms. F.F., 8989.
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the Chickasaw. They argued that similar attacks on white men 
seven years before had forced the English to reduce their 
prices on trade merchandise. However, even though Choctaw 
leaders were not happy about expensive French goods, their 
ancient rivalry with the Chickasaw Indians prevailed. In the 
closing weeks of 1720, the Choctaw presented Chickasaw scalps 
to French officials as they declared their alliance with the 
French.3
Bienville and Antoine Le Moyne de Chateaugue, his 
younger brother, had become aware of the hostility and the 
jealousy which existed between the Choctaw and the Chickasaw 
long before 1720. Indeed, it is conceivable that these sea­
soned Canadians understood those Indians' relationship as one 
of clan rivalry. One of the Chickasaw migration myths held 
that centuries before the brothers Chicsa and Chacta had led 
the tribe (the common ancestors of the Choctaw and Chickasaw) 
from the Southwest eastward to the Mississippi River.
Becoming separated when they crossed the river, the two clans 
had settled on separate lands. Over the years, feuds had 
erupted from time to time.4 This tradition of conflict and 
hostility between the two tribes continued into the historic 
period. Overhearing such tales while visiting the Choctaw 
villages, an insightful white man, such as Chateaugue, or even
3Colonial Directors to the Company, January 22, 1721, 
Archives de la Guerre, a 12502, ff. 103-03(v)(Chateau Vincennes, 
Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as AG; Giraud, Histoire,
IV, 420.
4see Chapter II, p. 31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
Bienville, could have played on the ancient rivalries which
existed between the Choctaw and the Chickasaw as a means to
encourage war between the two tribes. One scholar has
assessed the Southeastern warfare scene as follows:
The warfare pattern of the Southeastern Indians in 
historic times was not warfare in the European sense.
More than anything else it resembled clan retaliation 
which was the custom by which one clan sought revenge 
for the murder of one of its members by killing the 
manslayer or one of his clansmen. Warfare differed 
from clan retaliation in that it occurred between 
independent peoples, one death could lead to many.5
The new year raised Louisiana officials' hopes for 
the increased support of the Choctaw when the news arrived in 
New Orleans that six Choctaw war parties had left to attack 
the Chickasaw. Antoine Huche, the well-known interpreter to 
the Choctaw, it was reported, had secured the commitment of 
the warriors of several villages to go to war.6 But retaining 
these Indians as active soldiers would require that they be 
given presents for the scalps and the slaves which they would 
bring to the Louisianians. During the years when Louisiana 
was a royal colony, Bienville had paid one musket, one pound 
of powder and two pounds of balls for each enemy scalp, and he 
had given 8 0 livres in trade goods for each native slave.7
5Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, 
1976), 239.
6Sieur de ChateauguS to the Company, January 9, 1721, 
AG, A^-2592, f. 103 (v) ; Meeting of the Council of Commerce, 
February 8, 1721, Archives des Colonies, C13A 6, f. 146(v) 
(Archives Nationales, Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as AC.
7Meeting of the Council of Commerce, AC, C13A 7, 
February 8, 1721, f. 141(v).
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Now, the Company of the Indies, the new administrator of the 
colony, had to establish rates of payment that were appro­
priate to wartime. The Indians needed not only ammunition 
and other merchandise but also food. For due to bad weather, 
supplies of maize were low for both the Indians and the white 
people of Louisiana.3
The French continued to worry over Choctaw participa­
tion in the war even after the winter passed. In the summer 
of 1721, the shortage of supplies remained critical. Unfor­
tunately, because of bureaucratic entanglements, a decision 
about what to pay these native allies for Chickasaw scalps 
had not been reached by Company officials. Moreover, Bien­
ville feared a growing English influence with the tribe to be 
achieved by the payment of more and better prices for hides.9
Over the next several months Louisiana officials had 
difficulty in deciding how to conduct their war against the 
Chickasaw. Rumor and speculation on Choctaw activity cur­
tailed greatly French efforts to plan any well-organized 
campaign. In the winter of 1721-1722, there were unconfirmed 
reports of Choctaw parties armed to oppose the Chickasaw. 
However, these reports were probably incorrect, for the South-
®Memoir of M. Legac, March 5, 1721, Depot des Fortifi­
cations des Colonies: Louisiane, #8, £. 56 (Archives d'Outre- 
Mer, Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as Dep6t des Fortifi­
cations.
^Meeting of the Council of Commerce at Biloxi,
February 8, 1721, AC, C13A 7, ff. 141(v)-42; Bienville to the 
Council of the Marine, August 8, 1721, AC, C13A 6, ff. 172- 
72(v).
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eastern Indians normally did'not war in the winter time.
Later, in the spring, the Choctaw were said to have been 
"slow" to participate in the white man's war, probably 
because of the demands of the tribe's normal seasonal agricul­
tural activities. Spring and early summer were planting 
periods for these Indians, a nation of farmers rather than 
hunters.13 The extent of Choctaw aggression that year is 
uncertain. However, some fighting must have taken place. 
Reports of early 1722 indicated that the Choctaw were serving 
as a sort of military barrier between the French and the 
Chickasaw, who were by then openly hostile to the French.11 
It is quite possible that some, but not all, of the Choctaw 
villages were at war with the Chickasaw during this period.
Chickasaw attacks on the French increased in 1722.
The company was greatly concerned for the safety of travel on 
the Mississippi River. French traders and travelers from the 
Illinois country were frequently attacked by the Chickasaw 
while traveling south on the river. One entire Illinois
10John R. Swanton, Source Material for the Cultural 
and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians (Bureau of Ameri­
can Ethnology, Bulletin 103, Washington, 1931), 49, 1C3; John 
R. Swanton, The Indians of the Southeastern United States 
(Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137, Washington,
1946), 296.
11Journal of the Council of South Carolina, February 
11, 1722, Colonial Office Papers 5, 425, f. 55 (Public Record 
Office, London, England), hereinafter cited as PRO, C.O. 5; 
Pierre de Charlevoix, Journal historique d'un voyage fait par 
ordre du Roi dans l'Amerique septentrionale (6 vols., Paris, 
T W t ) ,  I I ,  -452 .---------------------------------------------------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
family was captured and taken to a Chickasaw village.x2
Added to the attacks of the Chickasaw was a natural 
catastrophe which befell Louisiana in the fall of 1722. A 
terrible hurricane struck the colony in September, leaving 
in its wake incredible devastation along the coast, and in­
land as well. Even the Natchez area experienced some of the 
high winds and driving rains of the storm which pounded the 
colony for several days. The losses appeared insurmountable. 
The corn harvest of the French and of many tribes was ruined. 
Several ships from France were destroyed in New Orleans, 
their precious cargoes sinking into the river along with the 
vessels themselves. But, perhaps, of most vital importance 
to the current Indian conflict between the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw was the destruction of the warehouse at Fort Louis 
in Mobile. Most of the trade merchandise so necessary for 
retaining Choctaw support in the war must have been lost in 
the storm.12
Unaware of Louisiana's lack of merchandise with which 
to reward them for their services, the Choctaw continued
i^The Council of the Marine Reviews Pierre de Charle­
voix's Letter of June 15, 1722 in December, 17 22, AC, C13B 1, 
f. 69(v); La Harpe, Ms. F.F., 8989, f. 79; M. Chassin to the 
Council, July 1, 1722, AC, C13A 6, f. 298(v); Report of Diron 
D'Artaguiette, December 16, 1722, ibid., ff. 388(v)-89;
Journal of Diron D'Artaguiette, September 1-September 11,
1722, AC, C13C 2, ff. 206-07(v).
13Journal of Diron D'Artaguiette, September 1-September 
11, 1722, AC, C13C 2, ff. 198(v)-99; "The Great Storm of 1722 
at Fort Louis, Mobile," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XIV 
(October, 1931), 567; Giraud, Histoire, IV, 285-86.
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their guerrilla attacks on the Chickasaw. They, along with 
several other small tribes, burned three Chickasaw villages 
in the summer of 1722. Such destruction brought injury and 
death to many members of the Chickasaw nation. The victors, 
elated by their success, presented Bienville with 400 Chicka­
saw scalps and 100 slaves. This great conquest had been 
achieved with no loss of French life. Some merchandise must 
have survived the storm at Mobile and was presented to the 
Choctaw. Chateaugu§, Bienville'r: brother, feared, however, 
that the Indians would not regard these goods to be an 
adequate reward for such loyal allies.
Rewarding the Indians for warring on other tribes as 
French agents was contrary t' position taken by Louisi­
ana's first leaders. For years the Chickasaw had served as 
British pawns in the Southeast when they provided the Caro­
linian merchants with captives for the colony's slave trade. 
On the other hand, Iberville and Bienville had worked tire­
lessly in the French colony's initial decade to encourage 
peace among all the natives. Perhaps, Louisiana's more 
secure position in the 1720's provided an explanation for its 
new attitude towards the Indians. French use of the Choctaw 
as agents of war reflected not only a change in policy, but 
a change in the general attitude of the French towards the
•^Letter of the Council to Bienville, January 24, 
1723, AC, C13A 6, ff. 394-94(v); M. de Chateaugue to the 
Council, January 13, 1723, ibid., f. 403; Bienville to the 
Council, February 1, 1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 183(v)-84.
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Indians. These changes would eventually have disastrous 
results.
Contributing to the complexity of the situation was 
the fact that both the Chickasaw and the Choctaw tribes 
regarded war as a religious experience, and both prepared for 
it through rituals, prayers and f a s t i n g . T h e  honor, titles 
and esteem enjoyed by those who had shown bravery in combat 
had for generations been cherished and sought after by the 
warriors of the Southeastern tribes.
In promoting conflict by reminding the Choctaw of 
past Chickasaw atrocities committed against them, Chateaugufe 
exhibited an awareness of the local Indian rivalries. How­
ever, the bribing of these people with goods to commence war, 
to give a musket, powder and balls for each scalp, suggests 
a corruption of the sacred rites. Rather than the honor of 
going to war, or even of taking a scalp by a warrior, a 
Choctaw brave was now motivated by the promise of a musket.
As mercenary soldiers for the white man, the Choctaw tribe 
took up the burden of war for new reasons. No longer encour­
aged by the sacredness of war, no longer moved to war over 
past feuds, the Indians, more and more dependent on the white 
man's merchandise, became instruments of his diplomacy.
Not only could the red men be used as allies to fight
^Swanton, Source Material for the Cultural and Cere­
monial Life of the Choctaw Indians, 162 ff.
^Extract from the Register of the Council's Delibera­
tions, February 8, 17 21, AC, C13A 7, f. 141(v).
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the white man's native enemies, but as stated by Bienville
early in 1723, by pitting one tribe against another the
extermination of all the Indians could be accomplished:
In all of the care I have taken to arouse these 
barbarians one against the other, this will be the 
only way to establish some kind of security for 
the colony because they will destroy one another 
as the strife continues.!7
Accordingly, even into mid-summer of that year, Bienville con­
tinued to urge that the Choctaw be supported in their attacks 
on the Chickasaw. And ultimately, at his urging, all of the 
Superior Council members agreed-that the French should aid 
and supply the Choctaw.12
This detached, even insensitive, position of Bien­
ville's so alien to what he and Iberville had earlier stood 
for, should not be considered to be a real change in his 
attitude, but rather, merely a political ploy. The Company 
of the Indies was pressing for reform of the graft and waste­
ful ways in Louisiana as well as for profit. The result of 
the Chickasaw attacks on the river commerce meant extensive 
losses for the company. Thus, Bienville supported the policy 
of encouraging the Choctaw to attack the Chickasaw not 
because he favored wars between the Indians, but only to pro­
tect his position as commandant general and to promote the 
company's interests.
17Bienville to the Council, February 1, 1723, ibid., 
ff. 183(v)-84.
12Presentation by Bienville for the Council, July 23, 
1723, ibid., ff. 125(v)-26(v).
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As evidence of his basic desire for peace between the 
tribes while arguing for an extended conflict, Bienville 
requested the pardon of the four Chickasaw chiefs who had 
returned the captured Illinois family.19 in stating that 
these leaders had always supported the French, the commandant 
general indicated that a division existed within the Chickasaw 
tribe. Such an appreciation reflects an individual who did 
not categorize all Indians as one, but rather, a white man 
who could distinguish differences among them.
Bienville became aware of the company's intentions to 
reform the administration of the colony, for the arrival of 
Jacques de la Chaise in Louisiana in 1723 indicated to local 
officials that a general administrative housecleaning was 
imminent. As the new commissaire, La Chaise would oversee 
the colony's supplies and accounts. Quite determined to 
tighten up the management of these matters, La Chaise, 
refusing to take the current Choctaw-Chickasaw conflict very 
seriously, proposed a reduction in the quantity of merchandise 
to be given the Choctaw. He failed to understand that a con­
stant flow of company goods was necessary to maintain the 
Choctaw interest in a French alliance.20
Quite likely, La Chaise's complaints about expendi­
tures on supplies for the Indians and perhaps even threats to
19Ibid., f. 127.
20Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and State in French 
Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 17 32 (New Haven,
1966), 145, 147.
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withhold the required merchandise for the Choctaw, prompted 
a meeting of the colony's war council in mid-September.21 
In addition to the commandant general, the group of council- 
men consisted of Antoine Bursle, Francois Fleuriau, Paul 
Perry, Jacques Barbazon de Pailloux and MM. Fazande and Baves. 
Factions existed in the group, some of them formed with the 
reorganization of the colony's administration in December, 
1722. Besides jealousy over status and authority, divisions 
emerged in the religious realm as well, with supporters of 
the Jesuits pitted against those of the Capuchins.22 while 
backers of Bienville in the group included only Perry and, 
perhaps Baves, all of these men agreed with the commandant 
general's view that the Choctaw-Chickasaw war should be con­
tinued and that gifts should be given to the Choctaw to hold 
their support and to keep them fighting.2-̂ Although very 
much enmeshed in their petty quarrels, the members of the 
war council were united in their efforts to promote the 
peace and welfare of the colony even at the expense of the 
red men.
Still, the colony was unable to give its full support
21La Chaise to the Company Directors, September 6, 
1723, AC, C13A 7, f. 46(v).
22Giraud, Histoire, IV, 348-67; O'Neill, Church and 
State, 153.
23A Meeting of the War Council of Louisiana, September 
18, 1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 143(v)-47(v).
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to a new Choctaw campaign in the spring of 1724 because of a 
natural disaster. From New Orleans to the Natchez area, the 
worst floods in Louisiana's history devastated the colony. 
Occurring in the planting period, the waters did not recede 
until the end of June, after which six more weeks of rain set 
in. The German colonists who lived 20 leagues north of New 
Orleans, imported to serve as the colony's farmers, but were 
unable to begin their labors. As a result, both natives and 
colonists suffered a famine due to the absence of a first 
harvest.2^
The terrible disaster which nature inflicted on the 
colony did not, however, stop the Choctaw from waging a new 
campaign against the Chickasaw in 1724. Living inland and, 
therefore, away from the main flood waters, the Choctaw did 
not suffer as severely as the whites. Thus, with ammunition 
supplied by the French the preceding fall, they were able to 
carry the fighting to the Chickasaw, and by the December 
1924 meeting of the Superior Council the embattled Chickasaw 
were suing for peace. 25 i>he Council unanimously agreed that 
peace should be restored because the members were convinced 
that French honor and authority had been reaffirmed among the 
red men.26
^Deliberations of the Council of Louisiana, February 
27, 1723, AC, C13A 9, f. 57(v); Giraud, Histoire, IV, 248-53.
25Extract from the Superior Council's Deliberations, 
December 1, 1724, AC, C13A 8, ff. 155-55(v).
26Ibid.
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Bienville did not participate in the December meeting 
of the Superior Council, for in October he had been removed 
by the Company of the Indies from his position as commandant 
general.27 Pierre de Boisbriant, then stationed at the 
Illinois post, received orders to succeed him. Until Bois­
briant reached New Orleans, Chateaugue served as the comman­
dant general. The change reflected the commercial priorities 
of the company. Father Charles O'Neill has noted:
It was in M. de la Chaise, with his loyalty to the 
company, his knowledge of commerce, and his accuracy 
in accounts that the company places all its hopes.
The gens d 'epee must not be allowed to dominate or 
interfere, they must obey.2^
Indeed, the profit motive appeared stronger than ever in this
era of colonial Louisiana's history.
Whether sensing an obligation, or pressured by the 
company to do so, Bienville requested and obtained permission 
from La Chaise to go to Mobile to arrange a peace between the 
Choctaw and the Chickasaw.2® Knowing that his departure for 
France was imminent, he wanted to leave Louisiana free of any 
quarreling Indians. Due in no small part to a generous dis­
tribution of presents to both tribes and the assurance that 
the French would construct a trading center between the 
territories of the Choctaw and the Chickasaw, Bienville's
27Ibid., f. 157.
^O'Neill, Church and State, 154.
^Bienville to La Chaise, December 11, 1724, AC, 
C13A 8, ff. 153(v)-54.
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efforts were successful, and the Indians made peace in March, 
1 7 2 5 . Officials hoped that the settlement would last in 
order that river transport could recommence peacefully.
During the five-year conflict between the Choctaw and 
the Chickasaw Bienville also dealt with a second native up­
heaval at the Natchez. Hostilities between the Chickasaw and 
the Choctaw were largely between red men and actual white 
involvement in the conflict had been limited to the annoying 
ambushes which had taken place on the Mississippi River. The 
disruption in the Natchez territory which began in the fall 
of 1722 was of a different and more serious nature. White 
people were directly involved in the controversy there which 
lasted for more than a year. Throughout these months French 
life and property at the Natchez were lost. The "second" 
Natchez war revealed in a very real way the tensions which 
existed between the white and the red races in Louisiana.
The first Natchez war of 1716 had ended with an 
invitation to the French to settle in the Natchez territory. 
At the time the settlers began to move into the area the 
Natchez were very much divided. Great Sun and Tattooed Ser­
pent still favored the French, while members of the anti- 
French faction were residing nearby in Apple Village. (Map 
No. 3.) The Great Sun and Tattooed Serpent, it will be re­
called, provided and helped supply the labor for the
30pauger to the Company Directors, March 23, 1725, 
AC, C13A 9, 4. 372.
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Map No. 8
A xerox copy of a map from Marcel Giraud's Histoire 
de la Louisiane Frangaise, III, 369.
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construction of Fort Rosalie in the summer of 1716.31 And,
according to one of the early settlers of the area, Le Page
du Pratz, the pro-French Indians also willingly and generously
helped the first settlers to arrive in the Natchez territory.
They assisted them in clearing the land and showed them how
to plant various crops, such as corn and tobacco. Although
the Indians' own culture was quite sophisticated, they were
drawn, like most red men, to the white man's goods:
. . . the Natchez were attracted by the easy way of 
trading for merchandise unfamiliar in their region, 
such as guns, powder, lead, brandy, materials which 
attracted them more and more to the French.32
By the fall of 1722 more than 100 white people were 
living and working in the two major concessions at the Natchez, 
which were called St. Catherine and Terre Blanche. The 160 
fertile arpents which comprised the St. Catherine concession 
originally belonged to Marc-Antoine Hubert, a former commis- 
saire for the colony. Hubert had worked to clear this land 
for corn and tobacco.33 At his departure from the colony, 
the land was transferred to the Societe de St. Catherine, a 
group of French businessmen interested in making a profit in 
Louisiana. By 17 21 the manager of the property, Faucon- 
Dumanoir, occupied Hubert's former residence there. Nearly 
100 laborers, 20 of whom were black, worked the land. In 1721
31See Chapter VI, p. 132.
32Le Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane Frangaise 
(3 vols., Paris, 1758), II, 179.
33See Chapter VI, pp. 139-40.
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they produced corn, and the next year, beans, peas and 
potatoes. They also grew some hops and tobacco. The conces­
sion, in addition, had fowl and livestock, about 65 head 
altogether, including horses, chickens and pigs. By October, 
17 22, the concession was a thriving enterprise.34
The other concession, Terre Blanche, belonged to the 
Company of the Indies. Efforts were made to develop tobacco 
cultivation here. A force of tobacco workers came from France 
to clear and farm the land. Never a very large operation, 
employing only 43 people at most, this enterprise did not 
prosper as well as the St. Catherine endeavor.35
Although the whites were apparently confined to an 
area near Fort Rosalie, they had a good deal of contact with 
the Indians. Some of the results of this contact were 
unfortunate for the red men. As a result of it, they con­
tracted sicknesses which the settlers and their slaves 
brought with them. When Pierre de Charlevoix visited the 
Natchez settlement in 1722, for example, he found an epidemic, 
probably smallpox, ravaging the Indian population. Further­
more, the soldiers and settlers traded with the Indians and 
these exchanges sometimes led to trouble, especially when the 
Indians failed to pay their debts.35 Two Indians owed a
34Giraud, Histoire, IV, 260-61.
35Ibid., 266-67.
35Charlevoix, Journal historique, II, 420.
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Sergeant Fontaine, one of the guards at Fort Rosalie, a debt 
for some merchandise. When he happened in October, 1722, to 
meet them and demanded payment, an argument and a fight 
ensued in which the sergeant mortally wounded the Indians.37 
Unfortunately, these Indians were members of Apple 
Village, several of whose leaders had been killed by Bienville 
in 1716. Ancient Hair, the current chief of the village and 
ally of White Ground, a rebel leader, ordered his men to 
attack the French. In the course of a week, the Apple Village 
Indians managed to kill or wound nearly a dozen French people 
as well as several black slaves. Livestock was also destroyed 
or stolen. More than 3 0 animals, including horses, pigs and 
oxen could not be accounted for by the time the fighting was 
over. The St. Catherine concession, located near the village, 
received the brunt of the blows. Black slaves were attacked 
while working in the fields. The assistant director of the 
concession, Pierre Guenot, refused to leave the property. 
Having no weapons with which to defend himself, he soon became 
one of the casualties of the conflict.38
■^La Tour to Company Directors, January 15, 17 23, AC, 
C13A 7, f. 195; Anonymous Journal of the Natchez War of 
October, 1722, Depot des Fortifications, #29, f. 1; An 
Account of the Natchez War with the French in 1723 by M. La 
Loire Flaucourt, June 6, 1723, ibid., #31, ff. 1-2.
^ A n  Anonymous Journal of the Natchez War of October,
1722, ibid., #29, ff. 2-6; An Account of the Natchez War with 
the French in 1723 by M. La Loire Flaucourt, June 6, 1723, 
ibid., #31, ff. 3-6; La Tour to the Company Directors, January 
15, 1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 195(v)-96.
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The military force stationed at Fort Rosalie at that 
time offered little leadership. Captain Berneval and his 20 
soldiers attempted to arm the panicky settlers, but the 
French colonists refused to take retaliatory steps, for the
3,000 Natchez far outnumbered the fewer than 200 Frenchmen. 
Finally, on October 24, the Captain dispatched Charles Du 
Tisng to New Orleans to report the desperate situation which 
existed at the Natchez. Arriving at the capital three days 
later, Du Tisne urged Bienville to send help at once.39
At the same time that Du Tisne was pleading for some 
relief from New Orleans, the Natchez themselves began to 
suggest that peace be negotiated. Captain Berneval had had 
the assistance of the followers of Tattooed Serpent through­
out the conflict, and several Indians had served as contacts 
between the French and the natives of Apple Village. What 
convinced the rebels to cease hostilities remains unclear.
The current French force posed no real threat. One account 
does record that the Tioux, a small tribe of Indians who 
lived near Fort Rosalie, decided to support the French. 
Indeed, it is quite possible that these Indians together with 
the followers of Tattooed Serpent and Great Sun, comprised a 
stronger, more numerous force than Ancient Hair's faction.
39La Harpe, Ms. F.F. 8989, January 20, 1722, f. 309; 
An Account of the Natchez War with the French in 1723 by M.
La Loire Flaucourt, June 6, 1723, Depot des Fortifications, 
#31, ff. 4-5; Bienville to the Council, August 3, 1723, AC, 
C13A 7, ff. 136-37.
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Whatever the reasons, on October 29, the French received word 
that a calumet of peace would soon follow, and peace between 
the settlers of the Natchez area and the Natchez of Apple 
Village was restored by early November.4°
Fearing some form of French retribution, Tattooed 
Serpent, accompanied by several braves, set out for New 
Orleans immediately following the establishment of peace at 
the Natchez. Arriving at the capital on November 6, the 
Indians met briefly with the commandant general. Bienville 
did not want a conflict with the Natchez, especially with the 
Choctaw-Chickasaw war well into its second year. Mindful of 
the potential military strength of Tattooed Serpent and his 
followers, he presented the Natchez visitors with arms and 
munitions worth several thousand livres.4  ̂ Bienville also 
ordered a small force of 60 recruits under Sergeant Pailloux 
to return with Tattooed Serpent to reinforce the Natchez post, 
Bienville urged Pailloux to trust the discretion, as well as 
the loyalty, of Tattooed Serpent, pointing out that he would 
need native assistance in his peace-keeping mission.42 This 
expedition arrived at the Natchez late in November. Since 
the strife appeared to be over, Pailloux demanded little in
4QIbid., ff. 5-12.
4^A List of Presents Given to Some Natchez Indians by 
Order of Bienville, November 6, 1722, AC, C13A 7, ff. 300-01.
42A Copy of the Orders Given to M. Pailloux, November 
7, 1722, ibid., ff. 210-10(v); Giraud, Histoire, IV, 292.
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the way of compensation from the natives. The white settlers 
were appalled by his seeming lack of force in punishing the 
Indians.
Perhaps as a result of his failure to retaliate for 
the Indian attacks, incidents of ambush and terror continued 
at the Natchez. Throughout the late winter and early spring 
of 1723, the trouble at the St. Catherine concession grew.
The Indians stole or killed a great many head of livestock. 
They used terror rather than death to traumatize the French 
settlers. Although a crop of corn had been planted, fear of 
ambush by the natives prevented its harvest.^
The settlers at Natchez appealed to the colonial 
authorities for further help, but the Superior Council's 
response was minimal. The Council decreed that settlers 
should cease trading with the Natchez, and that the comman­
dant at Fort Rosalie should see to it that no Indian should 
bear or be sold a musket. When reinforcements were finally 
sent, they numbered a mere 23 men. These soldiers, led by 
Captain Henry Desliettes, finally arrived in mid-July, more
43lbid.; Letter of M. de la Tour, January 15, 17 23, 
AC, C13A 6, f. 4 01; An Account of the Natchez War with theA 
French in 1723 by M. La Loire Flaucourt, June 6, 1723, Depot 
des Fortifications, #31, ff. 13-15; Bienville's Report to the 
Superior Council, August 3, 1723, AC, C13A 7, f. 132.
44Ibid., ff. 16-19; Reports Before the Superior 
Council Concerning the Problems at the Natchez, June, 17 23, 
AC, C13A 7, f. 302ff.
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than six months after Pailloux's force had been dispatched 
to the area.45
Although Desliettes' small force seemed insignificant 
in number, it was surely a welcome sight to the Natchez 
settlers. Native harassment had intensified over the months. 
The rebels had killed more livestock and had attempted several 
ambushes. A mock peace ceremony had taken place in early 
July when an armed group of 80 Natchez warriors had visited 
the settlers laughingly offering a calumet. Never before had 
there been such a large number of warriors prepared for 
attack. Tension appeared to be mounting.4®
During the Superior Cc \cil meeting in August, 17 23, 
all of the Council members ag...t;ed that order had to be 
restored to the Natchez area. Bienville, as commandant
general, was criticized by his leading opponent, Le Blond de
la Tour, for failing to move more quickly in this matter.
Not only was there the Nate1rz crisis at this time, but, it
should be recalled, the Choctaw and the Chickasaw were still 
at war with one another. In spite of minor bickering, all 
Council members agreed that more men must be sent to the
45Deliberations of the Superior Council, June 11, 
1723, AC, C13A 7, f. 124; Arrets of the Superior Council of 
Louisiana, June 21, 1723, ibid., ff. 103(v)-04(v); Le Page 
du Pratz, Histoire, I, 180-87; Giraud, Histoire, IV, 293.
46Reports Before the Superior Council Concerning 
Problems at the Natchez, June, 1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 303-303.
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Natchez post.^
To justify his delay in answering the Natchez attacks 
over the preceding three months, Bienville cited the shortage 
of men and supplies. The plight of the soldiers in Louisiana 
had been a bad one from the colony's first years. Desertion 
had always been high and morale very low. As recently as 
May, 1723, terrible riots against the government had occurred 
among the soldiers of New Orleans. Apparently, these men had 
legitimate complaints about the lack of supplies. Further­
more, neither the French government nor the Company of the 
Indies had ever provided them with proper barracks. Each 
man had to find his own place to live. A captain who 
received 90 livres a month in pay was charged as much as 4 0 
livres 50 sols in rent./j& Indeed, no member of the Superior 
Council could deny the reality of Louisiana's tenuous 
military situation.
By early September dispatches from the Natchez area 
reached a hysterical level with accounts of continued Natchez 
depredations on the French and their property. Finally, 
Bienville departed New Orleans on September 29, with a force
^7Bienville to the Council, August 3, 1723, ibid., 
ff. 137(v)-44; Opinions of the Members of the Superior 
Council Concerning the Natchez Problem, August, 1723, ibid., 
ff. 133-36.
^Deliberations of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 
May 28, 1723, AC. C13A 7, ff. 119-20(v); Deliberations of 
the Superior Council of Louisiana, June 5, 1723, ibid., ff. 
121(v)-24); La Chaise to the Company Directors, September 6, 
1723, ibid., ff. 18(v)-19(v) and ff. 22(v)-34(v).
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of 600 soldiers and volunteers. Included in his army were 
250 Indians from the Opelousas and the Avoyelles tribes. He 
hoped that with such an army some solution to this controversy 
could be found.
Within the month, Bienville and his army arrived at 
the fort. He found the friendly Natchez waiting for him, 
refusing to speak to Desliettes or any of the other officers 
at Fort Rosalie. ^  He immediately called a council of war 
with the officers of the post. The leaders decided that a 
conventional military assault on the Indians was out of the 
question because the countryside was so overgrown with cane 
and brush. Besides, since Indians from Apple Village were 
the culprits, all efforts should be concentrated on that band 
of natives alone. With the loyalty of five other villages, 
in addition to that of the Tioux unquestioned, Bienville 
felt confident that the French were in a relatively advan­
tageous position. Tattooed Serpent, the unfailing French 
ally, helped in the operations against the hostile Indians.
So great was his assistance that by the end of the month,
60 Indians of Apple Village had been either captured or 
killed. Rather than involve his own men, Bienville had seen 
to it that Tattooed Serpent and his followers attacked this 
village. Whether this native leader organized ambushes or 
direct assaults on the members of Apple Village is not
^^La Chaise to the Company Directors, October 18, 
1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 64(v)-65; Giraud, Histoire, IV,
294.
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known. However, many of the rebels died because of Tattooed 
Serpent's intervention.^
On November 23 Bienville called a meeting of the 
officers at the Natchez to decide whether or not to continue 
the war. Supplies were running out. Moreover, Bienville had 
learned from Sergeant Fontain's killing the two Indians the 
previous autumn, along with another soldier's assault on an 
elderly Indian that winter, had precipitated the Apple Village 
warriors' attacks. The war council also heard about natives 
from several other Natchez villages who had suffered at the 
hands of the French because of the debts which they owed.
Thus, the officers voted to end hostilities. The peace terms 
offered by the French and accepted by the Indians included:
(1) the Natchez were to remain at peace with the Indian allies 
of the French; (2) in the future, if the French should cause 
a quarrel, the Natchez were to go for redress directly to the 
commanding officer at Fort Rosalie; (3) the Natchez were to 
return the livestock stolen from St. Catherine concession.
With this agreement successfully concluded, Bienville and his 
men departed for New Orleans on December 2.~>̂
At first glance, the clash between the French and the
50Giraud, Histoire, IV, 295-95; Reports before the 
Superior Council Concerning Problems at the Natchez, June, 
1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 309-15(v).
51Reports before the Superior Council Concerning 
Problems at the Natchez, AC, C13A 7, ff. 315(v)-16; A War 
Council Meeting Report, January 7, 1724, ibid., ff. 173-74(v).
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Indians of the Natchez area appears to be a classic example 
of the racial tensions which had occurred on the frontier 
often growing out of commercial contact between the two 
peoples. In this case, the Natchez had over-extended them­
selves in trade and were unable to pay their debts, and this 
was an important source of friction between those Indians and 
the French.
Another explanation of the source of conflict between 
the French and the Natchez can be found in the ineffectiveness 
of the French military forces in the Natchez area. They were 
unable either to protect the settlers against the Indians or 
the Indians against the French. The failure of the military 
was due to poor leadership, as well as a lack of personnel 
and supplies. Even the discipline of the small Fort Rosalie 
garrison was poor. For example, in the midst of the tense 
situation in the fall of 1723, two soldiers, Jean-Francois 
Pasquier and Captain D 1Etcheparre, settled a private quarrel 
by a duel in which both men were wounded, a settlement wnicn 
v;as costly for a post with less than 30 soldiers. ̂  Thus, 
Bienville had little in the way of competent military help in 
dealing with the Natchez.
Bienville had been criticized by officials in New 
Orleans for waiting nearly a year to respond to the Natchez
La Chaise to the Community Directors, October 18, 
1723, AC C13A 7, ff. 73(v)-74; An Account of the Natchez War 
with the French in 1723 by M. La Loire Flaucourt, June 6, 
1723, D§pot des Fortifications, #31, ff. 3, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
attacks on the French. Le Blonde de la Tour and Jacques de 
le Chaise led the opposition against him. An engineer and a 
bookkeeper, respectively, both company men, neither of these 
individuals properly understood the realities of life in 
dealing with the Indians. Bienville had offered as excuses 
for his inaction, his own health, a lack of troops and meager 
supplies. It should also be recalled that with the Choctaw- 
Chickasaw war still raging, the commandant general probably 
did not want to alienate the Natchez, a potential source of 
allies. One final factor in inducing Bienville to wait to 
move against the Natchez may have been the season of the year. 
Knowing that all of the Indians would gather in their main 
villages for the October-November Great Corn Feast, Bienville 
could well have chosen that time to deal with them, confident 
that the guilty parties could then be found easily.33
While white abuse of the Indians provided one explana­
tion of the second Natchez war, the establishment of the St. 
Catherine concession may provide a better one. Even before 
the initial outbreak of the war in 1722, the Indians had 
attacked the concession, killing livestock. In the discussion 
of war Bienville himself mentioned that the Indians had always 
had something against the St. Catherine concession.54
53Mr. Daily to M. Faneuil, September 25, 1748, re­
printed in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly, V I (1923), 547; 
Bienville to the Council, August 3, 1723, AC, C13A 7, f. 137.
54Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Frangaise:
L 1Eooaue de John Law, 1717-1720 (Paris, 1963), 369? Robert S.
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Unknowingly, the French may have established the concession 
close to an old Natchez mound which had been worn down with 
the passage of time and, therefore, was not noticed by the 
French. This mound may well have been a former temple site.^^ 
If this, indeed, were the case, the area might have been con­
sidered still sacred, and the establishment of a white 
settlement on it may well have seemed sacrilegious to the 
rebel Natchez. (See Maps Nos. 9 and 10.) Just how much of 
the area surrounding a burial mound would have been considered 
sacred is quite difficult to say. It has been suggested 
previously that some, or all, of Apple Village represented a 
new unacculturated faction, or rebel group, at odds with the 
main Natchez tribe. If the bones of the ancestors of the 
rebel, or "outside," group were buried in the mound near St. 
Catherine concession, Tattooed Serpent's support of the French 
in the conflict is all the more understandable. The mound 
would have meant nothing to him and his people, and he might 
well have wanted some of the Apple Village leaders eliminated.
Whatever the cause of the outbreak of hostilities at 
the Natchez, it could not be denied that Bienville ended them 
and restored peace to Louisiana before his departure for France 
in— the summer of 1725. His expert : nndling of the native
Neitzel, The Archaeology of the Fatherland Site: the Grand 
Village of the Natchez (New York, 1965) , 14. —
55Ibid., 64.
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A xerox copy of a map from Robert Neitzel's Archae­
ology of the Fatherland Site; the Grand Village of the 
Natchez. 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 1
Map No. 10
A xerox copy of a map from Marcel Giraud's Histoire 
de la Louisiane Frangaise, III, 369.
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unrest in these years, while appreciated by the Indians and 
the settlers alike, failed to win him the complete approval 
of the Company of the Indies. Men of trade and profit were 
now ruling Louisiana. Such men could perhaps promote the 
colony's mercantile success, but they could not appreciate 
many of the needs of the frontier colony. The Indians them­
selves must have felt the insensitive nature of the company's 
bureaucratic operations following Bienville's departure, for 
in the summer of 1725 Pierre de Boisbriant wrote the company 
that all of the Indians of the colony waited anxiously for 
Bienville's return.56
56Memoir of M. de Boisbriant to the Minister, 1725, 
AC, C13A 8, ff. 248-48(v).
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CHAPTER VIII
COMPANY POLICIES MAKE AN IMPRESSION, 1720'S
The war years of 1720-1725 had been destructive for 
the Choctaw, the Chickasaw and the Natchez, but they would 
know even greater changes as the administration of Louisiana 
came more firmly into the hands of the Company of the Indies 
during the decade of the 1720's. New officials and leaders, 
of course, meant new attitudes towards the Indians as the Le 
Moyne family, who fully appreciated wilderness ways, gave 
way to a new regime in which the profit motive dominated.
The search for profits— large profits— altered the lives of 
the natives of Louisiana's three major tribes. The company 
hoped that the haphazard efforts of former years to exploit 
the colony's resources would now be better organized. If 
properly overseen, both the pelt trade with the Choctaw and a 
tobacco industry at the Natchez could mean great financial 
success for the company. While not directly involved in the 
company's economic schemes, the Chickasaw's role as a native 
pawn between two European powers became even clearer in these 
years. Ignorant of the difficult problems of New World 
diplomacy, rapacious in their determination to create a true 
"El Dorado" where John Law had failed, the officials of the 
Company of the Indies brought to bear policies and practices
173
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which would disrupt these Indians' lives to an even greater 
extent than had John Law's.
In France the company directors at least realized that 
the natives had to be encouraged with presents to remain 
friendly towards the French. The Company at first planned to 
spend 20,000 livres a year for three years for Indian goods, 
though it later reduced the amount to 10,000 livres.1 Even 
though Bienville's influence would soon decline, the company 
did consult him about how and where to distribute these 
presents. In 1721, when officials finally decided on 12,000 
livres annually for Indian presents, they also accepted Bien­
ville's recommendation for an increase in gifts for the 
distant posts of the Alabama area, the Illinois country and 
N a t c h i t o c h e s .  ̂ The principal recipients of the gifts, however, 
were to be the Choctaw tribe, because they would be vital to 
the development of an expanded skin trade. It was also 
generally agreed that a trading post would be necessary for 
their area in order to maintain the tribe as an ally in war, 
as well as a partner in the skin trade, and to forestall the
^Memoir on Louisiana by Sr. Le Bartz, a Company 
Director, c. 1720, Memoires et Documents, Amerique, I, ff.
163(v)-64 (Archives do Ministeres des Affaires Etrangeres, 
Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as AME, Mem. et Doc.
^Deliberations of the Council of Commerce of Louisi­
ana, August 25, 1721, C13A 6, ff. 148-49(v), Archives des 
Colonies (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), hereinafter 
cited as AC; Regulations for the Business of the Colony of 
Louisiana, September 6, 1721, AC, B 43, f. 34.
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encroachment of English traders from Carolina.3
Company officials also drew up a new price list for 
goods to be exchanged for the Indians' furs and skins. In 
the recent past, Bienville had complained that the Indians 
were charged more in hides for French goods than for English 
goods, thus placing the Fre.. traders at a competitive dis­
advantage. The crucial item for comparison was the musket 
which, in 1718, cost the Indians eight to ten skins when it 
was purchased from an English trader, while the same item 
cost them 30 skins when bought from a French trader.4 Under 
the new regime, these rates were lowered to about 20 skins 
for a musket. How well these new prices would compete with 
those of the English remained to be seen. However, a better 
organized effort to be more competitive was indeed underway.3
Unlike New France or even the English colonies in the 
eighteenth century, Louisiana did not have a highly organized 
fur trade business. The Crozat regime, it should be recalled, 
had stifled the enterprise because prices on trade items 
which Crozat supplied were too high for the average trader.
^Bienville to the Minister, June 10, 1718, AME, Mem. 
et Doc., Am., I, ff. 207-17 (v).
4Council of Commerce at Biloxi, February 8, 1721,
AC, C13A 6, ff. 146-46 (v)? An Addenda of a Dispatch from the 
Company of the Indies to Louisiana Officials, March 5, 1721, 
Archives de la Guerre, A^2592, ff. 105(v)-106 (Chateau 
Vincennes, Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as AG.
Regulations for the Business of the Colony of 
Louisiana, September 15, 1721, AC, B. 43, ff. 18(v)-20.
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Even under John Law's Company of the West, the business con­
tinued to struggle through the efforts of private individuals 
rather than to thrive through the work of company-supplied 
traders. In refusing to support settlers who would have been 
interested in working for the trade, neither the Crozat nor 
the John Law regimes helped the industry along.
The Company of the Indies hoped to improve the system. 
Officials in France felt that by granting exclusive fur 
trading privileges to selected private individuals in the 
colony, a greater growth of the industry would occur. An 
enterprising entrepreneur would supply and support a number 
of traders, who, in turn, would bring their pelts to a post 
such as Mobile or Fort Toulouse. However, not even a strong 
sponsor would be able to contend successfully with the dif­
ficulties of the high prices which continued to be charged the 
Indians for merchandise.
Beginning in 1721, the company sketched out rules for 
the conduct of the trade, as well as the prices to be charged 
for merchandise. Every sponsor who wished to secure trade 
goods from a company storehouse had to fill out a form on 
which he itemized the cloth, beads, muskets and other items 
which he wished to obtain for his trade. For these items the 
company charged the trader at an exchange rate of 20 sols for 
each buckskin. This plan was applied initially at the 
littoral centers of Mobile, New Orleans and Dauphine Island, 
but if it worked, the company intended to introduce it into
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the interior.6
The mark-up on merchandise purchased from warehouses 
near the coast was 50 percent above the price of the same item 
in France. Because of additional transportation costs, the 
prices of goods were further increased by as much as 7 0 per­
cent at the Natchez post and 100 percent at the Illinois post. 
Thus, those sponsors who lived in and around the New Orleans, 
Biloxi and Mobile areas enjoyed a substantial advantage over 
those operating well inland. The rates set at the Alabama 
post were set below those at any other post. They were 
restricted to an increase of 50 percent above the prices on 
trade items due to the nearness of the English and their com­
petitive prices.7
The company considered Mobile to occupy a very impor­
tant place in the colony affecting its role in the fur trade 
as well as other matters. In the early 1720's, Mobile was 
the most solidly established settlement in Louisiana.
Although Fort Louis itself needed repairs, most of its 200 
soldiers probably had adequate shelter, at least until the 
hurricane of 1722 which nearly destroyed everything in the 
area.8 Even after the storm, Mobile could supply settlers,
6Ibid., 22. 7Ibid., ff. 27-28.
8"The Great Storm of 1722 at Fort Louis, Mobile," a 
translated document from the Cabildo Depository in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, IV (October, 
1931), 567; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Francaise: 
Apres le Systeme de Law (Paris, 1974), IV, 285-86. Herein­
after cited as Giraud, Histoire, IV.
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soldiers and Indians of the vicinity with the services of a 
blacksmith, an ironmonger, several gunsmiths and a doctor, all 
individuals whose services were highly valued on the frontier. 
The several hundred settlers along the Mobile River raised 
rice, tobacco and even some livestock for the post. Already 
the potential of pitch and tar to be obtained from the thick 
pine forests of the hinterland was being investigated for 
future exploitation. With Antoine Le Moyne de Chateaugue as 
the commanding officer at Mobile, the stability of commercial 
endeavor there appeared assured.3 The settlement became the 
seat of the third military district in the reorganization of 
the colony in 1720. The lieutenant second to the king's 
lieutenant, Cnateaugu§, commanded the area which included 
Mobile Bay and Dauphine Island as well as the entire course 
of the Mobile River.-1-0
The company also had plans for improving the military 
facilities at Mobile. The sha aw waters of the Mobile River 
provided a natural defense against enemy ships. At points 
where an enemy might pose some threat of attack, batteries of 
cannon had been placed to protect the harbor.^ However, the
°Giraud, Histoire, ' 310-11; A Memoir on the Status
of Louisiana by Charles Le (_>*.. March 3, 17 31, Depot des 
Fortifications des Colonies: Louisiane, #8 f. 51, Archives
d'Outre-Mer, Paris, France. Hereinafter cited as D6pot des 
Fortifications.
l°Memoir on the Status of Louisiana, 1720, AG, A12592, 
f. 90(v); Instructions for a Better Settlement in Louisiana, 
1722, AC, C13A 6, f. 364.
1]-Giraud, Histoire, IV, 419.
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hurricane of 17 22 evidently destroyed most of these man-made 
defenses, for the fort was described by engineers in 1723 as 
a pitiful structure, offering as much protection as an open 
p a r k . jn that year the Superior Council voted 4,000 livres 
for improvements on Fort Conde, formerly Fort Louis, at Mobile. 
Adrien Pauger, as chief engineer, argued that the strategic 
location of Mobile made it crucial to the defense of Louisiana 
from the Spanish to the east at Pensacola, from the English 
to the northeast and from the Choctaw if they should ever 
choose to attack. Pauger even proposed erecting a building 
with a stone foundation which would endure longer than wood 
in the heat and humidity of the Gulf Coast.H
Commercial interests also encouraged a greater expendi­
ture of energy at the Mobile post. Plans for the development 
of the area as a fur trade center seemed at last to be coming 
to fruition. With the reorganization of the colony's adminis­
tration under the Company of the Indies in 17 20, optimism for 
the development of a successful pelt trade grew. One entre­
preneur, a M. Pellerin, ordered 400 light muskets, 2,000 
weight in balls, 3,000 ells of cloth, 200 small hatchets and
l2Ibid., 420; Le Blond de la Tour to the Company,
August 20, 1722, AC, C13A 6, f. 327(v); Adrien Pauger to the 
Company Directors, May 29, 1724, AC, C13A 8, f. 57; Pauger to 
the Company Directors, September 15, 17 24, ibid., f. 81; Le 
Blond de la Tour to the Company, April 23, 17 22, AC C13A 6, 
f. 311.
Pellerin to M. Soret, the Comptroller, October 
16, 1720, Ms. 4497, ff. 65-66 (Biblioth&que de 1'Arsenal,
Paris, France). Hereinafter cited as BA.
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40 sabres, all of which he planned to use in his trade with 
the Indians.14 The quantity of merchandise for presents or 
for trade goods appeared to increase under the company.15
Participation in the pelt trade by these entre­
preneurs had, in fact, increased by the time Jacques de la 
Chaise arrived at Mobile in the summer of 1723. Although La 
Chaise complained about the unpaid debts at the company's 
store, no one could deny that the enterprising was expanding.^  
The prices for deerskins fixed in 1721 apparently did not dis­
courage the trade, for by 172 5 more than 30,000 hides had 
been received from the Indians of Louisiana,17 nearly one-third 
of them from the Choctaw and the Chickasaw. The Indians of 
these two tribes were, thus, able to obtain large numbers of 
skins even while they were at war. Just how many of these 
skins were exported to France is not known, for because or 
the heat and humidity, some of the hides rotted. The French 
could find no solution to the problem of mites and other
14In the same era Benard La Harpe secured a signifi­
cant amount of goods for his trip into the Arkansas River area. 
See Benard La Harpe, Journal du Voyage de la Louisiana,
December 10, 1721, Fonds Francais, 8989, ff. 59-59(v) (Biblio- 
theque Nationale, Salle des Manuscripts, Paris, France). 
Hereinafter cited as La Harpe, 8939.
15La Chaise to the Company Directors, September 6,
1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 22-36.
1®Nancy Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana 
During the French Regime (New York, 1917), 345-47.
17Deliberations of the Council of Louisiana, February 
27, 1725, AC, C13A 9, f. 53(v); Memoir on Louisiana, 1726,
AC, C13A 10, ff. 150(v)-51.
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insects which destroyed the pelts when stored for very long. 
Yet, even though the condition of buckskins and wildcat skins 
which tne traders brought in was often unsatisfactory, offi­
cials believed it crucial to accept them mainly in order to 
keep out English competition. They could, thus, maintain the 
Choctaw and other Mobile River tribes as friends of the 
French.
By 1725 the loyalty and reliability of the Choctaw as 
partners in the pelt trade was unquestioned. Trade with the 
tribe had grown so much that company officials proposed to 
establish a large trading post near the Choctaw villages.
They hoped to do so soon, for the Choctaw chiefs were making 
almost daily requests for such an entrepot. Meanwhile, the 
Superior Council urged the company to make more merchandise 
available for the Indian trade at lower prices.19
Trade relations with the Chickasaw posed far greater 
problems. In the early 1720's, it will be recalled, the 
Chickasaw had attacked French travelers on the Mississippi 
River. Although they had no conclusive evidence, the French 
suspected the English of encouraging these attacks. As has 
been related, the Choctaw, at the behest of the French,
•^Council of Louisiana to Company Directors, February 
27, 1725, AC, C13A 9, ff. 28-29(v); Pauger to the Company 
Directors, March 23, 1725, ibid., ff. 371-72; Meeting of the 
Council of Louisiana, April 23, 1725, ibid., f. 129(v); Meet­
ing of the Council of Louisiana, November 1, 1725, ibid., f. 
245.
19See Chapter VII, pp. 152-53.
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retaliated for these Chickasaw attacks in 1722 and destroyed 
three Chickasaw villages. The Choctaw attack upset rela­
tions between the Chickasaw and the French.20
The increasing difficulties between the Chickasaw and 
the French could only benefit the English traders. The colony 
of Carolina had suffered great economic setbacks as a result 
of the Yamasee War of 1715-1717. Under the pressure of 
economic necessity, the English had increased their trading 
activities among the Indians of the Lower Mississippi Valley 
in the 1720's. As a result of this resurgence of effort and 
interest in that area, in 1726 Carolina exported 73,790 deer­
skins and 1,965 pounds of leather.21 Supplied with excellent 
cloth, muskets, hatchets, knives, scissors, wire, mirrors and 
other items, by the mid-17 20's, the Carolinian merchant again 
threatened French hegemony among the Indians of Louisiana.22
Late in 1722 the combination of the abundance of 
British trade goods and harassment from the Choctaw led
20Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana, 349-oQ.
21A Memoir on the Status of Louisiana, June, 17 20, AG, 
A12592, f. 90; Invoice of Goods and Skins Taken from John 
Sharp by the Creek Indians, November 19, 1724, Colonial Office 
Papers 5, 359, B(125), f. 264 (Public Record Office, London, 
England). Hereinafter cited as PRO, C.O. 5.
22Journal of the Assembly of South Carolina, June 21, 
1722, PRO, C.O. 5, 426, f. 28. Hereinafter cited as the 
Journal of the Assembly; Journal of the Council of South Caro­
lina, August 3, 1722, PRO, C.O. 5, 425,_F, ff. 1718. Herein­
after cited as the Journal of the Council; Journal of the 
Council, September 4, 1723, PRO, C.O. 5, 359, B (28), f. 78.
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several Chickasaw chiefs to negotiate a plan with the British 
authorities for those Indians to move into English territory. 
By the fall of 1723, 80 Chickasaw men, women and children had 
moved from their villages at the eastern edge of their lands 
to Savannah Town. Carolinian officials anticipated many other 
members of the tribe moving there in the spring.22
Since the majority of the Chickasaw tribe stayed 
behind, however, the English still had allies deep in French 
territory. Pierre de Boisbriant, Bienville's successor as 
commandant general of Louisiana, saw danger in the new native 
alignment. Urging greater company assistance in maintaining 
Indian allies, this veteran frontiersman feared that the 
French might lose all of their Indian friends as a result of 
English influence.24
Increased English activity in the Fort Toulouse area 
clearly underscored the English advantage in the skin trade 
and among the native people in that part of the country. 
Reports of the prices of English goods being only half those 
charged by the French produced discouragement for the company
22Boisbriant to the Comptroller General, October 24, 
1725, AC, C13A 8, f. 238; Boisbriant to the Minister, March
13, 1726, AC, C13A 9, ff. 247-49.
24Colonial Directors to the Company, January 22, 
1721, AG, A 12592, f. 103.
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directors.2  ̂ Furthermore, both the condition of the French 
post and the morale of the garrison were moving towards their 
nadir. According to Cr£pin Pechon de Comte, who commanded 
Fort Toulouse and its garrison of 60 men, the hastily built 
stake fort and the few rude huts within were rotting, while 
only a few leagues away the English posts were thriving and 
were well cared for. Such reports finally got results when 
the company granted 1,000 livres for post repairs and addi­
tional money for the employment - of an interpreter.26
Despite such grants, company officials in both 
Louisiana and France did not appreciate fully the need for 
much greater expenditures within the colony. Instead, they 
were attempting to reduce expenditures. Pay cuts for soldiers, 
introduced at this time in an effort to economize, only pro­
duced a higher rate of desertion. Other steps taken by the 
company to' decrease expenses included a cut-back in the grants 
for presents for the natives, a measure which hit at the
25Deliberations of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 
October 23, 1723, AC, C13A 7, ff. 118-21; La Chaise to the 
Company Directors, October 18, 1723, ibid., ff. 74-75; Memoir 
of Le Gac, March 5, 1721, D£pot des Fortifications, #8, f.
51; An Extract of the Deliberations of the Louisiana Superior 
Council, May 22, 1723, AC, C13A 7, f. 112; Memoir of Valdeterre, 
1726, AC, C13A 10, ff. 17(v)-18; Memoir of the Company of the 
Indies to Perier, September 30, 1726, AC, C13B 1, ff. 84-85.
26Ibid., f. 94(v), ff. 101(v)-02; Deliberations of the 
Superior Council of Louisiana, October 23, 17 23, AC C13A 7, 
ff. 120(v)-21; Deliberations of the Superior Council of 
Louisiana, March 17, 1726, ibid., ff. 247(v)-48.
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heart of Bienville's Indian policy.27 Boisbriant*s fears of 
declining French prestige in Louisiana were securely founded 
on substantial examples of bureaucratic mismanagement.
Even with the problems of administration, French 
policy initiatives were not totally ineffectual. Company 
gifts made, despite a general policy of retrenchment, grad­
ually helped draw the Chickasaw away from the English to the 
point of where the Chickasaw began killing and pillaging 
English merchants.28 Relations between the English and the 
Chickasaw became so poor that the Chickasaw were excluded from 
a general native peace which the Carolinians negotiated in 
1726. In an effort to restore English influence, the Com­
mittee of Indian Affairs of the Assembly of Carolina recom­
mended that Thomas Welch, a Chickasaw half-breed, become the 
Carolinian liaison with the Chickasaw. The committee's report 
of July, 1728 was a discouraging one. It noted, "the Traders 
at the Chickasaws have not returned from thence as was 
expected, and by the Account of the last traders headed there, 
we find that the Chickasaws were very insolent and robbed 
them of part of their goods."2  ̂ The presence of Thomas Welch
27Captain Fitch to Arthur Middleton, September 13,
17 26, Journal of the Council, read in the Session, October 8, 
1926, PRO, C.O. 5, 429, f. 14; Captain Fitch to Arthur Middle­
ton, September 25, 1726, ibid., f. 26.
28Committee of Indian Affairs Report, July 9, 1726, 
Journal of the Assembly, July 16, 17 28, PRO, C.O. 5, 4 30, f. 
12.
^8A Report of Captain Fitch at the Creeks read in
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was intended to end such difficulties.
Problems with the Chickasaw were atypical of English 
dealings with the Indians, even the Choctaw. Chickasaw dis­
content may, as a matter of fact, have stemmed from the fact 
that the Choctaw headmen had been received by the governor of 
Carolina in C h a r l e s t o n . 30 Boisbriant reported in 1727 rumors 
that following the departure of Bienville in the summer of 
1925, more than 200 English packhorses had been sighted among 
the tribes of Louisiana, expecially the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw. While the Carolinians may have thought they were 
losing ground among the Indians, the French continued to 
believe that English influence was growing stronger.31
Meanwhile, the confidence that the Indians themselves, 
especially the Choctaw, had in the current French regime was 
on the wane, due, in no small part, to the departure of Bien­
ville from Louisiana. Desiring to replace officials in the 
colony with company personnel, the Company of the Indies as 
has been noted, had Bienville recalled in 17 25. Reports 
indicated that many of the natives were awaiting Bienville's
Council, August 24, 1725, PRO, C.O. 428, ff. 4-5; Captain 
Fitch to Arthur Middleton, October 30, 17 26, Journal of the 
Council, November 6, 1726, PRO, C.O. 5, 429, ff. 43-44.
■^Boisbriant to the Minister, March 13, 1726, AC,
C13A 9, ff. 345-46(v).
■^Memoir of Louisiana, 1726, AC, C13A 10, ff. 138 (v)- 
41; Boisbriant to the Company Directors, January 15, 17 27, 
ibid., ff. 266(v)-67; Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and 
State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to
1732 (New Haven, 1966), 18li
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return. Unfortunately, the company did not intend to send him 
back to Louisiana. In August, 1726, Etienne de P6rier, a 
longtime company employee, was appointed commandant general of 
Louisiana. Boisbriant was moved to second in command, and 
Antoine Le Moyne de Cnateaugufe, the commanding officer at Fort 
Conde in Mobile, was replaced by Bernard Diron d 'Artaguiette.32
The new commandant general of Louisiana knew a great 
deal about shipping and company matters, but his knowledge of 
North American Indians in general, and of the natives of 
French Louisiana in particular, was sadly lacking. His 
initial instructions from the company reveal just how deficient 
his understanding of Indian affairs was. Aware of the English 
threat to Louisiana by way of the Chickasaw, the company gave 
the commandant very basic orders as to how to receive Indians
3 3properly, and to talk to them in a paternalistic way.
Shortly after his arrival in the colony in March, 1727,
Perier met with several groups of Choctaw and Chickasaw 
Indians. During their encounter he heard the Indians speak of 
English traders and merchandise and, therefore, he began to 
fear English influence among the tribes, a fear which became
"^Memoir of the Company of the Indies to Perier, 
September 30, 1726, AC, C13B 1, ff. 82(v)-83(v).
^^perier to Maurepas, November 15, 1727, AC, C13A 10, 
ff. 234(v)-35; Perier "o the Company of the Indies, November 
15, 1727, AME, Mem. et I.:., Am., VII, ff. 244-45(v); Perier 
to the Company of the Indies, May 17, 1726, ibid., ff. 257- 
59(v).
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an obsession with the commandant general.34
Despite his deficiencies, PSrier did see the impor­
tance of Fort Conde at Mobile for stabilizing both military 
and commercial relations with the Indians. By the beginning 
of 1728, the commandant general had visited Mobile where he 
met with some Choctaw leaders in an effort to encourage 
trade.3 5 While there he learned that not only was the 
settlement of Mobile growing, but Fort Cond£ was also being 
improved and strengthened. Construction of a stone fort, 
underway in 17 25, had stopped for long periods due to short­
ages of labor and money. Throughout the months of inactivity, 
the two companies of soldiers stationed at Mobile had 
remained well staffed and well armed with muskets and cannon. 
By the spring of 1729, the stockade and three of the four 
bastions had been completed. Fort Cond£ did have a stone 
foundation, but the ready availability of wood in the area 
altered Pauger1s initial plans for a fort made entirely of 
stone and brick.36
34P£rier to Maurepas, November 15, 17 27, ibid.,
f. 235.
35Pauger to the Company Directors, March 23, 1726, AC, 
C13A 9, f. 37 0 (v); Pauger to the Superior Council, March 21, 
1726, ibid., f. 366(v); M. Devon, an Engineer, to the Company 
Directors, March 29, 1726, ibid., ff. 394-94(v); Memoir of 
Valdeterre, 1726, AC, C13A 10, ff. 16(v)-17; Instructions to 
P^rier from the Company of the Indies, September 30, 1726, AC, 
C13B 1, ff. 80 (v)-81 (v) Boisbriant to the Company Directors, 
January 15, 1727, AC, C13A 10, ff. 259(v)-60; P^rier and La 
Chaise to the Company Directors, January 30, 17 26, AC, C13A 
11, f. 308 (v) .
36P£rier and La Chaise to the Company Directors, July
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As second in command in Louisiana, Bernard Diron 
d 'Artaguiette commanded the military establishment at Mobile. 
Since his arrival in Louisiana in 17 20, he had been promoted 
from inspector of the troops to king's first lieutenant, 
succeeding Chateaugue. Diron's notion of both his position 
and that of Mobile struck P6rier and La Chaise as somewhat 
inflated. His request for a budget of 60,000 livres annually 
for Fort Conde appeared out of line with what company officials 
believed necessary. When the company allocated only 60,000 
livres for all military installations in Louisiana, Diron 
requested 40,000 for Mobile.37 To support his request, the 
Mobile commanding officer offered the well-kncv/n arguments of 
the importance of Mobile's defensive position against the 
English and the Spanish, and of Fort Conue's being the well- 
established center for the fur trade with the Choctaw Indians 
and potentially even with the Chickasaw tribe.33
Diron's views had to be taken seriously by the company 
for several reasons. His responsibility as the commanding 
officer at Mobile was a very important one. Equally signifi­
cant was the fact that, as a brother of one of the company 
directors, he had received exclusive trading rights with the
31, 1723, ibid., ff. 56(v)-57(v); Giraud, Histoire, IV, 336.
37Diron to the Minister, December 9, 1728, AC, C13A
11, ff. 174-76(v).
3^Diron to the Minister, October 17, 1729, AC, C13A
12, ff. 149(v)-30.
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Choctaw Indians. In April, 1726 he had organized the traders 
and supplies for the Choctaw trade. Aided by the veteran 
Choctaw interpreter, Antoine Huche, Diron had established the 
beginnings of a profitable enterprise.39 Diron supplied 
traders who worked for him with merchandise which he obtained 
from the company.
Perier and La Chaise also became interested in the fur 
trade. Late in 1728, these two company officials made 
arrangements with two trappers from the Illinois country, a M. 
Marain and a M. Outlas, by which they agreed to sell all of 
their furs and skins to the Louisianians rather than to the 
Canadians, for a period of five years, and to obtain all their 
supplies for the trade from New Orleans. Not only beaver 
pelts, but also buckskins and doeskins were included.40
Early in 1729, Perier and La Chaise began to plan to 
seize the pelt trade with the Choctaw from D'Artaguiette.
They argued that D'Artaguiette was managing the business 
poorly at Mobile and filing false trade reports with the com­
pany. And yet, they could not deny that Diron had given the 
trade with the Choctaw from Mobile quite a boost through his
3deliberations of the Louisiana Superior Council, 
December 4, 1728, AC, C13A 11, ff. 154-55(v); Perier and La 
Chaise to the Company Directors, January 30, 1729, ibid., 
ff. 314-14(v).
40Ibid., ff. 306(v)-07(v); Perier and La Chaise to the 
Company Directors, April 22, 1727, AC, C13A 10, ff. 173-73(v); 
Perier and La Chaise to the Company Directors, November 2, 
1727, ibid., ff. 188-S8(v).
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own resources.41 In fact, even after two years, he still 
seemed to be the only sponsor in the Mobile area who could 
bear the expense of supporting traders.
It is difficult to say whether Perier and La Chaise 
were trying to monopolize the trade for themselves or for the 
company, or even whether they sincerely believed Diron incom­
petent. Whatever the case, English influence and trade among 
the Choctaw Indians continued to increase while company 
officials bickered among themselves. The better prices which 
the English had offered for skins over the years still pre­
vailed, and the Choctaw complained about the poor selection 
of merchandise which the French offered and its poor quality. 
Company officials took the complaints so seriously that they 
considered requesting French, manufacturers to copy English 
cloth.42 Throughout the summer of 1729, company representa­
tives grew increasingly restive, especially when they heard 
that about 30 Anglo traders were working in the main Choctaw 
villages. One of Diron's agents, a 'A. La Fleur, pleaded for 
more copper kettles, knives and limbourg to counter the influx 
of English goods. So great were the fears of total Choctaw 
defection to the English traders that Antoine Huche" received 
orders from Diron to take one corporal, five soldiers and six
41Pe"rier and La Chaise to the Company Directors,
January 30, 1729, ibid., ff. 307(v)-08(v).
42Sr. La Fleur to Diron, July 22, 1729, AC, C13A 12, 
ff. 170-71; M. Diron's Orders to M. Huch£, July 9, 1729, ibid., 
ff. 167-69(v).
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Thome Indians to the Choctaw territory to run out the Carolina
traders. The interpreter did so and extracted a promise from
the Choctaw to receive no more Englishmen.43
Still unhappy with the extent of Diron's influence
among the Choctaw, officials in Mew Orleans decided to send M.
Recollet Regis as their own representative to this tribe.
Regis left for Mobile in late August, 1729. Ostensibly his
purpose was to rid the Choctaw villages of English traders,
but quite probably Perier and La Chaise were conniving to
encourage the Choctaw to trade with them rather than with
Diron. Supplied with 800 livres of company merchandise for
presents to the Choctaw chiefs, Regis arrived at Mobile on
4 4August 3 to begin his trip to the Choctaw country.
Although ignorant of the tribe and accompanied by a 
poor interpreter, Regis set out from Mobile on September 6.
For the next month and a half, he visited the Choctaw leaders 
at the villages of Chitcachac, Cannes Jaunes, Nachouacnyia, 
Yowani, Concha, Ayanbe, Grosses Cannes, Klone Tchito, 
Bouktoukoulou, Okeloussa, Yte Tchipota, Chkanaap, Oskeloyana, 
Tala, Kaslacha, Kaffelatrya, Abeka and Boukfouha. Nearly all 
of the leaders of these towns complained of Diron’s high 
prices and insulting conduct. Why should the French be
43M. Perier's Instructions to M. Regis, August 21, 
1729, ibid., ff. 65-66.
44Journal of the Trip of M. Regis to the Choctaw in 
1729' ibid-> ff- 68-98bis.
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surprised, argued the Choctaw, that the tribe flirted with the 
English? They contended that they could no longer bear such 
abuse and humiliation as they suffered at the hands of the 
Mobile commanding officer. Promising better prices and greater 
respect from company officials, Regis urged these leaders to 
trade with New Orleans rather than with Mobile.45
Diron had opposed Regis' trip from the beginning. He 
argued that Regis was not at all qualified for the trade, and 
that he would disturb French relations with the Choctaw.4®
D'Artaguiette may well have wished to keep his own activities 
with the Indians free from official scrutiny. Indian accusa­
tions of his insults and high prices could do him no good.
Still, despite the temporary intrusions of the English 
traders, Diron's efforts had kept the Choctaw as a French 
rather than an English partner in trade. Choctaw complaints 
about Diron may have stemmed from the fact that the tribe was 
deeply in debt at Mobile and was looking for new traders in 
the hope of escaping its debts. Well aware of the French fear 
of English traders, the Indians also knew that the implicit 
threat of their defection to the Anglos could be used to 
improve their trading arrangement.
Another consideration may have motivated Choctaw 
denunciations of Diron. In the summer of 1728, a smallpox
^Diron to Perier, September 9, 1729, ibid., ff. 161- 
63; Diron to Perier, October 1, 1729, ibid., ff. 143-47.
4®Perier to Maurepas, November 12, 1728, AC, C13A 11, 
ff. 22-22(v).
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epidemic swept through the major tribes.47 The epidemic left 
the Choctaw with fewer warriors and hunters than in previous 
years, and they were unable to accumulate the skins needed to 
pay high French prices. Under such circumstances the lower 
prices of English traders exerted an unusually powerful 
appeal.4®
After Regis' mission, officials of the Company of the 
Indies continued to argue over trade.4  ̂ D'Artaguiette claimed 
that his rights as a trader had been violated, while Perier 
held to the belief that the Choctaw were being cheated by the 
Diron-supported Mobile trading group.
At the same time that the bickering was occurring 
between Perier and Diron, a thriving agricultural enterprise 
was growing in the Natchez country. In contrast to the con­
troversy between the French and the Choctaw over the pelt 
trade, and between the French and the Chickasaw over the 
English presence in that tribe, life in the Natchez country
47Journal of the Trip of M. Regis to the Choctaw in
1729, AC, Cl3A 12, ff. 90-90(v).
4®Superior Council of Louisiana to Diron, September 
14, 1729, ibid., ff. 172(v)-73(v); Diron to the Superior^ 
Council, September 3, 1726, ibid., f. 173(v); Diron to Perier, 
October 18, 1729, ibid., ff. 179(v)-80;Diron to the Minister,
October 17, 1729, Ibid., ff. 153(v)-54.
49Ibid., ff. 154-56(v); Perier to Maurepas, November 
25, 1729, ibid., ff. 30(v)-31(v).
5®The Status of Louisiana, c. 1719, AME, Mem. et Doc., 
Am., I, f. 98(v); A Memoir on the Status of Louisiana, 1720, 
AG, A12592, f. 93.
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appeared calm. The company maintained an active interest in 
the fertile country's potential for development.^  Despite 
that interest, the company had let the buildings at Fort 
Rosalie deteriorate badly. In 1725, colonial officials took 
note of their condition and the chief engineer for Louisiana, 
Adrien Pauger, assigned Ignace-Francois Broutin the task of 
restoring the fort. By the closing weeks of 17 26, Broutin 
reported that Fort Rosalie had been renovated, and that both 
settlers and Indians approved of his interim rule as the com­
manding officer of the post.^2
Competent military personnel were rare in Louisiana, 
which made finding a suitable leader for the Natchez post 
difficult. Captain Desliettes, who had brought French rein­
forcements into the Natchez country in July, 1723 and who had 
kept peace between the French and Indians since then, was 
competent. He was succeeded by Charles Du Tisne the following 
year. Concerning Tisn§, the missionary Father Raphael 
reported:
Of all the inhabitants there are not four who do not 
complain of having been mistreated by the commandant.
5-*-La Harpe, 8989, January 20-21, 1722, f. 64(v); Pauger 
to the Company Directors, September 15, 1724, AC, C13A 8, ff. 
83-83(v); Meeting of the Superior Council, September, 1725,
AC, C13A 9, ff. 221-21(v); Broutin to the Company Directors, 
December 23, 1726, AC, C13A 10, ff. 4-4(v).
^Deliberations of the Superior Council, April 23,
1725, AC C13A 9, f. 127; Father Raphael to the Abbe Raguet, 
December 28, 1726, in Dunbar Rowland and Albert Sanders, 
Mississippi Provincial Archives (3 vols., Jackson, 1927-33),
II, 527-28. Hereinafter cited as MPA.
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He talks to them only of chains and pillaging for 
the least thing and often enough he would go on 
to carry it o u t . 53
Apparently, Tisn6 alienated La Chaise as well as the people of
the Natchez area, for by early 1727 the Swiss Captain Frangois
Louis Merveilleux was assigned as his replacement on the
recommendation of Pierre de Boisbriant.54 At least for a
time, military order and stability reigned at the Natchez.
After the peace which Bienville arranged between the 
Natchez and the French in November, 1723, the natives of the 
area appeared to accept white settlement on their lands. In 
the months and years that followed, there were few disagree­
ments between the Europeans and the Indians.
The colony made serious efforts to promote the 
cultivation of tobacco as a staple crop. In 1719, the Louisi­
ana government had recommended to the company that the plant 
be cultivated at the Natchez, "since it is the most suitable 
place to gather the best tobacco."55 In the following year,
^^Boisbriant to the Company Directors, January 15, 
1727, AC, C13A 10, ff. 268-79(v).
54Minutes of the Council of Commerce of Louisiana, 
October 26, 1719, MPA, III, 268; Memoir on Louisiana by 
Bienville, 1726, ibid., 522.
^Extracts from the Deliberations of the Superior 
Council of Louisiana, March 8, 1724, AC, C13A 8, f. 100; A 
Memoir on Problems of Developing Tobacco at the Natchez, 
October, 1724, ibid., ff. 227-29(v); Extracts from Letters 
of the Louisiana Superior Council, August 28, 1725, AC, C13A 
9, ff. 239-39(v); Pierre Margry (ed.), Memoires et documents; 
D^couvertes et 6stablissements des frangais dans l 1Quest et 
dans le sud de l'Amerique septentnonale (6 vols., Pans, 
1879-88), V, 573-54; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane
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the company brought to Louisiana a tobacco grower from the 
south of France, M. Montplaisir de la Gauchay, and he was 
assigned to its concession at the Natchez to develop tobacco 
production there. His first efforts were disastrous failures. 
Although tobacco was grown, it rotted because neither the 
company hogsheads for storing it nor the boats for shipping 
it to New Orleans were provided. The company's suggestions 
for improving the operation were quick to come. They included 
the construction of workshops for spinning and rolling the 
tobacco and the building of facilities to manufacture hogs­
heads. French officials also hoped that a force of Negro 
slaves would be purchased to do the field work. It was 
estimated by the Superior Council that the sum of 25,77 0 
livres would be needed to set up a successful operation.^
Nearly all officials conceded that black slaves were 
crucial for the success of the tobacco venture. The first 
black slaves had been brought to Louisiana from French West 
Africa during the era of the Company of the West. In June, 
1719, between 400 and 500 slaves arrived in Louisiana, marking 
the beginnings of slavery in the colony. Shortly after the 
Company of the Indies' regime began, 1,312 more blacks
Frangaise: le systeme de John Law, 1717-1720 (Paris, 1963), 
III, 3 68.
56"Letter from the Western Company to Herpin, July 4, 
1718," in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XIV (April,
1931) , 172-74; Joe Gray Taylor, Negro "slavery in Louisiana 
(Baton Rouqe, 1960) , 10-12; Surrey, The Commerce ot Louisiana, 
232. ~
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arrived, the largest number brought to Louisiana to that 
date.57
By the summer of 17 25, the Superior Council's plans 
for the Natchez had been accepted by the company's directors 
in France, and the new commandant general, Etienne Perier, 
received orders to pursue the tobacco endeavor at all costs. 
Perier was promised Negro slaves, as well as more white 
tobacco-grovers. The men with M. Montplaisir who were working 
on the company concession had returned to France in 1722. 
However, Perier recruited two new growers at Cap Frangais 
while on his way to Louisiana. One of them agreed to go to 
the Natchez to teach the colonists and the Indians how to 
cultivate the plant. The Natchez had grown their own tobacco 
for some time before the advent of the whites among them, but 
the tobacco they grew had been for local consumption and 
would never have sold on the European market.55 Although the
La Chaise and the Four Councillors of Louisiana to 
the Council of the Company of the Indies, May 20, 1725, MPA. 
II, 467; Council of Louisiana to the Directors of the Company 
of the Indies, August 28, 1725, ibid., 492; Perier and La 
Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the Indies, April 
20, 1727, ibid., 534; Journal of Paul du Ru (Chicago, 1934), 
37; Benard la Harpe, Journal Historique de~la Louisiane (New 
Orleans, 1845), 28; Le Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane 
Francaise (3 vols., Paris, 1758), III, 44-46; Reuben Golde 
Thwaites (ed.), The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (73 
vols., Cleveland, 1900), LXV, 142-43. Hereinafter cited as 
The Jesuit Relations; Pierre Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la 
Compagnie des Indes (Paris, 1908) , 192; Dumont de Montigny, 
M£moires Historiques sur la Louisiane (3 vols., Paris, 1754), 
I, 34-42.
58P6rier and La Chaise to the Company Directors, April
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new crop grew well, everyone had problems meeting the Company's 
requirements for preparing the tobacco for market. The 
Indians especially had trouble in doing so. According to Com­
pany officials:
The Natchez did not know that it was necessary to 
deliver their tobacco in small bunches. They brought 
it in twists which M. La Chaise was obliged to take 
on the basis of ten sous a pound in order not to let 
them be ruined. They have lost considerably by it. . . .59
Clearly, the Natchez did not fit comfortably in the French plan 
for rapid economic development of the tobacco business.^
The tobacco crop was crucially important to company 
hopes for profits from its colonial venture. Perier wrote, 
"tobacco must constitute the principal objets of the colony.
We do not doubt the success of this plant at all."61 Predic­
tions were made by the company of the plant's unlimited 
success on the international markets, and of the great role 
that the Natchez country would play in the enterprise. In 
1727, Perier wrote the company, "The French settlement at the 
Natchez is becoming more important. Much tobacco is grown
22, 1727, AC, C13A 10, ff. 169-71; Perier and La Chaise to the 
Company Directors, November 2, 1727, ibid., ff. 186(v)- 
87 (v) .
5®Perier and La Chaise to the Company Directors, 
November 3, 1728, AC, C13A 11, f. 145(v).
60Perier and La Chaise to the Directors of the Company, 
April 22, 1727, MPA, II, 532. The brackets were added by the 
author.
61Thwaites, The Jesuit Relations, LXVII, 311; Perier 
to the Abbe Raguet, April 25, 17 27, MPA, II, 54 3.
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there which is considered the best in the country. How much 
of the 300,000 pounds of the crop shipped from the colony to 
France in 17 29 was grown at the Natchez is not known, but 
nearly 67,000 pounds had been sent from the Natchez two years 
before.^ With both the French and the Indians cultivating 
tobacco under increasing company pressure, the area must have 
contributed a sizeable amount. The degree of cooperation 
between the French and the Indian growers remains unknown. It 
is also impossible to determine if the two groups were treated 
equally in terms of prices paid for the product. There is 
evidence of some discontent on the company's part with the 
Indians' lack of industry. In 1728, Perier complained that 
it was "impossible to get any service from the Indians . . . 
for trade or for cultiva-ion of the earth. . . ."64
The origins of Perier's complaint remain shrouded in 
mystery, for very little is known about the feelings of the 
Natchez tribe from November, 1723 until November, 1729. As 
mentioned above, life appeared to be settled and calm in the
62P§rier and La Chaise to the Directors of the Com­
pany, April 5, 1727, AC, C13A 11, ff. 340, 343; Lewis Gray, 
The Agriculture of the South to 1860 (2 vols., Washington,
1933), I, 70.
62Perier to the Abbe Raguet, May 12, 1728, MPA, II,
574.
64Memoir from the Council of Louisiana to the Council 
of the Company of the Indies, April 23, 1725, ibid., 459; Le 
Page du Pratz, Histoire, III, 50.
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area as the tobacco enterprise developed. And yet, one event 
did occur which could explain why relations between the French 
and the Indians soon deteriorated. Tattooed Serpent, the 
leading friend and ally of the French over the years, died in 
1725. At his funeral other leaders gave orations, urging the 
Natchez to continue to live in peace with the French.^5 
Indeed, the speeches indicate that the Indians themselves 
realized Tattooed Serpent's role as pacificator not only 
between the races, but also among the quarreling factions of 
the Natchez people.
On the other hand, before his death, Tattooed Serpent
realized that a cultural change had occurred in the lives of
the Natchez, and he had begun to question sharply the effect
of the white man's influence. In an impassioned speech just
before his death, Tattooed Serpent asked his fellow tribesmen:
What need did we have of the French? Did you think 
that before them we were not living better than we 
do now that we deprive ourselves of a part of our 
corn game and fish which we kill for them even when 
we need them? Was it their guns? We used to use 
our bows and arrows which sufficed in providing us a 
good living. Was it their clothing, white blue and 
red? We have animal skins which are warmer. . . .
Before the arrival of the French we were living as men 
who know how to survive with what they have, in place 
of this, today we are walking as slaves. . . .66
If France's leading friend and ally among the Natchez felt
this way, the future of Franco-Indian relations at the Natchez
65Ibid., I, 204-205.
66Du Pratz, Histoire, I, 205-205.
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concession could only be problematical.
By the fall of 1729, the three major tribes of Louisi­
ana had been living for several years with the policies of the 
Company of the Indies which were determined primarily by the 
Company's desperate determination to wring at last some profit 
from Louisiana. And superficially at least, it looked as if 
the fur trade with the Choctaw and the tobacco plantations at 
Natchez might succeed. While not specifically involved in 
the mercantile schemes of the Company, the Chickasaw, a long­
time enemy of the French and ally of the English, remained at 
peace with the Louisianians in the latter years of the 17 20's. 
Unfortunately, these peaceful relations between the French and 
the Indians were merely a fagade. Individuals such as Bien­
ville or Boisbriant were no longer in positions of high 
responsibility in the realm of Indian affairs. And the 
resulting bureaucratic ignorance and gross insensitivity to 
the natives' feelings and needs eventually had terrible 
results.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IX
THE END OF THE NATCHEZ, 1729-1732
On December 2, 1729, the commandant general of Louisi­
ana, Etienne Perier, received the news of a massacre which 
had occurred at the Natchez post, Fort Rosalie, on November 28. 
Several of the settlers from the Natchez country, although 
wounded, escaped to New Orleans along with a few black slaves 
to announce the tragedy. Immediately, panic and fear of a 
general Indian uprising in Louisiana spread throughout the
Historians have offered several explanations of why 
the uprising occurred. Some place the blame on an incompetent 
commanding officer at Fort Rosalie, while others believe that 
the English encouraged the rebellion.^ And yet, the Company
•'•An Account of the Massacre at the Natchez Post on 
November 28, 1729 by Etienne Perier, March 18, 1730, Archives 
des Colonies, C13A 12, ff. 37-37(v) (Archives Nationales, 
Paris, France), hereinafter cited as AC; Father Petit's 
Account of the Fort Rosalie Massacre, July 12, 17 30, Depot des 
Fortifications: Louisiane, #40 (Archives d'Outre-Mer, Paris,
France). Hereinafter cited as Depot des Fortifications.
2 - Dumont de Montigny, Memoires Historiques sur la
Louisiana (2 vols., Paris, 1753), II, 125; Le Page du Pratz,
Histoire de la Louisiane (3 vols., Paris, 1758), III, 231;
Pierre Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des Indes
(Paris, 1911), 233-34; Charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and
State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to
1732 (New Haven, 1966), 231.
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of the Indies' efforts to derive profit from the tobacco pro­
duction of the area, as well as the complexities of the 
Natchez intra-tribal struggle, v/ere also part of the cause.
It should be recalled that by 1729 Tattooed Serpent, the 
faithful French ally, was dead. Indeed, even before his death, 
this respected war chief had come to believe that the tribe's 
cultural fiber was broken.^ Perhaps, at his death in 1725, 
anti-French factions, represented by Apple Village, finally 
won the tribal power struggle. Whatever the reasons for tl e 
attack, from December, 1729 to April, 1732 the Natchez 
Indians created turmoil in Louisiana. Attacking both wh. t > 
people and red people, the Natchez failed to rally enougn of 
the native populace to their cause. As a result, their 
nation was destroyed and many of its people were sold i Tto 
slavery.
In the midst of the Natchez celebrations of th- Great 
Corn Feast in the fall of 1729, Captain Chepart (a close 
friend of the commandant general who had been appointed com­
manding officer at Fort Rosalie as a favor the year before) 
announced to the Natchez that they would have to move their 
villages, for the French needed their lands. Chepart's demand, 
while understandably not well received by Natchez leaders, was 
reluctantly acceded to by the tribe.^ This display of
3Le Page du Pratz, Histoire, I, 204-205.
4See Jean Delanglez, "The Natchez Massacre and Governor 
Perier," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVII (October,
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contempt for the Indians by the white leaders, coupled with 
the anti-French feeling, spurred the Natchez to act in this 
season when their people were gathered together.
.Early on the morning of November 28, a hunting party 
of Indians began stopping in at the homes of white settlers, 
asking to borrow muskets for the hunt, and offering to repay 
the settlers with corn, fowl and deer meat. Since the Natchez 
had already consumed much of the corn harvest and were short 
of food, many settlers suspected nothing and complied with the 
Natchez' requests.5
Well armed with their borrowed French muskets, the 
Indians approached Fort Rosalie around nine o'clock in the 
morning. The Natchez chiefs asked to speak with Chepart about 
the hunt and to offer the calumet of peace as a part of a 
final ceremony concerning their land exchange. Chepart, on 
seeing the leaders outside his door, emerged from his house
1934), 631-41; H. Schlarman, From Quebec to New Orleans 
(Belleville, Illinois, 1929), 244; Dumont, M6moires Histor- 
iques, II, 127; Diron to the Minister, February 9, 17 30, AC, 
C13A 12, ff. 362-62 (v) .
5Perier to Maurepas, December 5, 1729, AC C13A 12, 
ff. 33-33(v); Perier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 
1720, ibid., ff. 37(v)-38; Father Petit's Account of the 
Massacre, July 12, 1730, D6pot des Fortifications, £40; Diron 
to the Minister, February 9, 1730, AC, C13A 12, f. 362(v); 
Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1720, ibid., ff. 371-71(v); 
Jean Charles de Pradel to his brother, December 6, 1729, 
Papers of Jean Charles de Pradel, folder 1 (Louisiana State 
University Archives, Baton Rouge, Louisiana). Hereinafter 
cited as LSU, Pradel Papers.
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and angrily demanded that they leave the premises. This 
insult was the last one the Captain would give the Indians.
The chief gave a signal and the Indians opened fire. Chepart 
was felled at once.6
Thus began the massacre which continued the entire 
day. By sunset, 237 white people had been killed, including 
145 men, 36 women and 56 children.7 Many of them met with the 
cruelest of deaths. The survivors reported that the pregnant 
women had their stomachs cut open and their unborn children 
ripped from them. All of the men, civilian and military 
alike, who were taken prisoner had their ears cut off before 
being killed. Father Poisson, the post's chaplain, was 
tomahawked by one of the chiefs in the midst of visiting the 
sick. As the Natchez reveled in their victory that evening, 
they placed the heads of the Frenchmen on the stakes which 
surrounded Fort Rosalie in full view of the surviving women
6Perier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 17 30, AC, 
C13A 12, ff. 37-38; Diron to the Minister, February 9, 1730, 
ibid., ff. 362 (v)-63; Dumont, Memoires Historiques, II, 139- 
44; Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1730, in Dunbar Rowland 
and Albert Sanders (eds.), Mississippi Provincial Archives (3 
vols., Jackson, 1928-32), I, 76. Hereinafter cited as MPA.
7A List of the People Killed at the Natchez Post in 
the Massacre of November 28, 1729, AC, C13A 12, ff. 57-53(v).
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and children who had been spared to serve as Natchez slaves.8
This tale of horror when reported by those who 
escaped down the river spread panic through the city of New 
Orleans. Commandant General Perier took immediate action to 
prepare for the colony's defense. Since his arrival in 
Louisiana in 1726, Perier had unsuccessfully requested the 
company to increase the number of troops for the colony. Now, 
in this time of crisis, he had only 40 men available with few, 
if any, reliable officers. Fortunately, however, the com­
petent Major Franfois-Louis Merveilleux was in New Orleans at 
the time. Perier dispatched Merveilleux with a sergeant and 
six soldiers to warn the settlers on both sides of the river 
as far north as Pointe Coupee to build defenses for their own 
protection. Merveilleux moved out quickly and by December 10 
he and his men had reached the Tunica country.9
Perier also acted quickly to defend the small com­
munity of New Orleans whose panic was spreading by the hour. 
Rumor of a general Indian uprising moved the commandant
8Ibid., f. 53(v); Father Petit's Account of the 
Massacre, July 12, 1730, Depot des Fortifications, #40; Diron 
to the Minister, February 9, 1730, AC, C13A 12, ff. 363-63(v); 
Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1730, ibid., f. 372; Jean 
Charles de Pradel to his mother, March 22, 1730, LSU, Pradel 
Papers, folder 1.
8Jean Charles to his brother, December 6, 1729, LSU, 
Pradel Papers, folder 1; Diron to the Minister, March 20,
1730, AC, C13A 12, f. 372(v); Perier's Account of the Massacre, 
March 18, 1730, ibid., ff. 38(v)-39; Sr. de Loye's Account on 
the Natchez Massacre, March 15, 1730, AC, C13C 4, ff. 179- 
79(v).
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general to involve as many people as possible in the city's 
defense. He organized some of the Negro slaves to dig a ditch 
around the city.-*-®
By December 6, fear prevailed in New Orleans that a 
general Indian uprising could well be in the making. If, for 
example, the Choctaw and the Chickasaw decided to join with 
the Natchez, the colony would be totally lost. Even the 
smaller tribes along the Mississippi River could not be 
trusted and might join in the hostilities, and Merveilleux had 
been warned to keep an eye on them during his trip to Pointe 
Couple. Actually, Perier's own paranoia took over in this 
regard, for on December 5 he ordered a band of Negroes to 
destroy the Chaoucha, a peaceful little tribe of only 30 
people who lived just south of New Orleans. As it turned out, 
however, Perier's move against the Chaoucha, while cruel and 
unnecessary, proved a "success," for other small tribes in 
the area of New Orleans declared their loyalty to the French.11
Not only did Perier secure the allegiance of small 
tribes, but he also convinced some Choctaw leaders to support 
the French cause. On December 3, he received several Choctaw
10Jean Charles de Pradel to his brother, December 6, 
1729, LSU, Pradel Papers, folder 1; Perier's Account of the 
Massacre, March 18, 1730, AC, C13A 12, ff. 40-40(v).
i;LPerier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 1730,
AC, C13A 12, ff. 39(v)—4 0; Jean Charles de Pradel to his 
brother, December 6, 1729, LSU, Pradel Papers, folder 1.
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chiefs who had been hunting in the Lake Pontchartrain area 
not far from New Orleans. Through an Indian interpreter, the 
commandant general relayed the tragic story of the massacre 
at the Natchez. He stressed the French need of the Choctaws’ 
help to avenge the atrocity. The Indian leaders expressed 
their sympathies and regrets at the great loss of life suffered 
by the whites. By December 7, they sent word directing those 
Choctaw who were enemies of the Natchez to march with the 
French, which greatly relieved Perier. The influence of the 
English traders in the Choctaw villages, coupled with Diron 
D 'Artaguiette's mistreatment of these Indians in the Mobile 
skin trade, could well have resulted in an end of the Choctaw 
friendship.^
During this crisis, Perier forgot his quarrels with 
Diron over the Mobile skin trade. Urging that he give his 
help in securing the enlistment of Choctaw forces in the fight 
against the Natchez, the commandant general asked D ' Artaguiette 
to forget his past grudges. Impatient for news and having 
heard nothing from Mobile's commanding officer, Perier dis­
patched Sieur Le Sueur to the Choctaw on January 1, 1730.
Any reservations which Perier may have had regarding the wisdom 
of this move, about which he had not informed Diron, were 
dispelled several days later when Perier learned that the
■^Perier to Maurepas, December 5, 1729, AC, C13A 12, 
ff. 34(v)-35; Perier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 
1730, ibid., ff. 38(v), 40(v).
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Natchez had visited several Choctaw villages to ask their help 
against the French.^
Any lingering fears of Choctaw defection which he may 
have had were ended when Perier learned on January 16 that La 
Sueur had left Yowani village on January 8 for the Natchez 
country accompanied by a party of from 50 0 to 700 Choctaw 
warriors. -*-4 Quite probably, Le Sueur's army took the Natchez 
Lower-Creek Trail which was well-known to the Indians (No. 91, 
Map No. 11).^
Desiring more details concerning events at the Natchez 
post, on January 16, officers at New Orleans dispatched a M. 
Mesplau to scout the area. He and his small party of six men 
set out immediately and arrived there eight days later. The 
Natchez discovered them at once and ambushed them, killing 
three Frenchmen and capturing Mesplau and two others. The 
following day the prisoners were burned alive amidst great 
celebration and revelry by the I n d i a n s . -*-6
13Perier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 1730, 
f. 42; Diron to the minister, January 10, 1731, AC, C13A 13, 
ff. 139-39(v).
14Journal of Sr. Lusser's Trip to the Choctaw Tribe 
from January 12, 1730 to March 23, 1730,^AC, C13A 12, f. 103. 
Hereinafter cited as Lusser's Journal; Perier's Account of the 
Massacre, March 18, 1730, AC, C13A 12, ff. 42(v)-43.
15William E. Myer, Indian Trails of the Southeast 
(Nashville, 1973), 94.
■^Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1730, ibid., f.
372(v); Father Petit's Account of the Massacre, July 12, 1730, 
Depot des Fortifications, #40.





A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
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Quite confident after Memplau's death, the Natchez 
sent a runner to the French company stationed at the Tunica 
village only 18 leagues away, demanding 200 muskets, 200 
barrels of powder, a like number of barrels of balls, 2,000 
flints, 200 knives, 200 hatchets, 200 picks, 20 quarts of 
brandy, 200 barrels of wine, 20 barrels of vermilion, 200 
shirts and a huge quantity of cloth and hats as ransom for the 
French women and children and black slaves they still held 
captive. While awaiting the merchandise, the Indians demanded 
that the chief of the Tunica and Sieur Broutin, the former 
commanding officer at the Natchez, be surrendered as hos­
tages .17
In the meantime, Choctaw scouts for Le Sueur's force 
reported that the Natchez revelry continued far into each 
night. Le Sueur hoped their endless celebrations had weakened 
them, and thus, he and his Indians attacked the Natchez in 
their forts at dawn on January 27. Within three hours, 60 
white women and children, along with 106 Negroes, had been 
freed. The French and Choctaw killed 8 0 Natchez warriors and 
took 16 women as prisoners. Not all of the Negro slaves 
welcomed the arrival of the French forces. In fact, some of 
them shot at their "rescuers."^
l7Father Petit's Account of the Massacre, July 12, 
1730, Depot des Fortifications, #40; Diron to the Minister, 
March 20, 1730, AC, C13A 12, f. 372(v).
18Diron to the Minister, March 20, 17 30, AC, C13A 12, 
f, 373; Father Petit's Account of the Massacre, July 12, 1730, 
D§pot des Fortifications, #40.
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The defeated Natchez retired into their two forts 
near the St. Catherine Concession where the Choctaw had 
camped. Le Sueur and his Indian allies immediately put the 
forts under siege. In the night which followed, the Natchez 
performed their death dance, bewailing their fate and 
reproaching the Choctaw for failing to join with them.-*-9
Le Sueur and his Indian allies continued the siege for 
several weeks. Having pillaged the ammunition stores at both 
Fort Rosalie and the company store, the Indians were well- 
supplied with arms needed to endure such a siege. Le Sueur 
sent runners to the Tunica village, where Sr. de Loubaye was 
awaiting troops coming up from New Orleans, to report the 
deadlock. Hearing the news, Louboye set out with 200 men and 
four cannons (all four-pounders) on February 2 for the Natchez 
post, where he arrived on February 8. He and Le Sueur immedi­
ately began planning a new attack on the forts.
On February 14, the French opened fire on the two 
Natchez forts with their cannons from a distance of about 3 50 
yards. The range proved too great for the guns, and in the 
first six hours of firing not even one stake around the two 
forts was destroyed. The failure of the bombardment angered 
the Choctaw, who were already anxious to return home, since
19Father Petit's Account of the Massacre, July 12, 
1730, Depot des Fortifications, #40.
^Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1730, AC, C13A 12,
f. 273.
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the French had led them to believe that the cannons would 
force the Natchez to succumb within hours. Yet not only did 
they survive the bombardment, they also withstood a general 
attack by all the French forces the following day.^
From February 16 to February 22, the French and their 
Indian allies attempted several times to take the forts, but 
they could not even capture the trench surrounding the forts 
and repeated efforts to destroy the Natchez position with the 
cannons all failed.
Suddenly on the morning of February 22, 300 Natchez 
burst out of the forts attacking in three different places. 
Thirty-two Frenchmen were surprised in the trench near the 
forts, but only one was killed. As quickly as they had emerged, 
the Natchez retreated.22
The Natchez assault had to be answered. So, on 
February 24, Le Sueur ordered his cannons moved to within 
about 300 years of the forts. He then sent messengers to warn 
the Natchez that if all of the French women and children and 
the Negro slaves were not handed over, the Natchez would be 
burned out completely. The Natchez remained silent in the 
face of this ultimatum and did nothing. The following day, a 
Choctaw chief, Alabama Mingo, spoke to them, telling the 
Natchez that not only were they outnumbered, but they were 
also outgunned. At such a close range, the French cannons
21-rbid. 22Ibid . , f. 373 (v) .
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could easily reduce their forts to powder. The Natchez 
responded to the Choctaw threat by offering to hand over the 
remaining prisoners if the attackers and their cannons were 
drawn back to the Mississippi River, a demand to which the
French agreed.23
Some time between February 27 and February 28, the 
Natchez escaped from the forts across the river to the western 
bank. Knowing better than the French the general area and 
its trails, they had managed to elude the white men by taking 
some back routes. For the time being, these Indians escaped 
to the Black River area near present-day Sicily Island, 
Louisiana. Apparently, some of the French and their Indian 
allies pursued them. The report of Father Petit describes 
starving Natchez women and children whose men were torn 
between defending their people and providing for them through 
the hunt.24
While the French were pursuing the Natchez across the 
Mississippi River, most of the Choctaw returned home. The 
journey was slow because they carried with them their dead and 
wounded warriors. Following the Choctaw train were some of 
the Negro slaves who had been released at the Natchez. In 
their haste to pursue the rebels, the French had left these 
slaves behind, so the Choctaw took them with them. These
23Ibid., ff. 374-74(v).
24Ibid., ff. 374(v)-75(v); Sr. de Loye's Account of 
the Massacre^- March 15, 1730, AC, C13C 4, ff. 179(v)-81(v).
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people would serve as bargaining pawns in the Choctaw negotia­
tions for higher prices for their skins, as well as compensa­
tion for their dead warriors.2®
In the meantime, since January 20, another one of 
Perier's representatives, a Sr. Le Sussur, had been visiting 
the Choctaw villages to encourage those Indians who had not 
left with Le Sueur to support the French in their war with the 
Natchez. During his visit, on February 26, while he was at 
the Achicachac Village, Le Sussur learned why the Choctaw had 
participated in the war. The captain of the village informed 
Le Sussur that the Choctaw chiefs had planned to go to New 
Orleans following the battle at the Natchez post to see 
Commandant General Perier to ask that they be paid for their 
skins prices equivalent to those paid by the English.2®
Several weeks later, on March 14, Le Sussur finally 
met some warriors at Cannes Jaunes Village who had just 
returned from the Natchez. They brought back with them the 
body of a celebrated village brave who had lost his life. His 
body and those of several other braves were still on the 
horses. Le Sussur also reported that a favorite chief, Patukp, 
had been seriously wounded and had been taken to New Orleans
25M . Baron to Cardinal de Fleury, April 10, 1730, 
Memoires et Documents, Amerique VII, ff. 293(v)-94(v)
(Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, France). 
Hereinafter cited as AME, Mem. et Doc., Am.
2®Lusser's Journal, AC, C13A 12, ff. 112(v)-13.
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for treatment. Acting out of grief and outrage at the loss 
of so many warriors' lives, the dhief of Cannes Jaunes Village 
demanded a funeral at once, declaring that he did not hide his 
chagrin as the rest of the Indians did. The chief continued 
his tirade, saying that he had rallied his people in good 
faith to help the French. The white leaders had promised 
reparations for any Choctaw lives lost. Since the French had 
offered nothing, he and his men felt justified in taking some 
of the goods, as well as the Negro slaves, which the braves 
had brought back with them from the Natchez.
Describing as ridiculous, or foolish, the siege at the 
Natchez which had lasted over five weeks, the chief mocked the 
white men whose "grosses fusils," the cannon, that made only 
terrible sounds and had destroyed nothing. It saddened him 
to think that the loss of Indian life meant so little to the 
French. Le Sussur's efforts to persuade the chief of French 
friendship, of their having saved the Choctaw nation from 
enslavement by the Chickasaw and the English, fell on deaf 
27ears.
Le Sussur soon discovered that the leaders of the 
Cannes Jaunes Village were not the only discontented Choctaw. 
Several days later, while visiting the Chicachae Village, he 
found that some of its inhabitants were also unhappy with the 
French. Some of the warriors of the village had joined the
27Ibid., ff. 120(v)-24.
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French forces at the Natchez. They reported having received 
very little powder during the fighting, and complained of 
having been promised gifts which they had also failed to 
receive. They, like the warriors from Cannes Jaunes Village, 
had brought some of the slaves of the French home with them 
which they were supposed to take to New Orleans, but they 
decided that when the French lowered their prices for trade 
goods and made reparations for the red men's war losses, they 
would give up the Negro slaves.28
Because of the Indians' seeming intractability with 
regard to the slaves, Le Sussur sought out Antoine Huche and 
persuaded him to serve as his emissary to all of the tribe's 
towns. The interpreter was to make threats, as well as 
promises, to the warriors of the various Choctaw villages: 
if the captured Negro slaves were not returned shortly, Choc­
taw warriors at both Mobile and New Orleans would be made 
slaves in their place.28
While Le Sussur's reaction to the Indians' refusal to 
relinquish the slaves may seem somewhat unreasonable, his 
sentiments represented the general fear among the officials 
of the colony that no red man could be trusted completely, 
for another massacre had occurred in Louisiana. While in the 
Choctaw country that February, Le Sussur had received news of
28Ibid., ff. 124(v)-23(v) .
29Ibid., ff. 128(v)-30.
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a massacre which had occurred at the Yazoo Post. On December 
17, 17 29, the Yazoo Indians, for unknown reasons, had attacked 
the French fort, St. Pierre. A Madame Aubry, one of the 
settlers at the Yazoo area, along with some Choctaw warriors 
from the Bouncfouca Village recounted the details of the 
second massacre of white people in colonial Louisiana at the 
hands of the Indians. Madame Aubry's husband, in addition to 
15 other Frenchmen, had been slaughtered by the Yazoo who cut 
the commanding officer, Chevalier de Roche, to pieces. The 
nine women and children who were spared were offered as slaves 
to nearby tribes, quite probably the C h i c k a s a w . 30
Le Sussur's negative reports were not the only ones 
that Perier received in the initial months of the pursuit of 
the Natchez. Sr. de Louboey failed in his attempt to find 
the Natchez after they slipped out of their forts and went to 
the western side of the Mississippi River. On March 12, 
therefore, he and his forces returned to Fort Rosalie and took 
possession of the Natchez forts and lands. About 250 women 
and children had been recaptured from the rebel Indians in 
addition to nearly all of the black slaves. The Choctaw, as 
was noted earlier, held the rest of the Negroes, about 30 
altogether. Louboey informed Perier that the Natchez had 
taken refuge somewhere in the Ouachita territory.3
30Ibid., ff. 115-19.
31Extract of Perier's Letter to the Company, March 18, 
1730, ibid., ff. 296(v)-97.
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The pitiful lack of organization and general plan of 
attack which characterized the French effort led to accusa­
tions and excuses from several sources. Diron D'Artaguiette, 
while praising the Choctaw for their participation, condemned 
the inaction of the French leaders. Louboey, he believed, 
"observed" from the Tunica for too long before proceeding to 
the Natchez. And Perier's decision to stay in New Orleans, he 
feared, would be viewed as very cowardly behavior by the 
Indians.33
Others did not praise the Choctaw as strongly as did 
Diron. Indeed, PSrier mistrusted and criticized the tribe, 
and he blamed them for the long siege at Natchez more than he 
did the weakness of the militia forces, the lack of supplies 
or even English-Chickasaw interference. Whether based on his 
fear of their having lost the Choctaw skin trade to the 
English, or just general distrust of relying on native allies 
for a military undertaking, Perier blamed the failure to 
defeat the Natchez completely on the Choctaw people who had 
not supported the French wholeheartedly.33
One colonist at the time commented quite pessimis­
tically about the final termination of the war if victory was
33Diron to the Minister, January 10, 1731, AC, C13A 
13, f. 140; L'Abbe Raguet to M. Robin, March 1, 1730, AC,
C13A 12, ff. 425(v)-26.
33 <*Perier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 1730, 
ibid., f. 45; Perier to Msgr Le Pelletire, March 18, 1730, 
ibid., ff. 291-92.
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to be achieved with the aid of Indian forces. Believing a
total French victory could take easily ten years, Jean Charles
de Pradel, a soldier observed:
. . . The Indians make only small attacks, they 
only go out in small groups to surprise their 
enemies whom they may kill and scalp as though 
it were a major victory.34
While an interesting commentary, this view does not seem to 
consider that the Choctaws, as pursuers of the Natchez, could 
have been somewhat lacking in vigor because they felt that the 
French mistrusted them. Moreover, the tension and disagree­
ment between the French and the Indians over trade prices 
would have added to their lack of enthusiasm for the French 
cause. Finally, the spring and early summer were corn planting 
time for the Choctaw, an activity more important to them as a 
tribe than serving as mercenaries for the white men.
While the French were reviewing their recent military 
activities and the contributions of the Choctaw to the 
operation, they were still concerned to find the Natchez and 
to complete their destruction. But on April 1 Perier had no 
idea where they were. In the meantime, several ships had 
arrived from France with supplies which would aid in contin­
uing the military effort. With new supplies more search 
parties could be sent out to look for the Natchez, even though 
the soldiers and settlers appeared to be an insufficient
34Jean Charles de Pradel to his mother, March 22, 
1730, LSU, Pradel Papers, folder 1.
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force for such an undertaking.35
Initially, the French believed that all of the Natchez 
had left their lands. However, some had stayed behind to 
plant the first crop of maize for the tribe. Learning of this, 
during the summer of 1730, Perier sent five different parties 
to the Natchez country to destroy the Indians' grain stores 
and to burn their new crops. Several of the parties were 
successful not only in burning the crops but also in capturing 
some prisoners. One French party was attacked early in July 
by 100 Natchez who apparently had returned for stores. Eight 
Natchez were killed in this encounter. As a result of the 
summer offensives, 50 Natchez were captured, 16 of whom were 
burned at New Orleans. The remaining prisoners were sent to 
St. Domingue to be sold as slaves.3  ̂ Perier learned from 
these prisoners that the Natchez had not fared well over the 
summer. Although 300 warriors were still at large, many of 
the wounded had died, and sickness and starvation had killed 
others. However, the Natchez had built a new fort somewhere 
across the Mississippi River, but its location remained 
unknown to the French.37
33Perier to the Company Directors, April 1, 17 30, AC,
C13A 12, ff. 352-54.
3®Perier to Msgr Ory, August 1, 1730, ibid., ff. 329-
31; Perier to Maurepas, August 1, 1730, ibid., ff. 308-309.
37Perier to Msgr Ory, August 1, 1730, ibid. , £•331(v). *
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If the settlers were traumatized and upset by the war, 
so were the Choctaw, for they too had suffered a great deal. 
With many important braves away at war and unable to hunt in 
their usual cycle, these Indians had less to offer for the 
white man's goods. Fearing that they would defect to the 
English traders with their abundance of merchandise, Perier 
himself finally left New Orleans for Mobile to talk to the 
Indians in the fall of 1730. He asked the red men to maintain 
their loyalty to the French by trading only with Louisiana 
men. At the same time, the commandant general and his 30 
soldiers distributed an enormous number of presents to 
various Choctaw chiefs who came to Fort Conde. Although many 
Choctaw were somewhat mollified by these overtures, several 
Indians reported that two of their chiefs had chosen to 
receive English traders rather than to come to Mobile.3®
While asking the Choctaw to remain loyal to the French 
and trade with them, Perier apparently also tried to convince 
them to march with the French once more against the Natchez, 
but he failed to do so. He then returned to New Orleans to 
plan a new campaign using only colonial troops. Three units, 
numbering about 200 men altogether, were organized for the 
campaign. Perier's unit set out with that of Le Baron de 
Crenay from New Orleans on November 14. They traveled as far
38Ibid., ff. 333(v)-34(v); Diron to the Minister, 
January 10"̂  1731, AC, C13A 13, ff. 140-42.
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as Bayagoula Village where they waited for M. de Benca and his 
troop of settlers. That evening at camp on Bayou Manchac one 
of Perier's officers suggested that the commandant general 
leave for the Tunica village to try to secure their help. It 
was decided that the various units and whatever Indian allies 
could be prevailed upon to join them would rendezvous shortly 
after the first of the year at the mouth of the Red River. 
Perier then left for the Tunica towns in icy weather on 
December 27.
He convinced the Tunica to join the campaign, and 
while among them he learned that the French troops at the 
Natchez had been attacked, and that half of the force of 20 
men had been killed or wounded. On January 3, the Tunica 
warriors set out with Perier. The following day, they met 
with two other companies at the Red River as planned. Within 
the week, men from the Natchez post, along with the troops 
from the post of Natchitoches, also arrived.39
Finding the Natchez, who had taken refuge in a fort 
somewhere between the Red River and the Black River, would 
not be easy. Perier decided to divide his forces for the 
search. One group would move in a northerly course along the 
Mississippi River while another would go overland towards the 
Black River. From January 11 to January 20, the French 
soldiers, militia, volunteers and their Indian allies painfully
3^Perier on the Defeat of the Natchez, March 25, 
1731 AC, C13A 13, ff. 35-36(v).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p roh ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
2 2 5
made their way through heavy canebrakes and swamp lands in 
the area of present-day Concordia Parish, Louisiana. Finally, 
after nine days of hard travel, a scouting party found the 
Natchez fort.
Perier left about 100 men to guard his camp on the 
Black River, and set out using the rest to attack. Although 
the distance from the campsite to the fort was not great, 
Perier's force had to travel slowly because of the thick pine 
forest and underbrush. But the dense growth enabled Perier 
and his men to approach to within 200 feet of the fort with­
out being noticed. In fact, the French were able to surround 
the fort before being discovered.
Reinforced by M. Baron de Crenay, on January 21 
Perier began his attack. For the next three days, the French, 
using some of their small cannons, fired on the Natchez stock­
ade. The enemy hurled insults as well as bullets and arrows 
at intervals from the fort, killing several officers and a 
black slave. At one point, the French fire sent part of the 
fort up in flames. Hearing the cries and screams from the 
women and children, the attackers increased their cannon and 
musket fire. On the morning of January 24, the Natchez sent 
out an emissary to talk peace with Perier. Perier refused to 
negotiate unless the Negro slaves, still being held by the 
Natchez, were handed over first. The Indians agreed, and 
shortly thereafter 19 Negro men and women emerged from the 
fort.
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Chief Farine and St. Cosme then emerged from the fort 
and told P6rier that their people were weary of war, and they 
agreed that on January 25 the Natchez would surrender. During 
that stormy night, however, Chief Farine and his followers 
slipped away, concealed by the fog.40
In the morning the remaining Natchez began filing out 
of the fort. Refugees for more than a year, the remnants of 
this once proud people, emerged. An escort of 4 5 braves 
accompanied the Great Sun's wife. They were followed by 
families of wounded, sick and starving Indians, some 450 
people altogether. By nine o'clock that evening all of the 
Natchez who were left had surrendered. Over the next two days, 
Perier supervised the burning of the fort and its defenses. 
Finally, on January 29, he and his men left to rejoin the 
troops who had camped on the Black River. The next day, the 
French army, worn out from its two-and-one-half month 
campaign, set out for New Orleans with the 4 50 captured mem­
bers of the Natchez nation as their prisoners. They arrived 
in the capital on February 5, where Perier began arrangements 
to sell his captives into slavery in St. Domingue.41
40ibid., ff. 36(v)-39(v).
4^Ibid., ff. 40-41; Diron to the Minister, March 24, 
1731' ibid77~ff. 143-44; M. de Loye to the Minister, April 16, 
1731, Ibid., ff. 210-10(v); M. Lancelot at New Orleans to ? 
March 1, 1731, Nouvelles Acquisitions, 2610, ff. 63-63(v), 
Salle des Manuscripts (Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France); 
Jean Charles de Pradel to his mother, 1731, LSU, Pradel 
Papers, folder 3.
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Although French morale improved following the victory, 
several hundred Natchez warriors were still at large. Some of 
these men, it will be recalled, had escaped with Chief Farine 
in January. Other parties of the Natchez had found refuge 
among the Chickasaw Indians. Thus, once again, the precise 
whereabouts of the surviving Natchez remained a mystery. 
Finally, in mid-April, a shortage of food and supplies and 
munitions forced the Natchez to reveal their position. They 
attacked several pirogues bound for the Illinois country on 
the Mississippi River just north of the Natchez post, capturing 
four boats filled with supplies and killing two Frenchmen.
The survivors estimated that the attacking Natchez party 
numbered about 7 0 men.^
Shortly afterward, the Tunica chief (whose people 
lived only 35 miles from the Natchez country) encountered 
several Natchez hunters who requested permission for the 
Natchez people to settle among the Tunica. Reporting the news 
to Perier, the commandant general urged the Indian leader and 
French ally to negotiate peace with Natchez.^
The Tunica chief met various parties of Natchez as
42Perier's Report on the Natchez Activity Since the 
Fall of the Natchez Post in January, 1731, April 28, 1731, AC 
C13A 13, ff. 85-85(v); Diron to the Minister, June 24, 1731, 
ibid., f. 145(v).
^Diron to the Minister, June 24, 1731, AC C13A 13, 
ff. 145-46; Perier to Maurepas, December 10, 1731, ibid., ff. 
60-60(v).
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they began coming into his territory in early June. And as 
he was advised by Perier to do, he disarmed them as they 
arrived. They were permitted to settle two leagues from the 
main Tunica village. The gracious Tunica even fed the 
refugees. Between 150 and 200 Natchez people had arrived at
the Tunica by June 13, 1731.
That night, the Natchez had a great celebration among 
themselves, feigning excitement at the friendly reception 
given them by the Tunica, but shortly after midnight, they 
attacked their hosts. Greatly outnumbered, and with their 
chief dead in the first ten minutes of the attack, many of the 
Tunica fled. With only 40 or 50 warriors at his command, the 
Tunica war chief managed to regroup his forces and to recap­
ture what was left of their village in five days. The enemy 
had burned most of the huts, pillaged the ammunition supplies 
and stolen their food stores. News of the Tunica tragedy 
shocked and disturbed the French who had relied on these 
faithful allies to serve as a barrier between New Orleans and
the Natchez country. Natchez losses probably numbered between
30 and 34. One-fifth of the Tunica tribe, which only numbered 
about 100 people, died in the fighting.44
44Diron to the Minister, June_24, 1731, AC, C13A 13, ff. 60(v)-62(v); Movements of the^Indians in Louisiana since 
the Fall of the Natchez Fort by Perier, 17 31, ibid., ff.
85(v)-86(v); Diron to the Comptrolleur General, June 24,
1731, ibid., ff. 147-48; Diron to the Minister, August 20, 
1731, ibid., ff. 152-52(v).
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On leaving the Tunica village, some of the Natchez 
returned to their country in search of food. There they 
encountered a company of French soldiers who had made peace 
with about 100 Natchez refugees who had returned home. The 
newcomers, fresh from their attack on the Tunica, turned on 
their own people, killing 15 of them. Several days later, 
under the pretext of surrender, these Indians entered Fort 
Rosalie, where they attacked the French soldiers, commanded 
by M. de Crenay, killing six of them and several Negroes.^5 
A few Frenchmen escaped to New Orleans to report the attack. 
The commandant general immediately sent reinforcements to
Fort Rosalie, but by the time they arrived the Natchez had
escaped, leaving most of the garrison dead.^6
The French position with regard to the Indians seemed
to deteriorate as 17 31 continued. News of the arrival of
English traders in Choctaw villages in August of that year 
was really upsetting. For more than seven years, the pack 
trains from Carolina had not been seen in some of the Choc­
taw villages because of the pillaging which had occurred in 
previous years. Perier, however, must have been relieved to
“̂ Movements of the Indians in Louisiana since the 
Fall of the Natchez Post by Perier, 1731, AC, C13A, 13, ff. 
86(v)-87; Sr. Juzon, an Officer, Account of Activities at 
Fort Rosalie from May 10, 1731, to July 1, 1731, DSpot des 
Fortifications, #41.
^ M .  de Beauchamp to the Minister, November 5, 1731, 
AC, C13A 13, f . 198 (v) .
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learn that the Choctaw chiefs were none too happy about 
receiving the Carolina traders. In fact, they preferred to 
trade with the French for powder and bullets, items which 
the English did not supply very much of, although the French 
were having trouble finding enough ammunition to deal with 
the Natchez and to keep the Choctaw happy. However difficult, 
it was critical that they find these supplies somehow, for 
the loss of the Choctaw's allegiance at this time could be 
devastating for the colony.47
The whereabouts of the hostile Natchez remained 
unknown for several months after the attack on Fort Rosalie, 
although it was believed that they still had stores and 
forts on the west bank of the Mississippi River. Then, 
without any warning, Chief Farine and some of his followers 
attacked the Natchitoches Indian village on the Red River on 
October 5. Both surprised and outnumbered, the Natchitoches 
fled to the French settlement of Natchitoches.
The long-time leader of Natchitoches, Louis 
Juchereau de St. Denis, quickly organized a force of several 
French soldiers, 14 Spanish soldiers, some Natchitoches 
Indians and 400 Arcania Indians and attacked the Natchez who 
had taken cover within the Natchitoches Indian village. The 
attack continued relentlessly until October 14, at which time
47Movements of the Indians in Louisiana since the
Fall of the Natchez Fort by PSrier, 1731, ibid., ff. 87-91.
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the Natchez Indians who were still alive fled to the swamps 
and the cane-covered bayous near the Ouachita River. Some 
74 Natchez men and women lost their lives in this battle.48 
So great was this loss that never again would the Natchez 
Indians attach as a nation. Even though as many as 200 
Natchez still lived, from this time on they had to rely on 
the Chickasaw for refuge and military help.
The Chickasaw had supported the Natchez in their 
struggle against the French from the beginning. Even in the 
first dispatches to the government concerning the Natchez 
massacre, P4rier reported that some of the rebels had gone 
to Chickasaw villages following the tragedy of November,
1729.49 As the war wore on over the months, and then over 
several years, the Chickasaw tribe's active participation in 
the war became clearer. Enemies of the French from the 
colony's first years, it really should have surprised no one 
that the Chickasaw would harbor a tribe that had dared to 
strike out at the French as the Natchez had. Louisiana's 
leading strategists hoped that the Choctaw could be con­
vinced to war on the Chickasaw, their age-old enemies. 
Actually, despite their sympathies with the Natchez, the
48Ibid., ff. 91-93 (v) ; St. Denis to Salmon, November 
2, 1731, ibid., ff. 162-65 (v) ; P4rier and Salmon to the 
Minister, December 5, 1731, ibid., ff. 13(v)-14; M. Luzon to 
the Minister, December 29, 1731, ibid., ff. 207-208.
48P4rier's Account of the Massacre, March 18, 1730,
AC, C13A 12, f. 40 (v).
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Chickasaw did not attack the French directly throughout the
war except for a few minor ambushes.5°
In the spring of 1732, the Chickasaw and the Natchez
began a series of guerilla-like attacks on both natives and
white settlers near New Orleans and Mobile. At this time,
the Chickasaw warriors probably numbered between 700 and 800.
These men, combined with the approximately 75 refugee Natchez
braves, could pose a serious threat to the colony.51 About
80 Chickasaws in five canoes surprised some natives of the
Thom£ Village located about 20 leagues north of Mobile later
in March, 1732 and ki-ic.1 most of them. Later that spring,
a band of Natchez and Chickasaw were reported to have had a
few skirmishes with the settlers of Pointe Couple, a post
only 45 leagues from New Orleans. This increasing terrorism
failed to cause widespread panic, for news was abroad that
the major Choctaw chiefs had decided to call their warriors
52out for a war on the Chickasaw.
5(̂ P6rier to Msgr. Le Pelletier, March 18, 1730, ibid.,
f. 291; Diron to the Minister, June 24, 1731, AC, C13A 13,
ff. 145-46(v); Diron to the Minister, August 20, 1731, ibid., 
ff. 153-54 (v); M. de Beauchamp to the Minister, November 5,
1731, ibid., ff. 198-200(v); Salmon to the Minister, December 
14, 1731, AC, C13A 15, f. 187; Salmon to the Minister, March 
24, 1732, ibid.. f. 49.
51Salmon to the Minister, March 24, 1732, AC, C13A 
13, ff. 44-50(v); Perier to Maurepas, July 25, 1732, AC,
C13A 14, ff. 70-70 (v).
52M. de Beauchamp to the Minister, April 4, 1732,
AC, C13A 14, ff. 104-105; Salmon to the Minister, June 20,
1732, AC, C13A 15, ff. 149-51(v).
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Nearly three years after the massacre of 1729, the 
French had managed to reduce the Natchez nation to only a 
few people and to destroy the tribe's culture and civiliza­
tion. The tragedy at Fort Rosalie in November of 1729 
resulted not only in the destruction of the Natchez nation, 
but also led to hostilities between the Choctaw and the 
Chickasaw. Captain Chepart was blamed for the revolt of 
these Indians because of his unreasonable demands for the 
Indians' lands. His carelessness of the Indians' rights and 
feelings and general incompetence are, indeed, the most 
obvious reasons for the Natchez to have struck back so 
violently. ̂
Traditional opinion concerning French and Indian 
relations in colonial North America holds that the natives 
received better treatment from the French than from the 
other Europeans who explored and settled the continent. 
However, this interpretation was arrived at largely through 
the study of the Canadian fur trade, a form of resource 
exploitation into which the Indians were easily integrated. 
Indeed, French fur trading and trapping disturbed the social 
ecology of the wilderness far less than Spanish mining or 
English farming. Perhaps, a general assessment of these 
racial relations should stress not the national traits of 
the various Europeans who came, but rather, their intended
^Msgr. Ory to Perier, November 1, 1730, AC, C13A 
12, ff. 405 (v)-408 (v) .
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uses of the land and other resources which they found.
Involved in the development of Louisiana in the Fort 
Rosalie area were Frenchmen, some of whom were Canadians.
Yet, these people in attempting to farm the land, much in 
the way the English did, caused a breakdown in Indian rela­
tions which resulted in tragedy for both sides. To be sure, 
the Natchez dependence on European goods paralleled that of 
the Indians involved in the fur trade; but, for the most 
part, the Indians of the North continued to roam freely in a 
wilderness which was owned by no one and was shared by all.
On the other hand, when the land became the private property 
of individuals, as it did at the Natchez post, when the 
company decided to exploit its tobacco plantations, the 
Indians were squeezed out. On realizing that the French no 
longer intended to share the land, but rather, to take it 
all, and that the tribe now faced removal, the Natchez 
struck back violently.
On another level, turmoil and conflict existed at 
the Natchez before the French even arrived there. This 
turmoil and conflict was caused by the bizarre nature of the 
tribe1s stratified social system of high ranking nobility 
and the lower class stinkards. This system of classes was, 
perhaps, the very thing which was responsible for the intra- 
tribal turmoil which existed during the years of French 
presence in the area. This system of classes was developed 
by the older leaders of the tribe— the Great Sun and Tattooed
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Serpent for examples— as a means to absorb new peoples, like 
the inhabitants of Apple Village, and still preserve the old 
tribal culture. But having been "acculturated" and then 
having obtained political control of the tribe at the death 
of Tattooed Serpent in 1725, these "newcomers" struck out 
against other newcomers, the French, a people of a totally 
different race, so foreign that they could never be absorbed 
into the Natchez tribal structure. The rudeness and insen­
sitivity of these new white people only emphasized their 
distance from a red culture which was so static by nature 
that it could not tolerate them.
The problems the Natchez experienced were not helped 
by Etienne PSrier's bungling attempts to deal with them and 
the war that followed. His failures, furthermore, high­
lighted to the French government the shortcomings of the
Company of the Indies and its bureaucrats. Until 1731,
official French policy had forbidden selling Indian slaves. 
The company's violations of this traditional position indi­
cated to the government that a new order was needed. Having 
involved both the Choctaw and the Chickasaw in the Natchez 
war, Perier seemed to have started a major Indian uprising 
in Louisiana. Obviously, a leader of experience and exper­
tise was needed to calm the panic, to reassure native French 
allies, to restore order. Louisiana desperately needed a
leader who understood and appreciated the Indian. Louisi­
ana's people, white and red, waited for the return of 
Bienville.
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THE RETURN OF BIENVILLE: THE FIRST
CHICKASAW CAMPAIGN, 1733-1736
During the war against the Natchez, a new era began 
for the colony of Louisiana. On July 1, 1731, the Company 
of the Indies returned the stewardship of the colony to the 
French government. Louisiana's new status as a royal 
colony meant that the Ministry of Marine was once again in 
control, and that gave rise to new hope in Louisiana and in 
France that the colony might yet be commercially successful.
Chosen to run the royal colony were Etienne Pferier, 
who was promoted from commandant general to governor, and 
Edm6 Salmon, whom the government sent to Louisiana in the 
late summer of 1731 to replace the deceased Jacques de la 
Chaise as commissaire ordonnateur. In the closing months of 
the Natchez war, these new officials worked to reorganize 
the colony's administration by removing company officials 
from the Superior Council. They also drew up plans for 
increasing trade and commerce in the colony. And they paid
^•Minister to P6rier, January 30, 1731, Archives des 
Colonies, B 55, f . 584 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France). 
Hereinafter cited as AC.
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far greater attention than had the company to the missionary 
effort.2
The government took immediate steps in the new
regime to help the ailing fur and skin trade. Under the
Company of the Indies, exclusive trade privileges had been
granted to certain individuals throughout the colony from
the Illinois country to Mobile.2 The controversies which
had arisen between these men and the colonial government had
weakened the overall effort. When Louisiana became a royal
colony again in 1731, the government ordered trade with the
Indians to be opened to all the people of Louisiana.^ A
direct order from the king in May of that year forbade
Perier and Commissaire Ordonnateur Salmon to grant exclusive
trading privileges to anyone. The government's position was
made quite clear:
. . . that the Trade be absolutely free and that 
no one be excluded from it if, however, they judge 
that it be necessary that there be some post at which 
it would be agreeable to have stores to accommodate 
the Indian tribes and to eliminate all excuses for 
trading with the neighbors the English, so biased
2charles Edwards O'Neill, Church and State in French 
Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732 (New Haven,
1966), 223, 230-32; Donald J. LeMieux, The Office of "com­
missaire ordonnateur" in French Louisiana, 17 31-1763: A
Study in French Colonial Administration. Unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Louisiana State University (1972), Chapter
3See Chapter VIII, pp. 190-91.
^An Arret Concerning the Retrocession of the Company 
of the Indies Exclusive Trading Privileges in Louisiana, 
March 27, 1731, AC, A 22, ff. 133-33(v).
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are their bad impressions of us that they give the 
Indians, His Majesty will be pleased that Sieurs 
P§rier and Salmon should establish the posts as 
stated if a clerk be sent there who will be in 
charge of it, in which event he will be responsible 
for regulating prices at a fixed rate so that there 
will be no abuses and that the Indians could justly 
complain, realizing that the same will be done every­
where. . . .5
Whether or not licenses were granted to individuals by the 
government, or traders were given areas in which to trade, 
is not known at this time. Nevertheless, the colonial 
officials appear to have supported the king in this matter, 
insisting that an officer be in charge at each post to pre­
vent any cheating of the natives by traders. A controversy, 
such as the one which had arisen between Pgrier and Diron 
D'Artaguiette in 1729, costing the Louisiana government 
nearly 80,000 livres, must not recur. It was hoped that 
regulating prices would improve relations with the Choctaw 
who had become annoyed with the French because of the 
excessive prices and arguments between officials over control 
of the trade.6
Unfortunately, P6rier proved to be singularly inept 
in dealing with the Indians. He nearly destroyed the
^Memoir of the King to M. P6rier, Governor of Louisi­
ana and M. Salmon, the Commissaire Ordonnateur, May 22,
1731, B 55, ff. 598(v)-99.
6P6rier and Salmon to the Minister, December 5, 1731,
AC, C13A 13, f. 15; Salmon to the Minister, January 19, 1732,
ibid., ff. 33-33(v); Salmon to the Minister, January 15,
1732, ibid., ff. 8-9.
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colony's alliance with the Choctaw. Because some of the 
Choctaw had flirted and traded with the English, and because 
they had refused to return all of the Negro slaves captured 
at the Natchez post, PSrier believed them unworthy of French 
friendship. His attitude that the French needed to assert 
themselves with the Choctaw, and that the French had no need 
of this tribe was indeed wrong.7 He failed to appreciate 
how costly for the Choctaw their participation in the Natchez 
war had been. The presence of 600 Choctaw braves at the 
Natchez post had meant not only a loss of life for them, but 
also fewer hunters to secure the needed pelts and hides for 
the skin trade and fewer men to farm the land.
At a meeting with 800 Choctaw tribesmen in October 
of 1730, P6rier talked with some of the tribe's leaders who 
aired their grievances. The French leader stated the French 
position: the trade rates would not be lowered if the tribe
dealt with white traders other than the French, nor would 
any presents be dispensed until the Negro slaves from the 
Natchez still in Choctaw hands had been returned. The 
Indians responded at once, arguing that they had yet to 
receive any remuneration for the ammunition which they had 
used in the Natchez war, ammunition which was normally 
allocated for the hunt. Therefore, they felt justified not
7P6rier to Maurepas, August 1, 1730, AC, C13A 12, 
ff. 306(v)-307; P6rier to Msgr. Ory, August 1, 1730, ibid., f. 332.
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only in keeping the Negroes, but also in demanding lower 
prices. Indeed, they had lost a great deal by fighting 
alongside the French. Although the company agreed to lower 
prices some 40 percent, unfortunately, P6rier still believed 
that the Choctaw needed the French more than the Louisianians 
needed this tribe.8
When the French hesitated to supply the Choctaw with 
goods because of past grievances, some of the tribe's 
villages sought the English traders' merchandise. Sometime 
after P6rier's meeting with the large contingent of Choctaw, 
several villages secured limbourg blankets from the English. 
By early 1731, Sr. Regis, who traded with the tribe, reported 
from Yowani village that many of the Choctaw had become 
seriously ill. Men, women and children in at least ten 
villages were dying. Four families arrived at Yowani on 
February 20 from the northeastern village, Boctokola, fleeing 
the epidemic which had broken out there. Rumor held that 
the disease (smallpox) came from a poison which the English 
had rubbed into the blankets which they had traded to the 
Indians.9
Angered by this terrible act, some of the Choctaw, 
led by a prominent trade and war leader, Mingo Onmastaba, or
9P£rier to Msgr. Ory, November 15, 1730, ibid., ff. 
312-15; P§rier to Maurepas, November 15, 1730, ibid., f.
325 (v) .
9Sr. Regis to P6rier, February 27, 1731, AC, C13A 
13, ff. 173-78.
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Red Sock, went to seek, presumably to punish the guilty 
traders, who were then residing among the Chickasaw. ■Lo
Not only had the Choctaw been alienated from the 
English traders by the illness which they had presumably 
brought with them, but P6rier believed that he had earlier 
enhanced the French position with them by achieving some 
unity between the eastern and western Choctaw villages by 
securing the election of a pro-French great chief for the 
western villages in the fall of 1730. (The great chief of 
the eastern villages was, of course, pro-French.)'1'̂  However, 
neither P§rier nor Regis understood the Choctaw tribal 
organization as well as did Father Beaudouin, a Jesuit 
missionary who had lived among the Choctaw for several years. 
The priest suggested that neither of these chiefs was strong, 
that the tribe consisted of over 40 villages, most of which 
were independent, except for a shared interest in warring 
against enemies, and in acquiring French merchandise.̂
Thus, the efforts of the French to organize these natives on 
familiar terms only confused their efforts to try to deal
Ibid., ff. 178(v)-79(v). Regis, however, feared, 
and rightly so it was later discovered, that these people 
were really searching for merchandise, since the French 
supplies were so low.
•^Minister to P6rier, May 22, 1731, AC, B 55, f.
592; P§rier to Msgr. Ory, November 15, 1730, AC, C13A 12, 
f . 315(v).
12pather Beaudouin to Salmon, November 23, 1732, AC, 
C13A 14, ff. 182-86.
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with the Indians as partners in trade and in war.
Although the Choctaw were supposedly alienated from 
the English traders in 1731 because they suspected them of 
bringing them an illness in infected blankets, in 1732 the 
English began to show renewed interest in the Choctaw. Dis­
patches from Father Beaudouin and Beauchamp reported an 
increasing number of Anglo traders in the Choctaw villages. 
Apparently, the Indians' desire for merchandise overcame 
their anger over the diseased blankets which the English had 
given them. By mid-March it was learned that as many as 50 
horses from Carolina had been sighted only 30 leagues from 
Choctaw territory. In fact, the Choctaw had been receiving 
huge quantities of merchandise from the English since Regis1 
trip in 1729.13 That year M. Benoit, the commanding officer 
at Fort Toulouse, sent word of English plans to set up 
trading posts among the Choctaw.14 on the eve of Bienville's 
arrival, Louisiana's relations with the Choctaw were at an 
all-time low because of the complete inadequacy of French 
merchandise. Even the inhabitants of some of the Choctaw 
villages who had been loyal French allies for years were 
threatening defection to the English.
13Salmon to the Minister, January 15, 1732, AC, C13A
15, ff. 9-9(v); Beauchamp to the Minister, March 15, 1732,
AC, C13A 14, f. 103; Memoir on English Merchandise Traded to 
the Choctaw, 1729, AC, C13A 12, ff. 99-99(v).
I^m . Benoit to the Minister, March 29, 1732, AC,
C13A 14, ff. 12-13(v).
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Fortunately for Louisiana, the Carolinians did not 
realize fully the impact that English goods were having on 
the Choctaw-French relationship. Indeed, the reports of the 
colony1s Indian Affairs Committee indicated that the Choctaw 
tribe's 5,000 warriors had been lost totally to the French. 
Indeed, Carolina officials feared that a united force of 
French and Indians might invade the English colony.^
On the other hand, the colony's leaders did seem to 
understand that Louisiana's influence in trade with the 
Choctaw Indians was declining because of a shortage of 
merchandise, as well as of French markets for the Indians' 
skins. To complicate matters, the Carolinian leaders 
learned that some English from New York and Pennsylvania 
were trading the French limbourg and liquor at New Orleans 
or Dauphine Island for h i d e s . N e i t h e r  the French govern­
ment nor that of South Carolina was pleased to learn of 
these transactions, and officials of both colonies ordered 
this illicit trade to cease. On the one hand, the Carolina 
government resented that transactions had occurred between 
the French and the northern British colonies, while Diron
•^Journal of the Assembly of the Colony of South 
Carolina, March 6, 1733, Colonial Office Papers 5, 433, f. 
116 (Public Record Office, London, England). Hereinafter 
cited as Journal of the Assembly, PRO, C.O. 5.
16Ibid., ff. 117-20? Assembly to the King, April 9, 
1734, PRO, C.O. 5, 363, ff. 102-104 (v); M. de Cremont to the 
Minister, August 1, 1733, AC, C13A 17, f. 273; Bienville and 
Salmon to the Minister, February 24, 1734, AC, C13A 18, 
ff. 3-4(v).
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D'Artaguiette himself admitted his mistake in allowing 
English traders to deal through Mobile. Indeed, the Choctaw 
had begun to notice that the limbourg which the Louisiana 
traders were now offering was really English-made.17
Apparently not satisfied with P6rier's performance 
as governor in the summer of 1732 the Ministry of Marine 
decided to replace him with Bienville. One scholar 
attributes this change to PSrier's "losing esteem,"1® but 
the government apparently wanted to "clean house," to rid 
the colony of all the company's personnel. La Chaise had 
conveniently died; P6rier was to be removed.
The government in France felt completely confident 
that Bienville would restore peace in the colony. "'Sieur 
de Bienville,1" wrote the King, "'by the services which he 
has already rendered has given evidence of his experience 
and capability, and . . . Sieur de Bienville had the confi­
dence both of settlers and of savages.'"19 The Ministry of 
Marine especially had complete confidence in his judgment 
and ability in native matters. If he believed a major 
campaign were necessary to settle the Natchez problem, he
17Minister to Bienville, September 15, 17 33, AC, B 
59, ff. 598(v)-99; Minis1er to Diron d'Artaguiette, September 
15, 1733, ibid., ff. 6: /)-18; Minister to Bienville and
Salmon, February 2, 1734, AC B 61, ff. 631-32(v); Diron to 
the Minister, March 20, 1734, AC C13A 19, ff. 115-17(v).
180'Neill, Church and State. 233.
19Quoted in ibid.
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would be supported. And the Minister of Marine, Jean- 
Frederic Ph^lypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, urged Bienville to 
reestablish the system of interpreters among the tribes which 
he had developed from 1700 until his departure from Louisi­
ana in 1725, but which had since broken down.20
When Bienville returned in the winter of 1733, he 
found that relations between the French and the Choctaw had 
deteriorated to a shockingly low level. Not only had the 
English presence and influence with this tribe grown, but 
French trade had declined.2 -̂ As was noted earlier, the 
greater supply of English merchandise at cheaper rates was 
driving the French completely out of the competition. In 
1731, only 4,067 buckskins were received at Mobile. The 
declining interest of Louisiana settlers in the skin trade, 
despite the government's effort to open it up, left the 
Choctaw little choice but to turn to the English.22
Bienville, however, was especially qualified to deal
20a  Memoir from the King for Instructions to Sr. de 
Bienville, Governor of Louisiana, September 2, 1732, AC, B 
55, ff. 796-96(v); Minister to Bienville and Salmon, Sept­
ember 2, 1732, AC, B. 57, ff. 814-14(v); Minister to Salmon, 
September 2, 1732, ibid., f. 816(v).
21Diron D'Artaguiette to the Minister, April 23, 
1733, AC, C13A 17, ff. 213(v)-14(v); Bienville and Salmon to 
the Minister, May 12, 1733, AC, C13A 16, ff. 68-71(v).
22Bienville to the Minister, May 15, 1733, ibid., 
ff. 206-208 (v); Salmon to the Minister, July 24, 1733, AC 
C13A 17, ff. 163(v)-64(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
August 1, 1733, ibid., ff. 271 (v)-73.
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with these problems, and it was hoped, to reverse these 
trends. Ever since he had departed for France in the summer 
of 1725, the Indians of Louisiana had awaited his return, 
for they remembered both his fairness and his understanding 
of the red men. Even the defeated and captive Natchez hoped 
for his return. While en route to Louisiana in the winter 
of 1732-1733, Le Moyne docked briefly at Cap Franijais, on 
St. Domingue. There he saw many of the Natchez who had been 
sold into slavery, including St. Cosme, the Great Sun, who 
rejoiced at the sight of Bienville and who hoped to return 
to Louisiana with him.33
Arriving in New Orleans late in February, 1733, 
Bienville immediately took over command with the arrogance 
and the assurance of one who had the authority of the king 
behind him. Snubbing all those who had been associated with 
the former regime, Bienville even had the audacity to strip 
PSrier's house of all its furnishings and sell them at 
auction.24 Not only did he have power from the Crown, but 
he also had loyal supporters in the colony, men like Charles 
St. Pierre de St. Julien, a former Superior Council member,
22Memoir of M. de Boisbriant, Commandant General of 
Louisiana in the Absence of Bienville, 1725, AC C13A 8, f.
248(v); Bienville to the Minister, January 28, 1733, AC,
C13A 16, f . 223(v).
24Jean Charles de Pradel to his brother, March 8,
1733 in A. Baillardel and A. Prioult, Le Chevalier de Pradel; 
Vie d'un Colon Franpais en Louisiane au XVIII Siecle (Paris, 
1928), 127.
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and Gilles-Augustin Payen de Noyan, his nephew. Both offi­
cials had been expelled by the company in 1725, but had 
returned to Louisiana shortly before Bienville.25
Along with these followers, the governor also had 
the help of men who were competent in dealing with the 
Indians. The D'Artaguiette brothers, Pierre at the Illinois 
post and Diron at Mobi^ had had a great deal of Indian 
experience. Men such as Jacques de Coutillas and Jadart de 
Beauchamp had received praise and promotions from the 
government for their work with the Choctaw. Sr. Le Sueur's 
ability had became evident during the Natchez war when he 
replaced the deceitful duplicitous Sr. Recollet Regis to 
work with the Choctaw.25 Expectations were truly high for 
improved relations with the Indians.
Following the appointment of Bienville as governor 
of Louisiana in July, 1732, the king reviewed with him the 
trade scene in the colony. Governor P§rier and Commissaire 
Ordonnateur Salmon had proposed two schemes for organizing 
the colony's trade. One proposed granting settlers small 
amounts of trade goods from the king's store on credit, which 
they would repay in skins. The other proposed organizing a
25o'Neill, Church and State, 181, 227.
25Salmon to the Minister, March 29, 1732, AC, C13A 
15, ff. 62(v)-63 (v); Minister to Beauchamp, September 2,
1732, AC, B 57, ff. 811(v)-12; Salmon to the Minister, May 
4, 1733, AC, C13A 17, f. 92; Salmon to the Minister, May,
1733, ibid., ff. 148-49.
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colonial trading company to run the entire operation by means 
of trading posts in each village. Learning that that 
privilege had been abused in the past, the Crown preferred 
that individuals, rather than an organization, trade with 
the Indians. Thus, Bienville and Salmon, in addition to 
running the government, were ordered to oversee the supply 
and prices of merchandise for the skin trade,27 and other 
colonial officials were directed to cooperate with them.^®
Supplying and distributing presents, as well as 
supplying trade merchandise, had always been difficult in 
Louisiana. In the latter years of the Company of the Indies' 
regime, the cost of presents for the Indians had increased 
to 20,000 livres or more annually, and this was considered 
to be too little. When the St. Anne arrived in November,
1731, carrying supplies from the government, only eleven 
pieces of material remained in the Mobile store for Indian 
trade and gift-giving.29
27P6rier and Salmon to the Minister, December 5, 1731, 
AC, C13A 13, ff. 17-18; Memoir of the King to Bienville and 
Salmon, September 2, 1732, AC, B 57, f. 830(v); Minister to
Salmon, September 2, 1732, ibid., f. 813; P6rier to the
Minister, December 1, 1731, AC, C13A 14, ff. 173-73(v).
2®Minister to M. de Cremont, September 2, 1732, AC,
B 57, ff. 808(v)-809; Minister to Bienville and Salmon, 
September 8, 1733, AC, B 59, f. 583.
29perier to the Minister, December 1, 1731, AC, C13A 
14, f. 174(v); Salmon to the Minister, December 1, 1731, AC, 
C13A 13, ff. 113-13 (v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, Novem­
ber 26, 1731, ibid., ff. 204-205; Salmon to the Minister, 
January 15, 1732, AC, C13A 15, ff. 7-8 (v).
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Eventually, the government would provide Louisiana 
with an adequate amount of trade supplies.30 However, from 
January 1732 until the fall of 1734, the shortages remained 
critical. In his first months as commissaire ordonnateur, 
for example, Salmon noticed a great lack of trade muskets.
As many as 900 natives were reported to have gone to Mobile 
to have their muskets repaired during the winter of 17 31- 
1732. Thus, the commissaire ordonnateur made several 
requests in the early months of 1732 for 1,000 muskets for 
the Indian trade.3  ̂ While wishing to fill those requests, 
shortages in France hampered the government's efforts to do 
s o . 32 A n d  despite Maurepas' assurances to Bienville that 
the colony would be adequately supplied, the new governor 
still worried that the natives would lose interest in the 
French, and trade with the English instead.33
30An Inventory of the Merchandise the Company of the 
Indies Ceded to the French Government, August 20, 1732, AC, 
A22, f. 141.
31Salmon to the Minister, January 15, 1732, AC, C13A
15, f. 8; Salmon to the Minister, March 24, 1732, AC, C13A
14, f. 134; Salmon to the Minister, March 26, 1732, AC C13A
15, f. 58 (v) .
33Minister to Salmon, August 26, 1732, AC, B 57, f. 
793(v); Minister to Bienville, September 30, 1732, ibid., f. 
853; Minister to Bienville, October 14, 1732, ibid., f. 862; 
Minister to Bienville, December 2, 1732, ibid., ff. 865(v)- 
66.
33Bienville to the Minister, October 8, 1732, AC, 
C13A 14, ff. 81-82; Bienville to the Minister, October 4, 
1732, ibid., ff. 79-79(v).
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In the winter of 1733, the critical supplies finally 
began to arrive. Louisianians welcomed gratefully 1,000 
muskets and 14,000 pounds of powder. Unfortunately, the 
powder magazine at Mobile was in such poor condition that 
more than 2,000 of the 3,000 pounds sent to this post 
spoiled because of the humidity. Nevertheless, the Ministry 
of Marine tried to attend to the colony1s needs so that the 
new era of the royal colony would begin well.^4
Assessing the supply situation after only a few 
months in Louisiana, Bienville reported that the annual 
allotment of 20,000 livres for Indian presents and merchan­
dise would have to be increased by more than 30 percent.
Lost ships and collapsing storehouses in Mobile further 
restricted his efforts to boost trade as well as to improve 
relations with the Indians.35
To overcome his problems, Bienville asked for more 
and more. He especially wanted for the Indian trade the soft 
cotton cloth limbourg. In 1733 the government sent him
34Salmon to the Minister, May 4, 1733, AC, C13A 17, 
f. 91(v); Diron D'Artaguiette to the Minister, April 23,
1733, ibid.. ff. 213-13 (v); Bienville and Salmon to the 
Minister, May 15, 1733, AC, C13A 16, ff. 14-14(v); Minister 
to Bienville and Salmon, February 2, 1734, AC, B 61, ff. 
630-30(v); Salmon to the Minister, April 6, 1734, AC, C13A 
19, ff. 25-25 (v)? Salmon to the Minister, August 19, 1734, 
ibid., ff. 80-81.
35Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, May 15, 1733, 
AC, C13A 16, ff. 95-95(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
April 30, 1734, AC, C13A 19, f. 159(v).
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only 90 of the 200 yards he had requested. When he reported 
that the natives preferred blue or red cloth to plain white, 
the Ministry tried to accommodate them. It sent 100 yards 
of limbourg early in 1734 and 200 more by the end of the 
year,3^
Bienville tried to improve the quality, as well as 
the quantity, of goods offered in trade, and here, too, the 
Ministry did what it could to help. Louisiana Indians, for 
example, generally preferred the large, soft blankets 
offered by English traders to the small, coarse "dog hair" 
blankets routinely offered by French traders.37 When the 
Ministry learned of the Indians' wishes, Maurepas requested 
that samples of the products which they favored be sent to
France so that they could be copied.^®
Not only did the natives reject the "cradle" blankets, 
they did not like the hatchets and pick-axes which the
36Minister to Bienville and Salmon, February 3, 1733, 
AC, B 59, ff. 559(v)-70; Minister to Salmon, February 3,
1733, ibid., ff. 570(v)-71; Salmon to the Minister, August 
2, 1733, AC, C13A 17, ff. 190-90(v); Minister to M. de St. 
Leon, February 7, 1734, AC, B 50, f. 8(v); Minister to 
Bienville and Salmon, December 1, 1734, ibid., 586 (v)-87.
37Salmon to the Minister, May 15, 1733, AC, C13A 17, 
ff. 130-31; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, July 29, 
1733, AC, C13A, 16, ff. 131-31(v); Salmon to the Minister,
August 1, 1733, AC, C13A, 17, ff. 188-89.
38Minister to Salmon, February 9, 1734, AC, B 51, 
ff. 635-35.
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government sent to Louisiana either. Since the Crozat era, 
an ironworker had produced such items at the Mobile post. 
Under the Company of the Indies, he had made more than 2,000 
such tools for the trade. The Choctaw and other Indians 
apparently preferred his work to that of a French manufac­
turer, for such complaints had not been made before.39
Although Bienville and the Ministry hoped to improve 
trade and diplomatic relations with all Louisiana's Indians, 
their trade policies and position were especially designed 
to appeal to the Choctaw. It was the Choctaw who had 
rejected French blankets and hatchets. The colonial govern­
ment of Louisiana had worked from the beginning to secure 
this huge tribe as a partner in the skin trade. Over the 
next few years, the pressure of English influence and the 
Chickasaw war would test the strength of the alliance with 
the French in trade and in war.
Efforts to placate the Indians did not, however, 
extend to trading them alcohol, at least not openly and with 
government consent. Until 1734, none of the records specifi­
cally states that liquor was traded to the Indians. Over 
the years, however, many barrels and casks of wine and 
brandy had been sent to the colony, and almost certainly 
some had found its way into the Indian trade. In the year
39Salmon to the Minister, January 15, 1732, AC, C13A, 
15, ff. 9(v)-10; Salmon to the Minister, August 1, 1733, AC, 
C13A 17, ff. 188(v)-89; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, 
August 9, 1733, AC, C13A 16, f. 143.
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1732 alone, 110 casks of wine and 180 barrels of brandy were 
sent to the colony, and even a greater amount the following 
year.40 Doubtless, Louisianians who already had a reputation 
of leading wild and debauched lives, drank most of it. And, 
of course, some was used for medicinal purposes, as well as 
a substitute for drinking water. Enough got to the Indians, 
however, so that the Superior Council had to forbid by 
ordinance trading wine, brandy or other liquors to the 
Indians. Violators could be fined 100 livres.4'1" Just how 
many traders, desperate to make a profit, disregarded the 
decree is not known, but the liquor problem increased over 
the next 25 years.
As the new governor of Louisiana, Bienville acted 
quickly to improve relations with the Choctaw. He believed 
that a post should be established in the Choctaw territory 
so the tribe would not have to travel all the way to Mobile 
to trade. And he encouraged individuals (rather than a com­
pany of traders) to deal with the Indians. Of course, 
Bienville's agents would oversee the clerks at the new post
Salmon and P6rier to the Minister, March 29, 1732,
AC, C13A 14, ff. 10-10(v); Bienville and Salmon to the
Minister, August 5, 1733, AC, C13A 16, f. 139; Minister to 
M. Jung, a shipper, June 9, 1733, AC, B 58, ff. 48-48 (v); 
Minister to M. Jung, July 1, 1733, ibid., f. 55; Minister to
M. Jiang, July 30, 1733, ibid., ff. 60-60 (v) ; Salmon to the
Minister, August 24, 1734, AC, C13A 19, f. 82.
^Ordinance of M. Salmon, November 14, 1734, AC, A 
23, f. 118.
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to keep stealing and cheating to a m i n i m u m . T h e  govern­
ment in France was most sympathetic to his plans, as well as 
to his requests for support and supplies for the tribe.
The growing English threat to the colony was taken quite 
seriously by the French government, especially since Bien­
ville regarded it to be such a grave matter. Maurepas con­
tinued to support all of Bienville's plans, because he hoped 
eventually to obtain as much as 30,000 to 40,000 pounds of 
skins a year from Louisiana,^3 and the Choctaw trade was 
crucial to his plan.
Since the colony needed the Choctaw alliance to 
survive economically and politically, its leaders were very 
upset when they learned that Red Sock had once again gone to 
Carolina in the summer of 1734, hoping to make a trade 
treaty with the English. While it is quite possible that 
the infected blankets of several years before had not 
affected Red Sock's village, his overtures to the English 
indicate that Red Sock and his people needed to have supplies
^2Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, April 5, 1734, 
AC, C13A 18, ff. 62(v)-67; Bienville to the Minister, April 
20, 1734, ibid., ff. 138-41.
43Minister to Bienville and Salmon, August 24, 1734, 
AC, B 61, ff. 646-47; Minister to Bienville and Salmon, 
September 2, 1734, ibid., ff. 652 (v)-53; Minister to Bien­
ville, September 2, 1734, ibid., ff. 659-59(v); Minister to 
Diron d'Artaguiette, September 9, 1734, ibid., ff. 673-74; 
Minister to Bienville and Salmon, December 1, 1734, ibid., 
ff. 687-87 (v).
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from the English which they were not getting in sufficient 
quantity from the French. On his return to his village at 
the end of September, he wore a suit trimmed with silver 
braid and carried a musket, a white blanket and four pieces 
of limbourg, all gifts from the English. Red Sock informed 
the skeptical chiefs of his tribe that similar presents 
awaited all who would trade with the English.44
By the spring of 1735, Bienville felt more secure 
about the Choctaw trade alliance, for he had learned over 
the winter that even though Red Sock had been relatively well 
received by the Carolinians, very few English traders had 
followed him back to the tribe. Of course, some Choctaw 
villages continued to trade with the English, as always had 
been the case. This could not be avoided, for the tribe was 
so large. However, that both Alabama Mingo and Red Sock, 
two important tribal leaders had apparently chosen to con­
tinue to deal with the English aroused the fears of many
. . . 45Louisianians.
Unfortunately, the trade competition in the South­
east no longer involved simply Louisiana and Carolina vying 
for the Indians' favor. In 1729, Georgia had been settled,
44Diron to the Minister, July 15, 1734, AC, C13A, 19, 
ff. 134-35; Salmon to the Minister, November 4, 1734, ibid., 
ff. 95-98(v).
45Bienville to the Minister, April 14, 1735, AC,
C13A 20, ff. 33-35.
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and among its settlers were entrepreneurs who were also 
quite interested in the fur trade. The schemes of Patrick 
McKay, the new colony's chief Indian agent, brought another 
level of competition into the region. As a matter of fact, 
Red Sock had gone to Georgia, as well as Carolina, in 1734. 
Throughout the summer, Bienville received reports of the 
Choctaw flirtation with traders from the new colony.^ The 
Georgia traders posed a real threat, for the McKay faction 
appeared to be well organized and well-supplied with 
merchandise and an amiable lot. Bienville was impressed by 
these new competitors, commenting that the Georgians had 
made more progress in the trade in one year than the Caro­
linians had in thirty-five.^
With the skin and hide trade still very much the 
backbone of their colony's economy, English merchants in 
South Carolina both feared and resented the Georgians 1 
presence. Just as Bienville worried about losing the Choc­
taw trade to the Georgians, the Carolinians feared losing
^Bienville to the Minister, September 9, 1735, 
ibid., ff. 185-88.
47Patrick McKay to the Georgia Trustees, March 23, 
1735, PRO, C.O. 5, 636, ff. 245-45 (v) ; Patrick McKay to 
Thomas Courstine, July 8, 1734, ibid., f. 314; Sam Eveleigh 
to James Oglethorpe, August 12, 1734, ibid., f. 12; Bienville 
to the Minister, August 25, 1734, AC, C13A 20, f. 163.
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the Chickasaw trade to them.48
To be sure, the Georgia group had to be taken 
seriously by Bienville, but the Carolinians continued to 
pose the main threat. They were once more making serious 
inroads into the trade with tribes of Louisiana. What the 
Louisiana governor feared most in the opening weeks of 1736 
was that the English would arrange a peace between the Choc­
taw and the Chickasaw. If this should occur, Louisiana 
49would most certainly be lost.
Although the long-range intentions of the government 
were to reap economic profit from an alliance with the 
Choctaw, Bienville, Salmon and other colonial officials 
realized that they needed the tribe's allegiance for defense 
too. In effect, they viewed the skin trade with the Choctaw, 
in part, as a means of securing their loyalty during the 
growing conflict with the Chickasaw.
Within a year following the Fort Rosalie massacre 
Louisiana officials realized that the Chickasaw (who were
48"Act for Maintaining the Peace with the Indians in 
the Province of Georgia," Journal of the Assembly, April 3, 
1735, PRO, C.O. 5, 365, F. (43), f. 168; Paul Jenys to James 
Oglethorpe, April 4, 1735, PRO, C.O. 5, 636, f. 270; Memoir 
of the Carolinian Merchants to Colonel Broughton, July 4, 
1735, PRO, C.O. 5, 365, F (14), ff. 37-39(v); Depositions of 
William Williams, Indian Trader, Taken Before Colonel 
Broughton, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, July 4, 
1735, ibid.. F (15), ff. 41-41(v).
49Bienville to the Minister, August 25, 1735, AC, 
C13A 20, ff. 160065; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, 
September 1, 1735, ibid., ff. 114-14; Minister to Bienville, 
December 27, 1735, AC, B 63, ff. 632(v)-33; Bienville to the 
Minister, February 10, 1736, AC, C13A 21, ff. 172-27(v).
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siding and harboring the surviving Natchez) would very likely 
soon be at war with the French. Recognizing the weakness of 
the French forces in the colony, these officials agreed that 
the Choctaw, the long-time enemies of the Chickasaw, would 
have to be enlisted as allies.50
As a result of their harboring the Natchez, the 
Chickasaw became the objects of war for both the Choctaw and 
the French. In the first years of the decade of the 17 30's, 
Louisiana officials felt quite strongly that the tribe 
should be totally destroyed.51 By the spring of 1732, the 
French had received reports that the Chickasaw and the 
Natchez were holed up in five forts, under near-starving 
conditions. Officials also learned that the Chickasaws1 
fears for their future were heightened when they heard that 
Bienville had returned to the colony. One officer even 
reported that an important Chickasaw chief had gone to the 
Alabama tribes to beg those Indians' participation in the
COwar against the French.
5C*Msgr. Ory to P6rier, November 1, 1730, AC, C13A 
12, f. 341(v); Minister to Pferier, August 21, 1731, AC, B 
55, f. 618; Salmon to the Minister, December 22, 1731, AC, 
C13A 13, f. 135.
51P6rier to Maurepas, August 1, 1730, AC, C13A 12, 
ff. 309 (v)-10; Msgr. Ory to P6rier, November 1, 1730, ibid., 
343(v)-44.
52M. Beauchamp to the Minister, March 15, 17 32, AC, 
C13A 14, f. 102 (v); P6rier to Maurepas, May 20, 1732, ibid., 
ff. 66-67(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, August 18,
1732, AC, C13A 15, ff. 191-92.
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Already by the spring of 1732, the Choctaw had begun 
bringing the French some Chickasaw scalps which they had 
taken in several ambushes. Though they had hoped for an 
all-out war with the Choctaw against the Chickasaw, Diron 
D'Artaguiette and Etienne P6rier acknowledged that some help 
was better than none. But, as always, such limited aid from 
the Choctaw depended on their receiving continued supplies 
from Louisiana. No matter how devoted the Choctaw were and 
how much they preferred the French to the English, as has 
been emphasized before, they were dependent on the white 
man's goods and their needs had to be satisfied.
The Choctaw began to show greater interest in a full- 
scale war on the Chickasaw in the summer of 1732 after they 
had finished planting their corn. Alabama Mingo, Red Sock 
and other leaders visited the Choctaw villages to enlist 
their fellow tribesmen in a campaign against the Chickasaw. 
This call for Indian forces was indeed welcomed by the 
leaders of Louisiana because of the shortage of French 
soldiers as well as supplies, which had so far prevented 
them from organizing a c a m p a i g n . 53 One observer estimated 
that as many as 500 soldiers led by officers with wilderness
53m . de Cremont to the Minister, March 15, 1732, AC, 
C13B 1, ff. 135-35(v); P6rier to Maurepas, May 14, 1732, AC, 
C13A 14, ff. 54-65; Beauchamps to the Minister, March 15, 
1732, ibid., ff. 102-103(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
June 6, 1732, ibid., f. 112 (v); M. de Cremont to the Minis­
ter, June 6, 1732, AC, C13B 1, ff. 147-50.
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experience would be needed to crush the Chickasaw.54
When Bienville arrived in Louisiana during the winter 
of 1732-1733, the Choctaw had stopped fighting for the winter 
months. And although French agents reported that Red Sock 
and several other village leaders were interested in fight­
ing, Father Beaudouin, the Jesuit priest at the Choctaw, 
advised caution. The Choctaw were divided, he warned, and 
the more numerous faction feared the Chickasaw. No war, he 
thought, would win total Choctaw support. He firmly believed 
that influential leaders, such as Alabama Mingo and Red Sock, 
must be kept as allies of the French.^
Negotiations with the tribe continued throughout the 
spring and summer to encourage a Choctaw offensive for the 
fall of 1733. The tribe's interest in war grew as supplies 
began to arrive after Bienville took over the colony. The 
Choctaw even began to talk about burning the Chickasaws1 corn 
crop to starve them out.-^
Finally, late in September, 1733, Diron, Sr. La
54P6rier to Maurepas, July 25, 1732, AC, C13A 14, f. 
6 9 (v); Father Beaudouin to Salmon, November 23, 1732, ibid., 
ff. 191-95 (v).
55Salmon to the Minister, February 8, 1733, AC,
C13A 17, ff. 39-42(v).
56P§rier to the Minister, January 25, 1733, AC, C13A, 
16, f. 178(v); Diron D'Artaguiette to the Minister, March 7, 
1733, AC, C13A 17, ff. 210-10(v); Father Beaudouin to Diron 
D ’Artaguiette, August 23, 1733, AC, C13A 18, f. 204; M. de 
Louboey to the Minister, September 24, 1733, AC, C13A 17, 
f. 242.
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Vergnes and several other officers convinced Bienville of 
the Choctaw's sincere intentions to war on the Chickasaw 
even though a smallpox epidemic had broken out among these 
allies of the French that summer. About 600 Choctaw braves 
assembled to march with Le Sueur that fall. To help arm 
them, La Vergnes, along with six other soldiers, took 1,000 
livres worth of powder, 2,000 livres of ball, 20 muskets and 
some vermilion up the Pascagoula River to the Yowani 
Village. D'Artaguiette had requested 100 soldiers to 
accompany the Indians, but unfortunately, because of illness, 
Bienville was able to send only 30 men under Le Sueur.57
Thus, mainly Choctaw Indians filled the ranks of the 
army which marched against the Chickasaw villages in the fall 
of 1733. They probably traveled from Yowani Village north 
on the Choctaw and Mobile Bay Trail, then cut west to the 
Natchez Trace Trail, and then turned north into the heart of 
the Chickasaw country.58 (Map No. 12.) Several days' 
journey from the Chickasaw villages, scouts reported that 
the Chickasaw were heavily supplied with English arms and 
ammunition. Following the receipt of this information, the 
Choctaw, who had fewer weapons than the Chickasaw, gradually
57Bienville to the Minister, April 23, 1734, AC, 
C13A 18, ff. 153 (v)-56; Diron to the Minister, March 20, 
1734, AC, C13A 19, f. 118 (v).
58William E. Myers, Indian Trails of the Southeast 
(Nashville, 1972), 12-13.






A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
Trails of the Southeast. *
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began to desert, leaving Le Sueur and Red Sock at the head 
of a steadily dwindling army. As a consequence, they decided
to abandon the mission and to return home. But once again,
59they promised to continue the war the following spring.
Although the Choctaw tribe failed to carry out an 
organized offensive against the Chickasaw, a number of war 
parties did engage in guerilla operations throughout 1733. 
They especially attacked the convoys and packtrains from 
Carolina which carried desperately needed ammunition to the 
Chickasaw.60
In the opening weeks of 1734, Bienville received a 
message of support and praise from the French government. 
Although he was quite concerned about the unsettled state of 
Indian affairs in the colony, Maurepas had great confidence 
in Le Moyne's expertise in dealing with the red men. The 
Minister of Marine believed that Bienville would be able to 
bring the Choctaw into an all-out war to destroy the Chicka­
saw tribe.61
69Diron to the Minister, March 20, 1734, AC, C13A 
19, ff. 119-20? M. de Cremont to the Minister, February 24, 
1734, ibid., ff. 154-55.
60P§rier to the Minister, January 25, 1733, AC, C13A 
16, f. 180? Bienville to the Minister, July 26, 1733, ibid., 
ff. 279ff? Diron to the Minister, September 25, 1733, AC 
C13A 17, f. 216.
61Minister to Bienville, September 15, 1733, AC,
B 59, ff. 604-606.
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As the winter of 1734 set in, all efforts to organize 
a campaign against the Chickasaw ceased because of the bad 
weather and the Choctaws' need to hunt. Despite the Choc­
taws ' failure to attack the enemy's forts or to b u m  their 
c o m  fields in the fall of 1733, the French received news 
from Father Beaudouin that the Chickasaw were becoming 
increasingly fearful that their defenses would fail should 
they be assaulted. Father Beaudouin sent word that the 
Chickasaw who had served as guides for the Carolina traders 
and who had been captured the previous year, reported that 
their people were weary of war. Having offered refuge and 
supplies to the Natchez since 1731, their homes and families 
had been disrupted with most of the tribe now holed up in 
five forts. Furthermore, in their efforts to help the 
Natchez in their war and to secure supplies from Carolina, 
many of their best warriors, as well as several important 
chiefs had been killed by early 17 34. Although reportedly 
desiring peace, the Chickasaw were divided in their future 
course of action. Those who still preferred the English to 
the French planned to leave their lands to settle among the 
Abeca Indians who lived on the Carolina border. Those who 
desired to stay, to follow the French, wanted to surrender 
the Natchez Indians without further conflict. Upon learning 
of this from Father Beaudouin, Bienville was elated. Such a 
surrender by one of the fiercest of Indian tribes would 
suggest to all, Bienville believed, that in Louisiana the
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French had, at last, won a secure place on the continent of 
North America.^ Nevertheless, the Chickasaw did not sue 
for peace, for by the late spring of 1734 some 231 Chickasaw 
scalps were brought to Mobile by the C h o c t a w . 6 3
Of course, it should be realized that the Choctaw 
took nearly three years to obtain these scalps partly because 
not all of the Choctaw were willing to fight with the French. 
The older Indians appeared unshakable in their loyalty to 
the French, but the younger men still believed that French 
prices for skins were too low, and that the shortage of 
Louisiana manpower and supplies was i n e x c u s a b l e . 64
In 17 34 the loyal Choctaw raised a force of 500 or 
600 to march on the Chickasaw forts. In one assault on the 
Chickasaw village of Chata , early that year, the tribe 
killed more than 40 of the enemy. Unfortunately, some of the 
Choctaw chiefs, including Alabama Mingo, was incorrectly 
reported to have died in the attack. Although the Choctaw 
and the French continued to harass the Chickasaw, many of 
the Choctaw lost interest in the war because their heavy
^Bienville to the Minister, April 23, 1734, AC, 
C13A 18, ff. 161(v)-62 (v).
63m . de Cremont to the Minister, June 20, 1734, AC 
C13A 19, ff. 167 (v) -69 (v) .
54Bienville to the Minister, March 15, 1734, AC 
C13A 18, ff. 132(v)-33.
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losses resulted in little or no compensation for the F r e n c h .
Not all of the Choctaw abandoned the fight. In early 
May, a furious Red Sock left with a party of his followers 
to avenge Alabama Mingo's death by finding his Chickasaw 
killers. Shortly after Red Sock's departure, however,
Alabama Mingo returned, reporting that he had been held up 
for more than two months because of streams swollen by the 
spring rains. During Red Sock's attack on the Chickasaw, 
however, several other Choctaw chief s were killed, which 
angered the tribe and moved them towards a total war against 
the Chickasaw.^
Only rumor promised total war, for the actual Choc­
taw fighting over the summer and the fall of 1734 was some­
thing less than that. Le Sueur led nearly 1,000 warriors on 
a raid to destroy Chickasaw cornfields in late August, but 
they did little damage and killed few of the enemy. The 
Choctaw Indians exaggerated the number of enemy deaths by 
cutting the scalps they took into several pieces and claiming
^Diron to the Minister, March 25, 1734, AC, C13A 
19, ff. 101-11(v); Beauchamp to the Minister, March 29, 
1734, ibid., f. 148(v); Diron to the Minister, March 30, 
1734, ibid., f. 122(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
April 30, ibid., f. 160.
^ Ibid., f. 160 (v) ; M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
June 20, 1734, ibid., ff. 168-68(v).
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each piece represented one dead Chickasaw.87
Bienville's irritation at such trickery, while not 
at all surprising, should be viewed critically. Over all of 
these months, the French had always been slow to reward the 
military efforts of the Choctaw, whether great or small. 
Indeed, very few white men had gone on these expeditions 
against the Chickasaw. Disgusted and irritated by the lack 
of French participation and support, Red Sock had gone to 
Carolina to negotiate a trade agreement with the English.
The resulting flow of English merchandise, along with the 
influence of the Abeca Indians, increased pressure for the 
Choctaw to abandon the French.88
In addition to this, Bienville and Diron D'Arta- 
guiette had both heard rumors from Father Beaudouin that the 
Choctaw no longer approved of Le Sueur's leadership. More­
over, stories were circulating about a dream that one of the 
tribe's elders had had in which many Choctaw warriors had 
met with a terrible death. Despite displays of cowardice 
and talk of fear of impending disaster, the Choctaw leaders 
continued to promise the French that hundreds of their
67Diron to the Minister, July 15, 1734, ibid., f. 
123; Bienville to the Minister, August 26, 1734, AC, C13A 
18, ff. 183(v), 185(v)-86(v).
68Bienville to the Minister, August 26, 1734, AC, 
C13A 18, f. 179; Diron to the Minister, September 1, 1734, 
AC, C13A 19, ff. 127 (v)-35 (v) .
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warriors would march against the Chickasaw in the spring of 
1735.69
The government seemed optimistic that the Choctaw 
would join with the French in the coming months, and the 
Minister encouraged Bienville to continue his efforts to 
persuade them to do so.79 Throughout 1734, the Chickasaw 
refused to surrender the Natchez who still resided with them. 
They were supported in their defiance by English supplies 
from Carolina and Georgia which they continued to receive.
The governor of Louisiana saw the resumption by the Choctaw 
of a war of extermination against the Chickasaw as one 
possibility for solving that problem, but he recognized that 
it would take years. Furthermore, if a war were to break 
out with the English, it would take precedence over any 
native problem and it would call for a joint French-Choctaw 
invasion of either Carolina or Georgia. But such an under­
taking would be both expensive and foolish because Louisiana 
was so short of supplies.71
69Diron to the Minister, September 22, 1734, ibid., 
ff. 138-39; M. de Cremont to the Minister, October 27, 1734, 
ibid., ff. 176-77(v); Bienville to the Minister, September 
30, 1734, AC, C13A 18, ff. 192(v)-95(v); Bienville to the 
Minister, October 4, 1734, ibid., ff. 206-207.
79Minister to Bienville, December 1, 1734, AC, B 61, 
ff. 690 (v) -92 (v) .
71Bienville to the Minister, April 23, 1735, AC, C13A
20, ff. 145-46(v); Diron to the Minister, January 12, 1736, 
AC, C13A 21, ff. 331-35; Bienville to the Minister, February 
10, 1736, ibid., ff. 138-42(v).
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The idea of a major military effort against the 
Chickasaw had been considered by the Louisianians since the 
initial conflict with the Natchez. Etienne Pfirier as com­
mandant general of Louisiana in 1731 had sent word to the 
governor of Canada, M. Charles de la Boische Beauharnais, 
that the French needed Canadian help.73 Over the next two 
years the commanding officers of Forts Chartres and 
Crevecoeur, communicated with each other on the subject of 
organizing white men, as well as Indians, from their areas 
to march on the Chickasaw. But nothing came of these com­
munications .73
Everyone realized that a competent commanding 
officer was needed to lead the Indians from Canada and the 
Illinois country. By the spring of 1734, colonial officials 
had decided that Pierre D'Artaguiette, the brother of Diron 
D'Artaguiette and the new commandant of Fort de Chartres, 
would be an excellent choice. This Illinois post would 
provide a natural rendezvous point for the forces from the 
north anyway. Moreover, since his arrival at the post that 
winter, young D 'Artaguiette had endeared himself to both the
73P6rier to Maurepas, March 25, 1731, AC, C13A 13, 
ff. 50(v)-51.
73pgrier to the Minister, May 14, 1732, AC, C13A 14, 
ff. 144-45(v); M. de Vincennes, Commanding Officer at 
Crevecoeur, to Beauharnais, April 30, 1733, AC, C13A 17, ff. 
246-47(v); Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, May 20, 
1733, AC, C13A 16, ff. 112-12(v).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t o w n er. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
2 7 0
white and the native populace. After only a short time 
there, he had settled a serious dispute which had arisen 
between the Cahokia Indians and some of the white settlers. 
Urging the Kaskaskia and the Metigimacha natives not to join 
in the Indian unrest, Pierre D'Artaguiette had reestablished 
peace in this thriving little community.
By the fall of 1735, Pierre D'Artaguiette received 
his orders from Bienville. The governor had decided that 
the troops from Fort de Chartres should join with his 
southern forces at the Chickasaw villages a few miles south 
of Old Pontotoc. D'Artaguiette would go down the Mississippi 
River as far as Fort Prud'Homme, just north of present-day 
Memphis, Tennessee. At this point, some Arkansas Indians, 
led by M. Grand'Pres, would meet them. They would then 
proceed over the Memphis, Pontotoc and Mobile Bay Trail 
(Trail No. 10 5, Map No. 13) into the Chickasaw country. 
Bienville's force would proceed up the Mobile River as far 
as present-day Cotton Gin Port, Mississippi. From there he 
would march overland to meet with D'Artaguiette.”75 (Map No. 
14.)
74m . de Louboey to the Minister, May 20, 1733, AC, 
C13A 17, f. 226; Salmon to the Minister, March 27, 1734, AC, 
C13A 19, f. 10 (v); Bienville to the Minister, April 22,
1734, ibid., ff. 149(v)-52(v); Salmon to the Minister,
April 22, 1734, AC, C13A 19, ff. 45-48.
7^An Anonymous Account of the Wars in Louisiana in 
1729 and 1736, AC, C13B 1, f. 183; Myer, Indian Trails of 
the Southeast, 78; James Malone, The Chickasaw (Louisville, 
1922), 251.







A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
Trails of the Southeast.
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In February, 1736, Pierre D'Artaguiette set out from 
Fort De Chartres with a force of 114 Frenchmen and 325 
Indians. He had gotten the troops underway in spite of the 
fact that Indians generally did not fight in the winter. On 
February 28, they arrived at Fort Prud'Homme to wait for 
other forces led by M. Moncheraux, M. Grand'Pres and Sr. 
Vincennes from the Ohio River. Having set out shortly after 
the first of the year, Vincennes was making good time with 
his 40 Indians; however, he slowed down to wait for 
Moncheraux who was having trouble organizing the Kaskaskia 
and the Metigimacha Indians. Because of these delays, these 
northern forces would never meet up with D'Artaguiette's 
army.
In March the waiting game continued. D'Artaguiette's 
scouts set out from present-day Memphis, Tennessee to find 
the Chickasaw village sites as well as the Southern forces 
led by Bienville. As the days passed, supplies ran quite 
low and the Indians grew restless. Around March 20,
D'Artaguiette received a letter from Bienville with the news 
that the rendezvous would be delayed until the end of April, 
and directed D'Artaguiette and his forces to wait. Shortly 
after receiving this news, the scouts returned to report 
that they had discovered a small Chickasaw village situated 
on the edge of a large prairie. It appeared to have only a 
few warriors but they seemed to be well armed. In council 
D'Artaguiette decided to move quickly to save his already
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dwindling army. Both French and Indian leaders agreed that
they would take the village, secure its supplies and wait
for Bienville's forces.
On March 24, the French approached the Chickasaw
village of Red Grass. Two days later, they began an attack
on what seemed to be several isolated huts. Almost at once,
an important Chickasaw chief was killed. However, shortly
afterwards, some 400 to 500 Chickasaw swooped down behind
the French in a surprise attack. The Indian forces with
D'Artaguiette, having been assured of an easy victory, fled
leaving D'Artaguiette with only a few loyal Indians and 15
Frenchmen. All were captured and later tortured and killed.
Unfortunately, the dispatches from Bienville, which contained
plans for the comin^ .ipaign, were also captured.7^
Bienville's forces had been delayed at Mobile for
several reasons. Supply ships from France were late and when
they finally arrived, they carried no mortars. Food for the 
77campaign also arrived late. In the meantime, soldiers and
7^An Anonymous Account of the Wars in Louisiana in 
1729 and 1736, AC, C13B 1, ff. 185-88; Salmon to the Minis­
ter, June 15, 1735, AC, C13A 21, ff. 269-71; Bienville to 
the Minister, June 28, 1736, ibid.. ff. 207-12(v); M. de 
Cremont to the Minister, February 21, 1737, AC, C13A 22, ff. 
252-54; Minister to Bienville, March 19, 1937, AC, 35 F, f.
495(v); Malone, The Chickasaw, 252.
77 .Bienville to the Minister, June 28, 1736, AC,
C13A 21, ff. 188(v)-90? M. le Bretton to the Minister, June 
15, 1736, ibid.. ff. 371-71(v).
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civilians alike began arriving at Fort Cond6 in Mobile.
Nine French companies of 30 men each, one Swiss company of 
150 men and 35 officers, two militia companies, as well as a 
volunteer company, filled c.;t the ranks of white men. About 
140 Negro slaves, led by free blacks, also joined the force. 
It was hoped that Choctaw warriors would join up along the 
way, but Bienville had received no word from Alabama Mingo 
or Red Sock on whether or not they would participate in the 
campaign.
Departing Mobile on April 1 in 31 boats, this army 
of 600 ascended the Tombigbee River reaching the new Fort 
Tombigbee at the site of present-day Epes, Alabama, in Choc­
taw country on April 24. After several days' rest, the 
officers negotiated with Red Sock and Alabama Mingo, who had 
arrived in the meantime, concerning the rendezvous point.
All agreed to meet on Bayou Octibica, about 40 leagues away, 
around May 15.^®
On May 22, accordingly, 700 Choctaw Indians joined 
the troops from Mobile at the site of modern-day Cotton Gin 
Port, Mississippi. The governor ordered the distribution of 
presents of limbourg and weapons to the Indians, and also 
supervised the construction of a supply depot amid terrible
78^. le Bretton to the Minister, June 15, 1736, AC, 
C13A 21, ff. 372-72 (v); Salmon to the Minister, April 24, 
1736, ibid., ff. 250-51; An Anonymous Account of the Cam­
paign Against the Chickasaw in 1736, ibid., ff. 164-64; 
Bienville to the Minister, June 28, 1736, ibid., ff. 190-95.
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rains.
Two days later, this army of nearly 1,500 blacks, 
whites and red men marched into Choctaw country. On May 24, 
they set up camp near the Chickasaw village, Ackia, which 
they planned to attack two days later. The Minister of 
Marine had ordered Bienville to attack and destroy initially 
any Natchez Indians who were found near the Chickasaw forts. 
However, Red Sock convinced him to attack the major Chicka­
saw forts at once.79 Bienville had learned from scouts, as 
well as from escaped prisoners, that the Chickasaw fort near 
the village wan well defended. The three buildings in the 
fort were constructed of wood, but their roofs were covered 
with a dried clay which prevented any flaming arrows from 
setting them afire. The three buildings were surrounded by 
a double stockade. To make the attack even more difficult, 
the buildings were located on a hilltop in a triangular 
formation. An English flag hung from one of them. As far 
as Le Moyne could determine, the Chickasaw forts were well- 
manned with armed warriors.®8
Ignorant of the whereabouts of the northern forces 
led by Pierre D'Artaguiette, Bienville decided not to wait 
for them any longer, and on the morning of May 26, the French 
forces began to form up. Unknown to the French, a force of
79Bienville to the Minister, June 28, 1736, AC, C13A 
21, ff. 195(v)-97(v)bis.
80Ibid.. ff. 200-200(v); Bienville to the Minister, 
August 20, 1735, AC, C13A 20, f. 158.
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nearly 500 Chickasaw was hidden in the rolling plains that 
surrounded the Chickasaw forts. Having secured Bienville's 
battle plans from D'Artaguiette, they were waiting in ambush 
for the Louisiana forces.
In mid-afternoon, the French and their allies began 
their first attack on the forts and failed to take them.
The Chickasaw Indians in the hills then attacked and caught 
the French in a cross-fire, and a general rout began. Even 
though Captain Beauchamp was ready to try a second assault 
with another 150 men, Bienville called for a retreat. Only 
a very few of the Choctaw had participated in the fighting, 
although in the retreat and return to camp they did help 
with the wounded.
In the battle the French lost a total of more than 
100 men. French casualties were quite high and excellent 
officers, such as Noyan and Lusser, were wounded in the first 
encounter. Several survivors mentioned seeing some English­
men within the forts who were advising the Chickasaw during 
the fighting.
The defeated army returned to Fort Tombigbee on June 
2 and then went on to Mobile arriving there six days later. 
There they learned of the massacre of Pierre D'Artaguiette 
and his northern forces. The governor arrived in New Orleans 
on June 22, where he immediately began to draft a report to 
the Minister of Marine explaining— and excusing— the
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disastrous campaign.8^
Salmon's report that the expedition had cost 
1,000,000 livres did not help Bienville's standing with the 
government.82 Of course, the delays encountered by not only 
Bienville, but also the northern forces of Vincennes had 
been one of the chief causes of defeat. Bienville also 
blamed the weather conditions and the incompetence of his 
troops and some of his officers. He even admitted his 
mistake in listening to Red Sock's advice to attack the main 
Chickasaw forts, rather than the Natchez positions which 
were located away from the main Chickasaw defenses. Pierre 
D ’Artaguiette too had used poor judgment when he had attacked, 
on Indians' advice, without the northern troops. Bienville 
also bitterly criticized English participation in the battle. 
Obviously, they had supplied the ammunition and a good deal 
of tactical advice. That the English had encouraged and 
coached the Chickasaw seemed to upset Bienville more than 
the loss of life or the overall failure of the campaign.83
S^An Anonymous Account of the Campaign Against the 
Chickasaw in 1736, AC, C13A 21, ff. 165(v)-67(v); Bienville 
to the Minister, June 28, 1736, ibid., ff. 197(v)bis-201(v); 
M. de Beauchamp to the Minister, June 18, 1736, ibid., ff. 
362-63; The Actual Account of the Attack by the French on the 
Chickasaw Indians in Their Forts, 1736, ibid., ff. 228-28(v).
82Salmon to the Minister, June 15, 1736, AC, C13A 21, 
f. 249; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, June 28, 1736, 
ibid., ff. 78-78(v); Salmon to the Minister, June 28, 1736, 
ibid., f. 301 (v); Salmon to the Minister, September 6, 1736, 
ibid., ff. 319(v)-20.
83Bienville to the Minister, February 15, 1737, AC,
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The potential of economic and political success for 
Louisiana when it once again became a royal colony in 1731 
seemed not to have been realized with the defeat of the 
French army in 1736. Efforts by the French government to 
encourage the skin trade for both white, and especially 
Choctaw, participation, although enthusiastically conceived, 
never really succeeded. Supply shortages discouraged Choc­
taw interest not only in the French fur trade, but also in 
their war against the Chickasaw. Even with the seasoned 
Bienville leading the colony, Louisiana was not growing or 
faring well in the face of increasing British strength and 
influence among the natives in war as well as in trade.
C13A 22, ff. 70-72 (v)? Diron to the Minister, May 8, 1737, 
ibid.. ff. 223-29.
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THE SECOND CHICKASAW CAMPAIGN,
1737-1743
The position of Bienville in Louisiana following his 
return to the colony in 1733 as governor and expert in 
Indian affairs was badly eroded by 1737. The disastrous 
failure of the campaign against the Chickasaw in 1736 indi­
cated that Bienville, now nearly 60 years of age, was, per­
haps, less effective in dealing with Louisiana's Indian 
problems than in prior years. His strength and judgment 
would again be tested over the next six years. Already there 
were some indications that a second campaign was needed to 
chastize the Chickasaw, which meant, in turn, that the 
Choctaw tribe would have to be sustained as an ally in both 
trade and war. To make matters worse, the English were 
increasing their pressure on both these tribes in the years 
from 17 37 to 1743 in an effort to bring them into their 
economic sphere.
Officials in South Carolina and Georgia had been 
kept informed of the French campaign against the Chickasaw. 
Obviously, interest in the outcome of the war was great in 
both Charleston and Savannah. However, while Carolina
280
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traders merely relayed news to Charleston, the Georgians 
openly aided the Chickasaw at the Battle of Ackia in May,
1736.1
Several influential people in Georgia, like John 
Wesley, had always liked the Chickasaw Indians. In fact, 
when some of the tribe's leaders came to Savannah in the 
summer of 1736 to secure additional weapons, Wesley requested 
permission to return with them as a missionary.^ At that 
time officials in Savannah learned that some of their traders, 
and not those from Carolina, had supplied the Chickasaw with 
weapons for use against the French. It was for this reason 
that the Chickasaw went to Savannah.3
The records of South Carolina and Georgia reveal 
that officials in both colonies knew most of the details of 
the French defeat by the Chickasaw. Several traders from
^Journal of the Council of South Carolina, March 5, 
1736, Colonial Office Papers, 5, 438, ff. 111-12 (Public 
Record Office, London, England), hereinafter cited as Journal 
of the Council, PRO, C.O. 5? Testimony of John Colcork to 
the Council, Journal of the Council, May 25, 1736, PRO, C.O.
5, 366, F (96)? Sam Eveleigh to Herman Verelst, PRO, C.O. 5, 
638, ff. 267(v)-68.
^Audience of the Chickasaw Chiefs with Mr. Ogle­
thorpe, Savannah, July 13, 1736, PRO, C.O. 5, 654, ff. 83- 
84; F. Ralph Randolph, British Travelers among the Southern 
Indians. 1660-1763 "(Norman, 1973), 112-13.
^Audience of the Chickasaw Chiefs with Mr. Oglethorpe, 
Savannah, July 13, 1736, PRO. C.O. 5, 654, f. 83.
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Georgia had reported to James Oglethorpe that they had 
witnessed not only the attack on Pierre D'Artaguiette's 
force, but had also seen 19 survivors burned at the stake. 
South Carolina officials knew the battle statistics along 
with the French position in retreat.** Although the Carolin­
ians had not taken an active part in the first engagement 
between the French and the Chickasaw, by 1737 they were pre­
pared to join with the Georgians who were already partici­
pating openly in the war. In February of 1737 the Carolina 
Assembly allocated money and ammunition for the Chickasaw 
defense.5
The Carolinians and the Georgians had been correct 
in assuming that the French would try a second offensive 
against the Chickasaw villages. Shortly after Bienville's 
return to New Orleans in 1736, he and Salmon requested
James Oglethorpe to the Duke of Newcastle, July 26, 
1746, PRO, C.O. 5, 638, f. 348(v); Sam Eveleigh to Herman 
Verelst, July 29, 1736, ibid., f. 306; Colonel Thomas 
Broughton to the Board of Trade, August 16, 1736, PRO, C.O.
5, 383, ff. 258-58(v); Thomas Broughton to the Board of Trade, 
August 16, 1736, PRO, C.O.5 365, F (38), ff. 132-32(v); Sam 
Eveleigh to Herman Verelst, August 17, 1736, PRO, C.O. 5,
638, ff. 360-60(v); Board of Trade to the Duke of Newcastle, 
November 9, 1736, PRO, C.O. 5, 383, f. 256; Sam Eveleigh to 
Herman Verelst, December 1, 1736, ff. 75-75 (v); Mr. Ogle­
thorpe to the Duke of Newcastle, c. 1736, PRO, C.O. 5, 383,
ff. 231-32.
^Journal of the Assembly of South Carolina, February 
23, 1737, PRO, C.O. 5, 439, ff. 20-21. Hereinafter cited as
the Journal of the Assembly. Journal of the Council, March
10, 1737, PRO, C.O. 5, 440, f. 34.
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government support for another campaign in order, among 
other things, to save face before the Indians of the colony. 
He expected the enemy to number about 600 Indians, as well 
as some English traders, and since he could not rely on 
settlers for much help, he asked for an army of 500 French 
soldiers.®
Although Maurepas at the Ministry of Marine was 
unhappy with the Louisianians' poor showing in the initial 
campaign, he agreed that the Wc.r had to be continued. He 
approved Bienville's request icr reinforcements, and he 
ordered Commissaire Ordonnateur Edm§ Salmon to make the 
necessary preparations for a new campaign. Maurepas informed 
Bienville that the new troops would be sent to the colony in 
February, 1737, and the government hoped they could march 
against the Chickasaw in September of that year.7
During the next year, the French learned the exact 
layout of the enemy's villages and forts. One of Bienville's 
problems in the earlier campaign had been his ignorance of 
the location of the Chickasaw defenses. By means of scouting 
reports, as well as a study of the battle reports, a M. De
^Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, June, 1736, 
AC, C13A 21, ff. 20-21.
7Minister to Bienville and Salmon, October 26, 1736, 
AC, B 64, ff. 524-24 (v); Minister to Bienville, October 26, 
1736, ibid., ff. 524 (v)-26 (v); Minister to Salmon, October 
26, 1736, ibid-/ f- 527.
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Batz sketched the position of the Chickasaw defenses as of 
1737.8 (Illust. No. 3.) The circles indicate villages in 
each of which was a fort surrounded by a protective stake 
fence three rows deep. Village A was that attacked by 
D'Artaguiette's forces in March, 1736. They had come over 
the trail marked R— the Memphis, Pontotoc, and Mobile Bay 
Trail.9 (See Trail No. 105 Map No. 15.) Bienville had come 
from the south, and had encountered fire from villages H, I 
and L, or Ackia Village. Q and S mark the route of French 
attack and their retreat. Surrounding hills and also bayous, 
marked N, obstructed the French in making their attack. 
Examining such an illustration of the Chickasaw position, it 
is clear why the French had been caught in the cross-fire. 
The symbols marked P indicate hilly, wooded areas in which 
Chickasaw from the other villages had hidden.'1'0
At the same time that the French were briefed on the 
location of the Chickasaw and their defensive arrangements, 
they learned of the Chickasaw view of their friends and 
enemies. One of the leading Chickasaw war chiefs, Mingo 
Ouma, had sketched his tribe's feelings on this subject on 
the back of a deerskin. A Choctaw village leader, Captain
8Map and Site of the Chickasaw Villages by De Batz, 
September, 1737, AC, C13A 22, f. 68.
9William E. Myers, Indian Trails of the Southeast 
(Nashville, 1972), 14.
10Map and Site of the Chickasaw Villages by De Batz, 
September, 1737, AC, C13A 22, f. 68.




A xerox copy of a sketch by a M. De Batz in AC, C13A 
22, f. 68.
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Map No. 15
A xerox copy of a map from William E. Myer's Indian 
Trails of the Southeast.
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Pakana, had obtained one for his people as well as one for 
the French.11 (Illust. No. 4.) L marks the location of the 
Chickasaw tribe's territories. The circles in black, at the 
top of L, in an easterly direction, mark the Chickasaws' 
friends. Circle A is Carolina, while the other circles 
represent the Alabama and the Cherokee, all of whom the 
Chickasaw considered their allies. The S lines mark the 
route of English traders from Carolina into the wilderness 
through Indian lands. The lighter-colored circles to the 
right or south-southeast of the circle L represent the south­
east enemies. The French position as Circle I appears 
isolated, for the Chickasaw apparently used more water routes 
than land routes when going to Mobile. Circle M represents 
northern enemies, the Huron and Illinois, those natives who 
had come with Pierre D'Artaguiette. While it would appear 
that the Chickasaw were almost completely surrounded as well 
as outnumbered, the valuable supplies of ammunition from the 
English would always move through pro-Chickasaw territory.12 
Thus, by the fall of 1737, Bienville had a greater under­
standing of the Chickasaw plan and who they considered their 
friends and their enemies.
These details of the Chickasaw position and attitudes, 
although informative, did not hurry the French preparations
11Friends and Foes of the Chickasaw, ibid., f. 67.
12Ibid.
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Illustration No. 4
A xerox cony of a sketch by a M. De Batz in AC, 
C13A 22, f. 67.
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for a second campaign which dragged out over the next 18 
months. Bienville offered several plausible excuses to the 
government for the delay. One was that a better route than 
that of the Mobile River had to be found into the Chickasaw 
territory. Until specific information concerning the exact 
location of portages, trails and streams could be determined, 
the governor would not depart. He requested the French 
government not to send additional troops until the summer of 
1738, by which time sufficient food would be on hand for 
them. Many of the new recruits would undoubtedly succumb to 
sickness in the colony; however, if enough food were avail­
able, perhaps, fewer men would die.13
The commissaire ordonnateur, Edme Salmon, gave the 
Governor even more reasons for delaying the attack against 
the Chickasaw. Bienville had requested Salmon to have 50 
boats 40 feet long and 9 feet wide built for the campaign. 
Salmon estimated the cost at 2,400 livres for each boat.
Such craft would be needed for the estimated 500 troops 
expected to participate. In addition to the soldiers, the 
governor had requested all kinds of munitions, including 
cannon, mortars and bombs, by means of which the Chickasaw 
forts could be destroyed. These too had to be transported
^Bienville to the Minister, February 16, 1737, ibid., 
ff. 74-77.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm is s io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p roh ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
290
through the wilderness.14 A shortage of laborers as well as 
the time needed to make the caulking for these vessels slowed 
their construction. With supplies low and boats unfinished, 
Bienville hoped that the government would hold the troops 
for still another year.1^
Fortunately, Bienville's letter of June arrived in 
France by August just before the troops assigned for Louisi­
ana were to depart. Although disappointed that the campaign 
had been postponed, the government agreed to delay sending 
soldiers and supplies until August, 1738. The requested food 
supplies, trade muskets and building materials would be 
shipped in the meantime. Maurepas agreed with Bienville and 
Salmon that even though the Louisianians would be unable to 
attack the Chickasaw, the Choctaw should be encouraged to 
destroy the cornfields of the Chickasaw.1^
The information which the French had concerning the 
precise geographical location of the Chickasaw forts was 
vital, for the Choctaw did agree to march on the Chickasaw
Salmon to the Minister, June 6, 1737, ibid., ff. 
176-78; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, September 1,
1736, AC, C13A 21, ff. 81(v)-85.
l5Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, June 15,
1737, AC, C13A 22, ff. 46(v)-50.
l6Minister to Bienville and Salmon, September 7, 
1737, AC, B. 65, ff. 511(v)-12, 13-15(v); Minister to Bien­
ville and Salmon, September 16, 1737, ibid., f. 529.
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that fall. They were persuaded to do so by Sieur de Lery 
17and Father Beaudoum.
Organizing the Choctaw for the Chickasaw campaign 
brought with it the usual difficulties when many of the 
tribe's 40 villages disagreed about the native leadership 
for the campaign. As a result, only about 500 men from the 
western towns went with De Lery in the fall of 1737.
Arriving at the southern-most Chickasaw village, Ackia, on 
October 1, this native army prepared for the attack. Shortly 
after the Choctaw arrived, the Chickasaw of Ackia made 
several attempts to leave their forts. However, each time 
the Choctaw drove them back. In the evening the pro-French 
forces began burning the cornfields, many of which were 
destroyed by morning.
Because of a shortage of ammunition, the Choctaw did 
not attempt an assault on the Chickasaw towns or forts and 
returned home with only ten enemy scalps. They immediately 
encountered braves from the eastern villages who were quite 
embarrassed at not having participated in the campaign, for 
Bienville had sent them supplies for this very purpose. De 
Lery succeeded in rallying these men as well as the western 
braves for a second campaign against the Chickasaw. On
Salmon to the Minister, February 20, 1737, AC, 
C13A 22, ff. 130-33(v); M. de Cremont to the Minister, 
February 21, 1737, ibid., ff. 252(v)-56; Bienville to the 
Minister, February 28, 1737, ibid., ff. 85(v)-86(v).
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October 15 he left with a force of 900 men. This time the 
Choctaw either killed or stole much of the Chickasaw live­
stock and burned the remainder of the corn and destroyed 
four forts.18 Thus, while unable to prepare a white army 
for war, the French were able to induce their Choctaw allies 
to fight for them.
With increased Choctaw interest in the war against 
the Chickasaw, the French themselves became more active in 
their preparations for a new campaign. Bienville and Salmon 
sent three reconnaissance teams out, led by Sieurs de Verges, 
Membrede and Broutin, to find a new route to the Chickasaw 
towns. Because the waters of the Mobile River were low in 
late summer and early fall, the months decided on for the 
campaign, some other route into the Chickasaw territory was 
needed. Late in 1737, Sieur de Verges returned to New 
Orleans after having spent several months in the Prud*Homme 
Bluff area in search of a route into the Chickasaw country 
from the Mississippi River. He and his party of 20 men 
explored the Wolf River area, about 50 miles south of 
present-day Memphis, Tennessee. At the same time, Sieur 
Membrede scouted the Yazoo River region to see whether or 
not a route into the Chickasaw lands existed there. Sieur 
Broutin retraced the campaign route of 1736 up the Mobile
18Beauchamp to the Minister, May 1, 1737, AC, C13A
32, ff. 249-49(v)bis; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, 
December 16, 1737, ibid., ff. 57-57(v); Bienville to the 
Minister, December 20, 1737, ibid., ff. 111-15.
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River. In the late spring of 1738 Bienville and Salmon
decided that the Wolf River route would be the most suitable.
Although the distance from the Mississippi River to the
Chickasaw forts was about the same as that from the Yazoo
River and Fort Tombigbee, the area nearer the Mississippi
River was freer from native interference. And if for some
reason the Choctaw should decide to terminate their French
alliance, the march could continue, since none of their
lands would have to be traversed."*'®
Such reasoning appeared to be prophetical, for by
early May Louisiana officials learned that the Choctaw had
20made peace with the Chickasaw. The Minister of Marine had 
warned that delays in warring on the Chickasaw would only 
help the enemy, and had cautioned Bienville to keep the 
Choctaw well supplied with merchandise in order to sustain 
their friendship. The Minister spared no words in reminding 
Bienville in the summer of 1738 how much his poor planning 
of 1736 had cost the government.̂
•*-®Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, December 22,
1737, AC, C13A 22, ff. 61-64(v); M. de Verges to the Minis­
ter, April 26, 1738, AC, C13A 23, ff. 212-16; Bienville and 
Salmon to the Minister, May 7, 1738, ibid., ff. 32-33(v).
^^Diron to the Minister, April 12, 1738, AC, C13A 
23, f. 182; Bienville and Salmon to the Minister, May 7,
1738, ibid., f. 33.
21Minister to Bienville, March 24, 1738, AC, B 66, 
ff. 317-17(v); Minister to Bienville and Salmon, March 24, 
1738, ibid., f. 320(v); Minister to Bienville, July 25,
1738, Ibid.. f . 332(v).
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The colony's leaders had been so concerned about the 
war preparations over the previous 12 months that they 
neglected the skin trade, and failed to keep the Choctaw 
well-supplied with trade goods. They discussed revising 
prices for skins and increasing gifts to the Choctaw, but 
they did nothing. Too late, they realized that the bond 
between the French and the tribe had been based merely on 
trade goods.^
The Choctaw not only had not received enough presents 
from the French during the war years, but their hunting 
season had been interrupted in 1736 because of the first 
Chickasaw campaign and, therefore, they had few skins to 
trade for goods. Having made a truce with the Chickasaw, 
the wily, plotting Chief Red Sock felt secure enough to 
travel to Charleston to ask for English supplies and to 
request that traders be sent to the Choctaw towns.23
Ever since the Choctaw attacks on the Chickasaw corn 
crop in 1737, the French had had an indication of the divi­
sions among the Choctaw villages. Thus, when Alabama Mingo 
reported in the summer of 17 38 that not all the Choctaw 
supported Red Sock1s peace with the Chickasaw, no one was
22Bienville to the Minister, April 28, 1738, AC,
C13A 23, ff. 58-62.
23M . de Louboey to the Marquis de Beauhamais, May, 
1738, AC, C13A 23, ff. 69-71; M. de Louboey to the Minister, 
June 30, 1738, ibid., ff. 156-56(v)? M. de Louboey to the 
Minister, July 11, 1738, ibid., f. 162(v); Bienville to the 
Minister, March 18, 1738, ibid., f. 43.
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really surprised. Unfortunately, however, Alabama Mingo
also reported that no Choctaw would join with the French in
fighting the Chickasaw, because some of their own people
would probably either be trading or living among the enemy.
By October Bienville realized that the English had
promoted the peace between the two tribes for purposes of
trade as well as of obstructing French war plans against the
Chickasaw. In spite of Alabama Mingo's claim that as many
as three-fourths of the tribe were not happy with the peace,
packhorses from Carolina and Georgia came to the Choctaw
villages. Although greatly respected by the Choctaw tribe,
Alabama Mingo's threats and reprimands to Red Sock broke
neither the peace with the Chickasaw nor the rebel chief's
influence over the tribe. Even those chiefs who were pro-
French succumbed to Red Sock's intimidation. Besides, it
was through him and his brother's efforts that the English
25traders were coming to the Choctaw villages.
The English response to the Choctaw peace with the 
Chickasaw and the new trade agreement with the Choctaw were 
impressive. The commanding officer at Fort Toulouse, M. 
D'Erneville, reported that more than 200 English packhorses
24Bienville to the Minister, July 15, 1738, AC, ibid.,
f, 84.
?5 Bienville to the Minister, October 31, 1738, ibid., 
ff. 95-99; M. de Louboey to the Minister, November 21, 17 38, 
ibid., ff. 164-66? Salmon to the Minister, November 26,
1738, ibid., ff. 144-46(v).
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had been sighted near the fort in the spring and early
summer of 1738.26 Governor William Bull of South Carolina
in July requested and obtained from the Assembly additional
money for merchandise for the Choctaw. In the fall of 1738,
nearly £ 1,000 in presents were reported to have been given
27to a Choctaw chief and his entourage.
By the end of 1738, Louisiana officials recognized 
that even those Choctaw villages which were pro-French would 
not join with French forces to oppose the Chickasaw. Not 
even Bienville or Captain Le Sueur, an officer whom these 
Indians had always followed before, could persuade the Choc­
taw to march with the French.2®
Even though the Choctaw refused to join with the 
French in war, the Louisianians did have a source of man­
power. By the end of November 1738, more than 450 recruits 
from France had arrived in Louisiana for the Indian cam­
paign. 29 When Bienville had heard of the Choctaw-Chickasaw 
peace which had been made earlier that year, he had worried
26M. de Louboey to the Minister, July 11, 1738, AC, 
C13A, 23, f. 158(v).
^Governor William Bull to the Lords of Trade, July 
20, 1738, PRO, C.O. 5, 384, ff. 47-49(v).
28M. de Louboey to the Minister, November 28, 1738, 
AC, C13A 23, ff. 169-73? Minister to Salmon, December 1, 
1738, AC, C 66, f. 348.
29M. de Louboey to the Minister, November 28, 1738, 
AC, C13A 23, f. 169.
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that the war would never succeed without the help of the 
Choctaw. Throughout the year, however, the Minister of 
Marine continued to draft troops for Louisiana. Although 
Bienville had requested four additional companies of soldiers, 
only about half of this number came at this time. Due to 
the delay of the offensive, most of the men would be sent 
from France in December and would, therefore, arrive in 
Louisiana in March or April of 1739.30
The French government had also attended to the sup­
plies and ammunition needs of the colony. Such stores 
apparently arrived on the ships which brought the soldiers. 
Not at all happy about the expedition's delay, Maurepas, 
nevertheless, gave great attention to the ships and provi­
sions for the Chickasaw war. Answering nearly every request 
which Bienville made, the Minister saw to it that munitions 
and stores were sent. Four eight-pound cannon were included. 
All of the powder and bullets that would be required were 
also sent. The Minister reported that part of the orders 
for 50,000 pounds of powder and 60,000 pounds of ball had 
been filled. Although Bienville had requested only 15,000 
pounds of powder, the government sent 50,000 pounds so that
30Bienville to the Marquis de Beauhamais, Governor
of New France, May 5, 1738, ibid., ff. 74-75; Memoir of the 
King to Bienville, 1738, ibid., ff. 54-56? M. de Louboey to 
the Minister, May 7, 1738, ibid., ff. 151(v)-52(v); Minister 
to Bienville, July 25, 1738, AC, B 66, ff. 333-33(v); 
Minister to Salmon, July 25, 1738, ibid., ff. 334-34(v).
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there would be enough for both trade and war. Some of the 
light artillery which Bienville and Salmon had originally 
requested was not available, and in its place the government 
sent cannon which weighed 1,000 pounds each. This equipment 
was too heavy to haul through the wilderness easily; yet, it 
was all that they had on hand. As many as ten gunners and 
ballistics experts were also coming to participate in the 
campaign. Ultimately, the French would need oxen, as well 
as carts, for hauling their artillery overland.31
Before the end of the year, a storehouse had been 
built for the war stores on the banks of the Mississippi 
River between the Arkansas River and the Prud1Homme Bluffs. 
Having established this position, Bienville began to see an 
end to the preparations. The Canadian governor, Charles de 
la Boische Beauharnais, was again asked to supply some men 
as well as Indian allies. Bienville also requested about 
200 horses from the Natchitoches and Illinois posts.33
As the preparations for the campaign neared com­
pletion, both the government and colonial officials hoped 
that the Choctaw would participate. The new year of 17 39
King to Bienville, December 16, 1738, AC, B 66, 
ff. 361-64; Minister to Bienville and Salmon, March 19, 1737, 
AC, B 65, ff. 499-502(v).
33Minister to Bienville, February 3, 1738, AC, B 66, 
f. 314(v); Minister to Bienville and Salmon, March 24, 1738, 
ibid., ff. 316-16(v); Bienville to the Minister, October 31, 
1738, AC, C13A 23, ff. 99-100.
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began with optimistic reports reaching Bienville that Alabama 
Mingo's faction was more determined than ever to end all the 
anti-French sentiment in the tribe.33 Over the winter a 
civil war broke out with 32 pro-French Choctaw villages 
harassing the ten which remained loyal to Red Sock. This 
headstrong chief firmly believed that he could continue to 
secure from English traders sufficient merchandise for the 
entire tribe. But the raids by their fellow tribesmen must 
have had some impact on the minority faction, for by the end 
of March, 1739, Red Sock's followers began defecting to 
Alabama Mingo's pro-French tribesmen.34
Late that spring Red Sock and 100 of his followers 
returned very unhappy from Carolina. Poorly received by the 
officials of the colony, these Indians had not been welcomed 
by anyone in Charleston. Apparently, the English were more 
interested in supporting the Chickasaw at the time. Red 
Sock failed in his efforts to bargain for better trade rates. 
Thus, on returning to the Choctaw nation, he swore alle­
giance to all of the Choctaw tribe and to the French. To 
show his intentions, he began making plans with the commanding
33M. de Louboey to the Minister, January 14, 1739, 
AC, C13A 24, ff. 188-89(v)? Minister to Salmon, February 9, 
1739, AC, B 68, ff. 400-400(v); Minister to Bienville, 
February 9, 1739, ibid., ff. 401-401(v).
34Bienville to the Minister, March 25, 1739, AC, 
C13A 24, ff. 35-43(v); Minister to Bienville, May 4, 1739, 
AC, B 68, ff. 407(v)-408.
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officer at Fort Tombigbee to move on the Chickasaw villages 
as soon as possible.33
Red Sock's return to the French camp surely meant a 
great deal to Bienville that May. His own plans for the 
campaign seemed finally to be shaping up. Having decided on 
the Mississippi River route, he had sent a Captain Coustilhas 
and Engineer Verges with workers and soldiers in six boats 
to build the entrepot in September, 1738. These people had 
orders to construct a rude fort near the mouth of the St. 
Francis River. They also were to build the carts needed to 
carry the munitions and the artillery. Two other groups had 
been sent since then to help in the undertaking. By mid-May 
more than 300 people were working on the preparations there. 
The most serious mistake that had been made so far was the 
miscalculation of the distance from the Mississippi River to 
the Chickasaw forts. Verges had reported that the Chickasaw 
were only 20 leagues from the Mississippi River; in reality, 
their forts were located about 40 leagues from the proposed 
point of departure. However, the campaign plans were too far 
advanced at this point to permit changes in the route, and 
the governor decided to proceed.3®
35Bizoton to the Minister, May 7, 1739, AC, C13A 24, 
ff. 246-48(v); Bienville to the Minister, May 20, 1739, 
ibid., ff. 63-66.
36Bienville to the Minister, May 12, 1739, AC, C13A
24, ff. 51-53bis.
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Quite optimistic that summer, Bienville felt that 
nearly every aspect of the campaign had been covered. The 
problem of the great distance from the mouth of the St.
Francis to the Chickasaw towns would be solved by establish­
ing a second fort, or base, in the interior which he had 
ordered his nephew, Sr. Noyan, to build. The livestock had 
been secured from the Illinois and Natchitoches areas.
Eighty pairs of oxen and 200 horses were included in the 
plans to carry supplies for the expedition. Believing that 
he knew the exact lay-out and plan of the Chickasaw defenses, 
Bienville hoped to depart New Orleans around the first part 
of July and to arrive at the St. Francis River fort at the 
end of September.37
Within the month, however, Bienville and Salmon 
learned that the ships from France with men and supplies had 
been delayed. Louisiana officials were greatly disappointed. 
The lateness of the ships meant that the whole campaign 
would be delayed. Rather than in July, Bienville now believed 
that he and his forces would probably be unable to leave New 
Orleans before the middle of August. This meant that the 
army would not reach the Prud'Homme area until the middle of 
November. The possibility of swollen winter streams, and 
perhaps even ice and snow, was not encouraging. The governor 
also feared that grass for the oxen and horses would be none
37Ibid., ff. 53bis-57.
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too plentiful in December and January. Quite discouraged, 
Bienville and Salmon requested the Minister of Marine that 
the supply ships meant for Louisiana for 1740 be sent to the 
colony early in order that the army would have more pro­
visions.38
As the hot summer passed in New Orleans, Bienville 
realized that the main force would not leave even by August. 
However, French leaders received some consolation when they 
heard that the Choctaw tribe had returned totally in alle­
giance to the French. The governor assigned Le Sueur to 
lead these Indians once again. Bienville sent munitions to 
the Choctaw as well as the few presents he had on hand. He 
felt it especially necessary to rely on the Choctaw for 
help, because he feared that the Illinois Indians would 
either desert or return home because of the delay in the 
planned rendezvous.39
Although there had been delays in the arrival of 
major supplies, some of the forces had already left New
M. de Louboey to the Minister, June 3, 1739, ibid., 
ff. 195(v)-96(v); Bienville and Salmon to the Minister,
June 9, 1739, ff. 5(v)-7(v).
^Bienville to the Minister, August 18, 1739, AC, 
C13A 24, ff. 76-78; Salmon to the Minister, August 30, 1739, 
ibid., ff. 149-50(v); Bienville to the Minister, August 30, 
1739, ibid.. ff. 85(v)-86(v); Beauchamp to the Minister, 
September 1, 1739, ibid.. ff. 243-43(v); Bienville to the 
Minister, September 4, 1739, ibid., ff. 92(v)-93.
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Orleans on July 24. These included three companies of 
marines, one party of 16 colonial soldiers, 58 Negroes and 
22 Indians. An artillery expert led the group. A second 
convoy had departed on August 8 with four companies of 
soldiers, 60 members of the colonial militia, 15 Negroes and 
18 Indians. M. Louis de Nouailles d'AymS led the third con­
tingent which set out on September 1. This force included 
three companies of 50 Swiss soldiers altogether who had just 
arrived in Louisiana, 62 Negroes and 19 Indians. The 
governor planned to leave on September 12 with 60 French and 
35 Swiss soldiers as well as some Negroes and Indians who 
would help with the boats. Officials estimated that about 
400 tons of equipment had been loaded onto the vessels, but 
additional supplies were still awaited. Although the 
government had advised Bienville to postpone his campaign 
until the following year, Bienville felt committed to going 
ahead in part at least because he believed it would be 
impossible to feed these hundreds of people for another year. 
He decided that he needed to use this force of nearly 1,220 
men as soon as possible if he were to defeat the Chickasaw.40
Throughout his correspondence with the government in 
the summer of 1739, Bienville expressed concern as to whether 
or not the Canadian forces would arrive in time. Several 
hundred northern Indians had come as troops to march with
^Bienville to the Minister, September 4, 1739, AC 
C13C 4, ff. 200-201.
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Pierre D'Artaguiette in February of 1736. This time the 
Canadian governor, Beauhamais, had promised even more.
Eleven officers, three sergeants and seventy-four cadets 
were to lead the Canadian force composed of French soldiers, 
Canadians and Indians, numbering about 500 in all. They were 
to have set out from Canada in June in order to meet the 
Bienville forces near Prud'Homme around September l.41
The actual number in the French and Indian force 
which departed Montreal in June of 1739 with M. Le Baron de 
Longeuil for Louisiana was 442 altogether. It was hoped that 
another 175 men from Detroit, Mackinac and Indian tribes in 
the Upper Mississippi River area would join with them.43 
Unknown to Bienville at the time, the commander of the 
Canadian forces, Longeuil, was having problems in managing 
his forces. Some of the Indians who were marching with him 
were drunk daily while others were deserting. The 50 men 
from Mackinac were making good progress, their spirits high. 
And yet, by the middle of August, these forces were still 
far from Prud'Homme. Longeuil feared that his army would 
miss the main battle with the Chickasaw.43
4^The Government's Plan for the Chickasaw War, 
September 22, 1739, ibid., ff. 97(v)-99.
42& List of the Men Who Left Montreal with Longeuil 
in June, 1739, ibid., ff. 206-206(v).
43Beauharnais to the Minister, October 18, 1739, AC, 
C13C 4, ff. 200-201.
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When Bienville left New Orleans on September 12, he 
did not know whether or not these people had received word 
that the rendezvous date had been changed to November 1.
If they had not, the governor feared that they would return 
to Canada. Because of storms and high winds, the governor's 
force was held up at Pointe CoupSe until September 22. 
Despite the delay, however, Bienville rendezvoused with 
Nouailles in the first week of October as planned.44 But by 
the middle of October, more than 50 men from Bienville's 
army had returned to New Orleans because of sickness.4^
These unfortunate people found little, if any, help in the 
capital where an epidemic, probably malaria, was rampant. 
Many settlers in the city were sick or dying. Only 30 
soldiers were fit enough to help keep peace in the capital. 
So serious was this plague that Sieur de Louboey, the com­
manding officer at New Orleans during Bienville's absence, 
feared that supplies would run out for the city, as well as 
for the army en route to the Chickasaw country.4^
44M. de Louboey to the Minister, October 12, 1739,
AC, C13A 24, f. 204? M. de Louboey to the Minister, October
15, 1739, ibid., ff. 217(v)-18; Journal de la Guerre du 
Micissippi contre le Chicachas en 1739 et finie en 1740, le
ler d'Avril by an Officer in M. Nouaille's Army (New York,
1859), 24. Hereinafter cited as Journal de la Guerre.
45m . de Louboey to the Minister, October 12, 17 39, 
AC, C13A 24, f. 204(v); Journal de la Guerre.
4®M. de Louvoey to the Minister, October 15, 1739,
AC, C13A 24, f. 218; M. de Louvoey to the Minister, October
20, 1739, ibid-/ f - 221(v).
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As he and his illness-plagued army were slowly 
ascending the Mississippi River, Bienville received reports 
from the commanding officers at both Fort Toulouse and Mobile 
that Red Sock and Alabama Mingo were organizing their Choctaw 
warriors to attack the Chickasaw villages from the east. In 
addition, the Choctaw leaders were preparing to pillage as 
many English supply trains in Chickasaw territory as pos­
sible. French officials, however, were concerned that 
adequate supplies would not be on hand for the Indians as 
well as for Bienville's main force.^
On November 3, the governor and his army arrived at 
the entrepot on the St. Francis River. There they found 
the New Orleans forces that had preceded them, as well as 
400 Canadians and Indians who had arrived on October 13.
The fort consisted of four bastions, octagonal in shape, 
surrounded by a stake fence as was typical of most Louisiana 
frontier installations. It, as was noted earlier, had been 
built more than a year before by Engineer Verges and his 
troops. Much of the artillery that had been sent ahead 
during the previous spring was stored there.^8
Shortly after his arrival, Bienville determined to 
depart at once for the inland post which Noyan, his nephew,
4?m . de Louboey to the Minister, October 12, 1739,
AC, C13A 24, ff. 204(v)-206(v); Salmon to the Minister,
October 12, 1739, ibid., ff. 175-75(v).
48See page 300 of this chapter.
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had built the previous August and had named Fort Assump­
tion.^^ Accordingly, on November 6 the officers began 
leading the troops down the St. Francis River to the fort.
Bad weather and changing currents slowed travel on this 
small stream, and it took more than a month for all of the 
men, livestock and supplies to complete the trip.50
More than a mere storehouse, Fort Assumption was a 
complete wilderness stockade. Noyan had seen to it that, 
besides its three bastions, the facility contained several 
huts for the officers and for some of the soldiers. Several 
stoves for baking biscuit and forges for repairing arms and 
implements had also been built at the installation. The 
colonial militia, as well as the Swiss troops, were occupying 
the quarters when Bienville's and Noauille's troops arrived 
on November 10.5^
By December 8 many of the supplies and most of the 
men who had been camped at the entrepot fort at the mouth of 
the St. Francis had arrived at Fort Assumption. To make up 
for lost time, Bienville had already dispatched an officer 
with 45 Canadians and 17 Indians to look for the best trails 
into Chickasaw territory. They took with them 60 pairs of 
oxen and 40 horses to help blaze a trail if necessary.
^Journal de la Guerre. 32-37.
50Bienville to M. de Louboey, December 8, 1739, AC, 
C13A 25, f. 212; Journal de la Guerre. 32-37.
51Ibid., 40-41.
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Bienville hoped that they would return soon with news of a 
route.52
Much of the artillery which had been sent up river 
from New Orleans had arrived in good condition. The muni­
tions supplies consisted of more than 300,000 pounds of 
cannon balls and small mortars and musket balls. The plan 
had called for oxen and Negroes to pull the more than 90 
carts overland from Ft. Assumption. Unfortunately, a bridge 
would now have to be built across the St. Francis River, 
which was about 80 feet wide. Such construction posed 
additional problems.52
Construction of this bridge was only one of the 
several difficulties Bienville encountered in December,
1739. As the weeks passed, the Indians from Canada and the 
Illinois country began to desert. Having been promised a 
fight with the ferocious Chickasaw, they were very disap­
pointed when such an engagement failed to materialize.
Those Indians who stayed began to drink heavily. Food 
shortages for both the livestock and the soldiers added to 
Bienville's many difficulties. However, the greatest failure 
of the entire expedition was the scouting party's inability 
to find the main road into the Chickasaw country, the 
Memphis, Pontotoc, Mobile Bay Trail. Pierre D'Artaguiette
52Bienville to M. de Louboey, December 8, 1739, AC, 
C13A 25, f. 212.
53Ibid.. ff. 212(v)-12(v)bis.
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had taken this road which had led directly into the enemy 
lands in 1736. Bienville could not move his army of nearly
1,000 French, Indians and Negroes against the enemy because 
he was unable to find the right trail.54
As discouraging as the situation was for him, the 
new year of 1740 began on an optimistic note for the 
governor. Throughout the weeks of encampment at Fort Assump­
tion, some of the Indians with the army hunted for food for 
the troops. On one hunting expedition some Illinois and 
Chacchouma Indians encountered and attacked a Chickasaw 
hunting party and captured several of the enemy. On the 
afternoon of January 1, these captives arrived at the French 
camp. During their interrogation which followed, Bienville 
learned about the situation at the Chickasaw villages. The 
prisoners reported that the Chickasaw were quite weary of 
war. Of the eight forts which Bienville and his forces had 
seen in 1737, only two were still serviceable. These 
Indians were incredulous that this huge French force had not 
come to them sooner. Their villages were only an eight-day 
trip from Ft. Assumption and, because it was the winter 
hunting season, only 180 warriors were currently residing at 
the forts with the women and children. These prisoners
54Journal de la Guerre, 56-65; Joly de Fleury, Ms. 
1726, ff. 21-22 (Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France). 
This long document entitled "M6moire sur la Louisiane" is 
believed to have been written by the commissaire ordon- 
nateur, Sebastien-Fran<jois-Ang6 Le Normant who served in 
this office from 1744-1748. Hereinafter cited as Joly 
Fleury.
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believed that if the Chickasaw knew how out-numbered they 
were, they would sue for peace, provided that the French 
moved quickly.^
Within a week of the interrogation of the prisoners, 
scouts reported having found a good road into the Chickasaw 
country. On January 11, Sieurs Broutin and Celeron returned 
to Ft. Assumption with news that a major road was located 
only 21 leagues away. The Memphis, Pontotoc, Mobile Bay 
Trail had finally been found. Using Broutin's information, 
along with that of the Chickasaw captives, Bienville sketched 
the route over which the army would advance and began to 
make plans for an offensive.^
The attack would be quite different than originally 
proposed. Over the winter months some of the cannons and 
ammunition had rusted because of the damp weather. In 
addition, many of the livestock which had been requested 
from the Natchitoches post had never arrived, and the animals 
which were on hand were either too weak or too sick to pull 
the carts. Furthermore, since trees would have to be felled 
to clear a trail between Ft. Assumption and the road, and 
bayous or swollen streams would have to be crossed, Bienville 
decided that none of the artillery could be used. If the 
Chickasaw prisoners had told the truth, only two of their
55Joly Fleury, ff. 65-68.
^ Ibid., 71-74; Salmon to the Minister, May 4, 1740, 
AC, C13A 25, ff. 159-60.
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eight forts presented any real threat a n y w a y . T h u s ,  the 
hundreds of pounds of ammunition and supplies which had been 
collected for over two years and which had been transported 
all the way from Brest or Rochefort, France to near present- 
day Memphis, Tennessee, would not be used.
Since the artillery would be useless, Bienville 
planned to place a good deal of reliance for the fighting on 
Indians who would be led by French officers. The remaining 
northern Indians still with Bienville would be joined by the 
Choctaw, or so he hoped. Thus far, however, the Choctaw had 
not shown up. Although Bienville heard rumors that Red Sock 
desired vengeance for the deaths of several Choctaw chiefs 
at the hands of the Chickasaw the previous December, the 
Choctaw chief and his men never came.^
Bienville ordered Celeron and several of his offi­
cers to depart for the Chickasaw encampment on February 6 
with 180 volunteers and 400 Indians. Within 10 days, they 
arrived at their objective and began to fire on the enemy's 
forts. Throughout the exchange of musket fire, the French 
could hear English voices from inside the forts. This 
angered the French officers. In spite of their seemingly
57Louboey to the Minister, January 29, 1740, AC,
C13A 25, ff. 215-15(v); Salmon to the Minister, January 29, 
1740, ibid., ff. 141-41(v); Beauchamps to the Minister,
March 19, 1740, ibid.. f. 249.
58Beauchamps to the Minister, March 19, 1740, AC, 
C13A 25, ff. 249-50(v); Beauchamps to the Minister, March 
12, 1740, ibid.. ff. 245-45(v).
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impregnable position, the Chickasaw indicated that they 
would be willing to open peace talks. They tried to send 
out messengers under a flag of truce to say that they were 
ready to talk peace, but the Indians with the French shot at 
the peace emissaries. When Celeron finally convinced his 
own Indians to allow some of the Chickasaw to come out and 
talk, he learned that most of the Chickasaw wanted peace.
As one of the peace terms, Celeron demanded that the 
emissaries surrender those Natchez who still resided with 
them to Bienville at Ft. Assumption. The French also 
insisted that the Chickasaw run the English traders out of 
their territory and that they b u m  their forts, to all of 
which demands the Indians agreed.59
Celeron did not stay to see the terms of the treaty 
with regard to the surrender of the forts carried out.
Faced with the rapid desertion of his troops, both white and 
Indian, he set out for Ft. Assumption. By the time that he 
reached the fort the army was badly depleted. On March 15 
only the Louisiana troops, about 500 altogether, remained, 
and many of them were ill. As the end of the month 
approached, Bienville still waited for some sign or message 
from the Chickasaw Indians concerning the surrender of the 
Natchez who still resided with them.
Deciding that the Chickasaw were not going to honor
59Bienville to the Minister, May 6, 1740, ibid., ff. 
4 8 (v)-53(v).
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their promise to Celeron to surrender the Natchez Indians, 
Bienville ordered the rest of the army to return to New 
Orleans. Just before his own departure on March 31, however, 
several sentries spied some Chickasaw chiefs approaching the 
camp accompanied by several Natchez prisoners.
Of the eleven Chickasaw villages which remained, 
seven Chickasaw chiefs had come to see Bienville. They 
reported that harassment and attacks by their fellow tribes­
men had delayed their trip for three weeks. They brought 
with them only one Natchez woman and three children. When 
asked why they were delivering so few Natchez, the Chicka­
saw leaders replied that most of them had fled to the 
Cherokee. However, some of them were still in hiding in 
Chickasaw lands, and they promised to deliver these Indians 
if Bienville would see to it that the Mississippi River and 
northern Indian tribes would stop their assaults on the 
Chickasaw forts. The governor agreed to these requests only 
if the Chickasaw would expel all the English traders from 
the defense encampment and from the Chickasaw country. The 
chiefs agreed to do so. Bienville also told them that he 
could not promise to call off the Choctaw, because the 
Choctaw were determined to avenge the deaths of the chiefs 
when the Chickasaw had killed in December.60
Following this meeting with the Chickasaw, Bienville
^°Ibid., ff. 60-64(v).
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returned to New Orleans in late April quite exhausted both 
physically and morally. Although he had organized a large 
force of men from Canada, Louisiana and France, and although 
he had planned the campaign fully with regard to artillery 
and even the carts and livestock to haul it, he had failed 
in his mission to annihilate the Chickasaw. His weak 
explanation to the Minister of Marine of the failure of the 
campaign reflected the views of an individual who was old 
and tired. He did believe, however, that the Chickasaw no 
longer offered much of a threat, for only several hundred 
warriors remained.61 Nevertheless, the enemy forts had not 
surrendered even though the French had spent more than a 
million livres in men, arms and supplies in an effort to 
destroy them.62
Even though Bienville's campaign had not succeeded, 
the impact of the endeavor was great on the English of South 
Carolina. The Louisianians had proved that they could 
organize a frontier army on a large scale. Fear began to 
grow in Charleston that the French and their allies could 
move against this English colony as well. Between the back 
country of South Carolina and the Mississippi River there 
was no insurmountable geographical barrier. Carolinian
61Ibid.. f. 68(v).
52Salmon to the Minister, January 2, 1740, ibid., ff.
136-36(v); Salmon to the Minister, May 5, 1740, ibid., ff.
165-65(v)7 Salmon to the Minister, June 27, 1740, ibid., f.
178(v).
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officials saw that with the Chickasaw seriously weakened, 
they had only a few Indian allies left to aid them in their 
defense. Believing that the French had plans for another 
campaign against the Chickasaw, the English wondered if the 
French did not intend to make systematic war on their native 
enemies and thus undertake the extermination of the native 
allies of the Anglos. After all, the French had already 
destroyed most of the Natchez tribe. They might now organ­
ize to move on the other Indian nations.66
The English realized that the Creek Indians had to 
be maintained as allies in order to secure their border.
The influence of the English traders among this tribe had 
apparently declined. D'Emeville, the commanding officer at 
Fort Toulouse, informed Bienville in the summer of 1740 that 
he had met with several Creek chiefs in May of that year. 
While he had given the Indians no large quantity of merchan­
dise, D'Emeville's report revealed that the meeting was a 
friendly one in which brandy was passed all round.64 Other 
rumors told of Choctaw plans to attack the Creeks who had
Colonel William Bull to the Board of Trade, June 
3, 1740, PRO, C.O. 5 384, f. 86(v)? Council and Assembly of 
South Carolina to the King, July 26, 1740, ibid., ff. 94(v)- 
95; William Bull to the Lords of Trade, June 3, 1740, PRO, 
C.O. 5 368, f. ll(v); Assembly to the King, July 26, 1740, 
ibid.. f. 24(v).
64Mr. Wood to Mr. Andrews, May 22, 1740, PRO, C.O.
5, 368, ff. 17-17(v).
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allegedly killed some of their c h i e f s . whatever the 
French plan might be, they had gained a tremendous psycho­
logical edge over the English in the summer of 1740. That 
the English believed that the French were planning to move 
next on South Carolina lessened the number of English traders 
going to Louisiana for several months.
A decrease in English activity in the months follow­
ing Bienville's campaign against the Chickasaw in 1739-1740 
was not the only positive element in the French situation.
The Choctaw had organized and had begun to move on the 
Chickasaw. Red Sock had failed to secure from the English 
the trade goods which they had promised. Because they had 
lost several traders in the Chickasaw war, the South 
Carolinians were undoubtedly refusing to became involved in 
Louisiana and its Indian quarrels for a time. It was during 
this "cooling off" period that Red Sock and the Choctaw 
resumed their attacks on the Chickasaw forts. The commanding 
officer at Fort Tombigbee kept the governor informed in 
these matters. He also reported that the Choctaw planned to 
b u m  the Chickasaws' corn in the fall of 1740.^
65Mr. Willy to Captain Croft, May 10, 1740, ibid.,
ff. 13-13; A Report on the State of the Province of Georgia,
November 10, 1740, ibid., f. 49.
^Louboey to the Minister, January 4, 1740, AC, C13A
25, f. 207; Bienville to the Minister, May 8, 1740, ibid.,
ff. 78-80; Louboey to the Minister, May 10, 1740, ibid., ff. 
223 (v)-24 (v); Bienville to the Minister, May 28, 1740, ibid.. 
ff. 78-80; Louboey to the Minister, June 23, 1740, ibid., 
ff. 238-38 (v).
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Unfortunately, the Choctaw expedition which had 
intended to burn the Chickasaw corn fields was not at all 
successful. Because of poor organization and bad weather, 
the force of 1,200 Choctaw caused little damage to the 
enemy's harvest.87
In September 1741, however, they attacked the 
Chickasaw's forts and c o m  fields, an attack which proved to 
be the most devastating in several years. Not only were 
more than 30 scalps taken, as well as many prisoners, but 
many of the Chickasaw and English traders' horses were 
stolen or run off. The French were, of course, delighted 
and continued to encourage their native allies to attack and 
to ambush the Chickasaw.88
Weary of war, in the fall of 1741 the Chickasaw 
chiefs who had negotiated the peace with Bienville at Fort 
Assumption in 1740 begged for an end to the assaults by the 
Choctaw and the other pro-French Indians. They promised to 
hand over all of the Natchez who remained in their villages.8^
87Beauchamps to the Minister, January 25, 1741, AC, 
C13A 26, ff. 202-203 (v); M. de Louboey to the Minister,
March 7, 1741, ibid., ff. 178-78 (v); Bienville to the Minis­
ter, September 30, 1741, ibid., f. 102.
^Bienville to the Minister, September 30, 1741, AC, 
C13A 26, ff. 98-100; Bienville to the Minister, February 18, 
1742, AC, C13A 27, ff. 38(v)-39(v).
88Bienville to the Minister, September 30, 1741,
AC, C13A 26, ff. 100-103(v).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm is s io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
3 1 8
French efforts to sustain Choctaw interest in 
fighting received a severe setback in the spring of 1742 
when a smallpox epidemic broke out in the Choctaw villages. 
Many children, as well as adults, were afflicted and many 
died. The extensive loss of life meant that there were 
fewer warriors to continue the fight against the Chickasaw.
Nevertheless, by late summer of 1742, many surviving 
Choctaw warriors agreed to march once again with the French 
on the Chickasaw. The French decided that if their villages 
were approached from the west, the attack would come with 
greater surprise. Even Red Sock who had been forgiven for 
his disloyalty to the French, organized some of the western 
villages to go with the other forces. Arriving at the 
Chickasaw villages on August 25, MM. Verbois and Pechon and 
their Choctaw army began to attack the enemy immediately. 
Although they destroyed much of the Chickasaws' corn crop 
during the following five days, the cost to the Choctaw in 
casualties was high. By September 2, the French and their 
native allies left for home, having failed once again to 
break the Chickasaw defenses.
7°Bienville to the Minister, March 28, 1742, AC,
C13A 27, ff. 65-66; Father Beaudouin to M. de Louboey, ibid., 
May 20, 1742, ff. 131(v)-34(v); M. de Louboey to the Minis­
ter, June 12, 1742, ibid.. ff. 136(v)-38; Bienville to the 
Minister, June 18, 1742, ibid., ff. 75(v)-76.
71Sr. Canelle's Journal of the Choctaw Campaign 
against the Chickasaw, August, 1742, AC, U3A 27, ff. 176- 
77 (v) .
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Despite the unsuccessful efforts of the French to 
crush the enemy with Choctaw help, Bienville felt confident 
that at least the Chickasaw-English threat to Louisiana 
could be contained. The return of Red Sock to the French 
alliance in the spring of 1742 would, it was hoped, mean a 
more profitable fur trade. Requests to the Ministry of 
Marine for additional merchandise did, in fact, increase 
after 1740. The governor believed that this trade might 
reduce the colony's huge war debt. The trade had been dis­
rupted in the war years, but Bienville hoped to revive it 
with the Choctaw now that most of the fighting had ended. 
Fort Tombigbee, located in the heart of the Choctaw country, 
served as a focal point for trade with the Choctaw in these 
years, for Bienville reported shortly before his departure 
for France in 1743 that more than 100,000 pounds in buck­
skins had been received from traders.72
Bienville, however, left Louisiana before the full 
results of his labors in the Choctaw skin trade were known. 
In the winter of 1742, he had requested to be recalled to 
France because of his age and illness. His petition was 
granted, and he was replaced by the Marquis Vaudreuil. The 
new governor arrived in May, 1743 and Bienville left for 
France later that summer. It was unfortunate that Bienville 
did not leave Louisiana with the usual honors of one who has
72Bienville to the Minister, February 4, 1743, AC, 
C13A 28, f. 36.
R e p ro d u c e d  w ith p e rm iss io n  of th e  c o p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p erm iss io n .
3 2 0
served a colony well for more than 40 years. Tactical 
errors, as well as general miscalculations concerning roads, 
supplies and weather, all had contributed to the failure of 
his last campaign against the Chickasaw.
To be sure the Chickasaw people had suffered greatly 
from the wars of the 1730's. Many had been killed and their 
homes had been destroyed. They must be admired for their 
fortitude and endurance in the face of the attacks made on 
them by the French for over five years.
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THE CHOCTAW AND GOVERNOR PIERRE DE RIGAUD DE VAUDREUIL, 
1743-1752
In 1741, following his second unsuccessful campaign 
against the Chickasaw Indians, Governor Bienville requested 
the Ministry of Marine to recall him. His request was 
granted and he was replaced by the Marquis Pierre de Rigaud 
de Vaudreuil, the son of a former governor of New France, on 
July 1, 1742. Comte Maurepas, still the chief minister of 
the navy and colonial affairs, believed the marquis well 
suited for the post because of the experience which he had 
gained in dealing with the Indians and with the problems of 
frontier life as governor of Trois Rivieres in Canada.^
As governor of Louisiana from 1743 until 1752, 
Vaudreuil would have to deal with the usual supply problems 
of a colony isolated during a European war. Such shortages 
meant a recurrence of the traditional difficulties for the 
settlers, as well as for the Louisiana fur trade and Indian 
relations. Indeed, it was during the Vaudreuil regime that
1Guy Fregault, Le Grand Marquis: Pierre de Rigaude
de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane (Montreal, 1952), 111-12.
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the French came to realize how extensive the Choctaw depen­
dence on the white m an's goods had become.
When Vaudreuil arrived in New Orleans in May, 1743, 
he received an enthusiastic welcome from several officers. 
Impressed with the new governor's general attitude and 
knowledge, Henry Dufour de Louboey, the commanding officer 
at Mobile, remarked that the King and the Minister had chosen 
well. He, like the Minister, observed that Vaudreuil 
appeared to know a great deal about frontier life, and 
especially about Indians. While admitting that the natives 
of Louisiana were different from those of Canada, Louboey 
was confident that the new governor would achieve friendship 
with these Indians because of his prior experience with the 
natives farther north. In the wake of the French military 
failures against the Chickasaw, he noted, the Louisianians 
would have to make a strong showing in order to keep the 
loyalty of the Choctaw and other native allies.^
Sensing the delicate nature of relations between the 
French and the natives of Louisiana, the new governor worked 
very hard in the first months of his administration to learn 
about these Indians. From interpreters to the tribes and 
informed officers, such as Louboey at Mobile, M. Hazeur at
^Memoir on Louisiana, August, 1743, Archives des 
Colonies, C13A 28, f. 94 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), 
hereinafter cited as AC; M. de Louboey to the Minister, June 
12, 1743, ibid.. f. 146(v).
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Fort Toulouse and M. D'Erneville at Fort Tombigbee, Vaudreuil 
acquired excellent information. He learned, among other 
things, that a dispute between the eastern villages of the 
Choctaw tribe and the Abeka and Talapoocha natives was dis­
turbing the peace to the east. Rather than involve the 
French in this affair, the governor encouraged the Alabama 
Indians to act as arbitrators in the conflict. By the fall 
of 1743, the Alabama chiefs had settled the dispute."^
On another front, there were rumors that the Chicka­
saw finally wanted peace. While anxious to settle this war 
which had gone on for more than ten years, Vaudreuil believed 
it crucial before entering into negotiations with the Chicka­
saw to consult with the Choctaw in order to learn what they
wanted from the peace. Arrangements were made for a meeting
4between Vaudreuil and the Choctaw in the fall of 1743. The 
governor went to Mobile for that purpose in December, 
arriving there on the fifth. There he welcomed more than
3,000 members of the Choctaw tribe over the next two months. 
Having been informed of the Choctaw leadership arrangement, 
Vaudreuil requested special meetings with the medal chiefs, 
that is, those war chiefs who had been awarded pendants, 
similar to the Cross of St. Louis worn by some of the French
•^Vaudreuil to the Minister, July 18, 1743, AC, C13A 
28, ff. 49-53? Fregault, Le Grand Marquis. 163-66.
^M. de Louboey to the Minister, September 24, 1743, 
AC, C13A 28, ff. 161-61(v).
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officers, for outstanding military achievement. During the 
first gathering of leaders, the Governor met Red Sock whose 
drunken behavior and foul language distinguished him at once 
from the rest of the Indians. Reprimanded and humiliated by 
the other Choctaw for his bad conduct, he sulked throughout 
the following weeks.^
Contrary to his information concerning the unity of 
the Choctaw tribe, Vaudreuil came to realize in the days of 
negotiations not only that the "medal chiefs" were relatively 
powerless, but also that the tribe was badly divided. In 
the course of informing the Choctaw of French moves towards 
making peace with the Chickasaw, he learned that the Choctaw 
villages followed their local leaders, and that the tribe 
seldom, if ever, acted as a whole. Vaudreuil convinced the 
Choctaw that much of the success of their enemies in their 
war with them was due to the muskets, ammunition and sup­
plies which the English traders had provided for the Chicka­
saw through trade. He, therefore, urged the Choctaw war 
chiefs to run out of their towns the English, the white men 
who had armed and supplied their Chickasaw enemies. By the 
end of January, the Choctaw consented to expel all English
5Vaudreuil to the Minister, February 12, 1744, ibid., 
ff. 199-201; The Present State of the Country and Inhabitants 
European and Indians of Louisiana on the North Continent of 
America, by an Officer at New Orleans to his Friend at Paris 
(London, 1744), 36-38. Hereinafter cited as The Present 
State.
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traders in their territory.^
Although his initial encounter with the Choctaw 
leaders was successful, the Governor, like his predecessors, 
informed the Ministry of Marine that he needed a greater 
supply of merchandise for trade and for gifts to keep the 
friendship and support of this huge tribe. At the time more 
than 50,000 livres had been budgeted for such expenses. 
However, when he returned from Mobile in early 1744,
Vaudreuil requested additional supplies, including 4,000 
yards of limbourg, 4,000 shirts, 400 trading muskets, 2,000 
blankets, 200 pounds of vermilion, 400 pounds of lead and
1,000 kettles. He also asked for another 3,000 livres for 
knives, scissors, mirrors, combs, bells, rings, iron and 
copper wire, ribbon and lace.7
Unfortunately, these requests were not completely 
filled because of heavy demands for weapons and supplies for 
the War of the Austrian Succession which began in 1744 and 
lasted until 1748. About six months following Vaudreuil's 
requests for an increase in merchandise, the Louisiana 
government learned that some of the Choctaw were so desperate 
for supplies that they were receiving English traders in 
their villages again. Vaudreuil also heard that peace 
negotiations were beginning between the Choctaw and the
^Vaudreuil to the Minister, February 12, 1744, AC, 
C13A 28, ff. 201-205.
7The Present State, 53-54.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p roh ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
3 2 6
Chickasaw, who, as allies of the English, were helping to 
facilitate an entree for the English traders into the Choc­
taw villages.8 Unaware of the outbreak of the war in Europe 
in 1744, the Governor complained to the Marine that the 
Choctaw had not received any kind of merchandise from the 
French for more than six months and, as a result, they were 
now dealing with English traders.
From the opening weeks of 1744, Maurepas was very 
much aware of the delays in sending merchandise for the 
Indians of Louisiana. Apologies for the lateness in 
delivering supplies seemed to come with each dispatch from 
France. Although the Government appeared to realize the 
necessity of goods for the Indians to retain their friend­
ship and to exclude English influence among them, no trade 
items arrived in the first six months of 1744.9
When a supply ship finally did arrive in September, 
1744, it was discovered that important trade items, such as 
shirts and cloth, had not been included in the cargo. Such 
delays and negligence in supplying the Choctaw cost the 
Louisianians a great deal, for by the fall of 1744, the 
colony's officials began to realize that the English had
8Vaudreuil to the Minister, September 17, 1744, AC, 
C13A 28, ff. 241-42.
9Minister to Vaudreuil, January 11, 1744, AC, B 78, 
ff. 436-37; Minister to Vaudreuil, January 22, 1744, ibid., 
ff. 454-54(v); Minister to Vaudreuil, April 30, 1744,~IbTd., 
ff. 473-73 (v).
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made extensive inroads into the trade with that tribe over
the last year.'1'®
During that same winter of 1744, when the French
were merely courting the Choctaw with promises of presents,
the English from Carolina were making their own plans for
the tribe. The Council and the Assembly had learned from a
trader, Locklass McGillivray, that the Choctaw were not at
all pleased with their trade relations with the French.
While on a visit to some Choctaw villages in the fall of
1743, McGillivray had listened sympathetically to Choctaw
complaints about their lack of food and clothing and their
general misery because of the French failure to supply them
properly.11 He informed the government of South Carolina of
these complaints and, as a result, both the Assembly and the
Council recommended that McGillivray be supplied with a
proper sum of money with which to purchase goods to trade 
12with the Choctaw.
The Council also received reports of Choctaw
^Vaudreuil to the Minister, September 17, 1744, AC, 
C13A, 28, ff. 242-43(v).
11Journal of the Council of South Carolina, January 
25, 1744, Colonial Office Papers 5, 451, ff. 47-50 (Public 
Record Office, London, England). Hereinafter cited as PRO, 
C.O. 5, Journal of the Council.
^Journal of the Assembly of South Carolina, Febru­
ary 21, 1744, PRO, C.O. 5, 452, ff. 95-96, 104, hereinafter 
cited as Journal of the Assembly; Journal of the Council, 
February 12, 1744, PRO, C.O. 5, 453, ff. 53-53(v).
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discontent similar to McGillivray's from some Virginia 
traders who had been captured by the French in the Louisiana 
territory in 1742. When these men finally reached Carolina 
in 1745, they confirmed the rumors of France's collapsing 
influence among the tribes of the Lower Mississippi Valley, 
and especially among the Choctaw. These traders believed 
that the Choctaw could be secured as English allies and 
trading partners if sufficient supplies were provided for 
them.^ Already by the late fall of 1744, Red Sock was once 
again working to get English traders into his villages. He 
was aided by the fact that the mood of many of the Choctaw 
medal chiefs had become more pro-English than ever."^
In July 1745, the Choctaw leaders called a meeting 
of the medal chiefs at Yanabe Village, the center of Red 
Sock's influence. The chiefs reported at this gathering on 
their people's discontent with their French allies in trade 
and war. Their warriors, women and children, they complained, 
needed cloth, knives, guns and iron pots which English 
traders were actually bringing to their villages and which 
French traders only promised. At this meeting, even Alabama 
Mingo, the loyal French friend, expressed a preference for 
the English over the French.
13Joumal of the Council, May 22, 1745, PRO, C.O. 5, 
451, ff. 305-308.
•^M. de Louboey to the Minister, October 6, 1745,
AC, C13A 29, ff. 189-90.
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Apparently, not all of the medal chiefs came to the 
July meeting at Yanabe, for another assembly took place in 
September at Kunshak Village, the home of Alabama Mingo. 
Between these meetings, the pro-French Choctaw leaders 
lobbied hard for the French. At the September assembly, 
other leaders of the tribe humiliated Alabama Mingo and Red 
Sock in front of the entire gathering because of their dis­
loyalty to the French. When Alabama Mingo tried to deny the 
accusations, the chiefs who had been at Yanabe in July 
reminded him of how disgusted he had been with the French at 
that time.15
However, mere criticism and reprimands did not dampen 
the influence of the pro-English faction in the tribe. 
Besides, not even those Choctaw villages most loyal to the 
French could deny that their people needed more supplies 
than they had been receiving. Thus, when scouts reported in 
late September that 20 English traders were approaching 
Choctaw territory with 50 packhorses loaded with trade goods, 
Alabama Mingo led a small party of his followers out to 
greet them. His action shocked Sr. Hazeur, the commanding 
officer at Fort Toulouse, for he thought that he had worked 
out a plan with the Choctaw to attack this party of Anglo 
merchants and not to welcome them.1^ In the end, the pack- 
horses never actually came, for, when the English heard of
15Ibid.. ff. 190(v)-92(v).
16Ibid.. ff. 193-93(v).
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an attack by Choctaw guerrillas on several of their traders 
within the tribe's territory, they changed their destination 
and traded instead with Indians of the Alabama area.
Governor Vaudreuil viewed the actions of the Choctaw 
guerrillas as most fortunate for the French. He was con­
vinced that Red Sock's power and influence would decline as 
a result of the Carolinian traders' failure to visit the 
Choctaw villages, and he planned to humiliate Red Sock in 
front of his warriors at their next meeting by accusing him 
of disloyalty to the French. In fact, he had heard recently 
that many warriors were not at all happy with the anti- 
French activities of their medal chiefs.17
In the face of trade competition from the English, 
what did Louisiana have to offer the Choctaw in 1745? Since 
1742 the government had been spending at least 20,000 livres 
a year for Indian presents and trade goods.18 During the 
new regime of Governor Vaudreuil, more than 70,000 livres 
had been allocated for Indian trade goods and gifts. Unfor­
tunately, not all of the items arrived because of negligence 
at the port of Rochefort and as has been mentioned, because 
of the War of the Austrian Succession which began in 1744.
17Ibid., ff. 194-94(v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, 
October 28, 1745, AC, C13A 29, ff. 46(v)-48.
-'-^Expenses for Louisiana, 1742, AC, C13A 27, f.
199(v); Merchandise Sent from France for Louisiana's 1743 
Supplies, AC, C13A 28, f. 132(v), ff. 134(v)-37(v).
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The Marine continued to apologize to the governor for these 
failures and delays and promised better service in the future. 
He tried to provide it by hiring private individuals in 
France, such as Antoine Gaillarde, to supply the requested 
trade goods for Louisiana's Indians.^ The government was 
undoubtedly frustrated, even exasperated, when Vaudreuil 
wrote that the Indians were requesting softer blankets and 
lighter brass kettles.^
Interestingly enough, the fur trade in Louisiana 
although hurt was not completely ruined during the war years. 
Nancy Miller Surrey estimates that about 1,600 people were 
active in the Louisiana trade from 1744 to 1748, but that 
only 9,000 pounds of skins were shipped from New Orleans in 
1745. Included along with the usual buckskins were buffalo, 
otter and beaver skins and pelts. Operating on a strictly 
private basis at this time, French fur traders, most of them 
of questionable character, traded the Indians musket, powder, 
knives, needles, razors, vermilion, cloth, ribbons, blankets, 
shirts and watered-down brandy.21 The Governor, indeed, 
attempted to organize a system of permits and examinations
19Expenses for Louisiana, 1744, AC, C13A 28, f. 358; 
Minister to Vaudreuil, April 26, 1745, AC, B 81, f. 359.
20Trade Goods Requested for Louisiana, November 1, 
1745, AC, B 81, f. 234; Vaudreuil to the Minister, October 
30, 1745, AC, C13A 29, f. 91.
^T h e  Present State. 11; Nancy Miller Surrey, The 
Commerce of Louisiana during the French Regime (New York, 
1916), 357-60.
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at the posts of Fort Toulouse, Fort Tombigbee and Fort de 
Chartres in the Illinois country in an effort to control the 
trade goods. None of his plans ever worked out, however, 
and the trade continued unregulated.22
Vaudreuil's efforts to aid the trade and thus help 
Indian relations, were somewhat mollified by the actions of 
the new commissaire ordonnateur, Sebastien-Frangois-Ang6- 
Lenormant. Following his arrival in Louisiana in the fall 
of 1744, he took extensive measures to reorganize and to 
restructure the colony's economy.23 Although well-inten­
tioned, Lenormant did not appreciate the nature of the 
domestic trade with the Indians. Admitting that he had no 
knowledge of the quantities of goods and munitions needed 
for the business, he took drastic steps to change the trade 
anyway.2^ He raised the price of trade goods sold to the 
traders from 50 to 50 percent, or more, and he ordered com­
manders at the trading posts to refuse to offer the Indians 
gifts of any kind when they came to a post if they did not 
trade their skins to the French during the visit. For years 
a tradition of the posts had included a preliminary present- 
giving ceremony to promote the reputation for generosity and
22Ibid., 360.
22Fregault, Le Grand Marquis, 192, 195-98.
2^Lenormant to the Minister, October 19, 1745, AC, 
C13A 29, ff. 127(v)-28; Lenormant to the Minister, October
20, 1745, ibid.. ff. 129-33.
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magnanimity of the commanding officer among the Indians of 
the area. As far as Lenormant was concerned, this practice 
was costly and not at all a practical economic measure. His 
decree, if enforced, would have broken many of the ties that 
the French had with the Indians of the colony. Even the 
French government reprimanded him and ordered him to learn 
more about the local customs of dealing with the Indians as 
soon as possible.25 Both Governor Vaudreuil and Louboey, 
the commanding officer at Mobile, complained to France that 
Lenormant's policies, and especially his price increases, 
were discouraging Indian trade with the French.25
The combination of shortages of merchandise, higher 
prices and increased English trade with the Choctaw posed an 
awesome threat to the French alliance with the tribe. In 
the last weeks of 1745, the suspicions of Louisiana offi­
cials that the Choctaw were defecting to the English changed 
to a certainty. Vaudreuil learned that Red Sock had begun 
peace negotiations with the Chickasaw in an effort to arrange 
for English traders to supply his people. The chief even 
reported to the commanding officer at Fort Tombigbee, M.
25vaudreuil to the Minister, October 30, 1745, ibid., 
ff. 58-58(v), 60-61(v); Minister to Lenormant, April 13,
1746, AC, B 83, ff. 301-301(v).
26Ibid., f. 301; Vaudreuil to the Minister, January 
6, 1746, AC, C13A 30, ff. 12-12(v), 14(v)-16(v); Vaudreuil 
to the Minister, March 9, 1746, ibid., ff. 24-26; Louboey to 
the Minister, April 2, 1746, ibid., ff. 177(v)-78(v).
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Erneville, that a general meeting between the leaders of the 
Chickasaw and himself would take place during the first week 
of the new year. English traders had already been sighted 
in greater numbers than ever before bringing to the Choctaw 
more trade items at better rates. Upsetting as this situa­
tion was, the French officers, such as Louboey, were not at 
all surprised, for the Choctaw had not received any French 
merchandise for more than six months.^7
To counter the English threat, the colony's leaders 
sent messengers into the Choctaw country inviting the medal 
chiefs to a meeting at Mobile in April with Governor 
Vaudreuil. By that time, it was hoped, sufficient supplies 
could be gathered to entertain the Indians properly. Unfor­
tunately, more than 1,200 Choctaw Indians accompanied the 
chiefs when, in March they showed up at New Orleans, rather 
than at Mobile. Their tribesmen desired goods but found 
very little in terms of food and gifts. Vaudreuil blamed 
Lenormant for the unsuccessful meeting which resulted, for 
he had not ordered the cloth, beads and baggatelles which 
the Choctaw liked so well.
At the meeting the Governor did learn, however, that 
some of Red Sock's supporters were deserting him to join 
with the Choctaw of the villages which were loyal supporters
^Louboey to the Minister, February 8, 1746, AC, 
C13A 30, ff. 171-72(v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, January
28, 1746, ibid., f. 20; Vaudreuil to the Minister, March 9, 
1746, ibid.. ff. 26(v)-27.
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of the French. Red Sock failed to participate in the March 
gathering, believed Vaudreuil, because he feared another 
humiliating reprimand from the leaders among his fellow 
tribesmen who were loyal to the French.28
Nevertheless, the meeting between the Choctaw and 
the French broke up with neither group very happy. Through­
out the summer of 1745, French traders still circulated among 
the Choctaw villages selling the wares on which the Indians 
were so dependent. In August three traders made the mis­
take of harassing Chief Red Sock by attempting to seduce his 
wife because of the chief's anti-French actions. Outraged, 
Red Sock had the three traders murdered. The news of this 
activity shocked Louisiana's officials, for never before had 
the Choctaw turned so on the French.29 The poor judgment and 
tactless action of the surly traders resulted not only in 
their own deaths, but it also contributed to an intra- 
tribal upheaval among the Choctaw nation.
Fearing that the murders of the Frenchmen would be 
the first of many, Governor Vaudreuil sent M. Beauchamps, an 
officer who had worked with the Indians in Louisiana for 
several decades, to the Choctaw in September to assess the
28vaudreuil to the Minister, March 9, 1746, AC, 
C13A, 30, ff. 26-26 (v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, April 1, 
1746, ibid., ff. 49-52, ff. 52-56; Louboey to the Minister, 
April 2, 1746, ibid.. ff. 176(v)-79(v).
29Joly de Fleury, Ms. 1756, ff. 31-32(Salle des 
Manuscripts, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France). Here­
inafter cited as Joly de Fleury.
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the tribe's feelings. For nearly a month he and his escort 
of ten men visited the Choctaw villages where they inter­
viewed many Indians. Their investigation revealed that the 
tribe was once more very badly divided between a pro-French 
and a pro-English faction over the question of whether the 
French or the English could better supply the Indians with 
the merchandise they so desperately needed. During his 
visit to the Chickasaw Village late in September, Beau­
champs learned, for example, that the Choctaw had become so 
dependent upon the white m an's goods that many of the 
tribe 1s young people did not even know how to use a bow and 
arrow for hunting. Without French or English muskets, powder 
and balls, their people would go hungry and naked.
Although understanding the Indians' plight, Beau­
champs informed them that French traders would no longer 
serve them if to do so would place their lives in jeopardy. 
Some leaders acknowledged that Red Sock had been wrong to 
kill the traders, and stated that he had fled with some of 
his followers. Other leaders declared that if the French 
would not provide for their needs, they would turn to the 
English, for they had to have the white man's goods to 
survive. Alabama Mingo, the leader from Kunshak Village, 
led the faction of eastern villages which seemed to favor 
the French even when the Louisianians had few supplies for 
them. How sincere expressions of loyalty such as his were 
remained uncertain. And yet, Beauchamps felt confident that
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there were some elements of the Choctaw tribe which pre­
ferred the Louisianians to any English trader, considering 
them to be allies who could be relied on in times of need.30
Within a month after Beauchamps' departure from 
Choctaw territory, M. Hazeur, the commanding officer at Fort 
Tombigbee, reported to Louboey at Mobile that some of the 
Choctaw were taking steps to punish those Indians responsible 
for the deaths of the French traders. A rumor, confirmed by 
Father Beaudouin, circulated that the home of one of Red 
Sock's chief advisor had been burned by Choctaw who were 
allies of the French.31 Governor Vaudreuil was pleased to 
hear that at least some members of the tribe were demon­
strating their loyalty to the French. The Governor naturally 
hoped that the pro-French Choctaw villages would prevail and 
that the English traders would not be welcomed anywhere in 
the tribe's territory.32
The French grew more optimistic about their alliance 
with the Choctaw during that winter, but they did not know 
that Red Sock and his followers had left for Carolina.
Through reports from scouts, traders and Indians, Governor
30Journal of M. Beauchamps' Trip to the Choctaw 
Villages from September 16, 1746 to October 16, 1746, AC, 
C13A 30, ff. 222-340 (v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, November 
26, 1746, ibid.. f. 128.
31Hazeur to Louboey, November 11, 1746, AC, C13A 30, 
ff. 183-86.
3^Vaudreuil to the Minister, November 20, 1746, 
ibid., ff. 80-84.
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James Glen of Carolina had already learned that the Choctaw 
were not at all happy with their trade dealings with the 
French.33 By April 1747, Red Sock, along with 50 of his 
followers, arrived in Charleston and requested an audience 
with the Governor. Not only were these Indians welcomed, 
they were given presents and were promised that traders 
would come to their villages. The gifts which they received 
valued at £ 1,200 and included muskets, ammunition, cloth, 
blankets, knives, beads and paint.^
Governor Glen learned more details about the Choctaw 
and their relations with the French from a French soldier 
who had deserted and fled Louisiana. The soldier, a M. de 
Lamtinac, had been stationed at Mobile for more than three 
years and at Fort Toulouse for five months before his 
desertion. Testifying before the Governor’s Council, he was 
asked among other things, the true position of Red Sock, who 
claimed to be a man of great importance in the tribe. 
Lamtinac replied that he believed Red Sock was the most 
influential of all the Choctaw chiefs, even though he prob­
ably did not have the status of the number one chief in the
33Governor James Glen to the Board of Trade, PRO, 
C.O. 5, 372, f. 35.
3^Journal of the Assembly, April 8, 1747, PRO, C.O. 
5, 454, f. 91; Journal of the Council, April 15, 1747, PRO, 
C.O. 5, 455, ff. 79-80; Journal of the Council, April 15, 
1747, ibid., ff. 49-50; Governor James Glen to the Board of 
Trade, April 28, 1747, PRO, C.O. 5, 371, f. 134(v).
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tribe.35
As far as the French were concerned, Red Sock repre­
sented a serious threat to their good relations with his 
tribe. Throughout the spring of 1747, Governor Vaudreuil 
held to the position that any further deliveries of powder 
or muskets to the Choctaw would not be forthcoming until the 
deaths of the French traders who had been murdered at Red 
Sock's order were properly avenged.88 The governor 
apparently wanted Red Sock and two of his followers executed. 
The French even offered a bounty of two pieces of limbourg 
cloth, 48 blankets, 10 guns, 4 pounds of vermilion, 100 
pounds of powder, 200 pounds of balls, 40 shirts and an 
assortment of trinkets for the chief's scalp.87 The French 
must have wanted the execution of Red Sock in order to "save 
face" before the Indians. However, Beauchamps feared a 
native civil war if these Indians' lives were taken. Never­
theless, the Choctaw sent word to Vaudreuil in early May 
that they would find the renegade chief and would deliver his 
head to the Governor as soon as possible.3®
35Journal of the Council, April 15, 1747, PRO, C.O. 
5, 455, ff. 80-82.
36Vaudreuil to the Minister, March 15, 1747, AC, 
C13A 31, ff. 17-19; M. Bobe Desclozeaux to the Minister, 
March 24, 1747, ibid.. f. 172.
37Joly de Fleury, ff. 34-35.
38Beauchamps to the Minister, March 20, 1747, AC, 
C13A 31, ff. 165-66(v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, May 10, 
1747, ibid., ff. 76-77(v).
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In the weeks that followed, many of the Choctaw from 
the villages near Fort Tombigbee searched for Red Sock. The 
last reports of his whereabouts stated that he was returning 
from Carolina with English traders and merchandise. Then, on 
the night of June 23, a young Choctaw warrior discovered Red 
Sock on the main trail from Carolina into Choctaw country 
and killed him along with the two English traders with whom 
he was traveling. He delivered the scalps of all three men 
to Governor Vaudreuil and claimed his reward.
Vaudreuil vainly hoped that these executions meant 
that the Carolinian traders would no longer be welcome into 
the Choctaw villages.39 Apparently, he and his associates 
still did not understand the division which still existed 
within the Choctaw tribe, that there were, indeed, many 
villages whose inhabitants preferred the English to the 
French. In fact, English traders estimated that about 40 
villages would welcome the Carolinians, and they urged 
Governor Glen to keep them supplied with trade goods. At Red 
Sock's death a close ally, Little Chief, succeeded him, and 
in the closing weeks of 1747, he began an attack on the pro- 
French Choctaw Indians. Thus, a civil war started among the 
Choctaw Indians.^0
39Vaudreuil to the Minister, September 17, 1747, 
ibid., ff. 98-101; Louboey to the Minister, February 16,
1748, AC, C13A 32, ff. 211-12; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 
November 5, 1748, ibid., f. 122.
^Journal of the Council, November 13, 1747, PRO,
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By the summer of 1748, Governor Vaudreuil and M.
Louboey at Mobile were finally aware of the great divisions
which existed among the Choctaw Indians. At this time they
had the loyalty of only four or five eastern bands with, as
the Anglo traders claimed, over 40 western villages being
pro-English. The Louisianians wanted the western villages
to talk peace, but when they became aware that these Indians
were receiving large munitions supplies from the English,
they must have feared that their prospects for peace were 
41poor.
The English effort to win over the Choctaw at this 
time was indeed impressive. As one example, a trader from 
Carolina, Charles McNaire, worked among the western villages 
in these years, supplying them with munitions and supplies.
In fact, he spent more than £ 1,700 of his own money on trade 
goods during 1747 when the Carolinian government officially 
had none to offer.42 Then, in the winter of 1748,r the 
English traders came to the western villages and gave out 
100 muskets, 800 pounds of powder and 1,600 pounds of bullets. 
And yet, despite their generosity, the Carolinians received
C.O. 5, 455, ff. 91-93; Journal of the Council, December 14, 
1747, PRO, C.O. 5, 456, ff. 10-12; James Glen to Charles 
McNaire, December 18, 1747, PRO, C.O. 5, 373, f. 26.
41Louboey to the Minister, February 16, 1748, AC,
C13A 32, f. 213; Vaudreuil to the Minister, June 4, 1748, 
ibid., ff. 81-81(v).
42Earl of Holdemesse to the Board of Trade, February 
7, 1752, PRO, C.O. 5, 373, ff. 15-15(v).
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reports in the fall that the strength of the French among 
the Choctaw was again growing, with eight additional vil­
lages having joined with the Louisianians. The reason for 
their change of allegiance was that supplies had arrived 
from France.4^
With these new supplies, the pro-French Choctaw 
faction engaged the English-allied Choctaw villages in several 
major battles that summer and fall. In July, Alabama Mingo 
led a force that attached and burned two western villages, 
Coenhchata and Neskoubou. Several important leaders and war 
chiefs of the pro-English faction died in the raid. The 
western villages attempted a counter offensive against 
Kunshak and the villages surrounding it in August, but the 
pro-French Choctaw of the eastern towns were ready and 
successfully defended their territory. The headman of the 
western Indians, a Captain Boufou was killed along with at 
least 80 of his braves. The eastern villages lost only 13 
men in the engagement.44 As a result of this fighting, by 
the fall of 1748 most of Red Sock's family had been killed 
and many of the villages loyal to him were in ashes, the 
people homeless. The additional munitions which the English
^Governor James Glen to the Board of Trade, July 
26, 1748, PRO, C.O. 5, 385, ff. 153(v)-54, 157; Governor 
James Glen to the Board of Trade, October 10, 1748, PRO, 
C.O. 5, 372, ff. 77-78.
44Vaudreuil to the Minister, November 5, 1748, AC, 
C13A 32, ff. 124(v)-25(v).
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traders had promised in the spring had not arrived, and thus 
these Indians were unable to defend themselves against the 
superior fighting power of the French-supported Choctaw.
Faced with the possibility of total annihilation, a 
delegation from the western towns set out with John Campbell, 
a trader from Carolina, to ask Governor Glen for more sup­
plies. The winter months provided the perfect opportunity 
for such a mission since this was not the season for war.^5 
The delegation reached Charleston in early January, 1749. 
With Campbell serving as their interpreter, the Indians met 
with the Governor and Council to plead for additional aid. 
All of the munitions which the English had sent the previous 
winter, they stated, had been used, and not having been 
resupplied over the summer, their losses had been great that 
year because they had run out of weapons. Throughout the 
time that they remained in Charleston the Indians conducted 
themselves badly, and their behavior worsened as the days 
passed. Several times they were too drunk to appear before- 
the Council. The Governor, nevertheless, promised them more 
traders with supplies and sent them away at the end of the 
month, complaining that their visit had cost the government
45Beauchamps to the Minister, October 24, 1748, ibid., 
f. 215(v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, November 5, 1748, ibid., 
ff. 130-31(v); Vaudreuil and D'Auberville to the Minister, 
November 10, 1748, ibid.. ff. 24(v)-25; Journal of the 
Council, December 20, 1748, PRO, C.O. 5, 457, ff. 23.
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entirely too much money.46
The French government was not pleased with the amount 
of money which it was having to spend on the eastern Choctaw 
in order to keep them supplied in the war against their 
fellow tribesmen and maintain their attachment to the 
French.4^ And yet, Vaudreuil's efforts to supply the pro- 
French Choctaw were paying off, for when spring came and the 
war resumed with even greater intensity than before the 
eastern villages scored new victories. Although hopeful 
that these successes would continue, the Louisiana governor 
feared that his supplies would not be sufficient when he 
learned that English traders were arriving almost daily at 
the western Choctaw villages.48
Vaudreuil's fears proved to be unfounded, for the 
unceasing attacks and steady pressure of the eastern Choctaw 
in the summer months finally forced the western leaders to 
ask for peace. The destruction and devastation of the 
western villages was terrible, their precious c o m  crop was 
destroyed and famine threatened the people. By the end of
46Journal of the Council, January 7, 1749, PRO,
C.O. 5, 457, ff. 14-15; Journal of the Council, January 9, 
1749, ibid., ff. 15-16; Journal of the Council, January 11, 
1749; ibid., f. 21; Journal of the Council, January 20,
1749, ibid., f. 43; Journal of the Council, January 25,
1749, ibid., f. 62.
4^Minister to Vaudreuil and Michel, February 14,
1949, AC, B 89, ff. 352-52(v); Minister to Vaudreuil, Febru­
ary 14, 1749, AC, C13A 40, ff. 353-53(v).
48Vaudreuil to the Minister, May 8, 1749, AC, C13A 
33, ff. 49-52.
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the summer of 1749 more than 100 scalps and the heads of 
three western chiefs had been presented to Governor Vaud­
reuil. In the preliminary peace which was arranged among 
the Choctaw, the western leaders agreed to drive all the 
English traders out of their villages. This peace did not 
last because, unfortunately, some of the warriors from the 
West continued to attack the eastern towns intermittently, 
and it was not until the fall that serious peace negotia­
tions began. The Governor was anxious for these discus­
sions to succeed, for the colony did not want its allies to 
destroy each o t h e r . E v e n  the Ministry of Marine realized 
that the Choctaw people had suffered and must be tired of 
war.50
When it began to appear as though the matters at 
issue between the two sides would never be settled, Governor 
Vaudreuil received news in early 17 50 that the western 
villages not only were ready to agree to terms, but had even 
begun killing English traders as well. Still the fighting 
continued sporadically throughout the summer of 1750, but 
then, following a very bloody offensive that fall, the
49vaudreuil to the Minister, September 22, 1749, 
ibid., ff. 79-81? Vaudreuil to the Minister, September 22,
1749, ibid.. ff. 86(v)-87.
50Vaudreuil to the Minister, February 1, 1750, AC, 
C13A 34, ff. 251-55? Vaudreuil to the Minister, June 24,
1750, ibid., ff. 261-64? Michel to the Minister, July 2, 
1750, ibid., ff. 315-16? Minister to Vaudreuil, September 
30, 1750, AC, B 91, ff. 401-401(v).
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western villages at last begged for peace. The terms 
dictated by the eastern Choctaw at Fort Tombigbee and 
accepted by the western towns on November 15, 1750, stipu­
lated: (1) any Indian involved in killing a Frenchman in the
future must die; (2) any Choctaw who brought an English 
trader into a village must die, along with the trader; (3) 
the Choctaw would unite to war on the Chickasaw; and (4) the 
rebel villages would destroy their forts and surrender any 
prisoners they had taken in the war.51 Thus, ended the 
civil war which had lasted for three years.
Although everyone welcomed the end to the Choctaw 
intra-tribal hostilities, Louisiana officials, as always, 
knew that sufficient merchandise for trade and for the 
annual present-giving ceremony would be needed to maintain 
cordial relations between the French and the Indians. Even 
though the Choctaw had proclaimed their loyalty to Louisiana 
and promised to expel the English, both the Indians and the 
whites knew that the red men needed the manufactured wares 
which the traders brought. It was still true that, regard­
less of treaty promises if the French could not supply the 
Choctaw leaders, the Indians would have to trade with the 
English.
It should be recalled that from 1744 to 1748, the War 
of the Austrian Succession which was raging in Europe
^Vaudreuil to the Minister, January 12, 1751, AC, 
C13A 35, ff. 61-63(v).
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had interfered with the supplying of France's North American 
colonies.52 The full impact of the shortages of goods that 
resulted was not felt by Louisiana, however, because of the 
disruption of the fur trade with the Choctaw caused by the 
tribe's civil war.
However, shortages of supplies, along with the new 
trade regulations from France, strained the bonds of friend­
ship with the Choctaw even more. In April 1749, a year and 
a half before the end of the Choctaw civil war, Honore 
Michel de la Rouvillere had arrived in Louisiana to serve 
as the colony's new commissaire ordonnateur.55 Suffering 
the usual culture shock that all new officials experienced 
when arriving in the colony, Michel had been quite appalled 
by the graft which he found among the commanding officers at 
the various posts. During the years of the War of the 
Austrian Succession, a new regulation for the distribution 
of trade supplies had been initiated by the governor. It 
stipulated that each post commander, acting as a clerk, was 
to oversee the supply store at the fort and was to sell the 
merchandise to local traders. In order to make a profit for 
himself, the commandant had illegally raised the prices on 
the items which, of course, meant that the traders had 
passed the increase on to the Indians. Such graft, of
52See pp. of this chapter.
^Michel to the Minister, September 25, 1749, AC,
C13A 34, f. 206(v).
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course, had stifled the growth of the trade. Michel recom­
mended to the governor that the whole supply operation be 
centered in New Orleans in order to discourage the corrup­
tion which was rampant.54
As far as Michel could determine, the abuses at Fort 
Tombigbee, the supply center for the Choctaw trade, were 
among the worst in the entire colony. It was costing the 
colony more than 50,000 livres a year to maintain the post. 
The traders to the Choctaw had debts of more than 40,000 
livres, with the officer at the post, a former trader him­
self, owing more than 25,000 livres to the King's supply 
store. Governor Vaudreuil agreed with Michel that Fort 
Tombigbee's expenses had gotten out of hand. Nevertheless, 
he also felt that it was important to maintain the post at 
least until the Choctaw civil war was over and the tribe's 
full allegiance to the French was reestablished.55 Governor 
Vaudreuil realized, as well, that a good French foothold in 
Choctaw territory was necessary, since, as has been noted 
earlier, the English traders continued to come to the western 
villages throughout the war.56
The English supply system was like that which Michel
54Michel to the Minister, August 20, 1749, ibid., 
ff. 134 (v) -42 (v) .
55Ibid.. f. 137; Michel to the Minister, August 20, 
1749, ibid., ff. 141-41(v); Vaudreuil to the Minister, 
September 24, 1750, ibid.. ff. 272(v)-74(v).
55Vaudreuil to the Minister, January 12, 1751, AC, 
C13A 35, f. 62(v).
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recommended that the French adopt. Under it the Carolina 
traders obtained their merchandise from a central warehouse 
in Charleston.5  ̂ Through their superior trading system, the 
English traders were again active among the Choctaw tribe by 
1751. Two of these traders were Charles McNaire, already 
mentioned, and a Mr. Petticrewe. At about the same time 
that Governor Vaudreuil was requesting supplies from the 
French government for his empty storehouses, the Assembly 
and Council of Carolina approved £ 1,000 in trade merchandise 
for Petticrewe and promised additional goods as soon as it 
became possible to provide them.5®
With the French and the English competing for the 
dominant position in their fur trade, the Choctaw continued 
to play up to both groups of traders. Knowing that Governor 
Vaudreuil wanted a final end to the Chickasaw tribe, the 
Choctaw leaders also continued to bring a few token scalps 
to Mobile when they went to receive their presents. Satis­
fied that the Louisiana governor had been convinced of their 
loyalty, they then returned home to receive the English 
traders who had arrived in their absence. Although Governor
5?A List of Merchandise for the Louisiana Indian 
Trade, 1750, AC, C13A 33, ff. 228-30; Minutes of the Council, 
August 4, 1749, PRO, C.O. 5 459, ff. 587-88.
58Vaudreuil to the Minister, May 28, 1751, AC, C13A 
35, ff. 151-52; Journal of the Council, August 6, 1751, PRO, 
C.O. 5 464, ff. 214-16.
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Vaudreuil wanted to believe in the loyalty of the Choctaw, 
he suspected them of double-dealing.59
However much they may have wanted to be loyal only 
to the French, so dependent were the Choctaw on the white 
m a n 's wares that they dealt with any white trader who came 
to their villages. The fur trade, in turn, was so important 
to the economies of both the Louisianians and the Carolin­
ians that their governments continued to send their traders 
to the Choctaw despite their duplicity.
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GOVERNOR LOUIS BILLOUART DE KEKLEREC AND 
THE CHOCTAW INDIANS, 1753-1762
With the appointment of Louis Billouart de Kerlerec 
to the position of governor of Louisiana in 1752, the final 
phase of the French rule of the colony began. About a year 
after Kerlerec's arrival in Louisiana, the Seven Years War 
broke out in Europe, a result of which was the loss of 
Louisiana as a colony of the French empire. The traditional 
problems which had plagued the colony for more than 50 years, 
specifically a shortage of money and supplies, reached 
catastrophic proportions in the war years. That Louisiana 
after all these years still relied so heavily on the mother 
country's supply ships became even more apparent in these 
years of isolation which the war brought. The scarcity of 
goods during this time affected both the white and Indian 
populace in the colony.
In his orders to Kerlerec issued prior to his depar­
ture for Louisiana in the fall of 1752, the king emphasized 
the importance of keeping peace with the Indians in the 
colony. The orders named the Choctaw specifically as the
351
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tribe who should be kept as allies of the French.'1'
Shortly after Kerlerec1s arrival in New Orleans in 
January, 1753, Governor Vaudreuil took the new official on 
an inspection tour of the area surrounding the capital as 
well as that near Mobile Bay. When Kerlerec returned to New 
Orleans in the latter part of February, he found seven 
Choctaw chiefs from western villages waiting for him. For 
two days these Indian leaders gave speeches to greet the new 
governor while Vaudreuil and Kerlerec saw to it that the 
chiefs were properly entertained. These ceremonies ended 
with an exchange of gifts at which time Kerlerec told the 
chiefs he would see them again in Mobile that summer.
Because the western tribes had been the center of Choctaw 
opposition to the French, according to Vaudreuil, Kerlerec 
was greatly encouraged that some of the chiefs from this 
area had come to greet him.^
The meeting in Mobile which Kerlerec promised the 
western Choctaw in February finally took place in June. 
Honoring the gathering with his presence was Alabama Mingo, 
the highly regarded Choctaw leader whom the French had known 
for more than 20 years. He and several chiefs from the
1-Memoir of the King to M. de Kerlerec, Governor of 
Louisiana, October 17, 1752, Archives des Colonies, 895, f. 
342 (Archives Nationales, Paris, France), hereinafter cited 
as AC.
2Kerlerec to the Minister, March 8, 1753, AC, C13A 
37, ff. 36-36(v).
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eastern villages were anxious to meet this new white leader. 
The ceremonies went well. One of the most important results 
of the talks was the promise of the Choctaw to capture and 
return all French deserters, rather than to help them escape. 
This problem had always plagued the colony. Whether these 
Indians would live up to their word was not known. However, 
they were at least making friendly overtures.3
By the end of the summer, just before the harvest, 
members from all 50 Choctaw villages had come to Mobile to 
meet with Kerlerec. The governor discussed the quarrels and 
disputes which continued among factions of the tribe and 
urged peace. In the course of the talks, Kerlerec learned 
that the root of their disagreement was the old question 
whether to trade with the French or with the English. 
Although the tribal leaders insisted that they preferred the 
French to the English, they acknowledged that they felt 
forced to deal with whomever could supply them with the 
cloth, muskets and powder they had to have for survival. 
Kerlerec promised them supplies and, indeed, impressed them 
so favorably that before their departure they gave him an 
Indian name, Youlaktimakacha, which meant "greatest man of 
the first race."4
3Kerlerec's Report on the Choctaw Visit to Mibile, 
June, 1753, ibid.. ff. 62-63(v).
4Kerlerec to the Minister, August 20, 1753, ibid., 
ff. 66-70(v).
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Convinced of the sincerity of their protestations of 
friendship, Kerlerec urged the Ministry of Marine to send 
more merchandise for this tribe. He felt very strongly that 
if the Choctaw were regularly supplied, they would run the 
English out of Louisiana territory within three years.^ 
Kerlerec also believed that Fort Tombigbee should be main­
tained no matter how great the expense. Located within the 
Choctaw country, the fort represented to the English the 
French foothold in the area as well as the French interest 
in the Indians.^
Unfortunately, Kerlerec's inexperience with Indians 
was reflected in his miscalculations of their loyalty. At a 
meeting with the Choctaw at Mobile in the fall of 1753, the 
new governor had no gifts on hand nor adequate trade mer­
chandise to offer. His shock and surprise when these 
leaders immediately announced their intentions to go to the 
English for help revealed to all his naivete.7 Obviously, 
he would have to have more to give the Indians than mere 
friendly greetings and good wishes. The commissaire 
ordonnateur at that time, a M. Auberville, realized that 
more supplies would be needed for the assemblies of 1754,
5Ibid.. ff. 68-68(v).
6Ibid.. f. 70(v).
7Kerlerec to the Minister, March 28, 1754, AC, C13A 
38, ff. 48-49(v).
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and requested the government in France to send merchandise.8
With the decline of Chickasaw strength following 
their wars with the French, the Carolinians began to fear 
for their backcountry borders. To secure their western 
frontier, as well as to try to win the Choctaw trade away 
from the French, the English induced several of their allies, 
namely, the Abeka, the Tala and the Kouaita, to make a 
number of raids on eastern Choctaw villages throughout the 
summer of 1754. Fortunately for the French, the attacks 
resulted in no major losses for the Choctaw.9
More than 2,000 Choctaw visited Governor Kerlerec 
that fall in Mobile. Although quite costly to the Louisiana 
government, these meetings had their value. Kerlerec 
learned more about the attacks of the pro-English tribes on 
the Choctaw from the medal chiefs who spoke for the various 
groups who visited Mobile. Their plans to retaliate by 
means of a full-scale war on these Indian friends of the 
English to the east did not please the governor at all.^8
Interestingly enough, when South Carolina's leaders 
learned of the Seven Years War in Europe they became more
8Bobe Descloseaux to the Minister, June 16, 1754, 
ibid., ff. 195-95(v); Auberville to the Minister, July 6, 
1754, ibid., ff. 156(v)-57; Expenditures for Louisiana, 1754, 
ibid.. f. 221.
9Kerlerec to the Minister, June 22, 1754, ibid., ff. 
76-77; Kerlerec to the Minister, September 15, 1754, ibid., 
ff. 99-101.
■^Kerlerec to the Minister, December 18, 1754, ibid., 
ff. 122-29.
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concerned than ever about their border defenses. Not only 
had they failed to break the Choctaw ties with the French, 
but they also received word that the Upper Creek villages 
had become more friendly towards the French in recent months. 
In fact, by the fall of 1755, a peace treaty had been nego­
tiated by the French between the Choctaw and the Upper 
Creeks. There was also a rumor circulating in Carolina that 
a large number of troops had arrived in Mobile the previous 
year. Thus, the English began to fear an invasion of their 
colony by a substantial Louisiana force which would consist 
not only of Frenchmen but also of many native allies.^
At the same time that the English feared a French 
offensive, the Louisianians believed that theirs was the 
more vulnerable position. Rumors of English plans to take 
over the Wabash River, and then the entire Illinois country, 
were widespread. Throughout the winter of 1755-1756,
Kerlerec heard that bounties had been placed on the heads of 
French traders. In an effort to exert even greater influ­
ence, the English were dispensing huge quantities of gifts 
to the Indians along Louisiana's eastern border.
As pessimistic as was Kerlerec's dispatch to the 
Minister of Marine reporting these rumors in April 1756, he
■^Journal of the Council of the Colony of Carolina, 
September 16, 1755, Colonial Office Papers 5, 471, f. 350
(Public Record Office, London, England), hereinafter cited 
as PRO, C.O. 5, Journal of the Council; Journal of the 
Council, September 17, 1755, ibid., f. 353.
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seemed to feel that French relations with the Cherokee were 
g o o d . 12 B y  the end of that year, Kerlerec had nearly com­
pleted a treaty with the Cherokee. If this arrangement 
should succeed, the Louisianians would have not only this 
great tribe of more than 30,000 natives as friends, but they
could also count many of the Creek Indians among their 
1allxes. J At least for the moment, the Louisianians believed 
that these natives could be depended on to fight for the 
French.
Indeed, these Indians, perhaps, did prefer the 
French; however, in these war years, the English traders had 
the merchandise that the natives desired. For example, in 
May, 1755, a private trader, John Beswick, the leader of an 
important group of traders, requested and was granted from 
the Carolina Assembly more than 17,000 pounds of gunpowder 
for trading with the colony's Indian allies.^ The leading 
Indian agent for the colony of Georgia in these years,
William Little, received for trade and negotiations with the 
Indians numerous items— calico, vermilion, shirts, coats,
12Kerlerec to the Minister, October 1, 1755, AC,
C13A 39, ff. 35-35 (v); Kerlerec to the Minister, April 1, 
1755, ibid., ff. 149-52.
l3Govemor James Glen to the Board of Trade, April 
14, 1756, PRO, C.O. 5, 375, ff. 102-(v)-103(v); Kerlerec to 
the Minister, December 13, 1756, ibid., ff. 194-96(v).
Bagdoni to the Board of Trade, PRO, C.O. 5,
375, f. 94.
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serge, muskets, flints, powder and balls— as well as the 
trinkets which the Indians liked— combs, rings, beads, 
jews-harps and bells.15 So successfully did the English 
continue to trade with the Indians of the Alabama area that 
they were planning to establish new trade centers. For­
tunately for the French, the Louisiana influence at Ft. 
Toulouse was still great, for the Kouaita Indians expelled 
some English traders who had begun a new installation in 
their territory.15
What is interesting in these years of apparent 
growth of English activity among the Indians from both Caro­
lina and Georgia was the ability of Louisiana to retain the 
allegiance of its native allies. It did so even though for 
nearly three years the colony received few, if any, supplies 
for trade. Kerlerec was especially concerned about the 
Choctaw's loyalty to the French in the face of these supply 
shortages. How long the French could maintain the support 
of these people remained uncertain. By the spring of 1757,
15A List of Merchandise Granted by Governor John 
Reynolds' Order to William Little from December 16, 1755 
to February 15, 1757, PRO, C.O. 5, 646, ff. 71(v)-72(v).
16Kerlerec to the Minister, April 1, 1756, AC, 
C13A 39, ff. 152-54? Kerlerec to the Minister, June 1, 
1756, ibid., ff. 170-70(v).
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the Choctaw were threatening to defect to the English who 
could supply them.17 During the remaining months of 1757 
and the first part of 1758, the colonists' stores dwindled 
to all-time lows. By mid-August of 1758, Kerlerec reported 
having only a few pieces of limbourg cloth to trade or give 
the Choctaw. The situation was indeed becoming serious, for 
both the Choctaw and the Alabama tribes were now dealing with 
the English traders. The governor had also received the bad 
news that two French traders had been tomahawked in Choctaw 
country in July. English encouragement, he believed, had 
caused this act of treachery.1®
When the situation appeared to have deteriorated to 
its lowest point, especially with the deaths of the French 
traders, a supply ship arrived from France. Kerlerec dis­
patched messengers immediately to the Choctaw country with 
news of the arrival of the merchandise and an invitation to 
a meeting at Mobile in the fall. The gifts, presented with 
suitable ceremony, pacified the Choctaw, for by the end of
17D 'Auberville to the Minister, April 14, 1755, AC, 
C13A 39, f. 78(v); Expenses for Louisiana for 1756: Indian
Goods, ibid., f. 93(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, June 26, 
1755, ibid., ff. 14-14(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, June 
28, 1755, ibid., f. 23? Kerlerec to the Minister, December 
12, 1756, ibid., ff. 190-91; Duplessis to the Minister, 
January 25, 1757, ibid., f. 302(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, 
February 4, 1757, AC, C13A 41, ff. 168-68(v); Kerlerec to 
the Minister, March 13, 1757, AC, C13A 39, ff. 258-59? 
Kerlerec to the Minister, May 13, 1757, ibid., ff. 264-65; 
Kerlerec to the Minister, October 21, 1757, ibid., ff.
277-78.
18Kerlerec to the Minister, August 12, 1758, AC,
C13A 40, ff. 31(v)-32.
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that year the governor felt more confident about Choctaw 
loyalty.19
Even though the governor wrote that the Choctaw 
still favored the French, Kerlerec was not completely con­
vinced of the strength of French influence with this tribe. 
He had heard reports from Ft. Toulouse and Ft. Tombigbee 
about the growing pressure on the Choctaw Indians from the 
Chickasaw tribe who were arguing that a Choctaw alliance 
with the English would assure them of all the goods they 
n e e d e d .20 These reports were accurate, for the prominent 
English trader to the Chickasaw, John Buckells, had indeed 
been encouraging the Chickasaw to raid Choctaw hunting 
parties and villages during 1758 as a means of detaching 
them from the French. By December 17, this agent reported 
to Carolina officials that a peace had been arranged between 
the Choctaw and the Chickasaw when the proper offerings of a 
white flag, white beads, tobacco and pipes had been accepted 
by the leaders of the Choctaw people.21
The English continued to make inroads among the 
Indians who were friends of the French. Kerlerec had not 
only already heard in late 1758 of English plans to build
l9Ibid., ff. 32(v)-33(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, 
December 25, 1758, ibid.. f. 170.
20Kerlerec to the Minister, December 20, 1758, AC, 
C13A 40, ff. 166-66(v).
21John Buckells to Jerome Courtanne, May 1, 1758, 
PRO, C.O. 5, 376, ff. 119-20.
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additional forts on their western borders, but he had also 
learned that English traders were spreading stories among 
the red men about the Louisianians and their evil intentions 
towards the Indians.^2 Any doubts he may have had about the 
veracity of these reports were dispelled by the spring of 
1759 at which time he recognized the growing Choctaw disaf­
fection and disinterest in the French.
The governor should have been discouraged about the 
colony's Indian relations, for the ships which arrived in 
New Orleans late in 1758 and in January, 1759 contained 
ruined cargo. More than 6,000 yards of limbourg, 4,370 
blankets, 3,390 trade shirts and 40,000 pounds of gunpowder 
had been included in the shipment, all of which was meant 
for the Indians. Kerlerec called the Indians to come to 
receive the new supplies. Unfortunately, in his haste, the 
governor failed to inspect the contents of the ship before 
issuing his invitation. When they were examined it was 
discovered that most had been destroyed by worms.^ A small 
quantity of relatively undamaged goods was given to the 
Choctaw.
Following this catastrophe, the governor learned 
that the English, having secured the Choctaw as allies,
22Kerlerec to the Minister, December 1, 1758, AC, 
C13A 40, ff. 112(v)-14(v).
^ K e r l e r e c  to the Minister, December 3, 1758, ibid., 
ff. 119-21; Rochemore to the Minister, January 4, 1759, AC, 
C13A 41, ff. 164-64(v).
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planned to use their 4,000 warriors to invade Louisiana from 
the east. The main objective of the English invasion was to 
be New Orleans which was to be attacked from the sea as well 
as overland. To Kerlerec it looked as though all the efforts 
of the French to retain the attachment of this tribe had 
been for nought.24
The summer of 1759 was indeed a depressing one for 
the governor of Louisiana. The New Orleans summer, always 
so hot and humid, was made worse by sickness among the 
colonists and a shortage of supplies for them as well as for 
the Choctaw. However, spirits rose in the fall when M. Jean 
Bossu, a traveler in the Choctaw country, reported from Ft. 
Tombigbee that these Indians were proclaiming their loyalty 
to the French. Leaders of this tribe had also given Bossu 
the impression that they would assist the French if Louisiana 
chose to invade either Georgia or South Carolina.^
Governor Kerlerec apparently doubted Bossu's opti­
mistic report, for he wrote the Minister of Marine that both 
the Alabama and the Choctaw tribes were dealing with English 
traders. He did not have even enough gunpowder for the 
colonial militia and he, therefore, found it impossible to
24Kerlerec to the Minister, April 24, 1759, ibid., 
ff. 16-16(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, May 6, 1759, ibid., 
ff. 51-52.
25N. Bo s s u , Travels through that part of North 
America formerly called Louisiane (2 vols.; London, 1778),
II, 142.
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continue to provide any to the Choctaw and the Alabama 
Indians.2® in spite of their seeming disaffection with the 
poor Louisianians, by the end of the year the Alabama were 
reported to have killed some English traders, and the Choc­
taw were once again making overtures to the French.
The chief means by which the French had retained the 
allegiance of the Choctaw tribe over the years had been the 
fur trade. With the outbreak of the war in Europe, this 
enterprise had been greatly disrupted. One historian, Nancy 
Miller Surrey, has argued that Kerlerec did an excellent job 
in sustaining Indian participation in the trade in the 
"trying times" of war.2® The governor had wanted the com­
manding officers at the various posts to direct the trade, 
with the supplies for the trade being provided by the colonial 
government or by private individuals who would secure their 
merchandise from New Orleans. In the Louisiana tradition of 
the fur trade, however, the operation continued to be run in 
a very haphazard fashion. Indeed, the abuses of the local 
officials continued even into the final days of the French 
regime. As a result of this situation, the Indians suffered
^Kerlerec to the Minister, December 8, 1759, AC, 
C13A 41, ff. 147(v)-48(v).
27Kerlerec to the Minister, June 12, 1760, AC, C13A 
42, ff. 50-52(v).
2®Nancy Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana 
during the French Regime (New York, 1916), 363-65.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm is s io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p roh ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
3 6 4
greatly, always having to pay higher prices for French 
merchandise than for English goods.29
Governor Kerlerec was not alone in recognizing the 
abuses which existed in the conduct of the fur trade. 
Vincent-Gaspart-Pierre de Rochemore, the colony's commis- 
saire ordonnateur from 1758 to 1761, suspected even in his 
first months in the colony that corruption in the trade was 
the greatest at Ft. Tombigbee, the central post for the 
Choctaw trade.39 In March of 1759, Rochemore reported to 
the Minister regarding this activity at Ft. Tombigbee,
" . . .  over the last six years, there have been three com­
mandants at Tombigbee and the first one still has not 
explained to the King why the trade deficit there is so 
great. . . . "31 This official was never able to understand 
the looseness of the fur trade operation in Louisiana. 
Officials had tried for years to set up rates of exchange of 
merchandise for the Indians' furs. Rochemore himself 
attempted such a price fixing effort in 1761." However, in
29Kerlerec to the Minister, May 4, 1753, AC, C13A 
37, ff. 50-51(v); Rochemore to Kerlerec, October 19, 1761, 
AC, C13B 1, ff. 295 (v)-96.
"Rochemore to the Minister, October 5, 1758, AC, 
C13A 40, ff. 187-87(v).
3lRochemore to the Minister, March 6, 1759, AC, C13A 
41, ff. 186-86(v).
" R o c h e m o r e  to the Minister, October 15, 1761, AC 
C13A 42, ff. 273-75(v).
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Louisiana's last years as a French colony, when a full-scale 
war was on in Europe causing a scarcity of goods, the
traders could not be kept from cheating the Indians.
However corrupt and inefficient its conduct, it is 
quite possible that the fur trade had caused near chaos and 
anarchy among the Choctaw by this time. Very much a nation
of farmers in 1700, for more than 60 years these Indians had
traded with the French becoming increasingly dependent upon 
their goods. As a result, they had undergone a technological 
revolution, moving from the Stone Age to the Iron Age. This 
radical change had altered, perhaps even broken the cultural 
fiber of the tribe.
What did such a dependence on European trade goods 
do to the tribal structure? It was stated in the early 
chapters of this work that the Choctaw Indians had a matri- 
lineal rather than a patrilineal kinship system,33 which 
means that the woman1s family and property dominated. Among 
the Choctaw Indians in the eighteenth century the women 
owned all the land,34 and until 1700, the land and its 
fruits provided the economic base for the society. Some 
anthropologists have argued that with the advent of the fur 
trade the economic base of native societies was altered 
so great an extent that it affected the societal structure
33see Chapter I, pp. 8-9.
34Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage (New York, 1967), 
99-100? Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville. 
1976).
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of the tribe. When, for example, men began to hunt for furs 
rather than farm, they were absent more from the village and 
needed food stores for the hunt. This meant that more women 
became involved in farming to provide for the hunters. 
Gradually, as cultural dependence grew, the hunter, by way 
of his musket, assumed the role of providing for the tribe 
rather than the squaw whose lands had served as the basis of 
the tribe's livelihood in former generations. Thus, the 
skins which the men secured and which brought iron products 
and, therefore, cultural change, now contributed more 
significantly and more directly to the households of the 
women rather than the crops from the lands of the w o m e n . 35 
Of course the Indians' records are silent regarding 
their intra-tribal workings. And yet, their activities in 
the later years of the French regime indicate that just such 
sociological changes did occur among the Choctaw. The civil 
war which broke out among these Indians in the 17401s 
divided the tribe between western, pro-English, villages and 
the eastern, pro-French, villages. Why this division 
occurred is uncertain. However, it is possible, even prob­
able, that the western villages, which were closer geo­
graphically to the Chickasaw, traded with these Indians, 
receiving from them English merchandise, and became more
35See Harold Hickerson, "Fur Trade Colonialism and 
the North American Indian," The Journal of Ethnic Studies,
I (1973), 15-44.
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culturally dependent at an earlier date. The women and 
their lands in the western villages, therefore, probably 
declined in importance sooner than those to the east. The 
eastern villages, loyal to the French, having less consistent 
access to European goods (the French having less merchandise), 
would have continued for a longer time in their traditional 
way.
In 1746 during M. Beauchamps' visit to the Choctaw, 
he learned from some of the chiefs that the younger men of 
the tribe could not use a bow and arrow, and, therefore, had 
to have muskets.36 Obviously, the Indian men could no 
longer provide food and clothing for their families without 
guns. One step further, however, would have been the loss 
of status by the men, a status which had grown out of their 
new role as hunter and providers. Seen in this light, it is 
not at all surprising that the Choctaw, as well as other 
Indians of the Southeast, tried desperately to trade with 
any white man, whether French, English or even Spanish.37
Of course, the leaders and officers of French Louisi­
ana under Governor Kerlerec would not have understood the 
significance of a tribe's societal changes. However, even 
had officials of this regime notice such alterations, they 
would not have commanded much attention in the face of the
36See Chapter XII, p. 336.
37Kerlerec to the Minister, July 12, 1761, AC, C13A 
42, ff. 229-30; Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana, 364.
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bickering and infighting which occurred among the French 
colonial officials. The basis of this strife was the 
division of authority between the governor and commissaire 
ordonnateur, a weakness of the colonial system of France, 
and not unique to Louisiana.38 For example, Governor 
Kerlerec, accused by subordinates of trading with the 
English, in turn, accused Rochemore of graft.38 In the 
inevitable showdown which occurred before the Superior 
Council in 1759, the Kerlerec faction prevailed and had 
Rochemore recalled.40 Thus, the colony's problems failed to 
be addressed properly, even in these years of war and pos­
sible conquest by the enemy.
In spite of the quarrels and petty arguments, 
Governor Kerlerec did realize that with a war in Europe his 
colony especially needed native allies. To counter English 
activities among the tribes near Fort Toulouse, he urged the 
chiefs of the Alabama, Talapouche and Kaouita tribes to run 
the English out and to guard the borders from Carolinian
38Donald J. LeMieux, "The Office of 'commissaire 
ordonnateur' in French Colonial Louisiana: 1731-1762"
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1972), 107-18.
38D'Erneville to the Minister, March 15, 1760, AC, 
C13A 42, ff. 184-84 (v) ? Kerlerec to the Minister, December
8, 1759, AC, C13A 41, ff. 147-47(v).
48Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana, the French 
Domination (4 vols.; New Orleans, 1903), II, 84-87.
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infiltration.41 Of even greater importance to the protec­
tion of French Louisiana, however, was, as always, the 
securing of the Choctaw tribe as a firm ally. Throughout 
the spring of 1760, the governor welcomed members of the 
tribe to New Orleans with presents. Still numbering about 
3,000 warriors, Kerlerec hoped to sway these natives to 
attack all Anglos they met.4  ̂ Although the documents are 
vague concerning the quantities and kinds of merchandise 
distributed, Commissaire Ordonnateur Rochemore reported that 
more chan 18,000 livres in presents were distributed to the 
Alabama and Choctaw Indians in October of 1759.43 It should, 
therefore, have surprised no one that the Choctaw came to 
Mobile the following spring to meet with the governor. 
Kerlerec must have swayed most of the tribe, for by the end 
of the summer English scalps were being brought to Mobile 
regularly.44
Kerlerec did not confine his efforts to secure Indian 
allies to the traditional friends of the Louisianians. In
41Kerlerec to the Minister, June 12, 1760, AC, C13A 
42, ff. 48-50.
42A Meeting Concerning Trade with the Alabama 
Indians, June 24, 1760, ibid., ff. 61-62(v); Kerlerec to the 
Minister, March 30, 1760, ibid., 6 (v); Kerlerec to the 
Minister, March 30, 1760, ibid., ff. 24(v)-25.
43Rochemore to the Minister, June 22, 1760, AC, C13A 
42, ff. 108-11.
44Kerlerec to the Minister, July 25, 1760, ibid., 
f. 54 (v); Kerlerec to the Minister, August 4, 1760,~Ibxd., 
f. 60.
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1759 he finally managed to arrange a treaty with the Chero­
kee. One of the articles of the treaty urged the Cherokee 
to attack the Chickasaw, which they did in the spring of 
1760.45 Thus, despite the vulnerable position of Louisiana 
in terms of its weak military defenses, Governor Kerlerec 
felt more secure by the end of that year, believing that he 
had broken the English defenses with the friendship of the 
Cherokee.46
The English in both South Carolina and Georgia were 
very much aware of the growing influence of the French among 
the Indians of the Southeast. Carolinian officials esti­
mated that the French -could organize as many as 9,000 
warriors from the Choctaw, Cherokee and Creek tribes to 
march on the E n g l i s h . A n d  yet, when the English traders 
returned to Charleston and Savannah, they reported that the 
Choctaw were not at all united in their alliance with the 
French. According to those traders, only the tribe's 
leaders showed unfaltering loyalty to the Louisianians, with 
more than three-fourths of their people welcoming the English
45Articles of Peace between Louisiana and the 
Cherokee Tribe, 1760, PRO, C.O. 5, 375, ff. 188-91.
46Kerlerec to the Minister, June 12, 1760, AC, C13A 
42, f. 49(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, December 21, 1760, 
ibid., ff. 84-84(v).
4^William Bull to Colonel Montgomery, July 12, 1760, 
PRO, C.O. 5, 376, f. 212.
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and their merchandise.*^® With both the French and the 
English believing that the Choctaw favored them, it is quite 
possible that the tribal divisions between the eastern and 
the western villages still existed in 1760, the eastern 
towns being pro-French and the western group being pro- 
English.
Whatever the real divisions among the Choctaw were, 
over the next three years Governor Kerlerec was able through 
them to achieve a pretty secure defensive barrier against 
the English.^® Although the quantities of merchandise 
delivered to the Indians between 1760 and 1763 decreased 
somewhat, somehow the Governor saw to it that this tribe 
especially continued to be supplied.50 He was thus able to 
maintain to the end of the French period the alliance with 
the Choctaw which from the beginning had been the chief 
element in Louisiana's Indian policy.
4%enry Ellis to the Board of Trade, September 5, 
1760, PRO, C.O. 5, 648, f. 15; Henry Ellis to the Board of 
Trade, October 20, 1760, ibid., ff. 19-19(v); William Bull 
to the Board of Trade, November 18, 1760, PRO, C.O. 5, 377, 
f. 41; William Bull to the Board of Trade, December 17,
1760, ibid., f. 4 4 (v).
49Kerlerec to the Minister, June 8, 1761, AC, C13A 
42, ff. 218-19; Kerlerec to the Minister, June 24, 1762, AC, 
C13A 43, ff. 78-78(v); Kerlerec to the Minister, May 2,
!763, ibid., ff. 196-97.
50A List of Gifts and Merchandise Delivered to the 
Choctaw Indians for the Years 1759 and 1760, AC, C13A 43, 
ff. 406-407(v).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  co p y rig h t ow ner. F u rth e r  re p ro d u c tio n  p ro h ib ited  w ithou t p e rm iss io n .
CONCLUSION
By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, France lost most of 
her North American Empire to Spain and England. Included in 
the possessions ceded to Spain was the colony of Louisiana. 
The colonial venture of the French in Louisiana had not been 
very successful. The colony had the misfortune to be settled 
in a century in which the mother country was at war much of 
the time. From the first years of colonization in Louisiana 
during the War of the Spanish Succession to the final months 
of possession by France during the Seven Years War, Louisi­
ana received little governmental support and attention. One 
of the unhappy results of this neglect was that supplies for 
the settlers and their native allies were often lacking or 
of poor quality.
The colony had been fortunate, however, to have as 
its first leaders members of the Le Moyne family, especially 
Iberville and Bienville. These men realized the value of 
peaceful natives as well as loyal Indian allies to sustain a 
colonial venture. Having known the Indians of Canada and 
their receptivity to the white man's merchandise, the Le 
Moynes promoted from the beginning the natives ' dependence 
on French goods. As a result of this growing dependence on
372
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the white man's goods, a cultural revolution occurred among 
the Choctaw, Chickasaw and Natchez Indians, a revolution 
which took these people from the Stone Age into the Iroi.
Age. And, even though relations with these tribes suffered 
under the leadership of Cadillac, the Company of the Indies, 
PSrier and even Bienville in his last years, this cultural 
dependence grew.
Surprisingly the French managed to retain the loyalty 
of their Indian friends even though the English traders 
offered them a greater quantity of goods of better quality 
at lower prices in an effort to undermine the Franco-Indian 
alliance. The trading advantage of the English was somewhat 
nullified, however, because the English constantly encroached 
on the Indians' lands, whereas the French, in most instances, 
did not. The French, generally remained "on the edge" of 
the Indian country; that is to say, they stayed on or near 
the Gulf Coast or the Mississippi River. Those Frenchmen 
who penetrated the wilderness and the Indians1 lands almost 
always came not to settle, but to trade. The natives did 
not feel threatened by peddlers "just passing through," or 
by coureurs des bois who may have been half-breeds anyway, 
for these men had no intention of settling.
In the one place the French did settle near an Indian 
tribe, namely the Natchez, a massacre occurred in which over 
200 white people died and the Natchez nation was destroyed. 
The trouble between the Natchez and the French resulted from
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some other causes in addition to the French intrusion on the 
Indians' lands. Most important of these was an intra-tribal 
struggle between the leaders of the old traditional culture 
and newer elements which had recently been incorporated into 
the tribe. The effort of the Natchez to assimilate this new 
group at the same time that they were trying to adjust to 
the presence of the French in their midst created a situation 
which made it easy for hostilities between the French and 
the Indians to be provoked.
The allies of the Natchez in their wars with the 
French were the Chickasaw, a much larger and more powerful 
tribe. These Indians had also been allied with the English 
in Carolina virtually from the beginning of Louisiana's 
settlement. By the 1730's the French had adopted a policy 
of seeking to exterminate this great tribe. Although they 
never completely succeeded, the French, with their allies 
the Choctaw, did kill many Chickasaws and inflicted great 
hardship upon them.
The Choctaw were by far the most important of the 
native allies of the French, and they generally remained 
friendly to the Louisianians throughout the time that the 
colony belonged to France. They fought with the French r.ot 
only against the Chickasaw and Natchez, but also against the 
Spanish.
As was true in all cases of Indian-white contact, 
the Choctaw underwent important social and economic changes
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as a result of their relations with the French. They became 
the victims of their diseases, especially smallpox and 
typhoid fever, and of their liquor. They also became 
economically dependent upon the white man 1s goods. This 
dependence caused serious divisions within the tribe over 
who could best supply these goods, the French or the English. 
It also shifted the Choctaw's economic base from farming to 
hunting. The men, as hunters, became the tribe's providers 
of furs and skins through which the white man's merchandise 
was obtained. The women's role as farmers became rela­
tively less important.
The effect of the close association of the Choctaw, 
and even the Natchez, with the French and their reliance 
upon them for weapons or other merchandise was to change 
their entire culture. They, for instance, came increasingly 
to view time as linear rather than cyclical. Instead of 
living strictly in harmony with the seasons, they began to 
do things at other than the traditional times. Like the 
American frontiersmen, they began to war not only in the 
late spring or summer or early fall, but even during the 
winter. The Choctaw, for example, fought the Natchez in the 
winters of 1730 and 1731, and carried out campaigns against 
the Chickasaw in the winters of 1737 and 1740. No longer 
did these Indians spend their winter months making bows and 
arrows, as had been their long-established custom, for they 
now relied on the musket for fighting and hunting. The
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skins of the deer and other animals which were killed were 
no longer used exclusively for clothing. Most of them were 
exchanged with the French traders for European goods. The 
Indians soon learned to prefer cotton cloth to skins for 
clothing, and brass and iron pots to pottery for cooking and 
other domestic purposes. The status of women, while enhanced 
because of their role in preparing hides for the "market," 
was reduced with the lessened emphasis on their ownership 
of the land as the economy became more directed to hunting 
than to farming.
Thus, the "order of things" changed for the Indians 
as a result of their contact with the whites. Of course, 
the Choctaw, Chickasaw and Natchez of colonial Louisiana 
were not unique in undergoing this cultural transformation. 
They were like all of the aborigines of North America in 
their inability to resist the white man's technology and, to 
some degree at least, his linear view of time which called 
for an ever increasing control by man of his environment and 
the eventual destruction of the wilderness where alone the 
red man's culture could survive. Already in 1762 as France 
lost her control of the Mississippi Valley, the Indians' 
life in the wilderness had been disturbed so much that the 
Delaware Prophet was moved to declare, "We are walking as 
slaves," a cry which a Natchez chief had made nearly 40 
years earlier.
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An Account Showing the Quantity of Skins and Furs Imported Annually Into This 
Kingdom From Carolina: Christmas, 1698 to Christmas, 1715
Skins and Furs 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706
Bear black 17 19 1 35 6 47 — —
Beaver 1,436 1,486 451 2,724 489 , 540 25 258
Buck *g drest 31,004 11,454 38,486 40,424 50,749 ' 50,419 3,172 23,676
Buck drest — — 56 379 182 342 200 29
Buck & Doe undrest 12,324 10,679 12,544 8,843 6, 950 10,780 6,917 9,249
Cat 192 199 138 138 135 17 — ~
Elk — — — — 18 — —
Fisher — __ __ __ — — — —
Fitches ~ — — — 71 — — —
Fox 1,069 1,456 1,150 1,748 632 992 186 253
India deer drest __ — — — — — -- —
India deer % drest 21,160 — — — — ~ —
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Skins and Furs 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715
Elk — — — — — 14 — — —
Fisher ~ ~ 24 — — — — — —
Fitches — ~ — — — — — — —
Fox 397 — 101 29 36 71 8 5 26
India deer drest — — 117 — 266 — — — —
India deer % drest — — — — — — — — —
Leopard ~ — — — — — — — —
Martin — — 18 ~ — — — —
Minks untamed — — 12 — — — — — —
Moose — — — 1,363 — — — -- —
Musquash — — — — — — — — —
Otter 39 — 33 18 — 24 2 1 9
Raccoon 20 10 122 — — 3 — 7 —
Woodshock — — — _ _ — — — — —
Wolf untamed — 6 — - - - - —
Colonial Office Papers, 5,1265, f.
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